Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAO NARAIN SINGH (DEAD) BY L.RS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1993
BENCH:
VENKATACHALA N. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATACHALA N. (J)
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
CITATION:
1993 AIR 1557 1993 SCR (2) 969
1993 SCC (3) 60 JT 1993 (2) 610
1993 SCALE (2)400
ACT:
Land Acquisition:
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952. Ss. 7, 8--Acquisition of requisitioned
property--compensation--Determination of--Valuation of
land--Comparable Sales Method’--Held, when parties produce
evidence of sales of lands in the vicinity of acquired land;
’comparable sales method’ is a ’healthy criterion for
determining the market value.
Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act 1953--S.23(2) Solatium--To be
paid for land acquired under Requisitioning and Acquisition
Act, 1952 cannot be a benefit of solatium not available for
a land acquired under State Act.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent-Union of India requisitioned certain
properties of the land owner-appellant comprising a building
and 1,38,117.20 sq. yards of land appurtenant thereto and
acquired the same in May, 1967 under the provisions of the
Defence of India Act 1962. After the Defence of India Act
ceased to have its force, the Collector exercising the
powers under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act 1952 (the Act), offered to the appellant on
10.9.1968 a sum of Rs.5,32,594 as total compensation for the
acquired building and land. The appellant rejected the
offer as inadequate. Consequently, an arbitrator was
appointed under S.8(1) (b) of the Act. The appellant
claimed Rs.2,50,000 for the building and Rs.10 per sq. yard
for the acquired land as compensation.
The Arbitrator, by his award, fixed the market value at
Rs.2,50,000 of the building and Rs.7.50 per sq. yard of the
land and Rs.2,000 as damages for loss of access to
appellant’s unacquired land. Solatium at the rate of 15 per
cent on the market value of the land, and interest at the
rate of 6% per annum was also awarded. Two appeals one by
the land-owner seeking enhancement and the other by the
Union of India seeking reduction in the amount of
compensation-were filed before the High Court.
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The High Court dismissed the appeal of the land owner and
partly allowed that of the Union of India. It reduced the
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compensation to Rs.1,41,100 for the building and Rs.4 per
sq. yard for the land. Solatium at a uniform rate of 10 per
cent on the market value of the building and the land and
interest at 4% per annum was provided. Aggrieved, the land
owner riled the appeal by special leave.
The appellant contended that the High Court erred in not
awarding the compensation liable to be paid under s.8(3) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act inasmuch as the price
of the property determined by the High Court fell far short
of what the property would have fetched if it had been sold
in the open market on the date of its acquisition; that the
High Court did not take into consideration the prices
fetched under sale deeds of similar lands in the vicinity of
the acquired land, and trend in price rise of lands; that
solatium should have been awarded at 15 per cent as
permissible under the Central Land Acquisition Act and not
at the rate of 10 per cent under the Rajathan Land
Acquisition Act.
Allowing the appeal in part, this Court,
HELD: 1.1. Method of valuation to be resorted to by a court
in determining acquired land’s just equivalent price has to
necessarily depend on the nature of evidence adduced by
parties in that regard. When, in a given case, the parties
produce evidence of sales relating to the land or lands in
the vicinity of the acquired land and require the concerned
court to determine the compensation payable for such
acquired land, the court can resort to ’the Comparable Sales
Method’ of Valuation of land which is a healthy criterion
for determining the market value of an acquired land. [p.
975 C-E]
Atmaram v. Collector of Nagpur, AIR 1929 P.C. 92, referred
and Union of India v. Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh & Ors.,
[1968] 1 SCR 463, relied on.
1.2. The High Court was right in examining the sale deeds
produced as evidence of comparable sales and in relying upon
the sale deeds marked as Ext.P-18 relating to sale of 26,733
sq. yards for Rs-3 per sq. yard which was a portion of the
acquired land, and Ext.P-10 relating to sale of 5124 sq.
yards at the rate of Rs.3.50 per sq. yard situated to the
close vicinity of the acquired land, and taking the prices
fetched for them as criteria for
971
determining the market value of the acquired land.
[pp. 976 B-C; 977 E-H; 978 A-E]
Bangaru Narasingha Rao Naidu v. R.D.O. Vizianagaram, [1980]
1 SCC 75, relied on.
The High Court rightly held the sale deeds, marked as Ext.P-
4 and Ex. P-19 or land situated in populous area of the
city and sale deeds Exts.P-6 and P-7 of small bits of lands
as not comparable to the large extent of the acquired land
situated at a place farther away from the city. [pp. 976 D-
G; 977 A-D]
Collector of Lakhimpur v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta, [1972] 4 SCC
236 and Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of M.P., [1977] 1 SCC
684, relied on.
1.3. The evidence in the case indicated trend in price-rise
of lands in the area of acquried land between the year 1961
when the appellant sold the land adjacent to the acquired
land and the year 1967 when the land in question was
acquired. Since the High Court determined the market value
of the acquired land without taking into account the trend
of price-rise of lands in the vicinity of the acquired land,
it would be very just and proper to add to the price of Rs.4
per sq. yard, as determined by the High Court, another Re.1
per sq. yard on account of the factor of price-rise of lands
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in the area of the acquired land. Hence, the market value
of the acquired land is determined at Rs.5 per sq. yard
which would satisfy the principle or awarding to it, an
equivalent price. [pp. 979 B-H; 980-A]
1.4. The High Court was justified in fixing the market value
of the acquired building at Rs.1,41,100 on the basis of the
estimate prepared and approved by Rajasthan Public Works
Department and produced on behalf of the land-owner.
However, the High Court should have added to that amount a
sum of Rs.5,720, the price of items in the building which
was left out in the estimate. Hence, the just equivalent
price of the acquired building would be Rs.1,41,100 plus
Rs.5,720. [pp. 981 D-G]
2. The High Court rightly fixed the solatium at the rate of
10 per cent on the amount of compensation payable for the
land and the building under s.23(2) of the Rajasthan Land
Acquisition Act, as the solatium to be paid for the land
acquired under the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act,
1952 cannot be a benefit of solatium not available for a
land acquired under the State Act. [pp. 981 G-H; 982 A-B]
972
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.1799 of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.5.1980 of the Rajasthan
High Court in D.B. Civil First Appeal Nos. 54 & 56 of 1971.
U.R. Lalit, A.K. Sen and Ms. V.D. Khanna for the Appellant.
M.L. Verma (NP), Niranjana Singh, Ms. A. Subhashini (NP) and
C.V.S. Rao for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATACHALA, J. This civil appeal by special leave is
preferred against the common judgment and. separate decrees
dated 9.5.1980 of the Rajasthan High Court, dismissing Civil
First Appeal No. 54 of 1971 in which the appellant had
sought enhanced compensation for his acquired property and
partly allowing Civil First Appeal No.56 of 1971 of the
Union of India in which it had sought reduction in the
market value of the same acquired property.
The appellant, since deceased (represented by his Legal
Representatives), was the owner in possession of a property
known as ’Kasuda House’ at Ajmer, comprised of a thirty year
old building with a large extent of land of about 70 Bighas,
14 Biswas, appurtenant thereto. On’24th April, 1963, the
Union of India, in exercise of its powers under Section 29
of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (D.I. Act), requisitioned
the said building and land for stationing the Central
Reserve Police Force (C.R.P.F.) and took its possession.
Then, on 5th May, 1967 the Collector of Ajmer, having served
a notice on the appellant under Section 36 of the D.I. Act,
acquired the said building and land. As the D.I. Act ceased
to have its force with effect from 10th July, 1968, the
Collector of Ajmer took recourse to Section 8(1) of the
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952 the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act and offered to
the appellant on 10th September, 1968 a sum of Rs. 5,32,594
as total compensation for the acquired building and land.
The appellant, ejected that offer of compensation as
inadequate. This situation led to the appointment of Shri
Updesh Narain Mathur, the Joint Legal Remembrancer for the
State of Rajasthan, as Arbitrator under Section 8(1)(b) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act, for determining the
just amount of compensation payable
973
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to the appellant for his acquired buidling and land. On a
notice issued by the Arbitrator to the appellant inviting
his claim for compensation, the appellant filed a claim-
statement claiming Rs.2,50,000 as compensation for the
acquired building and Rs.10 per sq. yard as compensation for
the acquired land. The Arbitrator, purporting to act on
evidence produced by parties in an enquiry held by him for
determining the compensation payable to the appellant, made
an award on 15th April, 1971. By that award, the market
value of the acquired building was fixed at Rs.2,50,000
while the market value of land was fixed at Rs.7.50 per sq.
yard. Then, the damages for loss of access to the
appellant’s unacquried land was fixed at Rs.2,000. Further,
the solatium payable on the total market value of the
acquired land was fixed at 15 per cent while the interest on
the total compensation payable was fixed at 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the award to the date of payment.
The appellant, who felt that the amount of compensation
awarded by the Arbitrator was inadequate, preferred an
appeal in the High Court seeking grant of enhanced
compensation. The, Union of India which, on the contrary,
felt that the amount of compensation awarded by the
Arbitrator was excessive, preferred an appeal in the High
Court seeking reduction in the amount of compensation. The
High Court which clubbed both the appeals and heard them, by
its common judgment partly allowed the appeal of the Union
of India and dismissed the appeal of the appellant. By that
judgment the market value of the building was reduced from
Rs.2,50,000 to Rs.1,41,100 while the market value of the
land was reduced from 7.50 per sq. yard to Rs.4 per sq.
yard. Solatium was given at a uniform rate of 10 per cent
on the market value of both the building and the land as
against the rate of solatium of 15 per cent, which had been
given on the market value of the land by the award.
Interest at 4 per cent per annum on the amount of
compensation was granted directing payment of that rate of
interest on the total amount of compensation from the date
of acquisition till 2nd November, 1968, the date on which
Rs.4,59,150.84 paise was paid to the appellant and on the
balance amount of compensation from 3rd November, 1968 upto
the date of its payment to the appellant. That common
judgment of the High Court and the decrees made thereon, are
appealed against by the appellant in these appeals, where by
grant of enhanced compensation is sought. Due to the death
of the appellant during the pendency of this appeal, his
Legal Representatives are permitted to prosecute this
appeal.
Shri A.K. Sen, the learned senior counsel for the appellant,
con-
974
ended before us that the market value of the acquired
building as well as the market value of the acquired land,
determined by the High Court fell ar short of the price
which each of them would have fetched in the open market if
had been sold on the date of their acquisition in the same
condition in which they were at the time of requisition and
hence were not the respective prices liable to be paid for
them under Section 8(3) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition Act. Elaborating the contention, he argued that
the High Court in determining the market value of the
acquired land at Rs.4 per sq. yard had not taken into
consideration the relevant factors, such as, (i) the
building potentiality of the acquired land, (ii) the prices
fetched under sale deeds of similar lands in the vicinity of
the acquired land and (iii) trend in price-rise of lands,
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which would have warranted granting of a higher market value
for it. He further contended that the High Court ought not
have reduced the market value of the acquired building to an
amount failing short of the amount fixed for it by the
Arbitrator on the basis of the estimate of its value
prepared by Shri G.L. Sharma, a private Engineer and his own
spot inspection report. As regards the solatium awarded by
the High Court at 10 per cent on the market value of the
acquired land and building, his contention was that such
solatium should have been awarded at the rate of 15 per cent
as was permissible under the Central Land Acquisition Act
and not at the rate of 10 per cent as was permissible under
the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. The learned counsel for
the Union of India, who refuted the said contentions
advanced on behalf of the appellant, sought to sustain the
judgment of the High Court.
The principal controversy which needs our decision in the
light of the above rival contentions since relates to the
correctness of the amount of compensation determined by the
High Court as that payable for the acquired land of
1.38,117.20 sq. yards, we shall proceed to deal with it at
the first instance.
Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition Act, being the provision according to which the
compensation payable for the acquired land has to be
determined, it is excerpted
"8(3). The compensation payable for the
acquisition of any property under section 7
shall be the price which the requisitioned
property would have fetched in the open
975
market, if it had remained in the same
condition as it was at the time of
requisitioning and been sold on the date of
acquisition."
As it is ruled by this Court in Union of India v. Kamlabhai
Harjiwandas Parekh & others, [1968] 1 SCR 463, that the
provision of Section 8(3) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition Act lays down a principle aimed at giving to the
owner of the acquired land an amount of compensation which
approximates to such land’s just equivalent value on the
date of its acquisition, our endeavor here would be to see
whether that principle is rightly applied by the High Court
in determining the amount of compensation payable for the
acquired land.
Method of valuation to be resorted to by a court in
determining acquired land’s just equivalent price, has to,
necessarily depend on the nature of evidence adduced by
parties in that regard. When, in a given case, the parties
produce evidence of sales relating to the acquired land or
lands in the vicinity of the acquired land and require the
concerned court to determine the compensation payable for
such acquired land, such court naturally resorts to what is
known as ’the Comparable Sales Method’ of valuation of land.
Indeed, ’Comparable Sales Method’ of valuation of an
acquired land is invariably resorted to by every court ever
since the Privy Council in Atmaram v. Collector of Nagpur,
AIR 1929 P.C.92, regarded that method as one which furnishes
’a healthy criterion’ for determining the market value of an
acquired land. As regards the acquired land, with the
market value of which we are concerned, parties themselves
had produced evidence of sales of lands before the
Arbitrator in order to enable him to determine its market
value based on prices fetched for lands under those sales.
The same sale deeds are considered by the High Court to find
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as to which of them could form the basis for determining the
market value of the acquired land. It is why we have now to
see, whether the sale deeds relied upon by the High Court to
determine the market value of the acquired land did really
furnish a proper basis to make such determination by
resorting to ’the Comparable Sales Method’ of valuation of
land.
Building potentiality of the acquired land, claimed to be
possessed by the acquired land, can assume no significance
in the instant case as ’the Comparable Sales Method’ of
valuation of land is resorted to by the High Court. Such
method is resorted to, as the acquired land was found to be
976
comparable in its essential features with land(s) respecting
which evidence of certain sale deed(s), was produced.
Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant raised to establish, that the acquired land had
building potentiality at the time of its acquisition, need
not engage our consideration.
The High Court, as is seen from it% judgment, has examined
the sale deeds produced as evidence of comparable sales with
a view to find out as to which of them could be taken to
relate to a land or lands comparable to the acquired land.
Such examination was necessary to find whether the land
covered under a genuine sale deed was basically similar to
the acquired land. If so found, it would not be difficult
for the Court to hold that the price fetched for such land
could be regarded as the price of the acquired land,
although some amount may have to be either added to sale
price or deducted out of the sale price in balancing certain
factors not common to the land(s) sold and the land
acquired.
A site plan of an area in Ajmer, available in the record, by
consent of parties, is utilised by the High Court for
locating the actual situation of the lands covered by the
sale deeds vis-a-vis the actual situation of the acquired
land. A sale deed dated 11.10.1960 produced in evidence as
Ex.P-4 is found to relate to sale of 48.400 sq. yards of
land at the rate of Rs.650 per sq. yard by Mayo College to
Life Insurance Corporation of India while another sale deed
dated 17.11.960 produced in evidence as Ex.P-19 is found to
relate to sale of 13,572 sq. yards of land at the rate of
Rs.7 per sq. yard by the very Mayo College to Model Housing
Cooperating Society Ltd. These sale deeds, according to
the High Court, since related to lands situated in a
populous area of Ajmer City, the lands sold under them were
not comparable to the acquired land which was situated at a
place farther away from the city. Although it was contended
on behalf of the appellant that the lands sold under the
said two sale deeds ought to have been held by the High.
Court as those comparable to the acquired land, that
contention cannot merit our acceptance since the location of
the lands covered by the sale deeds is altogether different
from the location of the acquired land, as becomes apparent
from the site plan with reference to which the High Court
has concluded that the lands covered by the sale deeds’
lands and the acquired land were not comparable.
Sale deed dated 14.1.1964 produced as Ex.P-5 whereunder Mayo
977
College had sold 1,000 sq. yards of land at the rate of
Rs.10 per sq. yard in favour of Mrs. V.M. Kaula; another
sale deed dated 25.9.1964 produced as Ex.P-6 relating to
sale of a small strip of land at Rs.10 per sq. yard between
the same parties; and a third sale deed dated 13.11.1964
produced as Ex.P-7 whereunder the very Mayo College had also
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sold to Navin Chandra Sharma 782 sq. yards of land at Rs.7
per sq. yard, are regarded by the High Court as not
comparable sales for determining the value of the acquired
land, in that each of them were small bits as compared to
the acquired land. The High Court, as suggested on behalf
of the appellant, cannot be found fault with for its refusal
to act upon the said three sale deeds as comparable sales to
determine the market value of the large extent of the
acquired land, when it is well settled that the prices
fetched’ under sale deeds of small bits of lands ought not
to, ordinarily, be made the basis for determination of large
extents of acquired land, (See: Collector’ of Lakhimpur v.
Bhuban Chandra Dutta, [1974] SCC 236 and Prithvi Raj Taneja
v. State of M.P., [1977] 1 SCC 684. Besides, in the instant
case when’ sale deeds of lands of even larger extents of
lands situated in the very area where the bits of lands
covered by the three rejected sale deeds were’ situated were
not considered by the High Court as comparable sales for the
reason of their situation in a populous area of the city,
that reason should equally hold good for the High Court not
acting upon the three sale deeds relating to bits of lands
as comparable sales for fixing the market value of the
acquired land.
However, there are other two important sale deeds which the
High, Court has regarded as sales of lands comparable to the
acquired land and, has taken the prices fetched for them as
the criteria for determining the, market value of the
acquired land. A sale deed of the year 1961 produced as
Ex.P- 18 related to sale of 26,733 sq. yards of land which
was a portion of the acquired land. That land had been sold
by the very appellant to Nayjiwan Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. at the rate of Rs.3 per sq. yard. Another sale
deed dated 14.3.1958 produced as Ex.P-10 related to, sale of
5, 124 sq. yards of land situated in the close vicinity of
the acquired land. That land had been sold at the rate of
Rs.3.50 per sq. yard by Joharilal to Saraswati Balika
Vidhyalaya. As regards sale deed Ex.P-18 under which the
appellant had sold a large extent of land to Navjiwan Co-
operative Society at the rate of Rs.3 per sq. yard, the
contention of learned counsel for the appellant before us
was, as was before the High Court, that the real value of
the land as on the date of sale was Rs.6 per sq. yard as
stated by
978
P.W.6, Sadu Singh, and hence that rate should have formed
the basis for determining the market value of the acquired
land. The High Court rejected this contention on its view
that the statement of P.W.6, the President of the Society,
that the price of the land was Rs.6 per sq. yard at the time
of its purchase in the year 1958 was difficult of acceptance
when the Society had accepted its price at the rate of Rs.4
per sq. yard in relation to the year 1965, when it had been
acquired. Besides, what cannot be overlooked is that
neither the vendor of the land nor P.W.1, Narayana Singh,
who has given evidence on behalf of the vendor,-had stated
at any time that the real price of the land in Ex.P-18 was
Rs.6 per sq. yard as on the date of its sale. The High
Court, therefore, cannot be found fault with for relying
upon the sale deed relating to a land Which formed part and
parcel of the acquired land earlier, as furnishing the real
criterion for determining the price of acquired land (See:
Bangaru Narasingha Rao Naidu v. R.D.Vizianagram, [1980] 1
SCC 75. Hence, the contention urged that the price under
sale deed Ex.P-18 should be regarded as Rs.6 per sq. yard
and that price should form the-basis for determining the
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market value-of the acquired land, ought to fail.
The contention that the rate of Rs.3.50 per sq. yard at
which Joharilal sold the land under Ex.P-10 to Saraswathi
Balika Vidayalaya had to be regarded as a concession price
since he was the Vice-President of the vendee Vidayalaya,
was not accepted by the High Court because of its view that
oral testimony given by Joharilal as P.W.2, several decades
after the actual sale had taken place, was difficult to act
upon, particularly, when there was nothing in the sale deed
which could give such indication. This contention has been
rightly not accepted by the High Court. We are unable to
find any good reason to take a contrary view in the matter.
The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that
the High Court should not have brushed aside the claim of
the appellant that the market value of the acquired land as
on the date of its acquisition could be fixed at least at
the rate of Rs.6 per sq. yard as had been done by the
Arbitrator taking into consideration the trend of price-rise
of lands. The High Court has taken the view that there was
no reliable evidence available on record to show that the
land price in the area between the year 1961 when the
deceased-appellant had sold the land adjoining the acquired
land at Rs.3 per sq. yard and the year 1967, when the land,
the compensation or which had to be determined, was actually
acquired, had gone up
979
appreciably. The view so taken by the High Court, according
to the learned counsel for the appellant, ignored the
reliable evidence on record relating to the sale prices of
building plots formed on a land far beyond the acquired land
by the Urban Improvement Trust of Ajmer fixed in the year
1963, that is, Rs.15 per sq. yard for commercial plots and
Rs.7 per sq. yard for residential plots and the said prices
were approved by the State Government. This evidence, it
was asserted by the learned counsel for the appellant,
clearly demonstrated the price-rise of land in the area of
the very acquired land after the year 1961. In our view,
the contentions of learned counsel as regards trend of
price-rise of land in the area of the acquired land are well
founded. No doubt, the plots of Urban Improvement Trust
made ready for sale at high prices pertained to a developed
lay-out. Yet, they clearly indicated the prices of land
situated beyond the acquired land, as prevailed in the year
1963. Besides, in the instant case it is admitted that for
the land which was purchased under Ex.P-18 by Navjiwan
Housing Society in the year 1961 at Rs.3 per sq. yard the
Arbitrator had awarded a rate of Rs. 4 per sq. yard with
reference to its acquisition in the year 1965, and that
award was not challenged by the State, as fixing a high
price. From this, it becomes obvious that even the State
was well aware of the trend of price-rise of lands in the
area of the acquired land between the year 1961 and 1965.
Thus, trend in price-rise of lands in the area of the
acquired land between the year 1961, the year in which the
appellant sold the land adjacent to the acquired land and
the year 1967, the year in which the land in question was
acquired, was therefore, very much seen. Indeed, the rising
trend in prices of immovable properties is a common
phenomenon all over the country after the year 1950,
although such rising trend has varied in degree from place
of place and year to year The lands around Ajmere City, were
no exception to such trend in price-rise. However, as the
market value of the acquired land is determined by the High
Court at Rs.4 per sq. yard in the year 1967, without taking
into account the trend of prise-rise of lands in the
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vicinity of the acquired land, we consider that it would be
very just and proper to add to that price of Rs. 4 per sq.
yard, another Re.1 per, sq. yard on account of the factor of
price-rise of lands in the area of the acquired land between
the year 1961 and the year 1967. If Re.1 per sq. yard is so
added to Rs. 4 per sq. yard, the market value of the
acquired land in 1967, the year of its acquisition, would
work out to Rs.5 per sq: yard, Hence, as against the market
value of the acquired land determined by the High Court at
Rs.4 per sq yard,
980
we determine the same at Rs.5 per sq. yard,, inasmuch as,
such determination of market value of the acquired land
would satisfy the principle of awarding to it an equivalent
price,
The next question which requires our examination keeping in
view the arguments of learned counsel for the contesting
parties, is as to whether the High Court had gone wrong in
not accepting the price of the acquired building ’Masuda
House’ determined by the Arbitrator in a sum of Rs. 2,50,000
as on the date of its acquisition as the correct market
price.
The Arbitrator for fixing the price of the acquired building
had acted on an estimate of one G.L. Sharma, a retired
Executive Engineer of Government of Rajasthan, who had
claimed that he had prepared the estimate of the acquired
building on an inspection of the building in the presence of
Shri B.D. Gupta, Assistant Surveyor, C.P.W.D. representing
the C.R.P.F. Ajmer for which the building had been acquired.
So also the Arbitrator had acted on the inspection report
which he had claimed as prepared on local inspection of the
building. The High Court found that the retired Executive
Engineer, who, it was said, had prepared the estimate of the
building for fixing its price on the date of acquisition,
had not given evidence about it as a witness and that had
led to denial to the contesting party, an opportunity of
cross-examining him as to acceptability of the Report.
Therefore, according to the High Court, such estimate could
not have had any evidentiary value and the price of the
building fixed by the Arbitrator on the basis of such
estimate had to be discarded. Further, the High Court has
found fault with the Arbitrator to have relied upon his
Inspection Report to test the estimate of the building
prepared by the retired Executive Engineer, although it had
not been admittedly signed by the Arbitrator at the time of
making his award. In the view of the High Court, such
report could not have been made use of by the Arbitrator for
the purpose of accepting the estimate of the building made
by the retired Executive Engineer, inasmuch as the parties
against whom such inspection report had been used, had no
opportunity of knowing about the very existence of such
report. As is seen from the evidence on record and the
proceedings before the High Court the reasons as to why the
High Court did not attach any value to the estimate made by
the retired Executive Engineer and the Inspection Report,
cannot be said to be ill-founded. Besides, it was not
disputed before us that the retired Executive Engineer Li
had been employed by the appellant-Rao Narain Singh, the
owner of the
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acquired building, as his private Engineer, inasmuch as that
Executive Engineer had admittedly visited the building and
prepared the estimate of costs and specification of
structures in the building on behalf of Rao Narain Singh.
Again, it was not disputed that the Arbitrator came to sign
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the Inspection Report said to have been prepared by him
after the award had been made and when he had become functus
officio’ as an Arbitrator. In the said view of the matters,
it is difficult for us to think that the High Court was in
any way unjustified in refusing to accept the valuation of
the building as Rs.2,50,000 based on the estimate made by
Shri G.L. Sharma retired Executive Engineer and the spot
Inspection Report claimed to have been made use of by the
Arbitrator. However, as is seen from the judgment of the
High Court, it has fixed the market price of the acquired
building at Rs.1,41,100 having regard to the estimate
prepared by the Executive Engineer, scrutinised by the
Superintending Engineer of the Rajasthan Public Works
Department and approved by the Chief Engineer of the
Rajasthan Public Works Department. Such estimates,
admittedly had been produced on behalf of the owner of the
building Rao Narain Singh of ’Masuda House’, by his own
witness P.W.5, Ramdayal Gupta and spoken to by him. We
cannot, therefore, say that the High Court in the said
circumstances, was not justified in relying upon the
estimates made by the Public Works Department of the State
of Rajasthan in fixing the price of the building at
Rs.1,41,100. Yet, we consider that the High Court should
have added to that price of the building a sum of Rs.5,720
when it had found that amount of Rs.5,720 was the price of
items in the building which were left out in the estimate of
the Engineers of the Public Works Department of the State of
Rajasthan. As stated by the High Court itself, the items
for which cost had not been fixed by the Engineers of the
Public Works Department in their estimate, were ’road side
retaining walls’, ’wire fencing’ and ’main gate wall’. The
cost of those left out items was found to be Rs.5,720. We,
therefore, consider it just and reasonable to add that
amount of Rs.5,720 to the price of the acquired building.
Hence, in’ our view, the just equivalent price of the
acquired building would be Rs.1,41,100 plus Rs.5,720 i.e.
Rs.1,46,820 and not merely Rs.1,41,100, its price determined
by the High Court.
The last question that arises for our consideration is
whether the High Court had acted rightly in fixing the
solatium payable on the amount of compensation for land and
building at 10 per cent instead of at 15 per cent. The High
Court in fixing the solatium at the rate of 10 per cent on
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the amount of compensation payable for the land and building
has held that the land and building acquired being in the
State of Rajasthan the solatium payable was the rate
admissible therefore under Section 23(2) of the Rajasthan
Land Acquisition Act the State Act and not the rate
admissible under the corresponding provision in the Central
Land Acquisition Act. We find no good reason to disagree
with the High Court in the said matter as the solatium to be
paid for the land acquired under the Requisitioning and
Acquisition Act cannot be a benefit of solatium not
available for a land acquired under the State Act, i.e.
under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the
appellant cannot succeed on this question.
In the result, we allow this appeal partly and modify the
judgment and decrees of the High Court under appeal. The
market price of acquired land of 70 Bighas, 14 Biswas and
1412 sq. yard is enhanced to Rs.5 per sq. yard from Rs.4 per
sq. yard awarded by the High Court. The market price of the
Masuda House is enhanced to Rs.1,46,820 from Rs.1,41,100
awarded by the High Court. The solatium at 10 per cent
shall be payable on the said total amount of the price of
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the land and price of the building, as determined by us.
The damages of Rs.2,000 awarded by the High Court as loss of
access to and utility of the unacquired land of the
appellant stands undisturbed. The interest of 4 per cent
per annum shall be payable on the total of all the said
amounts in the manner indicated by the High Court in its
judgment and decrees under appeal. Since the appellant died
during the pendency of this civil appeal, the amount of
compensation which has become payable under this judgment,
less the amount of compensation ,already paid or deposited,
shall be paid to the legal representatives of the deceased-
appellant, who are prosecuting this appeal. Costs payable
in this appeal shall be paid by the respondent to the legal
representatives of the deceased7appellant, in proportion to
their success.
R.P. Appeal partly allowed.
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