Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3086 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MUKESH SHARMA ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3092 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
GURUBUX SINGH alias BAKSHI SINGH ...RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3087 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
BIRBAL RAM ...RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3088 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RATAN LAL ...RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3089 OF 2016
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2019.04.22
17:09:33 IST
Reason:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAM GOPAL ...RESPONDENT(S)
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CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3091 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
BIRBAL MAHARIYA ...RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3090 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
TEJ SINGH alias SANWAT SINGH ...RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3093 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAM AVTAR KHATIK AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3094 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAM RATAN AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3095 OF 2016
STATE OF RAJASTHAN ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
ARJUN ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
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A common question of law arises for consideration in this
batch of appeals. The individual facts are therefore not relevant
for adjudication. Suffice it to observe that each of the
respondents in the respective appeals was convicted under
Section 302 and other provisions of the Indian Penal Code in
different Sessions trials arising from separate unconnected
incidents and sentenced to imprisonment for life. They filed
individual writ petitions contending that they had served more
than 14 years in custody but their cases were not placed by the
Jail Authorities before the State Advisory Boards for shortening
of their sentences and premature release. The constitutional
validity of Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rajasthan Prisons (Shortening of
Sentences) Rules, 2006, (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules,
2006”) was challenged, putting a fetter on consideration of their
cases till they earned a minimum of four years of remission after
completing 14 years of actual imprisonment excluding
remission, as being contrary to Section 433A Cr.P.C. No other
issue was urged.
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2. The Rules, 2006 were framed by the State Government in
exercise of powers under Clause (2) & (5) of Section 59 (1) of the
Prisons Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The High
Court held that the Rules not having been placed before the
Legislature of the State as required by Section 59(2) of the Act did
not acquire statutory force. Furthermore, the Rules could not
have been framed contrary to Section 433A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, relying on the Constitution Bench
decision in Maru Ram vs. Union of India , 1981 (1) SCC 107.
3. In view of the question of law involved, it will be proper to
set out the statutory provisions arising for consideration.
“ Section 59. Power to make rules.
(1) The State Government may by notification in
the Official Gazette make rules consistent with this
Act
xxx
(2) determining the classification of prison
offences into serious and minor offences;
xxx
(5) for the award of marks and the shortening
of sentences;
xxx
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(2) Every Rule made under this section shall be
laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before the
State Legislature.”
“ Rule 8(2) Notwithstanding anything contained
in subrule (i)
(i) a prisoner who has been sentenced to
imprisonment for life for any offence for which
death penalty is one of the punishment provided by
law or who has been sentenced to death but this
sentence has been commuted under Section 433 of
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, into one of
imprisonment for life, shall be considered only after
he has served 14 years of actual imprisonment
excluding remission but including the period of
detention spent during enquiry, investigation or
trial, on the condition that such a prisoner shall
also have to earn minimum of 4 years of remission
in order to be eligible for consideration.”
“ Section 433A. Restriction on powers of
remission and commutation in certain cases
Notwithstanding anything contained in section
432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is
imposed on conviction of a person for an offence
for which death is one of the punishments provided
by laws, or where a sentence of death imposed on a
person has been commuted under section 433 into
one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not
be released from prison unless he had served at
least fourteen years of imprisonment.”
4. Learned Senior Counsel Dr. Manish Singhvi, for the
appellants, submitted that the High Court erred in striking down
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the latter part of Rule 8(2)(i) requiring a minimum of four years
remission after completion of 14 years in custody on both
counts. Adverting to the striking down of the Rule for not laying
it before the Legislature, it was submitted that the Rules did not
contemplate laying before the Legislature prior to promulgation,
as a precondition. The use of the words “as soon as” does not
give any definite time period before which it is to be laid before
the State Legislature. No consequences were provided for not
laying the Rules before the Legislature, and in absence of which
it could not come into force. The provision was therefore
directory and not mandatory. Any omission, therefore, in laying
the Rules before the Legislature does not render the Rules
invalid. In any event, the Rules had subsequently been laid
before the Legislature. Dr. Singhvi relied on M/s. Atlas Cycle
Industries Ltd. & ors. vs. the State of Haryana , (1979) 2 SCC
196.
5. It was next submitted that remission after completion of 14
years in custody was not a matter of right, but was dependent
on a host of considerations. (supra) has not been
Maru Ram
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correctly appreciated. Life imprisonment normally means an
imprisonment for life. Section 433A, Cr.P.C. stipulates that
where sentence for imprisonment for life is imposed for an
offence for which death is one of the punishments such person
shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least
fourteen years of imprisonment. Thus, the State in its wisdom
could easily provide that life imprisonment shall not be subject
to any remission or provide limitations on the same. Remission,
in the present case, being a matter of State policy as
incorporated in statutory rules falling within the domain of the
State, could not be claimed as a matter of fundamental right.
Reliance was placed on
Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India &
ors. , (2005) 7 SCC 417. The State Government could, therefore,
always insist on a minimum number of years before premature
release of a convict serving life sentence.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
remission policy of the State Government was ultra vires Article
14 of the Constitution of India as it would take approximately 18
years of imprisonment for a model prisoner to earn 4 years of
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remission, making it virtually impossible to be considered for
shortening of sentence in terms of Section 433A. Rule 8(2)(i)
was clearly contrary to Section 433A Cr.P.C. in view of Maru
(supra) to the extent that it restricts consideration for
Ram
remission after 14 years.
7. We have considered the respective submissions. The plain
language of Section 59(2) makes it manifest that there is no
requirement for laying of the Rules before the Legislature prior to
promulgation. No time limit for laying has been provided. As
rightly urged, the use of words “as soon as” coupled with the
absence of any consequence for not laying makes the provision
directory and not mandatory. In Atlas Cycle (supra) it was
observed:
“22. …In the instant case, it would be noticed that
sub section (6) of Section 3 of the Act merely
provides that every order made under Section 3 by
the Central Government or by any officer or
authority of the Central Government shall be laid
before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may
be, after it is made. It does not provide that it shall
be subject to the negative or the affirmative
resolution by either House of Parliament. It also
does not provide that it shall be open to the
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Parliament to approve or disapprove the order
made under Section 3 of the Act. It does not even
say that it shall be subject to any modification
which either House of Parliament may in its
wisdom think it necessary to provide. It does not
even specify the period for which the order is to be
laid before both Houses of Parliament nor does it
provide any penalty for nonobservance of or non
compliance with the direction as to the laying of
the order before both Houses of Parliament. It
would also be noticed that the requirement as to
the laying of the order before both Houses of
Parliament is not a condition precedent but
subsequent to the making of the order. In other
words, there is no prohibition to the making of the
orders without the approval of both Houses of
Parliament. In these circumstances, we are clearly
of the view that the requirement as to laying
contained in subsection (6) of Section 3 of the Act
falls within the first category i.e. “simple laying”
and is directory not mandatory.”
In conclusion, it was held that the Legislature never
intended that noncompliance with the requirement of laying as
envisaged by subsection (6) of Section 3 of the Act should
render the order void.
8. Part3 of the Rajasthan Prison Rules, 1951, under the
heading Remission System, in Rule 1(e) provides that the
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sentence for imprisonment for life or transportation of life shall
be deemed to mean imprisonment for 20 years.
9. Rule 2(e) of the Rules 2006, defines shortening of sentence
to mean the reduction of that period of sentence of a prisoner
which he has to serve in the prison upon a judicially pronounced
sentence as a matter of grace on the part of the State and as a
recognition of his good behaviour in the prison.
10. That sentence for imprisonment for life or transportation of
life under the Penal Code shall mean the convict’s natural life
needs no further elaboration in view of
Gopal Vinayak Godse
vs. State of Maharashtra (1961) 3 SCR 440 followed in para
72(4) of (supra) as follows:
Maru Ram
“5….. A sentence of transportation for life or
imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as
transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person’s natural life.”
11. Section 432 Cr.P.C. provides for the power to suspend or
remit sentences and also to refuse the same. Section 433 (b)
10
Cr.P.C. provides for commuting a sentence of imprisonment for
life to 14 years. Section 433A Cr.P.C. provides that remission or
commutation shall not enable release of the convict from prison
unless the person had served at least 14 years of imprisonment.
It, therefore, fixes a minimum period before which remission
could not be considered. Any rule that may provide to consider
remission before 14 years would obviously be bad in view of the
statutory provision contained in the Code. In Union of India vs.
(2016) 7 SCC 1, it was observed:
V. Sriharan,
“79. In this context, the submission of the learned
Solicitor General on the interpretation of Section 433A
CrPC assumes significance. His contention was that
under Section 433A CrPC what is prescribed is only the
minimum and, therefore, there is no restriction to fix it
at any period beyond 14 years and up to the end of
one’s lifespan. We find substance in the said
submission. When we refer to Section 433A, we find
that the expression used in the said section for the
purpose of grant of remission relating to a person
convicted and directed to undergo life imprisonment, it
stipulates that “such person shall not be released from
prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of
imprisonment” (emphasis supplied). Therefore, when the
minimum imprisonment is prescribed under the statute,
there will be every justification for the court which
considers the nature of offence for which conviction is
imposed on the offender for which offence the extent of
punishment either death or life imprisonment is
provided for, it should be held that there will be every
justification and authority for the court to ensure in the
interest of the public at large and the society, that such
11
person should undergo imprisonment for a specified
period even beyond 14 years without any scope for
remission. In fact, going by the caption of the said
Section 433A, it imposes a restriction on powers of
remission or commutation in certain cases….”
12. Manifestly remission not being a matter of right, much less
upon completion of 14 years of custody, but subject to rules
framed in that regard, including complete denial of the same in
specified circumstances, as a matter of State policy, nothing
prevents the State from imposing restrictions in the manner
done by Rule 8(2)(i) to consider claims for remission. In
Maru
Ram (supra) this Court held:
“30. A possible confusion creeps into this discussion by
equating life imprisonment with 20 years’ imprisonment.
Reliance is placed for this purpose on Section 55 IPC
and on definitions in various Remission Schemes. All
that we need say, as clearly pointed out in Godse , is that
these equivalents are meant for the limited objective of
computation to help the State exercise its wide powers of
total remissions. Even if the remissions earned have
totalled up to 20 years, still the State Government may
or may not release the prisoner and until such a release
order remitting the remaining part of the life sentence is
passed, the prisoner cannot claim his liberty. The
reason is that life sentence is nothing less than lifelong
imprisonment. Moreover, the penalty then and now is
the same — life term. And remission vests no right to
release when the sentence is life imprisonment. No
greater punishment is inflicted by Section 433A than
the law annexed originally to the crime. Nor is any
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vested right to remission cancelled by compulsory 14
year jail life once we realise the truism that a life
sentence is a sentence for a whole life.”
13. It is, therefore, held that the High Court erred in striking
down Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rules, 2006 on both counts. The Rule is
held to be valid and consistent with the law. The impugned
orders of the High Court are set aside and the appeals are
allowed.
.……………………….J.
(Arun Mishra)
………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
April 22, 2019
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