Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2023 INSC 695
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2023
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO(S). 15774 OF 2023]
DEV GUPTA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Special leave granted. This appeal challenges an order of the Punjab &
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Haryana High Court. The High Court rejected the appellant’s Writ Petition
which had questioned the imposition of a minimum 75% aggregate marks as an
eligibility condition (in the qualifying examination) for enabling a candidate to
claim admission in engineering courses under the 2% sports quota. The appellant
had contended that the sudden imposition of such an eligibility condition defeated
the purpose of the quota itself and was consequently arbitrary. The High Court,
however, rejected the petition requiring the authorities to consider an issue.
2. The Secretary Technical Education, Chandigarh Administration (hereafter
“UTC”) by letter dated 07.01.2016 accorded approval to the respondent
Signature Not Verified
university (hereafter “the University”) to admit students through the Central
Digitally signed by
NEETA SAPRA
Date: 2023.08.09
16:53:19 IST
Reason:
Counselling System at the National level from 2016-2017 (hereafter referred to
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Dated 14.07.2023 in CWP No. 14594 of 2023
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as “JOSSA”). The UT had consistently followed the process, and admission to
institutions within Chandigarh were regulated by its rules. The rules for the
current academic year 2023-24 for JOSSA were issued through a brochure on
07.06.2023. Those rules apply to UT institutions, including the respondent-
whose name finds mention at Serial No. 25.
3. The eligibility criterion provided for admission to engineering courses and
the same reads as under:
“1. Must have secured at least 75% aggregate marks in the Class XII (or
equivalent) Board Examination. The aggregate marks for SC, ST and PwD
candidates should be at least 65%. “
The respondent issued the admission brochure for academic year 2023-24 for four
reserved categories. The eligibility criterion applicable, inter alia , to sports
candidates was mentioned in clause 1(b) which is extracted below:
“b. The candidate has secured minimum 75% marks in the Class XII (or
equivalent) examination of respective stream and Board.”
4. Seventeen (17) seats were earmarked for the sports category (under the 2%
quota). The university received a total of 34 applications -of which 28 applicants
fulfilled the eligibility criterion -of securing 75% marks and above. The
remaining six applications included that of the appellant who did not secure the
basic 75% marks. Further, 16 out of the total 17 seats in the Sports Category have
already been allocated to eligible candidates and only 1 seat has fallen vacant as
on date in Materials and Metallurgical Engineering branch for which the
counselling is scheduled to be held on 10.08.2023. It is acknowledged that the
applicable Sports Policy for the UT had been published earlier.
5. The brochure listed out several categories, to indicate how the candidates
were to be classified for the purposes of admission. This did not include the sports
quota candidates. As a matter of fact, the Union Territory of Chandigarh followed
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JoSAA for purposes of admission; however, the sports quota category was kept
out of the JoSAA programme. Likewise the quota set apart for three other
categories i.e. Kashmiri Migrants, Sons/Daughters/Spouses of Military/Para
Military Personnel and children and grand children of freedom fighters were
treated and dealt with separately.
6. After publication of the brochure on 24.06.2023, the respondent issued an
advertisement calling upon eligible candidates to apply. The appellant
represented to the authorities complaining that the eligibility condition was
unrealistically high, on 27.06.2023. Upon receiving no response, he filed a Writ
Petition, which was rejected by the impugned order.
7. It is contended by Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel that the
threshold minimum eligible condition of having acquired 75% marks, defeats the
objective of providing a sports quota because it assumes that sports persons -like
other general candidates would also have the degree of academic excellence
which is required of all candidates. It was submitted that those participating in
sports have to be treated differently and the 2% quota was specifically carved out
for this purpose. In this context, it is pointed out that as far as sports quota
candidates are concerned, the brochure itself makes a distinction so far as
candidates who are eligible to apply for vertical reservations; Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) have to possess 65% marks to be considered
eligible. It was submitted that in the past too, the UT had not imposed high
criterion for candidates to be admitted in the sports quota for qualifying in the
examination.
8. Learned counsel also pointed out that in the past, sports quota guidelines
had prescribed what specified sports would be graded for the purpose of
determining inter se rankings and furthermore, the types of events, and the
conditions guiding the eligibility and assessment criterion (such as for instance,
the minimum number of participants in the concerned sports, the level of
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participation, i.e. the district, state, national and international event(s) organized
by the concerned regulating board or organization/federation, etc). These guide
and regulate both the determination of inter se ranking of sports candidates, to
ensure that those who achieve higher proficiency in the concerned sports, rather
than academic qualification, are duly accommodated.
9. Mr. Sanchar Anand, appearing on behalf of the respondent, urged this court
not to intervene, and submitted that admissions have almost concluded. He points
out that earlier too, the UT had insisted upon the relevant criterion of 75%
minimum cut-off in the qualifying examination and points to a note submitted to
the High Court, justifying the 75% minimum criterion for the sports quota. It was
argued that whilst for 2017-18, the minimum qualifying marks required for sports
category candidates was 60%, it was increased for the years 2018-19 and 2019-
20 to 75%. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that there is nothing inherently
arbitrary or discriminatory in the insistence of such criterion. He reiterated that in
the present case too, out of the 34 applications received, 28 fulfilled the 75%
threshold and all but one (out of 17) seats had been filled by them.
10. Learned counsel further stated that evolving a minimum threshold
educational qualification for the purposes of allocation in the sports quota was
essentially a policy matter which the UT exercised legitimately in the present
case. He submitted that this Court’s intervention would result in large scale
disruption of the allocations made till date and that it would be futile to intervene
since several other candidates who might not have applied and who might be
better off than the appellant would be kept out of consideration.
Analysis & Conclusions
11. Besides the brochure the relevant extracts of which were set out before
discussing the relevant submissions, it is necessary to briefly describe the relevant
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provisions of the prevailing sports quota (embodied in a Policy ). Para 2 of the
policy stated that the benefit of this sports category would be available to those
who “pass their qualifying examination from schools/colleges recognised by the
Chandigarh administration and those who studied in Chandigarh schools or
colleges for at least two years before applying for graduation certificates” . The
policy further stipulated that merit of the certificates, i.e. sports certificates would
be graded appropriately as A, B, C and D, and in descending order. Grade A
contains sports persons of international standing, -who represented the country or
who donned the India colour in Olympic Games, World Cups, tournaments and
championships organised by international federations at the highest levels, and
Commonwealth Games. Grade B comprised of sports persons, who participated
in World University/international tournaments and games other than those in
Grade A in which at least 10 teams participated, including Asian Federation Cup;
Schools Games or obtained first three positions in recognised National
Championships, International championships, State Federations, All India
Combined Universities team etc. Grade C listed participation in senior
nationals/inter-University tournaments/federation cup; Junior National
Federation i.e. National School Games, KVS teams participating in the national
school games; first three positions in recognised Chandigarh schools game
(provided at least 7 teams participated) and several such other sports competitions
and events. Grade D listed participation in senior national championship/national
games participation in recognised junior championship; participation in national
school games etc.
12. The Policy further provided that the state rankings would be considered by
the concerned institution and listed the criteria in the following order: record
holders in any event; winners; runners-up; third position holders; number of times
participated; number of disciplines participated). Other criteria too were spelt out.
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Dated 05.05.2003 issued by the UT Chandigarh.
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According to the policy, sports gradation excluded those participating in the sub-
junior ranking tournaments and, that events the positions achieved would be only
if they were achieved with seven or more participants in State/Senior/Junior/inter-
college competition or international tournaments etc or in at least ten state
universities in national, i.e. senior, junior and all university competitions. Besides
this, the policy stipulated that the applicants would be interviewed and also would
be given field tests in the discipline concerned, “to assess the genuineness of the
testimonials/certificates which they produce in support of their claims”.
13. It would be also necessary to reproduce the note which was placed before
the High Court approved by the Chandigarh administration, while justifying the
75% minimum qualifying criterion in the present case. Dealing with the
respondent’s admission policy based upon the UT Chandigarh’s stipulations, the
note inter alia stated as follows:
➢ “ PEC had been participating in, Joint Admission Committee (JAC)
Chandigarh till year 2017. Eligibility criteria of JAC 2017 for general and
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sports category was same i.e., class 12 at least 60% marks. Copy attached
for ready reference.
➢ The eligibility criteria followed by PEC for Kashmiri Migrants and Kashmiri
| Year of<br>Admission | Admission<br>through | Relevant Criteria<br>of 10+2 setup by<br>Admission Agency | Relevant<br>Criteria of<br>10+2 followed<br>by PEC | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017-18 | JAC<br>Chandigarh | > 60% | > 60% | Same as<br>Admission<br>Agency |
| 2018-19 | JoSAA/CSAB | > 75% | > 75% | Same as<br>Admission<br>Agency |
| 2019-20 | JoSAA/CSAB | > 75% | > 75% | Same as<br>Admission<br>Agency |
| 2020-21 | JoSAA/CSAB | 10+2 Pass | 10+2 Pass | Same as<br>Admission<br>Agency |
| 2021-22 | JoSAA/CSAB | 10+2 Pass | 10+2 Pass | Same as<br>Admission |
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| Agency | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-23 | JoSAA/CSAB | 10+2 Pass | 10+2 Pass | Same as<br>Admission<br>Agency |
| 2023-24 | JoSAA/CSAB | > 75% | >75% | Same as<br>Admission<br>Agency |
of Kashmiri Migrants and Kashmiri Pandits/ Kashmiri Hindu Families (Non-
Migrants) living in Kashmiri Valley, Sports persons, Sons/ Daughters/
Spouses of Military/ Paramilitary personnel Children/Grandchildren of
Freedom Fighters was 10.07.2023 and the further process is in progress.
➢ That the instant writ petition is coming up for preliminary hearing only on
13.07.2023, when the admission process is already underway and thus, the
petition in barred by latches.
➢ That the prospectus is sacrosanct and at this stage, in case, the criteria is
changed, the entire admission process shall get delayed and derailed.
➢ The academic session is scheduled to start from 31.07.2023 and the candidates
have to attend minimum 75% of lectures to become eligible for appearing in
examination.”
14. It is now entrenched in our constitutional jurisprudence, that the doctrine
of equality has varied- and layered dimensions, one of which is that under Article
14, “Equals must be treated equally. Unequals must not be treated equally. What
constitutes reasonable classification must depend upon the facts of each case, the
context provided by the statute, the existence of intelligible differentia which has
led to the grouping of the persons or things as a class and the leaving out of those
who do not share the intelligible differentia. No doubt it must bear rational nexus
to the objects sought to be achieved.” (Ref Manish Kumar v Union of India (UOI)
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& Ors ).
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15. This court, in Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan explained how the
reasonable classification is to be applied:
“6. The concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of absolute
equality amongst all, which may be a physical impossibility. All that Article
14 guarantees is the similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. The
protection of equal laws does not mean that all laws must be uniform. Equality
before the law means that among equals the law should be equal and should
| 2021 (14) SCR 895 | |
|---|---|
| 2002 (2) SCR 649 |
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| be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. Equality | ||
|---|---|---|
| before the law does not mean that things which are different shall be treated | ||
| as though they were the same. It is true that Article 14 enjoins that the people | ||
| similarly situated should be treated similarly but what amount of dissimilarity | ||
| would make the people disentitled to be treated equally, is rather a vexed | ||
| question. A legislature, which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of | ||
| an infinite variety of human relations must of necessity, have the power of | ||
| making special laws, to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it must | ||
| have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things upon | ||
| which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment | ||
| does not “per se” amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal | ||
| protection clause. The State has always the power to make classification on a | ||
| basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular subject to be dealt with. | ||
| In order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be | ||
| fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible | ||
| differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together | ||
| from others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must | ||
| have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. What | ||
| is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification | ||
| and the object of the Act. When a law is challenged as violative of Article 14, | ||
| it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute | ||
| and the object intended to be achieved by it. Having ascertained the policy and | ||
| the object of the Act, the court has to apply a dual test in examining the | ||
| validity, the test being, whether the classification is rational and based upon | ||
| an intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that are | ||
| grouped together from others that are left out of the group, and whether the | ||
| basis of differentiation has any rational nexus or relation with its avowed | ||
| policy and objects. In order that a law may be struck down under this article, | ||
| the inequality must arise under the same piece of legislation or under the same | ||
| set of laws which have to be treated together as one enactment. Inequality | ||
| resulting from two different enactments made by two different authorities in | ||
| relation to the same subject will not be liable to attack under Article 14” | ||
| It has also been held, in State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa5 that “the object to | ||
| be achieved” should not be “a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of | ||
| inequalities and the classification” should not be “characterized as arbitrary or | ||
| absurd”. The judgment in Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of A.P.6 , is a decision | ||
| where this court pointed out, to how discrimination arises, if persons who are un- | ||
| equals are treated as equals, thus: | ||
| “Just as a difference in the treatment of persons similarly situate leads to | ||
| discrimination, so also discrimination can arise if persons who are unequals, | ||
| i.e., differently placed, are treated similarly. … A law providing for equal | ||
| treatment of unequal objects, transactions or persons would be condemned as |
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1974 (1) SCR 771
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1993 (3) SCR 616
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| discriminatory if there is absence of rational relation to the object intended to<br>be achieved by the law.” | discriminatory if there is absence of rational relation to the object intended to | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| be achieved by the law.” | |||
| 16. The observations in Roop Chand Adlakha v Delhi Development Authority7 | |||
| are very perceptive, and relevant in the present context; the court had said that the | |||
| “process of classification is in itself productive of inequality and in that sense | |||
| antithetical of equality. The process would be constitutionally valid if it | |||
| recognises a pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration of the effects | |||
| of such pre-existent inequality. But the process cannot in itself generate or | |||
| aggravate the inequality” and warned that overemphasis on the doctrine of | |||
| classification “or any anxious and sustained attempts to discover some basis for | |||
| classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the article of its precious | |||
| content and end in replacing doctrine of equality by the doctrine of | |||
| classification” thus pushing classification rendering “the precious guarantee of | |||
| equality “a mere rope of sand”.” The application of the reasonable classification | |||
| test, in Deepak Sibal v Punjab University8, led to invalidation of a rule which | |||
| disqualified and rendered ineligible employees of private establishments, and | |||
| confining admission of candidates to government departments and institutions, in | |||
| evening law college. Condemning the classification, this court said that the | |||
| university had “deviated from the objective for the starting of evening classes. | |||
| The objective was to accommodate in the evening classes employees in general | |||
| including private employees who were unable to attend morning classes because | |||
| of their employment.” The justification given by the university, that government | |||
| employees held permanent jobs or position was held to be irrelevant for the object | |||
| of opening the evening law course. |
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17. In Subramanian Swamy v Central Bureau of Investigation this court
frowned upon, and declared void, a classification based on status in public
7
1988 Supp (3) SCR 353
8
1989 (1) SCR 689
9
2014 (9) SCR 283
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employment, characterizing that it defeats the purpose of the underlying law, i.e
combating corruption:
| “59. It seems to us that classification which is made in Section 6-A on the basis | ||
|---|---|---|
| of status in government service is not permissible under Article 14 as it defeats | ||
| the purpose of finding prima facie truth into the allegations of graft, which | ||
| amount to an offence under the PC Act, 1988. Can there be sound | ||
| differentiation between corrupt public servants based on their status? Surely | ||
| not, because irrespective of their status or position, corrupt public servants | ||
| are corrupters of public power. The corrupt public servants, whether high or | ||
| low, are birds of the same feather and must be confronted with the process of | ||
| investigation and inquiry equally. Based on the position or status in service, | ||
| no distinction can be made between public servants against whom there are | ||
| allegations amounting to an offence under the PC Act, 1988.” |
On an objective application of the principles outlined above, this court is of the
considered opinion that the objective of introducing the sports quota i.e. 2% of
intake, was to promote and encourage those who excelled and gained a certain
degree of prescribed proficiency and achievement in defined competitive sports.
The introduction of this quota was to promote sports, and sportsmanship in
educational institutions. No doubt, the state acts within its rights to prescribe a
certain minimum eligibility standard or set of criteria as the threshold requirement
for admission to any particular course, given its peculiar requirements. The
Punjab and Haryana High Court, thus, upheld the prescription of a cut off
eligibility standard of securing minimum 15% in the qualifying examination, in
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Jagatpreet Kaur And Ors. vs Punjab University :
| “The petitioner has himself stated that the prospectus for Punjab Engineering | |
|---|---|
| College had specifically provided that there would a minimum cut- off | |
| aggregate of 15 marks. The respondents-University have only introduced the | |
| criteria which ensures the bare minimum of academic excellence which would | |
| be required of a student who is ultimately to become an Engineer. In Amardeep | |
| Singh Sahota 's case (supra) the Full Bench has categorically held that these | |
| are students who will ultimately serve humanity. Excellence in Sports may be | |
| a relevant consideration, but a certain minimum academic standard is | |
| required to be maintained.” |
The objective of introducing sports quota, however, is not to accommodate
academic merit, but something altogether different: promotion of sports in the
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(2004) 138 PLR 896
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institution, the university, and ultimately, in the country. Among others,
universities are the nurseries or the catchment for sportspersons, who can
represent in state, national, international level and Olympic sports. At the same
time, the state or educational institution can insist upon a minimum eligibility
condition. That is not to say that such condition would necessarily and
mandatorily have to be what is applicable to general (or open category)
candidates. The latter kind of criteria would tend to exclude meritorious
sportspersons, and place the less (academically) meritorious sportspersons, at a
disadvantageous position, because they satisfy the open category candidates’
criterion of higher academic merit. For instance, it is quite possible that a
sportsperson, who has and continues to represent the country in international
Olympic sports, and gained such excellence as to have bagged a medal or two, in
say, wrestling, would be altogether excluded in the eventuality of a wrestler, of
the same category (but who has never reached the national level) securing 80%
marks in the qualifying examination. It exactly this consequence which this court
had warned would be the “unequal application” of a uniform criteria, a wooden
equality without regard to the inherent differences, which Article 14 frowns upon,
and forbids.
18. The conclusion drawn by the court is also supported by the fact that the
sports policy of 2023 governing admissions, was evolved with a careful eye to
detail, to ensure that performance in sport, rather than academic merit, was the
chosen criterion to be applied for filling the 2% sports quota. Another reason
which leads this court to conclude that discrimination has resulted, is because in
respect of sports too, the state has lowered the criterion for those enjoying vertical
classification, under Article 15 (4). In such event, it was open to the state to lower
the eligibility criterion, for sports quota, to other candidates too; the dissimilarity
in treatment is therefore, egregious. Moreover, the record indicates that except
for the academic years 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2023-24, for all the previous years,
the eligibility prescribed was lower; indeed, for 2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23,
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the criterion was “10+2 Pass”. Lastly, the sports policy, itself underlines that the
quota would be available to students who “pass their qualifying examination from
schools/colleges recognised by the Chandigarh administration” or had studied in
Chandigarh for two preceding years. Requiring all candidates to possess a fulfil
a certain eligibility standard- such as the one, prescribed in the sports policy, of
2023 (alluded to) or the qualifying marks prescribed by the concerned Board, or
university, to pass in the concerned subjects is entirely different from the
prescription of a uniform standard, far higher than the such a minimum threshold.
The imposition of the minimum 75% eligibility condition, therefore, does not
subserve the object of introducing the sports quota, but is, rather destructive of
it; the criterion, in that sense subverted the object and is discriminatory; it
therefore, falls afoul of the equality clause, in Article 14 of the Constitution.
19. For the above reasons, it is held that exclusion of the petitioner and other
like candidates, on the ground of their securing less than 75% in the qualifying
examination, was unwarranted and discriminatory. The reference to, and
incorporation of clauses giving effect to such criterion is held unenforceable and
void. This court is alive to the fact that allocation for admission to all but one seat
has been completed. By this court’s interim order, dated 08.08.2023, the
respondent was restrained from filling the left-over seat(s) which had to be filled
after the last round (of admission process) scheduled on 10.08.2023. In view of
the findings, it is hereby directed that the remaining seat or seats shall be filled
by application of the standards spelt out in the sports policy of the UT of
Chandigarh, as applied by the respondent university to determine inter se sports
merit of the candidates who had applied, but whose candidature was rejected on
the ground of ineligibility due to their securing less than 75% marks in the
qualifying examination. These candidates however should have qualified in terms
of the immediately preceding academic year’s criterion, applicable for the
balance sports quota seat(s). At the same time, candidates who have been selected
and given admission are concerned, shall not be disturbed. The process of filling
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the remaining vacant seat(s)- in the sports quota shall be completed within two
weeks. Nothing said in this judgment shall result in invalidation of admission of
candidates in other (non-sports) categories.
20. The impugned order is, resultantly, set aside. The appeal is allowed in the
above terms. In the circumstances, there shall be no order on costs.
……………….……………...……J.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT]
……………………………............J.
[ARAVIND KUMAR]
NEW DELHI
AUGUST 9, 2023.