STATE BANK OF INDIA vs. K.S. VISHWANATH

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3490 OF 2022 State Bank of India & Anr.               ...Appellants Versus K.S. Vishwanath        ...Respondent J U D G M E N T  M. R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and  order  dated  16.03.2021 passed by  the  High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No.4220 of 2011 by which the High Court has dismissed the said Writ Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R Natarajan Date: 2022.05.20 17:52:26 IST Reason: Appeal No.4220 of 2011 preferred by the appellant – employer – SBI and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by 1 the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority and directing the Bank to pay to the delinquent officer consequential benefits without back wages, the appellant ­ SBI – employer has preferred the present appeal. 2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under: That the respondent herein ­ the delinquent officer was working as a Deputy Manager (Cash) at SSI Peenya II Stage Branch   of   the   SBI   Bank   at   Bangalore   from   14.03.1996 onwards.  That there was a requirement of Rs.10 lakhs which was required to be collected from Peenya Industrial Estate Branch of the Bank.   That on the basis of one forged letter dated 06.08.1996, the delinquent officer withdrew Rs.10 lakhs fraudulently.   The delinquent officer produced a false letter dated   06.08.1996   at   Peenya   Industrial   Estate   Branch   and withdrew   the   aforesaid   amount   of   Rs.10   lakhs   which remained unaccounted at the SSI Branch.   The letter dated 06.08.1996 was purported to have been signed by one A.R. Balasubramanian, the AGM of the SSI Branch.  He denied his 2 signature found on the letter dated 06.08.1996.  Subsequently on tallying the account it was found that Rs.10 lakhs was withdrawn from Peenya Industrial Estate Branch which was to be deposited at SSI Branch had not been accounted for and the said amount had not been deposited with the SSI Branch. Thereafter the local Head Officer submitted a complaint to the CBI on 10.11.1998, based on which the FIR was registered. The   aforesaid   FIR   was   registered   after   the   preliminary investigation was held on 18.09.1998.  It was found that the fraud has been committed by the insider, who was well aware of   the   procedure   for   cash   remittance   as   well   as   with   the signature   of   the   Branch   Manager   of   SSI   Branch.     The respondent – delinquent officer was placed under suspension. Thereafter a departmental enquiry was initiated against the delinquent officer and he was charged with the charge­sheet as under: th “(i)  On 6  August, 1996, you got prepared a set   of   fraudulent   cash   remittance documented and by producing the same at Peenya Industrial Estate Branch, Bangalore made the officials threat believe them to be genuine and part with Rs.10 Lacs as cash remittance to SSI Peenya II stage Branch and you  failed  to  account   for  the  same  in  the books of SSI Peenya II Stage Branch. 3 (ii)  You have made substantial investments in   Kisan   Vikas   Patra   and   Special   Term Deposits with SBI Staff Co­operative Credit Society,   Bangalore   during   the   period 23.09.1998 to 08.06.1988 and you failed to make proper disclosures of the same in the Assets & Liabilities Statements submitted by you. Your act stated at (i) above has resulted in the Bank incurring an undue loss of Rs.10 Lacs.” 2.1 Before   the   Enquiry   Officer,   41   documents   and   9 witnesses   were  produced  by   the  management  to prove  the charges.     After   considering   the   statements/depositions   of management   witnesses   PW1   to   PW7   the   Enquiry   Officer submitted   his   report   holding   charge   no.1   as   proved   and charge   no.2   as   partly   proved.     The   Appointing   Authority agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and imposed the   penalty   of   dismissal   from   services   which   came   to   be confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 2.2 Thereafter the respondent – delinquent officer filed a writ petition before the learned Single Judge of the High Court.  By the   time   the   writ   petition   came   to   be   disposed   of,   the respondent   –   delinquent   officer   attained   the   age   of 4 superannuation.   By judgment and order dated 22.03.2011 the learned Single Judge set aside the order of punishment and directed the Bank to give all the consequential benefits to the   original   writ   petitioners   except   back   wages   as   in   the meantime he attained the age of superannuation.  2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the appointing authority, the Bank filed the present Writ Appeal No.4220 of 2011 before the Division Bench of the High Court.   The delinquent officer also filed Writ Appeal No.4599 of 2011 against the denial of back wages.  Both the writ appeals came to be heard, decided and disposed of by a common impugned judgment and order.  By the   common   impugned   judgment   and   order   the   Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed both the appeals, one preferred   by   the   appellant   –   management   and   another preferred by the delinquent officer. 2.4 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in dismissing the Writ Appeal No.4220 of 2011 and 5 confirming   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   learned Single Judge setting aside the punishment imposed by the appointing authority, the Bank – employer has preferred the present appeal. 3. Shri Sanjay Kapoor, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, both, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer which were on appreciation of evidence on record, both documentary as well as oral. 3.1 It is submitted that during the enquiry the Management examined   in   all   9   witnesses   and   produced   on   record   41 documents   to   prove   the   charges.     That   the   management witnesses were primarily employees of the Bank who were also cross­examined during the course of enquiry.  It is submitted that in the present case PW2 and PW3, the Cash Officer and the Accountant confirmed the practice adopted by the Branch seeking remittance, as also the fact that the respondent on the relevant date had come with one more person whom he 6 introduced as the Cashier of the Branch.   By examining the aforesaid   witnesses,   the   management   has   established   and proved that voucher and remittance/cash was given to the respondent inside the vault. 3.1.1  It is submitted that by examining the witness namely, the Branch Manager ­ PW4, the management has proved that the Branch Manager whose alleged signature was found on the alleged letter was in fact not of his and that he confirmed that   the   letter   allegedly   bearing   his   signature   seeking remittance of Rs.10 lakhs was not signed by him at all.   He explained   the   normal   practice   during   the   course   of   his evidence. 3.1.2  It is submitted that PW5 and PW6 confirmed that it was the   respondent   –   delinquent   officer   who   had   come   to   the Branch with another person with cash remittance and he was a witness to the said incident. 3.1.3  It is further submitted by Shri Kapoor, learned counsel appearing for the Branch Manager that even the management has been successful in establishing and proving that it was 7 respondent   –   delinquent   officer   who   got   prepared   the fraudulent   letter.     Further,   PW7   ­   proprietor   of   the   photo stating shop confirmed that it was the respondent who had come for typing the fraudulent letter and she got typed the same in her shop.  It is submitted that she also identified the respondent in the enquiry. 3.2 It is contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the   appellant   –   Bank   that   despite   the   aforesaid   clinching evidence placed on record the High Court has erred in holding that the bank has not been able to prove the complicity of the respondent   in   the   alleged   offence.     It   is   urged   that   while setting   aside   the   order   of   punishment   the   learned   Single Judge   acted   beyond   the   scope   and   ambit   of   the   writ jurisdiction and the power of the judicial review conferred on a constitutional court. 3.3 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of State of   Karnataka vs. N. Ganga Raj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 , it is submitted by Shri Kapoor, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant – Bank that in the said decision   this   Court   observed   and   held   that   the   power   of 8 Judicial Review conferred on a constitutional court is not that of an appellate authority but is confined only to the decision­ making process.  It is submitted that as held, under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not reappreciate the evidence, interfering with the conclusions in the enquiry, go into the adequacy or reliability of the evidence or correct the error of fact however grave it may be. 3.4 It is contended that the High Court has committed a grave error in interfering with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer  and setting  aside  the order of  punishment imposed by the appointing authority. 4. While   opposing   the   present   appeal   learned   counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent – delinquent officer has made the following submissions: (i) That the respondent herein had an unblemished record from his joining as a clerk till the date of alleged incident in his career of long 28 years and had even got two promotions; 9 (ii) That   the   entire   amount   of   Rs.10   lakhs   was allegedly paid to one Shri M.N. Kiran and not to the respondent – delinquent officer; (iii) Initially   the   Local   Head   Officer   of   the   Branch directed   one   Shri   M.R.   Srinath,   AGM   to investigate the matter.  Shri Srinath investigated the   matter   and   found   that   there   was   no involvement of any officer from the SSI Peenya II Branch and completely absolved the delinquent officer.  It is submitted that it was observed that the style of the letter requesting the remittance resembles   the   usual   style   adopted   by   the delinquent officer.  That it is observed that that none of the documents at the SSI Peenya Branch was tampered with which is indicative of non­ involvement of staff of the SSI Peenya Branch; (iv) That in the criminal proceedings investigated by the   CBI,   the   delinquent   officer   has   been acquitted by the competent criminal court.  That the   learned   Single   Judge   specifically   observed 10 and held that the enquiry was vitiated due to the violation of principles of natural justice; (v) The enquiry officer held the respondent guilty on mere surmises and conjectures.   (vi) The   enquiry   officer   erred   in   relying   on   the deposition   of   PW7,   who   claimed   to   be   the manager of the photocopying shop; (vii) That   the   manager   failed   to   prove   that document/letter dated 06.08.1996 was prepared by the respondent ­ delinquent officer.  (viii) Therefore, once the preparation of document was itself doubtful from the evidence of PW7 there is no question of forging the signatures on the said documents by the respondent; (ix) That therefore, the entire allegation is made on falsehood   which   has   not   been   proved   by   any evidence. 4.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Others, AIR 1978 SC   1277 ,   it   is   submitted   that   as   held   by   this   Court   the 11 domestic tribunals are quasi­judicial in character.  Therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence i.e. cogent material which with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of charges against him. 4.2 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 , it is submitted that a quasi­judicial tribunal which SCC 635 records findings based on no legal evidence, then the findings are either ipse­dixit or based on conjectures and surmises. The   enquiry   suffers   from   the   additional   infirmity   of   non­ application of mind and stands vitiated. 4.3 On   judicial   review,   it   is   submitted   that   if   there   is procedural   violation   and   violation   of   principles   of   natural justice,   the   courts   are   justified   to   set   aside   such administrative action and in many a case may possibly direct a denovo enquiry.  It is submitted that however, in the present case   the   delinquent   officer   has   attained   the   age   of 12 superannuation,   he   cannot   be   burdened   with   the   fresh enquiry   and   the   courts   have   to   set   aside   the   said administrative action itself.  It is submitted that therefore as such the respondent was required to be reinstated with full back wages.  That instead the High Court has denied the back wages to the respondent – delinquent officer.  Therefore, the impugned judgment and orders passed by the High Court are not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers   conferred   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   of India. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 5. In rejoinder learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant – Bank has pointed out that in view of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge confirmed by the Division Bench, the respondent – delinquent officer would get Rs.25.61 lakhs towards terminal benefits and arrears of pension etc. and thereafter Rs.20,502/­ per month towards pension,   which   would   amount   to   granting   premium   to dishonesty.  13 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 7. At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the departmental  enquiry  against the  delinquent officer  by  the disciplinary authority it was alleged that he got prepared a set of fraudulent cash remittance document and by producing the same at Peenya Industrial Estate Branch, Bangalore made the officials believe them to be genuine and part with Rs.10 Lacs as cash remittance to SSI Peenya II Stage Branch and after receiving the same cash he failed to account for the same in the   books   of   SSI   Peenya   II   Stage   Branch.     To   prove   the aforesaid   charge   the   management   as   such   examined   9 witnesses and produced 41 documents.  The aforesaid charge has   been   held   to   be   proved   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   on appreciation of the entire evidence on record including the deposition of the management witnesses examined as PW1 to PW7.   On considering the enquiry report and the findings recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   it   appears   that   the management   has   been   able   to   establish   and   prove   the complicity of the delinquent officer and has been successful in proving that; 14 The  delinquent officer  prepared the   fraudulent (i) letter dated 06.08.1996 (by examining PW7) who at the letter requesting for remittance resembles the style/writing of the delinquent officer (PW1); (ii) It was the respondent – delinquent officer who had   come   with   one   more   person   whom   he introduced as a new cashier and the delinquent officer   submitted   the   voucher   and   that   the remittance/cash   was   given   to   him   inside   the vault (by examining PW2 and PW3); (iii) The Branch Manager confirmed that the letter allegedly   bearing   his   signature   seeking remittance of Rs.10 lakhs was not signed by him (PW4); (iv) And   that   it   was   the   respondent   –   delinquent officer   who   went   to   the   Branch   with   another person for  cash  remittance  and  that the  cash remittance   was   paid   to   the   respondent   – delinquent officer.   The aforesaid findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were   on   the   appreciation   of   evidence   on   record,   both 15 documentary as well as oral.   Despite the above, the High Court has observed and held that the management had failed to prove the complicity of the delinquent officer in the alleged offence.  7.1 From the aforesaid, it can be seen that the management has been able to prove the complete chain of events which led to   the   conclusion   that   it   was   the   delinquent   officer   who prepared the false letter dated 06.08.1996; he went to the Branch for withdrawing the cash along with the fraudulent letter; that it was he who took the cash/remittance of Rs.10 lakhs and thereafter the said amount was not deposited with the SSI Peenya II Stage Branch. Then,   what   else   was   required   to   be   established   and proved   by   the   Management   to   prove   the   complicity   of   the delinquent officer? 7.2 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court it appears that the High Court has dealt with and considered the writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution   of   India   challenging   the   decision   of   the Bank/Management dismissing the delinquent officer as if the 16 High   Court   was   exercising   the   powers   of   the   Appellate Authority.     The   High   Court   in   exercise   of   powers   under Articles   226/227   of   the   Constitution   of   India   has reappreciated the evidence on record which otherwise is not permissible as held by this Court in a catena of decisions. 7.3 Recently in the case of   Nand Kishore Prasad (Supra) after   considering   other   decisions   of   this   Court   on   judicial review and the power of the High Court in a departmental enquiry and interference with the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry, it is observed and held that the High Court   is   not   a   court   of   appeal   over   the   decision   of   the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is further observed and held that the High Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority   competent   in   that   behalf,   and   according   to   the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. It is further observed that if there is some evidence, that the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent 17 officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to review/reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.  In paragraphs 9 to 14, this Court had considered other decisions on the power of the High Court on judicial review on the decisions taken by the Disciplinary Authority as under: “9.  In  State of A.P.  v.  S. Sree Rama Rao  [ State of  v.  , AIR 1963 SC 1723] , a A.P. S. Sree Rama Rao three­Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High   Court   is   not   a   court   of   appeal   over   the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine   whether   the   enquiry   is   held   by   an authority competent in that behalf, and according to  the  procedure prescribed in  that  behalf, and whether   the   rules   of   natural   justice   are   not violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726­ 27, para 7) “ 7 . … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice   are   not   violated.   Where   there   is   some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence 18 and to  arrive  at an  independent finding on the evidence.” 10.  In  B.C.   Chaturvedi  v.  Union   of   India  [ B.C. Chaturvedi  v.  Union of India , (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , again a three­Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of   judicial   review   is   meant   to   ensure   that   the individual   receives   fair   treatment   and   not   to ensure   that   the   conclusion   which   the   authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759­60, paras 12­13) “ 12 . Judicial review is not an  appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to   ensure   that   the   individual   receives   fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in   the   eye   of   the   court.   When   an   inquiry   is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant,   the   Court/Tribunal   is   concerned   to determine   whether   the   inquiry   was   held   by   a competent   officer   or   whether   rules   of   natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions   are   based   on   some   evidence,   the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.   When   the   authority   accepts   that evidence   and   conclusion   receives   support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold   that   the   delinquent   officer   is   guilty   of   the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial 19 review   does   not   act   as   appellate   authority   to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent   findings   on   the   evidence.   The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding   reached   by   the   disciplinary   authority   is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,   the   Court/Tribunal   may   interfere   with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13 . The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co­extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary   inquiry,   the   strict   proof   of   legal evidence   and   findings   on   that   evidence   are   not relevant.   Adequacy   of   evidence   or   reliability   of evidence   cannot   be   permitted   to   be   canvassed before   the   Court/Tribunal.   In  Union   of India  v.  H.C.   Goel  [ Union   of   India  v.  H.C.   Goel , (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court held   at   p.   728   that   if   the   conclusion,   upon consideration   of   the   evidence   reached   by   the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 11.  In  High   Court   of   Bombay  v.  Shashikant   S. Patil  [ High Court of Bombay  v.  Shashikant S. Patil , (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] , this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental   authorities   is   permitted   if   such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles   of   natural   justice   or   in   violation   of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 20 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16) “ .   The   Division   Bench   [ 16 Shashikant   S. Patil  v.  High Court of Bombay , 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was   an   appeal   against   the   order   of   the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court.   Interference   with   the   decision   of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising   jurisdiction   under   Article   226   of   the Constitution   if   such   authority   had   held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice   or   in   violation   of   statutory   regulations prescribing   the   mode   of   such   enquiry   or   if   the decision   of   the   authority   is   vitiated   by considerations   extraneous   to   the   evidence   and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the   authority,   on   the   very   face   of   it,   is   wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could   have   arrived   at   such   a   conclusion,   or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings   can   be   based,   then   adequacy   or   even reliability   of   that   evidence   is   not   a   matter   for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.”  In   v.  12. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Nemi Chand   Nalwaya  [ State   Bank   of   Bikaner   & Jaipur  v.  Nemi   Chand   Nalwaya ,   (2011)   4   SCC 584 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721] , this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and   reassess   the   evidence   led   in   the   domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the 21 findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 587­88, paras 7 & 10) “ 7 . It is now well settled that the courts will not act   as   an   appellate   court   and   reassess   the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds   for   interfering   with   the   findings   in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere   with   findings   of   fact   recorded   in departmental   enquiries,   except   where   such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is   to   see   whether   a   tribunal   acting   reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if   principles   of   natural   justice   or   statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found   to   be   arbitrary,   capricious,   mala   fide   or based   on   extraneous   considerations.   (Vide  B.C. Chaturvedi  v.  Union   of   India  [ B.C. Chaturvedi  v.  Union of India , (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996   SCC   (L&S)   80]   ,  Union   of   India  v.  G. Ganayutham  [ Union   of   India  v.  G.   Ganayutham , (1997)   7   SCC   463   :   1997   SCC   (L&S)   1806] and  Bank of India  v.  Degala Suryanarayana  [ Bank of  India  v.  Degala  Suryanarayana , (1999) 5 SCC 762   :   1999   SCC   (L&S)   1036]   ,  High   Court   of Bombay  v.  Shashikant   S.   Patil  [ High   Court   of 22 Bombay  v.  Shashikant S. Patil , (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] .) * 10 .   The   fact   that   the   criminal   court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him   the   benefit   of   doubt,   will   not   in   any   way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor   affect  the   validity   of   the   finding   of   guilt  or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required   in   criminal   proceedings   being   different from   the   standard   of   proof   required   in departmental   enquiries,   the   same   charges   and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings,   that   is,   finding   of   guilt   in departmental   proceedings   and   an   acquittal   by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This   is   more   so   when   the   departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point   of   time,   when   compared   to   the   criminal proceedings.   The   findings   by   the   criminal   court will   have   no   effect   on   previously   concluded domestic   enquiry.   An   employee   who   allows   the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary   authority   to   attain   finality   by   non­ challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision   on   the   ground   that   subsequently,   the criminal court has acquitted him.” 13.  In another judgment reported as  Union of India  v.  P.   Gunasekaran  [ Union   of   India  v.  P. Gunasekaran , (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)   554]   ,   this   Court   held   that   while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as   an   appellate   authority   in   the   disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when   the   High   Court   shall   not   interfere   in   the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13) 23 “ 13 . Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: ( i ) reappreciate the evidence; ( ii ) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in   case   the   same   has   been   conducted   in accordance with law; ( iii ) go into the adequacy of the evidence; ( iv ) go into the reliability of the evidence; ( v ) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. ( vi ) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; ( vii ) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14.  On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as  Allahabad   Bank  v.  Krishna   Narayan Tewari  [ Allahabad   Bank  v.  Krishna   Narayan Tewari , (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335]   ,   wherein   this   Court   held   that   if   the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings.   We   do   not   find   that   even   on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence   or   that   the   findings   are   perverse.   The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there   are   discrepancies   in   the   evidence   of   the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned 24 a   finding   that   the   respondent   is   guilty   of misconduct.” That   thereafter   this   Court   has   observed   and   held   in paragraph 7, 8 and 15 as under: “7.  The   disciplinary   authority   has   taken   into consideration   the   evidence   led   before   the   IO   to return a finding that the charges levelled against the respondent stand proved.  We find that  the interference in the order  of 8. punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision­making process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority. xxx  xxx xxx

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decisions   to  the  facts  of   the   case   on  hand,   we  are  of   the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in interfering with the order passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent – delinquent officer from service. The High Court has erred in reappreciating the entire evidence on record and thereafter interfering with the findings of fact recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   and   accepted   by   the disciplinary   authority.   By   interfering   with   the   findings recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   which   as   such   were   on appreciation of evidence on record, the order passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality.   From the findings recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   recorded   hereinabove,   it cannot be said that there was no evidence at all which may reasonably support the conclusion that the Delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. 26

respondent – delinquent officer that as he has been acquitted in a criminal court and therefore, he cannot be held guilty in a disciplinary   proceeding   is   concerned,   the   aforesaid   has   no substance.     From   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the criminal court it appears that he has been given the benefit of doubt.  Even otherwise the standard of proof which is required in a criminal case and that of the disciplinary proceedings is different.     The   fact   that   the   criminal   court   acquitted   the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect   the   validity   of   the   finding   of   guilt   or   consequential punishment.  As held by this Court in a catena of decisions the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries,   the   same   charges   and   evidence   may   lead   to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings 27 10. Now the next question which is posed for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appointing   authority   was   justified   in   dismissing   the delinquent officer  from service  is  concerned looking  to the seriousness of the charge proved of misappropriating the sum of Rs.10 lakhs and not depositing the same with the Bank, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal can be said to be disproportionate   to   the   charge   and   misconduct   held   to   be proved.   At this stage even the modus operandi adopted by the delinquent officer also deserves the consideration.  As per the   evidence   on   record,   he   went   along   with   the   false   and fabricated   document   dated  06.08.1996   along   with   another person and he introduced that person as a new cashier and he   ensured   that   the   voucher   was   not   signed   by   him   but singed by the other person who was introduced by him as a new cashier.  Therefore, he saw to it that there is no evidence on record that he actually received the money.   This shows the   criminal   mind/conduct   on   the   part   of   the   delinquent officer.  Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the disciplinary authority/competent 28 authority/management   had   committed   any   error   in dismissing the respondent – delinquent officer from service.  11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   Division Bench   of   the   High   Court   dismissing   the   appeal   and   not interfering with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge which interfered with the order of punishment imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   dismissing   the respondent – delinquent officer from service and the judgment and  order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   are   hereby quashed and set aside. The   order   passed   by   the   Management   dismissing   the respondent   –   delinquent   officer   on   proved   charge   and misconduct is hereby restored. Present Appeal is accordingly Allowed.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.  …………………………………J.              (M. R. SHAH) …………………………………J.                                                  (B.V. NAGARATHNA) New Delhi,  May 20, 2022. 29