R.JANKIAMMAL vs. S.K.KUMARASWAMY (D) THR.LRS.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1537 OF 2016 R. JANAKIAMMAL ... APPELLANT VERSUS S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.1538 OF 2016 S.R. SOMASUNDARAM AND ANOTHER ... APPELLANTS VERSUS S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. These   two   appeals   have   been   filed   challenging   the Division Bench judgment dated 23.11.2011 of Madras High Court dismissing the A.S. No.281 of 2000 and A.S. No.332 of   1999   filed   by   the   appellants   respectively.     The Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MEENAKSHI KOHLI Date: 2021.06.30 15:13:48 IST Reason: parties shall be referred to as described in O.S.No.1101 of   1987   (S.R.   Somasundaram   vs.   S.K.   Kumarasamy).   The 2 appellant,   R.   Janakiammal   in   C.A.No.1537   of   2016   was defendant   No.7   in   O.S.No.1101   of   1987   whereas   S.R. Somasundaram, appellant in C.A.No.1538 of 2016 was the plaintiff   in   O.S.No.1101   of   1987.   Janakiammal   is   the mother   of   Somasundaram.   Relevant   facts   and   events necessary to decide these two appeals are: 2. The parties came from Pattanam, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu. We may notice the Genealogical Tree of the family which is to the following effect: Kandaswami Gounder (died in 1964) |    ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­|    |                                       |   Senniamalai(died)                          | st nd 1  wife's son                       2  wife's sons                                            |            ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­            |                 |                            |            Rangasami        Kumaraswami D­1   S.K. Chinnaswami D­4            (Died in 1967­   Sundarambal D­2   Smt.C.Kamalgm    D­5        Smt. Janakiammal D­7               |                |              |                            |                |   ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­       |                |    |                 |             |        |                |   Shanmugha     Somasundaram  Saraswathi   |                |  valauyutham    Plaintiff     D­8     |                 |    D­10                                     |                |                                       |              |                            Kandaavadival D­3        |                                                      |                         ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­                          |             |               |     Satyavathi     Ponmeenakshi      C.Senthil Kumaravel                      D­6 3 3. The   plaintiff,   S.R.   Somasundaram   and   his   mother, Janakiammal who are the appellants in these two appeals belong to branch of Rangasamy Gounder whereas other two branches   are   of   S.K.   Kumarasamy,D­1   and   S.K. Chinnasamy,D­4.   Three   brothers   with   their   father   A.V. Kandasamy   Gounder   were   residing   as   a   joint   family   in ancestral   house   at   Sadapalayam   Hemlet,   Karumathampatti Village, Palladam Taluka, District Coimbatore. Rangasamy and   others   received     a   land   measuring   86.72   acres   by partition deed executed on 27.09.1953 between late A.V. Kandasamy Gounder and Ponnammal, junior wife of Kandasamy Gounder, his first wife, Senniamalai, son of Kandasamy Gounder   from   first   wife,   Rangasamy   Gounder,   S.K. Kumarasamy, S.K. Chinnasamy, all sons of second wife of Kandasamy.   4. These   appeals   are   concerned   with   three   branches, namely, Rangasamy, Kumarasamy and Chinnasamy. In the year 1954­55, three brothers purchased various properties and started rice mill business called Laxmi Rice Mills and also started Swamy Textiles in 1976, a match factory, a 4 slate factory, saw mills, timber business and power loom out of joint family funds. On 07.11.1960 a partition deed was registered between three brothers with respect to the properties allotted to them as per registered partition deed dated 27.09.1953 along with the properties purchased by three brothers in the ratio of 1/3rd each. Even after partition,   three   brothers   continued   to   live   under   the same roof and carried on business as partners. In the year 1963 they purchased housing site by sale deed dated 16.10.1963   in   Somanur   Hemlet,   Village   Karumathampatti, and   constructed   a   house   therein   and   all   the   three brothers started living in Somanur house from the year 1964 and carried on their different joint business. On 27.05.1967,   Rangasamy   Gounder   died   in   a   road   accident leaving   behind   his   widow,   Janakiammal,   two   sons,   S.R. Somasundaram, S.R. Shanmugavelayutham and one daughter, S.Saraswathy.  From 1968 to 1978 various properties were purchased in the name of three branches. The family also purchased in the year 1972 Tea Estate known as High Field Estate   in   the   name   of   defendant   Nos.1,   4,   10   and plaintiff. A Private Limited Company known as Swamy and 5 Swamy Plantations (P) Ltd. was also promoted with  family members being shareholders and Directors.  5. In the year 1975, 50 acres of lands were purchased in Vedapatti village, in the name of defendant Nos.1, 4, 10 and plaintiff. In the year 1978 a palatial Bungalow was   purchased   in   Tatabad,   Coimbatore.   Defendant   No.10, who   was   Captain   in   the   Indian   Army,   came   back   to Coimbatore after leaving his job to look after the family business and properties. From the year 1973, he started looking   after   the   properties   at   Coonoor.   Somasundaram, the   plaintiff   started   his   studies   at   Coimbatore   and Chennai   and   after   completing   his   studies   came   back   to Coimbatore in the year 1979.  6. In   Coimbatore   one   Vasudeva   Industries   Ltd.,   which was   in liquidation since 1967 was taken on lease from official liquidator of Madras High Court by one Shroff, who along with defendant No.4, S.K. Chinnasamy formed a partnership   firm   to   run   Vasudeva   Industries   Ltd. Defendant No.1, S.K. Kumarasamy was appointed as General Manager to look after the affairs of Vasudeva Industries Limited. An application was filed in the year 1981 in 6 Company   Petition   No.39   of   1956.   Defendant   No.1,   S.K. Kumarasamy   filed   an   affidavit   in   support   of   Company Application   No.320   of   1981   praying   that   liquidation proceedings be closed. On 30.04.1981, the High Court of Madras passed order directing convening of a meeting of the creditors. In the meeting of creditors a draft scheme submitted was approved on 09.06.1981, Madras High Court passed   an   order   on   22.01.1982   allowed   the   application filed   by   defendant   No.1,   permanently   stayed   the liquidation proceedings and permitted running of Vasudeva Industries Ltd. by the Board of Directors. On 03.02.1982 a   Resolution   was   passed   to   bring   the   mills   under   the control   of   the   Board   of   Directors,   including   the plaintiff,   defendant   Nos.1,   4   and   10.   The   name   of Vasudeva Industries Ltd. was changed to Vasudeva Textiles Mills.   In   the   year   1983   Vasudeva   Textiles Mills( hereinafter referred to as “Mills”) obtained loan from Punjab National Bank in which personal guarantee was also given by the plaintiff and defendant No.10, who were Directors. The plaintiff and defendant No.10 were also in the year 1984 elected as Managing Directors. The Swamy & 7 Swamy Co. which was earlier running the Mill on lease was dissolved in the year 1984. The Mills although started running by the Board of Directors but in the years 1983, 1984   and   1985   accumulated   losses   were   more   than   the profit of Mills.  7. On 19.01.1984, C. Senthil Kumaravel, defendant No.6 and son of S.K. Chinnasami, defendant   No.4 filed O.S. No.37   of   1984   praying,   inter   alia,   for   partition   and allotment of 1/6th share to him. In O.S.No.37 of 1984 Senthil Kumaravel, the plaintiff came with the case that the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1, 3,4, 8,9 and 10 were members   of   joint   family.   In   O.S.No.37   of   1984, Janakiammal   was   impleaded   as   defendant   No.8, Shanmugavelayutham   as   defendant   No.9,   Somasundaram   as defendant No.10 and Saraswathi as defendant No.11. In the plaint   case,   it   was   stated   that   even   after   registered partition deed dated 07.11.1960 between three branches, defendant   Nos.1,   4   and   the   deceased   K.   Rangasami continued to live jointly and did business jointly. All the three branches lived jointly. In the plaint, it was further stated that from the savings of the income and by 8 mortgaging ancestral property, the capital necessary for the business was found and the business was expanded from time   to   time.   It   was   further   pleaded   that   plaintiff, Senthil Kumaravel was entitled to 1/6th share. Defendant Nos.8   to   11,   representing   the   branch   of   deceased   K. Rangasami, were entitled jointly 1/3rd share in all suit properties. The plaintiff in suit had prayed following reliefs: "a) to divide the immovable suit properties   described in the schedules 'B', 'D' and   'E'   and   items   1   to   9   in   Schedule   'C'   hereunder into six equal shares by metes   and bounds with reference to good and bad  soil and allot one such share to him with  separate possession;  b) to   allot   1/6th   share   in   the   shares   mentioned in item 10 and 11 of Schedule   'C' and item 2 of Schedule 'D' described  hereunder;  c) directing the defendants to pay cost of   the suit;”  8. The plaint Schedule 'B' included ancestral land in Palladam   and   Samalapuram   villages   with   house   at Sadapalayam   Helmet.   Schedule   'C'   included   various immovable properties and included residential building, 9 shares   in   M/s.   Swamy   and   Swamy   Plantations   (P)   Ltd. Coonoor,     and   shares   of   M/s.   Vasudeva   Industries   Ltd. were also mentioned as item Nos. 10 and 11 of Scheduled 'C'. In the above suit only defendant Nos.1 to 3 of the suit, namely, S.K. Kumarasamy, Sundarambal, wife of S.K. Kumarasamy and minor Kandavadivel son of S.K. Kumarasamy filed their written statements. In the written statement, it was pleaded that no doubt some properties have been acquired jointly in the names of the defendant Nos.1, 3, 4,9 and 10, but they must be deemed to be only co­sharers in respect of those properties. It was pleaded that three branches   were   allotted   shares   in   1960   partition   and plaint case that parties continued to live jointly was denied.  9. In   O.S.No.37   of   1984,   an   application   under   Order XXIII Rule 3 was filed on 06.08.1984 by the plaintiff containing signatures of plaintiff and defendants. In the application under Order XXIII Rule 3 in Schedule 'A' to Schedule 'J', various items of properties were listed and allocated   to   different   members   of   the   family.   On   the basis   of   application   under   Order   XXIII   Rule   3,   Sub­ 10 ordinate Judge, Coimbatore passed an order dated 6.8.1984 and directed for preparation of decree on the basis of compromise petition.  10. In   the   compromise   decree   although   various agricultural properties, house properties and shares were allotted to two other branches, i.e., branches of S.K. Kumarasamy   and   S.K.   Chinnasamy   but   the   branch   of Rangasamy   was   allocated   only   shares   in   Vasudeva Industries which was under liquidation and taken under the orders of Madras High Court dated 21.01.1982 to be run by the Board of Directors. 11. Minor children of defendant No.10 filed O.S.No. 827 of 1987 through their mother challenging the compromise decree dated 06.08.1984 on the ground that they were not parties thereto. On 03.08.1987 O.S. No.1101 of 1987 was filed   by   both   the   sons   of   Rangasamy,   i.e.,   S.R. Shanmugnavelayutham   and   S.R.   Somasundaram.   In   O.S. No.1101   of   1987   defendant   Nos.1,2   and   3   filed   their written statements where it was pleaded that there was agreement on 08.03.1981 between the three branches where defendant No.1 was to pay Rs. 4 lacs to defendant No.4 11 and plaintiff was to pay Rs. 7 lacs to defendant No.4 and since payment was not made to defendant No.4 suit was filed   through   his   son.   It   was   further   pleaded   that compromise dated 06.08.1984 was to give effect to earlier agreement dated 08.03.1981. In the O.S. No.827 of 1987, an affidavit was filed by the mother of the minor stating that they had entered into the compromise with defendant No.1 hence seeking permission to withdraw the suit. On 10.02.1993, the O.S. No.827 of 1987 was withdrawn, on the same date Shanmugavelayuthem who was the first plaintiff in O.S.No.1101 of 1987 withdrew himself from the suit and was   transposed   as   defendant   No.10   in   the   suit.   The written   statement   was   filed   by   Janakiammal,   defendant No.8 supporting the plaintiff's case and also praying for partition   of   her   share.   Senthil   Kumaravel,   who   was plaintiff   in   Suit   No.37   of   1984,   filed   a   written statement in O.S.No.1101 of 1987 where he stated that he filed   Suit   No.37   of   1984   at   the   instance   of   S.K. Kumarasamy,   defendant   No.1   and   decree   dated   06.08.1984 was sham and nominal, and was not to be given effect to. Additional   written   statements   were   filed   by   defendant 12 Nos.1 to 3. Defendant No.10 also filed written statement supporting the case of defendant No.1. Reply was filed by plaintiff, Somasundaram to the written statements filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 3.  12. Five   witnesses   were   examined   on   behalf   of   the plaintiff. Somasundaram, plaintiff appeared as PW.1. The plaintiff   filed   Exhs.   A­1   to   A­55.   On   the   side   of defendants,   four   witnesses   were   examined.   Janakiammal appeared   as   DW.2   whereas   S.K.   Kumarasamy   appeared   as DW.1.   Exh.B­1   to   B­104   were   marked   on   behalf   of   the defendants.   Exh. X­I to X­27 have been marked through witnesses.  13. The   trial   court   framed   five   issues   and   six additional issues. One of the additional issues was that whether the suit is not maintainable under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC. The trial court vide its judgment dated   30.09.1997   dismissed   the   suit.   The   trial   court upheld the plea of defendant Nos.1 to 3 that O.S.No.1101 of 1987 was barred by Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC. The trial court also upheld the partition deed dated 07.11.1960 and the agreement dated 08.03.1981. The trial court held that 13 after the year 1960 the entire family was not living as joint family and all the three branches are co­owners as far   as   properties   are   concerned   and   were   running partnership businesses. Challenging the judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit two appeals were filed in the   High   Court.   A.S.No.332   of   1999   was   filed   by Somasundaram, the plaintiff and A.S. No.281 of 2000 was filed by Janakiammal defendant No.8.  14. The   High   Court   has   noticed   the   point   for determination in the appeal, i.e., whether O.S.No.1101 of 1987   is   maintainable   in   the   light   of   the   provisions contained in Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC. The High Court, however, observed that appeals could be disposed of   according   to   the   finding   to   be   recorded   on   the aforesaid point for consideration, however, it has not formulated   any   other   point   for   consideration   though extensive   arguments   have   been   made   by   the   respective counsel. It is useful to reproduce paragraphs 163 and 164 of   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   which   are   to   the following effect: “163. The point for determination that 14 arises for consideration in the above appeals is as to whether the suit seeking to declare the decree passed in O.S.No.37 of 1984 on the file of the Sub Court, Coimbatore, is sham and nominal, ultra­vires, collusive, unsustainable, invalid, unenforceable and not binding on the plaintiff, is maintainable in the light of the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC and Order 23 Rule 3­A of the CPC? 164. As the appeals could be disposed of on the basis of the finding to be recorded on the aforesaid point for determination, we have not   formulated   any   other   point   for determination, though extensive arguments have been   made   by   the   respective   counsel   as   to whether the partition effected under Ex.B­26, dated 07.11.1960 between Rangaswamy (father of the   plaintiff),   Kumaraswamy   (D­1)   and Chinnaswamy   (D­4)   was   acted   upon   or   not; whether   there   was   a   joint   family   among   the three branches after 07.11.1960;   whether the various   businesses   run   under   different partnership   firms   are   the   joint   family businesses.” 15. The High Court after considering the submissions of the   respective   counsel   came   to   the   conclusion   that compromise decree dated 06.08.1984 in Suit No.37 of 1984 was valid, the plaintiff failed to prove that any fraud was played.  The plaintiff, further, failed to prove that they gave any guarantee in the year 1984 for taking loan from Punjab National Bank. Hence, basis of the suit that 15 they signed the compromise deed on the representation of defendant   No.1   and   that   the   plaintiff   and   defendant having   given   personal   guarantee   for   loan   obtained   for Vasudeva Industries Ltd., to save family properties from claim of the Bank, the properties be kept only in the name of defendant No.1 and defendant No.4 but the right of the plaintiff and defendants will be held intact.  16. The High Court held that it has not been proved that any personal guarantee was given by the plaintiff, the very ground   pleaded by the plaintiff is knocked out.  The High Court further held that suit was barred by Order XXIII   Rule   3A   CPC   and   only   remedy   available   was   to question the compromise decree in the same suit. The High Court   dismissed   both   the   appeals.   Aggrieved   by   the judgment of the High Court, these two appeals have been filed. 17. We have heard Shri V. Giri and Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior counsel   for the appellants. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel has appeared for contesting respondents.   Shri   S.   Nagamuthu,   learned   senior   counsel 16 has appeared for defendant No.11 and other defendants. 18. Shri V.Giri, learned senior counsel appearing for R. Janakiammal   submits   that   the   compromise   decree   dated 06.08.1984 in Suit No.37 of 1984 is unfair, inequitable and fraudulent. Shri Giri submits that Janakiammal who was defendant No.8 in Suit No.37 of 1984 was not aware of the compromise application or its terms. Janakiammal is a widow only knowing Tamil, she signed the English written papers which was brought to her by DW­2, wife of D­1. She never   engaged   any   counsel.   Shri   P.R.   Thirumalnesan, learned counsel, was never engaged by her. She never went into   the   Court   nor   appeared   before   the   Court   on 06.08.1984. The family possessed several hundreds acres of land, several houses and other numerous assets but in the compromise decree, she was allotted 200 shares which were in the name of Smt. Kamalam, DW­2 of a sick mill, i.e., Vasudev Mill.  19.   The   properties   which   she   inherited   from   her   late husband   Rangasamy   and   numerous   properties   which   were purchased in her name after the death of her husband were 17 all allocated to branches of D­1 and D­4 without giving an inch of land to her. The shares were also allotted to D­2 and D­5, the wives of D­1 and D­4, who have no pre existing rights. Janakiammal and her son Somasundaram did not get any immovable property in the compromise decree except shares of the Vasudeva mills, a sick company. The consent decree clearly records that no Vakalatnama has been filed by D­8. When no Vakalatnama was filed by  D­8, she was not represented by a counsel and the Court was misled   to   believe   that   Thirumalnesan,   advocate represented D­8. 20. The learned counsel submits that the family of three brothers lived jointly and continued to be joint family even   after   partition   dated   07.11.1960   and   acquired several   properties   in   the   name   of   three   branches.   The family possessed more than 260 acres of land at different places with several houses but no immovable property was allocated to Janakiammal or her sons. 21. O.S. No.37 of 1984 was filed on the behest of S.K. Kumarasamy by C. SenthilKumaravel, son of S.K.Chinnasamy. 18 C.   SenthilKumaravel   in   his   written   statement   in   Suit No.1101 of 1987 has pleaded that Suit No. 37 of 1984 was filed by him at the behest of S.K.Kumarasamy, D­1. C. Senthilkumaravel   further   pleaded   that   decree   in   O.S. No.37   of   1984   was   sham   and   nominal.   The   200   shares allotted to Janakiammal as per compromise decree dated 06.08.1984 which were in the name of Smt. Kamalam were never   transferred   to   Janakaiammal.   Janakiammal   fully supported the plaint case of suit No.1101 of 1987.  22. The partition agreement dated 08.03.1981 as pleaded by D­1 was only an imaginary story. No   such agreement was filed in the court nor the same was pleaded in a written statement filed by D.1­3 in O.S. No.37 of 1984. Despite the agreement dated 08.03.1981 not being produced in   the   Court,   the   trial   court   in   its   judgment   dated 30.09.1997   had   erroneously   accepted   the   factum   of partition by agreement dated 08.03.1981 and accepted the case   of   defendant   No.1   that   compromise   decree   dated 06.08.1984   was   to   give   effect   to   the   partition   dated 08.03.1981.  19 23. No partition was affected in the year 1981 and the family remained as a joint family. In O.S. No.37 of 1984, the house property at Tatabad which was in the name of D­1, was not included, which property was purchased by joint family fund and the three branches had share in house at Tatabad which was mentioned at item No.10 in Schedule C of Suit No.1101 of 1987. 24.   The   pleading   of   defendant   No.1   that   under   the agreement dated 08.03.1981, the plaintiff was to pay Rs. Seven Lakhs to D­4 and D­1 was to pay Rs. Four Lakhs to D­4 were all imaginary stories set up by D­1. Neither any agreement took place on 08.03.1981 nor any amount was to be   paid   by   plaintiff   to   D­4.   The   house   at   Tatabad purchased in the year 1978 with the joint family fund was not included in O.S.  No.37 of 1984, and in the house all members   of   the   family   had   a   share.   The   amount   of Rs.1,03,000/­, which was received by Janakiammal from the Insurance Corporation after the death of her husband was given to defendant No.1, which was utilised for business purposes. The High Court did not consider the case of 20 Janakiammal as pleaded.  25.   Shri   Gaurav   Agrawal,   learned   counsel   appearing   in Civil Appeal No. 1538 of 2016 on behalf of Somasundaram submits   that   plaintiff   was   deprived   of   his   immovable properties including land and houses and was given only worthless   shares   in   the   Compromise   decree   dated 06.08.1984. He submits that the suit No.1101 of 1987 was filed   by   the   plaintiff   to   declare   the   decree   dated 06.08.1984 void, unenforceable and fraudulent.  26. It is submitted that the plaintiff was taken to the Court   by   D­1   on   06.08.1984   and   was   asked   to   sign   the compromise application on the representation that since the plaintiff and D­10 had given personal guarantee for the loan taken for Vasudeva Textiles Mills from Punjab National   Bank,   their   name   should   not   be   any   immovable property to save the family property. The plaintiff was assured by D­1 that his right in immovable property shall not be affected by the Compromise decree as the decree dated 06.08.1984 shall not be made effective.  21 27. It is submitted that the allocation of the properties in the compromise decree is unfair. A fraud was played on the plaintiff as well as on the court in obtaining the compromise decree. It is submitted that the Order XXIII Rule 3A shall not govern a case where a fraud is played on the Court. Suit No. 37 of 1984 was filed on illusory cause of action, bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A shall not apply. The High Court after having found that suit is barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A has not entered into other   issues.   The   house   property   of   Tatabad   which   was purchased   in   1978   was   not   included   in   Schedule   of O.S.NO.37   of   1984   which   property   was   included   in   Suit No.1101 of 1987, hence, suit for share in house property at   Tatabad   was   fully   maintainable.   The   plaintiff   has completed his graduation in Textile Engineering. Vasudeva Industries   was   not   a   family   concern,   which   was   under litigation   and   was   not   a   profit   making   venture.   The consent decree dated 06.08.1984 was never acted upon. The mill could not be revived and closed down in 1987. The defendant   No.1   continued   to   manage   the   affairs   of   the mill till 1989 when he resigned.  22 28.   Shri   Kapil   Sibal   refuting   the   submissions   of   the appellants   contends   that   partition   dated   07.11.1960 between three branches was given effect to. Income Tax Returns were filed by three branches on the basis of 1960 partition. There was an arrangement made in 1981 under which the D­1 was to take properties at Coonoor, D­4 was to   take   properties   at   Somnur   whereas   plaintiff   and defendant No.1 decided to take Vasudeva Textiles Mills. The Suit No.37 of 1984 was filed by the son of D­4 at his instance.   29. Shri Sibal submits that the Suit No.37 of 1984 has been decided on compromise where all the defendants have signed the compromise application including Janakiammal as   well   as   Somasundaram.   The   Vakalatnama   on   behalf   of defendant Nos.7 to 11 was filed by Advocate Thirumalnesan who represented defendants 8 to 11. It is submitted that plaintiff and D­10 were all educated persons and having signed the compromise application, it is not open to them to contend that they signed the application under some misrepresentation or fraud.  23 30. The plaintiff and defendant No.10 wanted to take the mill in their share hence, the shares of the mill were allocated in the compromise decree to Rangasamy Branch. Rangasamy Branch had 95% shares in the Mill, i.e., the controlling share. The mill was valued at the rate of Rs.32 Lakhs. There is no fraud in the compromise decree. The Compromise decree dated 06.08.1984 was given effect to.   There   being   partition   in   the   year   1960   there   was neither any joint family property nor any joint family. It   was   pleaded   by   the   plaintiff   that   his   mother   and sister expressed a desire not to take any share. In 1989, the plaintiff had sold the Vasudeva Mills.  31. Shri Sibal submits that none of the pleadings of the plaintiff falls in the definition of fraud. No fraud was committed   on   the   plaintiff.   Under   Order   XXIII   Rule   3A CPC, no separate suit could have been filed to question the compromise decree.  32.   Shri   Sibal   submits   that   the   remedy   open   for   the plaintiff was to either file an application in suit No.37 24 of 1984 or file an appeal against the Compromise decree. Filing of suit No.1101 of 1987 is nothing but litigative gambling by the plaintiff. Shri Sibal submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed with costs.  33. Shri Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the   defendant   No.11   has   supported   the   judgment   of   the Courts   below.   He   submits   that   from   1989,   selling   of shares of the mill started. The defendant No.1 purchased the   shares   of   the   mill.   The   Compromise   decree   dated 06.08.1984 was acted upon. In 1994, the complete shares of the mill were transferred. Shri Nagamuthu submits that the defendant No.11 and other defendants were transferee of the shares. 34.   Shri   Giri   in   rejoinder   submission   submits   that Janakiammal’s   case   was   that   she   never   engaged   any advocate. She, however, stated that she had signed the compromise application in Tamil. Her case was that she does not know English and the Compromise was written in 25 English.   Signatures   of   Janakiammal   were   taken   on compromise application by D­2, wife of D­1, who in usual course,   for   the   purposes   of   business   and   Tax   obtains signatures of Janakiammal from time to time. The family was running various businesses. Shri Giri submits that the judgment of the trial court dated 06.08.1984 in O.S. No.37 of 1984 states that Vakalatnama of defendant Nos.8 to 13 was not filed. He submits that certified copy of Vakalatnama filed by advocate Thirumalnesan on behalf of defendant Nos.8 to 13 has also not been brought on record and   according   to   the   papers   submitted   by   D­1,   the Vakalatnama and the documents have been destroyed. How can D­1 say that the Vakalatnama has been destroyed.  35. Shri Giri submits that the house at Tatabad which was included as Item No.10 in Schedule C in Suit No.1101 of 1987 was purchased from a joint family fund. Although the house was taken in auction by D­1 but the consideration for house was not paid by D­1 individually, rather the amount   was   obtained   from   company   Swamy   and   Swamy Plantations, which is a private limited company in which 26 D­1, D­4 and D­10 had shares. The Branch of Rangasamy in  Swamy and Swamy Plantations had about more than one­third share.   The   Tatabad   house   having   been   obtained   from   a private   company   which   was   a   family   business,   all   the branches shall have shares in the house. The Suit No.37 of 1984 having not included the Tatabad house, the suit for partition of house being Suit No.1101 of 1987 was fully   maintainable   and   both   the   Courts   erred   in   not granting share to the plaintiff in the said house.  36. One of the additional   issues,   which   were   framed   by the   trial   court,   was   “Whether   the   suit   is   not maintainable in view of Order 23 Rule 3 (A) of the Code of Civil Procedure?” 37. The trial court has decided the above issue against the plaintiff holding that separate suit challenging the compromise decree is barred as per Order XXIII Rule 3A of Civil Procedure Code. 38.   The   High   Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   as   noted above has observed that the appeals can be decided on only one point of consideration, i.e., as to whether Suit 27 No.   1101   of   1997   filed   by   the   plaintiff   Somasundaram challenging   the   compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   was barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A.  The High Court in the impugned judgment relying on judgments of this Court held that   no   separate   suit   is   maintainable   questioning   the compromise decree, hence Suit No.1101 of 1987 was barred. Both the Courts having held that Suit No.1101 of 1987 filed by the plaintiff is barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A, we deem it appropriate to first consider the above issue.  39. Order XXIII Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit. In Rule 3 amendments were made by Act No. 104 of 1976 by which   a   proviso   and   an   explanation   was   added.     Order XXIII Rule 3 as amended is to the following effect:­

28 or satisfaction is the same as the subject­ matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party   and   denied   by   the   other   that   an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no   adjournment   shall   be   granted   for   the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation ­An   agreement   or   compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed   to   be   lawful   within   the   meaning   of this rule;” 40. By the same amendment Act No.104 of 1976, a new Rule, i.e., Rule 3A was added providing “3A. Bar to suit.  ­ No suit shall lie to set   aside   a   decree   on   the   ground   that   the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.” 41. Determination of disputes between persons and bodies is   regulated   by   law.   The   legislative   policy   of   all legislatures is to provide a mechanism for determination of dispute so that dispute may come to an end and peace in   society   be   restored.     Legislative   policy   also   aims for giving finality  of  the  litigation,  simultaneously 29 providing   higher   forum   of   appeal/revision   to   vend   the grievances of an aggrieved party.  Rule 3A which has been added by above amendment provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.  At the same time, by adding the proviso in Rule 3, it is provided that when there is a dispute as to whether an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the same shall be decided by the Court which recorded the compromise.  Rule 3 of Order XXIII provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the Court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and pass a decree in accordance therewith.  Rule 3 uses the expression “lawful agreement or compromise”. The   explanation   added   by   amendment   provided   that   an agreement or a compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall not be deemed to be lawful.” 42. Reading Rule 3 with Proviso and Explanation, it is 30 clear that an agreement or compromise, which is void or voidable, cannot be recorded by the Courts and even if it is recorded the Court on challenge of such recording can decide the question.   The Explanation refers to Indian Contract Act.   The Indian Contract Act provides as to which contracts are void or voidable.  Section 10 of the Indian   Contract   Act   provides   that   all   agreements   are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent   to   contract,   for   a   lawful   consideration   and with   a   lawful   object,   and   are   not   hereby   expressly declared to be void. Section 14 defines free consent in following words:­ “ 14.   “Free   consent”   defined. —Consent   is said to be free when it is not caused by—  (1)  coercion, as defined in section 15, or  (2)  undue influence, as defined in section 16, or  (3)  fraud, as defined in section 17, or (4) misrepresentation, as defined in section 18, or  (5)   mistake, subject to the provisions of sections 20, 21 and 22. Consent is said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence of   such   coercion,   undue   influence,   fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.”  31 43. A consent when it is caused due to coercion, undue influence,   fraud,   misrepresentation   or   mistake   is   not free consent and such agreement shall not be contract if free   consent   is  wanting.   Sections   15,   16,   17   and   18 define   coercion,   undue   influence,   fraud   and misrepresentation.  Section 19 deals with voidability of agreements without free consent.   Section 19 is to the following effect:­ “ 19.   Voidability   of   agreements   without free consent. —When consent to an agreement is caused   by   coercion,   fraud   or misrepresentation,   the   agreement   is   a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.  A party to a contract whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be performed, and that he shall be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true.  Exception.—If such consent was caused by misrepresentation   or   by   silence,   fraudulent within   the   meaning   of   section   17,   the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence.  Explanation.—A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of   the   party   on   whom   such   fraud   was practised, or to whom such misrepresentation was   made,   does   not   render   a   contract voidable.” 32 44.   A   conjoint   reading   of   Sections   10,   13   and   14 indicates   that   when   consent   is   obtained   by   coercion, undue   influence,   fraud,   misrepresentation   or   mistake, such consent is not free consent and the contract becomes voidable at the option of the party whose consent was caused due to coercion, fraud or misrepresentation.   An agreement,   which   is   void   or   voidable   under   the   Indian Contract   Act,   shall   not   be   deemed   to   be   lawful   as   is provided by Explanation to Rule 3 of Order XXIII.  45.   We   need   to   examine   the   grounds   on   which   the compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   was   sought   to   be impeached by pleadings in Suit No. 1101 of 1987.  Whether the grounds to impeach the compromise deed are one which can be raised before the Court recording the compromise decree as per Rule 3 of Order XXIII?   We need to look into the grounds on the basis of which Suit No.1101 of 1987   was   filed   questioning   the   compromise   decree. Paragraphs   12   and   13   of   the   plaint   contain   the allegations, which are to the following effect:­ st “ 12.    In the beginning of 1984, the 1 33 defendant   represented   that   since   the plaintiff   have   given   personal   guarantee   to the Bank for the loans of several lakhs, it would be risky and not expedient to have the family   properties   in   the   name   of   the plaintiff   and   it   would   be   advantageous   and safe to keep off the names of the plaintiff on   records   as   owners.     Even   there   the plaintiff did not direction and wisdom of the st st 1   defendant.     The   1   defendant   further represented that the entire family properties would be kept in the name of defendants­ 1 and 4 for the purpose of record and to avoid st the risk of any bank claim.  The 1  defendant assured   that   this   arrangement   would   not affect or extinguish the plaintiff legitimate share   in   the   properties.     Here   again   the plaintiff obeyed and acted according to the st decision and directions of the 1  defendant.  st 13. The 1   defendant arranged to file a suit   in   Sub   Court,   Coimbatore,   through   the family lawyer.  It was a collusive suit and a mere   make   believe   affairs.   There   was   no misunderstanding or provocations for any one of the members of the family to go to a Court of Law for partition.”     46. In paragraph 15 of the plaint, the plaintiffs had further   pleaded   that   entre   proceedings   and   the   decree secured from the Court is a fraud played not only on the plaintiff   but   also   against   the   Court.     The   plaintiffs pleads that compromise decree which was intended only to secure and safeguard the properties is sham and nominal besides being fraudulent. 34 47. From the above, it is clear that plaintiff pleaded that   compromise   recorded   on   06.08.1984   was   not   lawful compromise   having   been   obtained   by   fraud   and misrepresentation.   The plaintiff’s case was that they were   represented   by   D1   that   the   compromise   is   being entered   only   to   save   the   family   property   since   the plaintiff   has   given   personal   guarantee   to   the   Punjab National   Bank   for   obtaining   loan   for   Vasudeva   Mills. Pleadings clearly make out the case of the plaintiff that the consent which he gave for compromise by signing the compromise was not free consent.   The compromise, thus, become voidable at the instance of the plaintiff.      48. Whether the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII shall be attracted in the facts of the present case as held by the Courts below is the question to be answered by us.  Rule 3A bars the suit to set aside the decree on the ground that   compromise   on   which   decree   was   passed   was   not lawful.  As noted above, the word “lawful” has been used in Rule 3 and in the Explanation of Rule 3 states that “an   agreement   or   compromise   which   is   void   or   voidable under the Indian Contract Act,1872 (9 of 1872), shall not 35 be deemed to be lawful……………….;” 49.   Thus,   an   agreement   or   compromise   which   is   clearly void or voidable shall not be deemed to be lawful and the bar under Rule 3A shall be attracted if compromise on the basis of which decree was passed was void or voidable.     50.   Order   XXIII   Rule   3   as   well   as   Rule   3A   came   for consideration before this Court in large number of cases and we need to refer to few of them to find out the ratio of judgments of this Court in context of Rule 3 and Rule 3A.   In   Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi (Smt.) Though LRs. And Anr., (1993) 1 SCC 581,  this Court considered Rule 3 as well as Rule 3A of Order XXIII.  This Court held that object of the Amendment Act, 1976 is to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the Court which has   recorded   the   compromise.     In   paragraphs   6   and   7, following was laid down:­  The experience of the courts has been “6. that on many occasions parties having filed petitions   of   compromise   on   basis   of   which decrees are prepared, later for one reason or other   challenge   the   validity   of   such compromise.   For   setting   aside   such   decrees suits used to be filed which dragged on for years including appeals to different courts. Keeping in view the predicament of the courts 36

37

38 the decree is based was not lawful.” 51.    The next judgment to be noted is  Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) Through LR. Sadhna Rai (Smt.) Vs. Rajinder Singh and   Ors.,   (2006)   5   SCC   566,   Justice   R.V.   Raveendran speaking   for   the   Court   noted   the   provisions   of   Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A and recorded his conclusions in paragraph 17 in following words:­

39

52. The next judgment is  R. Rajanna Vs. S.R. Venkataswamy and Ors., (2014) 15 SCC 471  in which  provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A were again considered.   After 40 extracting the aforesaid provisions, following was held by this Court in paragraph 11:­ “11.  It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of   any   suit   by   a   lawful   agreement   or compromise   in   writing   and   signed   by   the parties, the Court before whom such question is   raised,   shall   decide   the   same.   What   is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by   the   parties,   the   question   whether   the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined   by   the   court   concerned.   What   is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations   suggest   any   infirmity   in   the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3­A clearly bars   a   suit   to   set   aside   a   decree   on   the ground   that   the   compromise   on   which   the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that   no   sooner   a   question   relating   to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised   before   the   court   that   passed   the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone   who   can   examine   and   determine   that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3­A CPC. That is precisely 41 what has happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge   the   validity   of   the   compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC   on   the   application   made   by   the respondents   holding   that   such   a   suit   was barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3­A CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (respondents herein) could hardly be   heard   to   argue   that   the   plaintiff (appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been rejected to pursue his remedy against   such   rejection   before   a   higher court.”  53.   The   judgments   of   Pushpa   Devi(supra)   as   well   as Banwari Lal (supra)  were referred to and relied by this Court.     This   Court   held   that   no   sooner   a   question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. 54.   In   subsequent   judgment,   Triloki   Nath   Singh   Vs. Anirudh   Singh   (Dead)   Through   Legal   Representatives   and Ors., (2020) 6 SCC 629 , this Court again referring to 42 earlier judgments reiterated the same preposition, i.e., the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and separate suit is not maintainable.     In   paragraphs   17   and   18,   following   has been laid down:­ “17.  By introducing the amendment to the Civil   Procedure   Code   (Amendment)   1976 w.e.f.   1­2­1977,   the   legislature   has brought into force Order 23 Rule 3­A, which creates   bar   to   institute   the   suit   to   set aside   a   decree   on   the   ground   that   the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful.   The   purpose   of   effecting   a compromise between the parties is to put an end to the various disputes pending before the   court   of   competent   jurisdiction   once and for all. 18.  Finality   of   decisions   is   an underlying   principle   of   all   adjudicating forums.   Thus,   creation   of   further litigation should never be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule 3­A of Order   23   CPC   put   a   specific   bar   that   no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground   that   the   compromise   on   which   the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of   Order   23   Rule   3   CPC   is   to   avoid multiplicity   of   litigation   and   permit parties   to   amicably   come   to   a   settlement which   is   lawful,   is   in   writing   and   a voluntary act on the part of the parties. 43

44 taken by the plaintiff in Suit No.1101 of 1987, the only remedy   available   to   the   plaintiff   was   to   approach   the court   in   the   same   case   and   satisfy   the   court   that compromise   was   not   lawful.     Rule   3A   was   specifically added by the amendment to bar separate suit to challenge the   compromise   decree   which   according   to   legislative intent to arrest the multiplicity of proceedings.   We, thus,   do   not   find   any   error   in   the   judgment   of   trial court and High Court holding that Suit No.1101 of 1987 was barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A.  56.   We   having   found   that   Suit   No.1101   of   1987   being barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A, it is not necessary for us to enter into correctness or otherwise of the grounds taken in the plaint for questioning the compromise decree dated   06.08.1984.     The   compromise   decree   dated 06.08.1984, thus, could not have been questioned in Suit No. 1101 of 1987.  57. There remains one more submission which needs to be considered. 58. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that even 45 if consent decree dated 06.08.1984 could not have been challenged, the appellants were entitled for shares in residential   building   at   Tatabad,   Dr.   Alagappa   Chettiar Road,   Coimbatore, which was left out from the decree dated 06.08.1984. The above residential suit property was not   a   part   in   O.S.   No.37   of   1984   and   was   not   in compromise decree dated 06.08.1984. The averment of the appellant   is   that   the   said   residential   property   was although   in   the   name   of   defendant   No.1   but   it   was acquired from joint family funds hence the appellant had also share in the property.  59.   The   residential   building   at   Tatabad,   Dr.   Alagappa Chettiar Road,  Coimbatore  was included in Item No.10 of Schedule 'B' of properties to the following effect: “Item No.X In   Coimbatore   Registration   on   District, Coimbatore   Corporation   Limits,   Tatabad,   Dr. Alagappa Chettiar Road,  D.No.101, Extent 0.33 acres   with   4500   sq.ft.   built   up   residential building.” 60. The above residential property was neither included in O.S.No.37 of 1984 nor part of compromise decree dated 46 06.08.1984. The plaintiff's prayer to declare the decree passed   in   O.S.37   of   1984   as   unenforceable   shall   not preclude the consideration of a property which was not part   of   the   decree.   The   appellants'   case   for   claiming share in the residential property at Tatabad, Alagappa Chettiar Road, Coimbatore, thus, needs to be considered in these appeals. 61. We may first notice pleadings regarding the case of the   plaintiff   and   defendant   No.1   with   regard   to   above mentioned house property as reflected in O.S. No.1101 of 1987. 62. In paragraph 6(e) of the plaint, following has been pleaded by the plaintiff: "6(e) In 1978 a palatial bungalow was purchased in   Tatabad,   Coimbatore.   This   is   set   out   and described as Item No.10 of Schedule 'B'. The acquisition of this property was only out of the  joint  income  and   for  the   benefit  of  the family.” 63. Defendant   Nos.1   to   3   filed   written   statements   in O.S. No.1101 of 1987 and with regard to above averment made in paragraph 6(e), following has been pleaded by the defendant No.1: 47 "6. The   allegations   in   paragraph   6   of   the plaint are not wholly true. The allegation that the   property   described   as   Item   No.10   of Schedule   'B'   was   acquired   out   of   the   joint income   for   the   benefit   of   the   family   is absolutely   false.   Firstly   there  was  no   joint income. Secondly there is no family, thirdly it was   not   purchased   out   of   joint   income.   The st property   was   taken   in   auction   by   the   1 defendant. The amount necessary for payment of st the price was drawn by the 1   defendant from Swamy   &   Swamy   Co.   The   amount   was   debited against him in the amounts of the Swamy & Co.” 64. The case of defendant No.1 was that above property was   purchased   in   auction   by   the   defendant   No.1.   The defendant No.1 had filed Ex.B­27 in support of his claim that house property is a separate property of defendant No.1. Ex.B­27 indicates that defendant No.1 was declared as   the   purchaser   of   the   property   as   sold   by   public auction held on 28.11.1979 for Rs.1,51,000/­. Ex.B­27 was a sale certificate issued by Court of Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore to the above effect. Although in paragraph 6 of the written statement the defendant No.1 had pleaded that amount necessary for payment of price was drawn by defendant No.1 from Swamy and Swamy Co. Defendant No.1 appeared in Witness Box as DW­2 and stated  in his cross­ 48 examination that he has for payment of house property at Tatabad   utilised   the   funds   of   the   Swamy   and   Swamy Plantations   Co.   In   his   cross­examination,   he   admitted that   he   had   taken   Rs.1,50,000/­.   In   his   cross­ examination, following was stated by defendant No.2: “It   is   incorrect   to   say   that   for purchasing house company funds were taken. I do not remember and there are no records to show from which partnership and from which account it was drawn. It is not correct to say that I took joint family funds and purchased. I would have   taken   about   Rs.1.50   lakhs.   It   was   not returned. Records cannot be produced now.” 65. In   subsequent   cross­examination,   he   clearly mentioned   that   the   amount   which   was   taken   for   the purchase   of   the   house   property   at   Tatabad   was   not returned to Swamy and Swamy Plantations Co. In his cross­ examination on 12.08.1997, defendant No.2 states: “On   12.8.1997   the   witness   was   sworn   and   re­ examined.  The   reason   for   not   returning   the   amount   to Swamy & Sawmy Plantation Company from which it was borrowed for the purchase of the house in Tatabad, because there was credit balance in my name in the said company.” 49 66.   Evidence   on   record,   thus,   indicates   that   Tatabad house   property   was   purchased   in   the   name   of   defendant No.1   and   the   consideration   for   purchase   was   paid   from Swamy and Swamy Plantations Co. having its Directors and shareholders only the family members of all the branches. In his cross­examination defendant No.2 has stated: “We   started   Co.   by   name   Swamy   and   Swamy Plantations in 1974 in which members of all the three   branches   of   the   family   were   the shareholders.” 67. The   details   of   the   shareholders   of   the   Swamy   and Swamy Plantations (P) Ltd., Coonoor, were mentioned in O.S.No.37 of 1984 as Item No.10 of Schedule 'C' which is to the following effect: “Item No.10 Details of shares in M/s. Swami and Swami Plantations (P) Ltd., Coonoor. S.No. Name    No. of Shares   Total Value 1.S.K. Kumaraswamy 920 Rs.92,000.00 2.S.K. Chinnasamy 440 Rs.44,000.00 3.S.R.Shanmugavelautham 410 Rs.41,000.00 4.S.R. Somasundaram 230 Rs.23,000.00 5.Smt.R. Janaiammal 810 Rs. 1,000.00 6.Smt. S. Saraswathy 750 Rs.75,000.00 7.C.Kamalam 610 Rs.61,000.00 8.Smt. C. Sathiyavathi  75 Rs. 7,500.00 50 Total    4245    Rs.4,24,500.00” 68. As per details given above the Rangasamy branch held 2190 shares out of 4245 shares which is more than 50% shares of the Company.  69. The main plank of submission on behalf of respondent No.1 is that after the partition dated 07.11.1960, the three branches had separated and joint family status came to end. He submitted that partition dated 07.11.1960 is the   registered   partnership   deed   which   partition   was accepted by trial court in its judgment. The partition of joint family of three branches having been accepted on 07.11.1960   there   was   no   joint   family   when   the   Tatabad house property was purchased in 1979.  70. The   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the appellants in support of the appeals is that partition dated 07.11.1960 was entered between three brothers to save   the   landed   property   from   Land   Ceiling   Act.   The partition   deed   dated   07.11.1960   was   got   registered   on 07.11.1960, it claims that parties have divided immovable properties   on   01.04.1960.   The   submission   is   that   Land 51 Ceiling   Act   was   being   implemented   immediately   after 01.04.1960   hence   the   said   claim   was   set   up   in   the partition deed. The partition deed was executed to save the landed property of the three branches and there was no intention of separating each branch and bringing the change   in   joint   family   status.   The   submission   of   Shri Giri has been reiterated which was also raised before the High   Court   that   after   partition   dated   07.11.1960   the three   brothers   united   and   joint   family   continued   even after   07.11.1960,   which   is   evident   from   different properties   purchased   in   the   name   of   all   the   three branches,   living   together   in   ancestral   house   at Sadapalayam and newly constructed house at Somnur. After the   purchase   of   land   in   1963   all   the   three   branches continued to run family businesses together.  71. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  further  submits that   it   is   own   case   of   defendant   No.1   that   partition agreement dated 08.03.1981 took between the parties under which Rangasamy branch agreed to take Vasudeva Textile Mills,   the   branch   of   defendant   No.1,   S.K.   Kumarasamy decided to take property at Coonoor and Vedapathi village 52 and Chinnasamy branch decided to take property at Somnur. Defendant No.1 has pleaded that under the agreement dated 08.03.1981,   the   plaintiff   had   to   pay   Rs.7   lacs   to defendant No.4 and defendant No.1 had to pay Rs.4 lacs to defendant No.4 to equalise the valuation by partition as was   agreed   on   08.03.1981.   Shri   Giri   submits   that   DW.1 himself came with case that partition had taken place on 08.03.1983   and   compromise   decree   was   nothing   but implementation of the said agreement. Shri Giri submits that   when   defendant   No.1   himself   states   about   the partition in the year 1981, the partition pre­supposes the   joint   family   and   had   the   three   branches   separated from 07.11.1960, there was no question of again effecting partition in the year 1981.  72. One   of   the   points   for   consideration   before   us   is that as to whether at the time when Tatabad house was acquired   by   defendant   No.1   whether   all   three   branches were part of joint family or all the three branches after partition dated 07.11.1960 continued to be separate from each other. 53 73. The sheet anchor of the defendant No.1 is that three branches of family were not joint as it was partitioned by partition deed dated 07.11.1960.   The partition deed dated 07.11.1960 is a registered partition deed between three   branches.   The   partition   deed   dated   07.11.1960 referred to earlier partition deed dated 27.09.1953 by which the father of three brothers partitioned property between son of his first wife and his three sons from second wife.   The properties which were allotted to in the   partition   deed   dated   27.09.1953   was   86.72   acres between   three   brothers.     The   Partition   Deed   dated 07.11.1960 reads:­ “A   Document   dated   28.09.1953   bearing No.3158/1953   has   been   registered   at   the Coimbatore   Registrar’s   Office   as   a Partition Deed and has been executed on the th 27   day   of   September,   1953   wherein   the properties   belonging   to   our   brother Sennimalai   Gounder,   the   son   of   the   first wife of our father A.V. Kandasamy Gounder between us and our father.   We have been enjoying   the   properties   allotted   to   the three of us vide the said document as one family and have developed it, sold it, done agriculture in it and carried out business. We have also partitioned among us.  Since   we   decided   to   partition   amongst ourselves   we   have   divided   the   business 54 capital belonging to our joint family vide accounts dated 1.4.1960.   We have already divided   the   jewels,   utensils   and   other articles and each of us are enjoying them separately.   Though on 01.04.1960 we have divided   the   immovable   properties   such   as house   buildings,   factory   buildings,   farm and lands to avoid litigation among us in future we have registered it through this document.”                     74. The case of the appellant is that the partition deed dated 07.11.1960 was entered between three brothers to save the properties from land ceiling laws.  The relevant date under the Land Ceiling Act was 07.04.1960 on which date the extent of properties in hands of a person has to be   determined   and   since   three   brothers,   who   consisted members of joint family on the relevant date had more than   the   land   which   was   permitted   to   a   person,   a partition was entered to save the properties from land ceiling laws.   This argument was rejected by the trial court   holding   that   it   has   not   been   proved   that   land ceiling laws in any manner affected the extent of land in the   hands   of   three   brothers.   We   need   to   notice   some provisions   of   Tamil   Nadu   Land   Reforms   (Fixation   of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961.  Section 3 of the Act which 55 is   a   definition   clause   defines   the   word   “person”   in Section 3(34) which is to the following effect:­ “3(34).         “person”   includes   any company,   family   firm,   society   or association   of   individuals,   whether incorporated or not or any private trust or public trust.” 75.   Section   5   of   the   Act   provide   for   ceiling   area. According to sub­section (1)(a) of Section 5 the ceiling area in the case of every person and in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members was 30 standard   acres.   Figure   of   30   standard   acres   was subsequently reduced to 15 standard acres by Tamil Nadu Act No. 37 of 1972.   Section 5(1)(b) further provided that ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of   more   than   five   members   shall   be   30   standard   acres together with an additional 5 standard acres for every member of the family in excess of five. In event, the ceiling area is determined treating the Hindu Undivided Family, joint family consisting of three brothers, the ceiling area shall be 30 standard acres by which 5 acres additional for every member of the family in excess of five.  The land which was possessed by the three brothers 56 in the year 1960 was more than 86.52 acres, which extent was   received   by   the   three   brothers   in   1953   partition. Thereafter three brothers have acquired further land. In case,   three   brothers   before   07.04.1960   partition   their joint family, then each person will be entitled to 30 acres.     Thus,   partition   of   the   properties   among   three brothers   was   clearly   beneficial   to   the   properties possessed by the three brothers.  The view of the trial court that it is not proved that any benefit under the Ceiling of Land Act could have been obtained by three brothers is clearly untenable. The view expressed by the trial   court   was   not   after   examining   the   provisions   of Act, 1961.  Further the statement in the partition that three   brothers   have   already   divided   the   immovable properties on 01.04.1960 clearly was with intent to get away from Act, 1961 since the relevant date under the Ceiling Act was 07.04.1960.   76. Under Hindu Law, any member of the joint family can separate himself from joint family.  The intention of the parties   to   terminate   the   status   of   joint   family   is   a relevant   factor   to   determine   the   status   of   Hindu 57 Undivided Family.  From the above, it is clear that real intendment   of   three   branches   to   partition   their properties was not that they did not want Hindu Undivided Family   to   continue   rather   the   said   partition   was   with object to get away from application of Ceiling Act, 1961. The intention of the parties when they partitioned their properties in the year 1960 is a relevant fact.          77. However, the Partition Deed dated 07.11.1960 being a registered   Partition   Deed   between   three   branches,   the same   cannot   be   ignored.     Properties   admittedly   were divided in three branches by the said partition.   The question is as to whether after 07.11.1960, the family continued as a Joint Family or the status of joint family came to an end on 07.11.1960.  The case of the appellant which was also pressed by the High Court was that even if partition dated 07.11.1960 is accepted; the parties lived in   a   joint   family   and   continued   their   joint   family status.     The   contention   advanced   by   the   appellant   was that there was reunion between three brothers to revert to   the   status   of   Joint   Hindu   Family,   which   is   amply proved   from   the   acts   and   conducts   of   the   parties 58 subsequent to 07.11.1960.   78. The concept of reunion in Hindu Law is well known. Hindu Joint Family even if partitioned can revert back and   reunite   to   continue   the   status   of   joint   family. nd Mulla on Hindu Law, 22   Edition, while deliberating on reunion has status following in paragraphs 341, 342 and 343:­ “ 341.   Who   may   reunite,­   ‘A   reunion   in estate properly so called, can only take place between persons who were parties to the   original   partition’.   It   would   appear from   this   that   a   reunion   can   take   place between   any   persons   who   were   parties   to the   original   partition.   Only   males   can reunite. 342. Effect of reunion,­   The effect of a reunion is to remit the reunited members to   their   former   status   as   members   of   a joint Hindu family. 343.   Intention   necessary   to   constitute reunion:   To   constitute   a   reunion,   there must   be   an   intention   of   the   parties   to reunite in estate and interest.  In  Bhagwan Dayal   v.   Reoti   Devi ,   the   Supr eme   Court pointed   out   that   it   is   implicit   in   the concept of a reunion that there shall be an   agreement   between   the   parties   to reunite   in   estate   with   an   intention   to revert   to   their   former   status.   Such   an agreement may be express or may be implied by the conduct of the parties. The conduct must   be   of   an   incontrovertible   character 59 and the burden lies heavily on the party who assets reunion.” 79.   The   Privy   Council   in   Palani   Ammal   Vs. Muthuvenkatacharla Moniagar and Ors., AIR 1925 PC 49  has held that if a joint Hindu family separates, the family or any members of it may agree to reunite as a joint Hindu   family,   but   such   a   reuniting   is   for   obvious reasons, which would apply in many cases under the law of the   Mitakshara,   of   very   rare   occurrence,   and   when   it happens it must be strictly proved as any other disputed fact is proved. In paragraph 9, the Privy Council laid down following :­ “ 9.    But the mere fact that the shares of   the   coparceners   have   been   ascertained does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference   that   the   family   had   separated. There   may   be   reasons   other   than   a contemplated   immediate   separation   for ascertaining   what   the   shares   of   the coparceners on a separation would be. It is also now beyond doubt that a member of such a   joint   family   can   separate   himself   from the other members of the joint family and is on separation entitled to have his share in   the   property   of   the   joint   family ascertained   and   partitioned   off   for   him, and that the remaining coparceners, without any   special   agreement   amongst   themselves, 60 may continue to be coparceners and to enjoy as members of a joint family what remained after   such   a   partition   of   the   family property.   That   the   remaining   members continued to be joint may, if disputed, be inferred from the way in which their family business   was   carried   on   after   their previous   coparcener   had   separated   from them.   It   is   also   quite   clear   that   if   a joint Hindu family separates, the family or any members of it may agree to reunite as a joint Hindu family, but such a reuniting is for obvious reasons, which would apply in many cases under the law of the Mitakshara, of   very   rare   occurrence,   and   when   it happens it must be strictly proved as any other disputed fact is proved. The leading authority   for   that   last   proposition is Balabux   Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai   (1903)   30 Cal. 725.”  80.   Another   judgment   which   needs   to   be   noticed   is judgment of Madras High Court in  Mukku Venkataramayya Vs. Mukku Tatayya and Ors., AIR 1943 Mad. 538 .  In the above case, there was partition in the family in the year 1903 as a result of which the father with his second wife and children separated and begin to live apart from his sons by the first wife.   The case of the respondent was that he and his brothers continued to remain joint after their father   decided   to   remain   away   from   them   in   1903.   An alternative case was also put forward that there has been 61 a   reunion   amongst   the   brothers   after   the   partition. Madras High Court in paragraph 5 stated:­

81.   The   High   Court   held   that   the   brothers,   who   had divided,   lived   and   traded   together,   the   case   of   the reunion   was   accepted.     In   paragraph   17,   following   was laid down:­ “ 17.  The question then is, whether this 62 finding is sufficient to support a case of reunion. We are conscious that the burden of proof is heavily on the respondent and also   that   proof   of   mere   jointness   in residence,   food   and   worship   dees   not necessarily make out reunion. What is to be established   is   that   not   only   did   the parties   who   had   divided   lived   and   traded together,   but   that   they   did   so   with   the intention of thereby altering their divided status   into   a   joint   status   with   all   the usual incidents of jointness in estate and interest. In our opinion the way in which the brothers dealt with each other leaves no   room   for   doubt   that   it   was   their deliberate   intention   to   reunite   so   as   to reproduce   the   joint   status   which   had existed before the partition of 1903. The immediate   object   of   the   partition   was   to enable the father to live separately from his   sons   by   the   first   wife,   as misunderstandings had arisen between them. As between the sons themselves there never was   any   reason   for   a   separation   inter   se and there can be no doubt that the moment they separated away from their father they desired to live and lived together in joint status. It is true that at that time the first respondent was a minor. But this can make little difference if after he attained majority he accepted the position in which the appellant and Nagayya had already begun to   live   together.   In   our   view   it   is   not necessary that there should be a formal and express   agreement   to   reunite.   Such   an agreement   can   be   established   by   clear evidence   of   conduct   incapable   of explanation on any other footing. Such, in our view, is the position here established. That being so, the claim of the appellant to   the   exclusive   ownership   of   the 63 properties in suit must be negatived. The appeal   fails   and   must   therefore   be dismissed with costs.” 82. One more judgment on the concept of reunion which need to be referred to is the judgment of Karnataka High Court   is   M/s.   Paramanand   L.   Bajaj,   Bangalore   Vs.   The Commissioner   of   Income   Tax,   Karnataka,   II,   Bangalore, (1981) SCC Online Karnataka 131.   Justice Rama Jois after referring   to   Smritis   and   relevant   judgments   on   the subject laid down that reunion is the reversal of the process of partition, following was held in paragraphs 8 and 12:­ “ 8.  The basic proposition of Hindu Law on   reunion   is   laid   down   in   Brihaspati Smriti   (Gaekwad’s   Oriental   Series,   Vol. LXXXV­pp   214­215),   also   vide   Smrti­ Chandrika III Vyavaharakanda Part II (1916) published   by   Government   of   highness   the Maharaja   of   Mysore   pp   702­703;   English version   J.R.   Gharpura   (1952)   Part   III   pp 667­670). वविभत्कक य पन : वपतरर भतररतरर चैक्तर सवसस्थित : । वपतव्येणर स्थिविर पतररीत्यर तत्संसतष्ट : स उच्यतये ॥ He   who   being   once   separated   dwells again   through   affection   with   his   father brought   or   paternal   uncle   is   termed reunited. 64 संसतष्टटौ यटौ पन : पतररीत्यतटौ परसपरभरवगिनटौ । When two coparceners have again become reunited   through   affection,   they   shall mutually   participate   in   each   others properties. The view expressed by Devanna Bhatta, the author of Smriti­Chandrika on the text of Brihaspati is­  सहविरसये परुषरणरमरहत्य संसगिर्ग भरविरत धनदररयेण संसगिकर्ग विरच्य इतरीदसंतरव्य विहररवनवमतभतरविच्छयेदकरप नकदयेन वविभक्तरनरसं पभविर्गविदयेकररशरीकरणपयर्गन्तससंसगिटौ न पन : सहविरसमवतमवत मन्तव्यमत । Association   not   necessarily   being   by co­residence, the association is expressed to be through wealth; so by way of removing the   distinguishing   factor   of   that,   it should   be   understood   that   the   re­ association of the separated members shall be to the extent of pooling together(all) the wealth etc., as before, and not merely by a co­residence only. Mitakshra on Yaj.II 138­139, which lay down   special   rule   of   inheritance   at   a partition   among   reunited   members   explains the effect of reunion as follows: वविभक्तसं धनसं पनवमशतररीकततसं संससतष्टसं तदसयरसतरीवत संसतष्टरी । Effects   which   had   been   divided   and which are again mixed together are termed re­united. He, to whom such appertain, is a re­united parcener. The aforesaid provisions have been the subject matter of interpretation in number 65 of cases. 12.  On   a   consideration   of   the   basic texts   on   the   point   and   the   views   of commentators   expressed   in   Mitakshara   and Smriti­chandrika   and   the   case   law   cited before us and having due regard to the real purpose   and   intent   of   the   Hindu   law governing   HUF,   it   appears   to   us   that provision   for   reunion   has   been   provided for,   for   enabling   erstwhile   members   of   a Hindu   undivided   family,   to   come   together and   to   form   once   again   a   joint   family governed   by   Mitakshara   law.   The   mutual love,   affection   arising   from   blood relationship   and   the   desire   to   reunite proceeding therefrom, constitutes the very foundation of reunion. This is evident from the   text   of   Brihaspati   in   which   even   the relationship   of   persons   who   could   reunite is   specified   though   some   of   the commentators have taken the view that it is only   illustrative   and   not   exhaustive   and that reunion is possible even among persons not   specified   in   the   text   of   Brihaspati. (See: Virmitrodaya,   translated   by Gopalachandra   Sarkar (1879)   pp   204­ 205; Vivadachintamani   Gaekwad's   Oriental Series Vol. XCIX pp 288­289). But even so there   is   no   controversy   that   reunion   is possible only among persons who were on an earlier   date   members   of   a   HUF.   Reunion therefore is a reversal of the process of partion.   Therefore,   it   is   reasonable   to take the view that reunion is not merely an agreement   to   live   together   as   tenants   in common,   but   is   intended   to   bring   about   a fusion   in   interest   and   estate   among   the divided members of an erstwhile HUF so as to restore to them the status of HUF once again   and   therefore   reunion   creates   right 66 on   all   the   reuniting   coparceners   in   the joint   family   properties   which   were   the subject matter of partition among them to the   extent   they   were   not   dissipated   away before the date of reunion. That would be the legal consequence of a genuine reunion is forcefully brought about by the text of Brihaspati,   which   provides   “where coparceners   have   again   reunited   through affection, they   shall   mutually   participate in   each   others   properties”.   Mitakshara states that mixing up of divided properties is   the   effect   of   reunion.   Therefore   it follows, no coparcener, who is a party to a reunion   and   who   admits   reunion,   shall   be heard to contend that the property which he had got at an earlier partition and still with him has not become the property of the reconstituted   HUF.   But   there   can   be   no doubt that reunion, when disputed must be proved as any disputed question of fact and the   circumstances   that   all   the   reuniting members   have   not   brought   back   their properties   to   form   the   common­stock,   may support   the   plea   taken   by   any   concerned party that there was no reunion. However, if reunion is admitted by all the parties to the reunion or it is proved, the share of the properties of reunited members got at   an   earlier   partition   and   in   their possession at the time of reunion becomes the   properties   of   the   joint   family, notwithstanding the fact that some of them have failed to throw those properties into the   common   hotch   pot,   whether   with   or without   the   knowledge   or   consent   of   each other. It is a different aspect if reunion itself is not admitted by the persons who are   parties   to   a   reunion   and   it   is   not proved   by   the   party   pleading   reunion,   in which   event   there   would   be   no   reunion   at 67 all.”   83. We may now notice the judgment of this Court dealing with reunion in a Hindu Undivided Family.   In   Bhagwan

examined the principles of Hindu Law and  principles of Hindu Joint Family.   In paragraph 16, it was held that the   general   principle   is   that   every   Hindu   family   is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved; but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course   of   conduct.   In   the   above   case,   one   of   the questions   was   as   to   whether   there   was   reunion   between members of the Joint Family after partition.  This Court quoted with approval the judgments of Privy Council in

22:­

68

69

70

84.  The   above   observations   indicates   that   this   Court also   approved   the   Madras   High   Court   judgment   in   Mukku Venkataramayya(supra).    Again this Court in   Anil Kumar Mitra and Ors. Vs. Ganendra Nath Mitra and Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 725  held that the acts of the parties may lead to the inference that parties reunited after previous partition. 71 In paragraph 4, following observations have been made:­

85. Now, we look into other materials on record.   The ancestral   house   of   the   parties   was   at  Helmet, Sedapalayam, Village Karumathampaty where three brothers alongwith their father A.V. Kandaswamy used to live. DW2 in   her   statement   has   also   stated   that   after   she   was married with Rangasamy, she lived at ancestral house at Sedapalayam.  Further the three brothers in the year 1963 purchased   the   house   site   at  Hemlet   Somanur   and constructed a new house where three brothers with their families shifted and lived at Somanur which become the new   home   of   the   Joint   Family   consisting   of   three brothers.  The new house was constructed after purchasing the land in the year 1963 and the families of the three brothers started living at about in 1964, which clearly indicate that intention of all the brothers was to live jointly   and   continue   as   Joint   Hindu   Family.     After 72 partition dated 07.11.1960, three branches have purchased several immovable properties together, details of which are as follows:­ i) Sale deed dated 09.06.1962 filed as exhibit A­42 in favour of (a) K.Rangasamy, (b) S.K.Kumarasamy and (c) S.K.Chinmasamy of the land to the extent of 5.6 acres in Karumathampaty village. ii) Sale deed dated 16.10.1963 which has been filed as   exhibit   A­43.   By   sale   deed,   property   was purchased for construction of house only which fact   was   stated   in   the   sale   deed   itself.   The sale deed was in the name of three brothers  (a) K.Rangasamy,   (b)   S.K.Kumarasamy   and   (c) S.K.Chinmasamy. iii) On   14.09.1972,   by   three   sale   deeds   which   were filed   as   exhibit   A­41,   B­10   and   B­11,   huge property situated at Coonoor namely High Field estate   was   purchased   in   the   name   of S.K.Kumarasamy,   S.R.Somasundaram(minor   in   the guardianship   of   his   mother   Mrs.   Janakiammal), S.R.Shammugha   velcyutham   in   which   estate   the 73 family carried business. 86.   The   three   branches   continued   joint   business   by establishing   firms   and   companies   which   was   carried   by joint family in the partnership or by private company. It   was   only   the   members   of   the   family,   who   were shareholders   and   directors.     The   purchase   of   various immovable properties in the names of the three branches clearly   indicate   the   intention   that   all   the   three branches are joint and they are purchasing the properties in the name of all the three branches.  After the death of Rangasamy in the year 1967, it was S.K. Kumarasamy, defendant No.1, who took the reins of the family being the eldest.  The plaintiff and defendant No.10, sons of Ranagasamy were very young at the time when their father died   and   thereafter   they   were   under   the   guidance   and control of defendant No.1 and the materials on the record indicate   that   it   was   the   defendant   No.1   under   whose guidance, all businesses were carried out.     Even the Suit   No.37   of   1984   which   was   filed   for   partition   of properties was at the instance of defendant No.1, which pleadings have been made by the plaintiff of that suit 74 when he filed written statement in Suit No. 1101 of 1987. The plaintiff of Suit No.37 of 1984 Senthil Kumaravel in his   written   statement   in   Suit   No.   1101   of   1987   has clearly stated that he filed the Suit No.37 of 1984 at the instance of defendant No.1, which fact has also been noted in paragraph 9 of the trial court’s judgment. 87. It is relevant to note that in suit No.1101 of 1987, it   was   only   D­1,   who   filed   the   written   statement   and appeared   in   the   witness   box.   D­4,   S.K.   Chinnasamy, neither filed written statement nor came to the witness box. It was D­1 who was pleading that joint family came to the an end after partition dated 07.11.1960. D­1 in his written statement and in his oral statement before the   court   has   come   up   with   the   case   that   there   was partition   of   the   properties   on   08.03.1981   and   an agreement   was   entered   between   the   three   branches   and compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   was   passed   to implement   the   agreement   which   was   entered   in   the   year 1981. In the written statement filed by D­1 to D­3, in paragraphs 16 and 17, following was pleaded by D­1:­ 75 "16....The arrangement to put an end to the co­ ownership had been arrived at even in 1981 and separate ownership had been agreed upon. Hence there could be no representation or assurance as alleged in the plaint. 17....As the mode of division and allotment of the   various   items   had   been   agreed   upon th previously and the amounts were paid to the 4 defendant   the   compromise   was   arrived   at,   an early date in a smooth manner and the decree was passed   in   terms   thereof.   The   decree   has   also been registered. At the terms of the agreement were   being   incorporated   in   the   compromise   the parties were advised that it was not necessary to   refer   to   the   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   in the compromise.” 88. The case of partition of all properties by agreement dated 08.03.1981 standing in name of different branches including   the   branch   of   Rangasamy   was   the   case   of defendant No.1 who was the eldest member of the family and has been denying the jointness of the family after 07.11.1960. D­1 S.K. Chinnasamy appeared in witness box as DW­2. In his cross examination dated 10.04.1997, DW­2 stated: ­ "In   March,   1981,   we   divided   the   common properties. On 08.03.1981 we reduced the same in to a written agreement, written on stamp paper, th th th and we signed the same. Myself, 4 , 7  and 10 76 defendants and the plaintiff signed in it. Three copies were taken. The same has not been filed. All of us had signed in all the three copies. We took possession of our respective shares in the properties.   After   08.03.1981   the   common properties   were   not   in   joint   possession   and common enjoyment of all...” 89. Further in his cross­examination on 11.08.1997, D­2 further stated: ­ “...I had stated that division of all properties was   done   in   1981.   The   arrangement   that   was decided in 1981 was implemented in 1984 under the   decree.   Nothing   new   was   done.   As   per   the arrangement decided in March, 1981, Vasudev Mill having 16 acres of land and buildings and the machineries belonging to the mill were allotted to the branch of my elder brother...” The trial court in its judgment dated 30.09.1997 in paragraph 28 held:­ "28....the agreement that had been executed on 08.03.1981 is genuine and it is clear that it has come into force and that the shares which were more or less raised afresh were given to the   plaintiff   branch   and   that   after   the   year st 1981,   the   family   of   the   1   defendant,   had relieved themselves from Swamy & Co., Rangasamy Brothers.   Swamy   Textiles,   Rengavilas   Warfing   & Sizing   Factory   and   that   it   had   been   proved through   the   oral   evidence   and   the   documentary proof and that through the Ex.A12 document, the th plaintiff   and   the   10   defendant   were   in   the management   of   the   mill   and   the   same   had   been 77 st clearly proved and that after 08.03.81, the 1 defendant had obtained the right in the estate and that it is clearly proved through Ex.B67 and that it is the stock register maintained in the Sciefield Tea Factory and that it would reveal th that   till   March,   1981   and   10   defendant   had signed in the register and that thereafter the st 1   defendant had signed in the same is clearly revealed, in the Ex.B68, 69 gate pass also it is found as above and that from this, it is clearly revealed   that   after   the   1981,   the   above   said agreement was brought into force and that it is proved clearly and that it had been indicated on the side of the plaintiff that it is incorrect to   state   that   the   property   at   Coonoor, st Veerakeralam   is   in   the   custody   of   the   1 defendant   and   the   properties   at   Somanur   are th lying   with   the   4   defendant   and   that   the plaintiff had accepted in the evidence that he had   not   managed   the   property   at   Coonoor,   and that from this it is clearly revealed that the above said agreement was brought into force.” 90. Further in paragraph 159, the trial court again held that agreement of the year 1981 is genuine and it was brought into force and the argument of DW­1 is found to be acceptable. 91. The   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   was   denied   by   the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that at no point of time, there was any agreement entered between parties in the year 1981 to divide the properties standing in the 78 names of three branches. The agreement dated 08.03.1981 was not filed by D­1 in the evidence. The agreement was not filed nor exhibited by the defendant, D­1.  92. In the written statement which was filed by D­1 in O.S. No.37 of 1984, no plea was taken regarding agreement dated   08.03.1981.   It   was   for   the   first   time   in   the written statement filed by D­1 in suit No.1101 of 1987 that   mention   of   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   was   made. Neither   any   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   was   filed   or proved nor there is any other evidence on record to prove the division of properties between three branches in the year 1981.  93. It   is   the   case   of   the   defendant   No.1   that   the compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   is   nothing   but implementation   of   agreement   dated   08.03.1981.   It   is, thus,   clear   that   the   case   of   D­1   is   that   there   was partition   of   all   properties   standing   in   the   names   of three   branches   and   allocated   to   different   branches   on 08.03.1981,   which   has   been   subsequently   implemented   by 79 consent   decree   dated   06.08.1984.   As   per   the   case   of defendant, the Vasudeva Textiles Mills was given to the branch of Rangasamy, property at Coonoor was taken by D1 and properties at Somnur by D­4. 94. When   the   D­1   comes   with   the   case   that   there   was partition   on   08.03.1981   of   all   immovable   properties standing   in   the   names   of   three   branches,   which   was implemented on 06.08.1984, the conclusion is irresistible that family was joint and had the three branches were not part of joint Hindu family, there was no occasion for attempting any partition on 08.03.1981 as claimed by D­1. The fact that defendant No.1 is coming with the case that there   was   partition   on   18.03.1981   itself   proves   that three branches were joint till then as per case of D­1 himself.  95. It is to be noted that plaintiff never admitted the agreement   dated   08.03.1981   or   alleged   partition   of 08.03.1981,   it   is,   thus,   clear   that   parties   remained joint   and   properties   standing   in   the   names   of   three branches   remained   joint   till   the     consent   decree   was 80 passed on 06.08.1984.  96. Thus, in the year 1979 when residential property of Tatabad was obtained in the name of defendant No.1, all three branches were part of the joint Hindu family and the house property purchased in the name of one member of joint Hindu family was for the benefit of all.  97. Both the Courts below although accepted the partition dated   18.03.1981   as   pleaded   by   D­1   but   erred   in   not considering   the   consequence   of   such   pleading.   When partition   of   all   immovable   and   movable   properties   is claimed   on   08.03.1981,   the   conclusion   is   irresistible that the family was joined till then. The theory set up by D­1 that all the three branches were separate after 07.11.1960   is   denied/belied   by   claim   of   partition   on 08.03.1981. 98. Both the trial court and High Court have given much emphasis   on   the   fact   that   three   branches   were   filing separate Income­Tax Returns and Wealth Tax Returns after 1967. An individual member of joint Hindu Family can very well file his separate Returns both under the Income Tax 81 Act as well as Wealth Tax Act and filing of such Returns was   not   conclusive   of   status   of   the   family.   The plaintiff's case throughout was that family continued to be joint after 07.11.1960 and D­1 who alone had filed the written statement and appeared in the witness box having come with the case of partition on 08.03.1981 which he claims   to   be   implemented   on   06.08.1984   by   Compromise Decree, it is proved that family was joint at least till then, i.e., 08.03.1981 or 06.08.1984. Thus, in the year 1979, when the Tatabad residential property was acquired, the three branches were joint.  99. The Tatabad residential property was for the benefit of all the three branches which is further proved from the fact that the consideration for the said amount was not paid by DW­1 from his separate account or in cash. The   amount   was   drawn   from   the   private   limited   company Swamy and Swamy Plantation Private Limited in which all the three branches were shareholders and Directors. The Swamy and Swamy Plantation Company had not purchased the residential   property   at   Tatabad   for   the   company.   The Swamy   and   Swamy   plantation   private   company   is   not   the 82 owner   of   the   residential   property   and   the   residential property at Tatabad is a joint family property for the benefit of all the three branches. 100. We thus conclude that all three branches have equal share   in   the   Tatabad   residential   property,   i.e.,   Item No.X  of Schedule 'B' of plaint in Original Suit No.1101 of 1987. This residential property being not a part of O.S.No.37 of 1984, there is no bar in seeking partition of   the   said   property   by   the   plaintiff.   Accordingly   we declare that plaintiff/defendant No.7, defendant No.1 and rd defendant No.4 are entitled to 1/3  share jointly in the aforesaid Item No.X of Schedule 'B' of the suit property rd ( 1/3  share each to K. Rangasamy branch, S.K. Kumarasamy branch   and   S.K.   Chinnasamy   branch).   Accordingly,   a preliminary decree for partition shall be drawn for the aforesaid property. 101.    Civil   Appeal   No.1537   of   2016   and   Civil   Appeal No.1538   of   2016   are   partly   allowed.   Consequently,   the Original   Suit   No.1101   of   1987   stands   decreed   to   the extent indicated above, by granting a decree of partition of   Item   No.X   of   Schedule   'B',   i.e.,   “In   Coimbatore 83 Registration on District, Coimbatore Corporation Limits, Tatabad,   Dr.   Alagappa   Chettiar   Road,   D.No.101,   Extent 0.33   acres   with   4500   sq.ft.   built­up   residential building.” 102.  Parties   are   at   liberty   to   make   an   application before the trial court for passing an appropriate final decree and such application is to be disposed of by the trial court in accordance with law. 103. Parties shall bear their own costs. ..........................J.   ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) ..........................J. ( R. SUBHASH REDDY ) NEW DELHI, JUNE 30, 2021.