Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4
PETITIONER:
SHRI ALVARO NORONHA FERRIERA & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/04/1999
BENCH:
K.T. Thomas, S.Saghir Hamad
JUDGMENT:
THOMAS, J.
Some Judges whose function was dispensation of justice
had to approach the High Court for justice based on the
celebrated doctrine equal pay for equal work but they were
non-suited by a Division Bench of that High Court. They
were Judges of higher judiciary in the subordinate level.
They have now come to the Supreme Court with this appeal by
special leave. It is interesting that, in the meanwhile,
two of them have become Judges of the same High Court of
Bombay as efflux of a decade in between has changed the
hierarchiel status of the parties who initiated this legal
action. When they filed the writ petition in the High Court
they were District and Sessions Judges. One of them has
since retired from service but the cause which they espoused
survives.
The nub of their grievance is this: When the scale of
pay of their counterparts in the Union Territory of Delhi
was increased, appellants, while working in the same cadre
in the Union Territory of Goa, were not given that pay
scale. It infringes, according to them, the principle
enshrined in the Constitution.
Facts are simple. On 20-12-1961 the Territories of
Goa, Daman and Diu were liberated from the suzerainty of
Portugal. In 1962, Goa became part of the Union Territory
of India. Appellants were District Judges posted in the
Union Territory of Goa. On 3-9-1981 the pay-scale of
judicial officers (in the category of Additional District &
Sessions Judges) in the Union Territories was the same
Rs.1200-2000/-. In 1982 the Union Territory of Delhi
increased the scale of pay of such Judges to Rs.2000-3200/-
while their counterparts in the Union Territory of Goa were
not given any increase to keep the scale on par with the
former. When the Fourth Pay Commission was formed
representations were made by the judicial officers of Goa to
rectify the anomaly which, according to them, came into
existence for the first time in 1982, but no relief was
provided to them. On the contrary, the recommendations of
the Pay Commission were for raising the scale of pay of
Delhi Judges to Rs.4500-5700/- while that of Goa Judges was
raised only to Rs.3000- 5000/-.
On 30-5-1987, Goa became a State separate from Union
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4
Territory. It is conceded that appellants cannot claim
parity with the Delhi judicial officers after that date.
Hence the grievance of the appellants was confined to the
period between 1-3-1982 and 31-3-1987. Appellants therefore
filed writ petitions before the High Court for necessary
reliefs to be granted to them.
The Division Bench of the High Court while declining
to grant the reliefs advanced the following reasons:
It is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of
the Supreme Court and this Court that the doctrine of equal
work, equal pay is a well-accepted norm in administration
of services under the control of the Governments. To enable
the employees to claim an advantage, it is essential to
establish that the posts of judicial officers in Delhi and
Goa are equal or are comparable before demanding that the
pay scales available to Delhi officers should be made
available to Goa officers. The only averment in the
petition is that the posts in Delhi and Goa Judicial Service
carry the same duties, responsibilities and nature of work
being identical, the Goa officers are entitled to identical
pay scales as those available to Delhi officers. The
averment made in the petition is not supported by any
material whatsoever and it would be impossible to draw on
imagination to hold that the nature of the duties of
officers in Delhi and Goa are identical.
Learned Judges repelled the contention that since
Delhi and Goa were Union Territories it must be assumed that
the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the
District and Sessions Judges were identical and consequently
both must get same benefit. They took the view that merely
because the officers in the two Territories are in judicial
service it cannot be even suggested that the nature of the
duties and the responsibilities are identical.
To buttress the aforesaid reasoning the Division Bench
cited an illustration as the following: Take for
illustration, the nurses employed in a large hospital in a
city like Bombay. Is it possible by any stretch of
imagination to suggest that the nurses working in a small
hospital in a remote village are performing the same duties
and carrying the same responsibilities as the nurses working
in a large hospital in a city like Bombay?
Ultimately the writ petitions were dismissed as
learned Judges were unable to appreciate on what basis they
could claim to be entitled to the same pay-scales as those
available to judicial officers in Delhi. In the concluding
passage the Division Bench said that in our judgment the
claim made by the petitioners is wholly misconceived and the
petitioners are not entitled to any relief. We are unable
to grant any relief to the petitioner and the petition must
fail.
Shri Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel contended
that Division Bench of the High Court missed the crucial
point that the claim is confined to the period when the
District Judges and their counterparts in Delhi were working
under the same Union Government though the administration in
the two territories was carried on through separate
agencies. According to the senior counsel, pendency of work
at two places is not a criteria, as the workload and the
nature of work at both places were substantially the same.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4
The illustration of nurses cited in the judgment was sought
to be demonstrated as another point in support of the claim
instead of repelling it.
The principle of equal pay for equal work has gained
judicial recognition. The principle incorporated in Article
14 when understood from the angle provided in Article 39(d)
of the Constitution is held to be the recognition of the
aforesaid doctrine. It has been held in Randhir Singh vs.
Union of India [1982 (1) SCC 612] that the principle equal
pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine but one of
substance. Their Lordships pointed out: To the vast
majority of the people in India the equality clauses of the
Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with
the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality
clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal
pay.
The parameters for invoking the said principles would
include, inter alia, nature of the work and common employer.
There can be no two views that the nature of work of
District and Sessions Judges is the same though in some
areas pendency of cases would be higher than others.
Differences in the backlog are not uncommon even in two
different stations of the same territory, nay, in two
different courts of the same station. Such lopsidedness is
hardly the ground to conclude that the nature of work done
by one judicial officer at one place is different from
other. The duty hours would be substantially the same, the
powers to be discharged are in no way different, whether
they are District Judges in Goa or in Delhi. It would be a
futile exercise to make an endeavour for drawing a
distinction between the work pattern at the two different
places, for, such differences are discernible everywhere.
But that would not make the nature of work different. It
was not necessary to cast the burden of proof on the
appellants to establish the pendency of litigation or the
norms fixed for disposal of cases by the Delhi court to
enable comparison between the nature of duties and the
responsibilities carried by the officers of the Delhi
Territory and the Goa Territory.
One admitted fact which looms large is that till hike
in the pay-scale was brought about in 1982 for Delhi Judges
the parity maintained as between Union Territory of Goa and
Delhi applied to the same cadre of judicial officers.
Nobody doubted till then that the nature and dimension of
work discharged by the officers of the same cadre of
judicial officers at two different territories were
different from any perceptible standard. It is for the
contesting respondents to show that there was change in the
nature of work which necessitated the Government to keep two
different levels of pay to the same officers working at two
different places.
Pay-scale of District and Sessions Judges in the Union
Territory of Goa was made on a par with that of Delhi by
means of the rules and regulations formulated by the Central
Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the
provisions of The Goa, Daman and Diu (Absorbed Employees)
Act, 1965. The change was effected in 1982 on the premise
that the judicial officers in Delhi were upgraded as class I
officers and since Union Territory of Delhi was declared a
Metropolitan city, the pay-scales were equated with the
pay-scales of judicial officers in other Metropolitan
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4
cities. We are not against revision of the pay-scales of
the judicial officers in the Union Territory of Delhi on the
basis of any justifiable grounds. But in doing so the
pay-scales of their counterparts working in other Union
Territories cannot suffer. Shri A.S. Nambiar, learned
Senior Advocate made a bid to raise a new contention that
the Central Government was helpless in keeping up the
pay-scales of the officers in Goa on a par with the judicial
officers of Delhi as Goa was then administered through a
separate elected legislature, and under Article 240 of the
Constitution powers of the President to make regulations had
been bridled. We are not disposed to countenance the said
contention advanced for the first time during arguments,
for, that was not the premise on which the parity was denied
to the appellants.
For the aforesaid reasons we allow this appeal and
direct the respondent Union of India to disburse the arrears
of pay to the appellants calculating their scale of pay on a
par with their counterparts in the Union Territory of Delhi
during the period between 1.3.1982 and 31.3.1987. Such
recalculation shall be made and the arrears shall be
quantified to be disbursed within six months from today.