Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia And Ors. vs. State Of Gujarat And Ors.

2026 INSC 21
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6130 OF 2016
DALSUKHBHAI BACHUBHAI SATASIA
& OTHERS …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
This civil appeal assails the impugned judgment dated
23.07.2014 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in
LPA No.2024/2010 in Special Civil Application No.533/2009
wherein the appeal filed by the appellants herein was dismissed.
Factual Backdrop :
2. The facts of the case are that the land in question is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2026.01.06
16:39:32 IST
Reason:
admeasuring 9303 square metres and bearing Survey No. 339 of
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Town Planning Scheme No.4, Final Plot Nos.9A and 9B of Village
Katargam, Surat, Gujarat (for short, “Survey 339”). According to
the appellants, the said land belonged to one Nathubhai
Ranchhodbhai, upon whose death in the year 1933, his heir
Kuberbhai Nathubhai became its true owner and occupier.
2.1 On 17.02.1976, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 (“ULC Act”, for the sake of convenience) came into force.
Section 6(1) of the said Act directed every person holding vacant
land in excess of the ceiling limit to file a statement specifying the
location, extent, value and such other particulars of all vacant
lands held by him . Accordingly, on 12.08.1976, Kuberbhai
Nathubhai filed a Form under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act declaring
the following lands of Katargam, Surat under his holding:

2


2.2 Thereafter, on 18.02.1980, the Competent Authority under
the ULC Act (for short, “Competent Authority-I”) passed an order
holding that lands bearing Survey Nos. 479 and 472/p were exempt
under Section 21 of the ULC Act, which stated that excess vacant
land shall not be treated as excess in certain cases. The order also
held that the remaining land of Survey No.339 was within the
ceiling limit , so there was “no excess land” being held by the family
members of Kuberbhai Nathubhai. The respondents contended
that the form filled earlier under Section 6(1) was not processed and
was kept pending.
2.3 Thereafter, one Khodidas Kanjibhai Patel, the organiser of
Sardar Hira Udhyog Sahakari Mandali Ltd. (for short, “the Society”)
purchased the lands of Survey No.339 at a public auction held by
the Special Recovery Officer on 28.04.1981. By order dated
28.05.1981, the officer confirmed the auction, and directed that the
name of the Society be entered in the records of rights. Accordingly,
the name of the Society was entered in the revenue records by
Mutation Entry No.7068 on 16.05.1983. Thereafter, Khodidas
Kanjibhai Patel obtained Construction Permission (for short, “Raja
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Chitthi”) on 13.12.1983 from the Surat Municipal Corporation for
constructing industrial units for the Society. Khodidas Patel then
issued Possession Receipts (for short, “Kabja Receipts”) to multiple
sub-plot holders , the appellants herein, who have remained in
possession of the said sub-plots since the year 1983-84.
2.4 However, on 12.10.1984, the Assistant Collector, Choryasi
Prant, passed an order cancelling Mutation Entry No.7068 dated
16.05.1983, inter alia, on the basis that the public auction dated
28.04.1981 was not conducted according to the provisions of the
ULC Act. This order was challenged before the Collector, Choryasi
Prant in Appeal No.152/1985, which passed an order dated
16.01.1986 upholding the original order dated 12.10.1984 of the
Assistant Collector. The order of the Collector was in turn
challenged before the Assistant Secretary, Revenue Department in
Revision under Rule 108(6A) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules,
1972. By order dated 07.04.1986, said Revision was dismissed
thereby upholding the order dated 16.01.1986 passed by the
Collector in Appeal No.152/1985.
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2.5 On 03.05.1988, the Government of Gujarat exercised its
powers of revision under Section 34 of the ULC Act and set aside
the order dated 18.02.1980 passed by the Competent Authority-I,
and remanded the matter to the Competent Authority & Additional
Collector, ULC, Surat (for short, “Competent Authority-II”) for
reconsideration of the question of “excess land” with regard to the
subject land Survey No.339. Thereafter, on 16.01.1989, the
Competent Authority-II passed an order declaring that 662.18
square metres out of the total area of 9303 square metres of the
subject land in Survey No.339 – Final Plot Nos. 9A and 9B was
‘excess land’.
2.6 According to the appellants , in the order dated 16.01.1989,
the cancellation of the mutation entry was specifically mentioned.
However, they were not served with any notice by the Competent
Authority-II, though they were the unit holders (sub-plot holders),
and were in actual physical and legal possession of the said units.
Furthermore, none of them was made a party before the Competent
Authority-II, despite being in possession .
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2.7 Therefore, on the cancellation of the auction purchase in
favour of Khodidas Kanjibhai Patel the original landowner,
Kuberbhai Nathubhai, entered into a registered agreements of sale
for the sub-plots in favour of the sub-plot holders/appellants
herein, and hence the appellants became owners and came into
possession of sub-plot Nos.1 to 77 situated upon Survey No.339.
According to the appellants, majority of them are engaged in the
business of diamond cutting and polishing, while a few of them are
engaged in different businesses, such as embroidery and other
small businesses.
2.8 On 22.11.1990, a notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act
was issued to the original landholder directing him to vacate and
handover possession of the “excess land” to the respondent/State
Government within a period of thirty days. Since possession was
not surrendered, the Deputy Collector, ULC drew Panchnama dated
21.01.1992, directing taking over possession of the ‘excess land’ to
the tune of 662.18 square metres out of the total area of the land
admeasuring 9303 square metre s. In the said order, it was also
observed that the said excess land is “open on the site” and that
6


the possession of the same has been taken by the Competent
Authority and Deputy Collector, ULC.
2.9 When some of the sub-plot holders tried to resell their sub-
plots, the Competent Authority-II sent letters dated 20.06.2007 and
05.07.2008 refusing to grant ‘No Objection Certificates’ (for short,
“NOCs”) for the subsequent sale, on the ground that the
constructed units were situated over the alleged ‘excess land’ as the
said surplus land was taken over and therefore vested in the
government since 21.01,1992. The appellants contended that this
was the first time it came to their knowledge that the said property
had been declared as ‘excess land’ by the Competent Authority-II.
2.10 Aggrieved, the appellants preferred Writ Petition being
Special Civil Application No.533/2009 before the Gujarat High
Court, seeking relief in the nature of directions to the respondent
to issue the necessary NOCs for subsequent sale of the said sub-
plots. Thereafter another Writ Petition being Special Civil
Application No.10844/2010 was preferred by the appellants before
the Gujarat High Court, seeking relief in the nature of a declaration
7


to the effect that no ‘Non-Agricultural Use Permission’ was required
for the usage of the said allotted sub-plots. Both the said Writ
Petitions were dismissed vide separate orders dated 08.02.2010 by
the Gujarat High Court.
2.11 Aggrieved by the dismissal of the said Writ Petitions, the
appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeals bearing LPA
Nos.2024/2010 and 1171/2011 before the Gujarat High Court. The
said Letters Patent Appeals were dismissed vide impugned common
order dated 23.07.2014. The Gujarat High Court, while dismissing
the said Letter Patent Appeals, observed that the appellants herein
are ‘illegal occupants’ of the said sub-plots and had the knowledge
and notice of the proceedings under the ULC Act as it is apparent
from the perusal of the sale deeds and ‘Raja Chitthi’ that said
transfers were made subject to the proceedings and provisions of
the ULC Act. It was further observed by the High Court that the
order of permission granted was in favour of the Society and not in
favour of the appellants. It was observed that the fact that
electricity connections and subsequent bills raised were in the
name of the appellants but the same do not establish their
8


possession as emphasised under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act.
Lastly, the High Court also observed that none of the appellants
were in possession of the said pieces of land on the date on which
the ULC Act came into force.
2.12 Aggrieved by the impugned common order dated 23.07.2014
passed in LPA No.2024/2010 in Special Civil Application
No.533/2009 and LPA No.1171/2011 in Special Civil Application
No.10844/2010, the appellants have preferred the present Civil
Appeal. The appellants submitted that they have only challenged
one order and hence the declaration of ‘excess vacant land’ is the
only hurdle preventing the issuance of NOC’s. Therefore, if they
were to succeed in the present appeal, the other reliefs sought for,
and grievances of the appellants, including the relief sought for in
LPA No.1171/2011, can be redressed by the respondents
themselves.
Submissions:
3. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
perused the materia ls on record.
9


3.1 Learned counsel for the appellants submitted as follows:
3.1.1 As per the wording of Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, the
intention of the legislation is clear inasmuch as the persons who
are in possession of the land are required to be served with notice
and not merely the persons who had filled the declaration form
under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act. Therefore, the High Court
misinterpreted the provisions of Section 10(5) of the ULC Act. Had
the appellants, as possessors of the concerned plots been served
notice, they would have been in a position to take appropriate
action against the orders of the Competent Authority-II, as well as
the original landowners. Neither Benches of the High Court
disagreed with the fact that the physical and actual possession of
the sub-plots in question were with the appellants. Rather, while
the learned Single Judge did not consider the question of
possession, the Division Bench held that possession of the sub-
plots by the appellants was illegal under the provisions of the ULC
Act.
10


3.1.2 That the above finding is contrary to law. This is because
when the Society allotted the sub-plots to its members, including
the appellants herein, in the year 1983-84, there was no
declaration regarding ‘excess vacant land’. No notice was ever
served to the appellants about such a declaration, despite them
possessing the sub-plots, putting up construction upon them and
running small factories/diamond factories/industrial units. The
appellants had adduced electricity bills in their name to prove
possession. However, the High Court held that the electricity bills
do not establish possession.
3.1.3 Further, the High Court erred in holding that the appellants
were in illegal occupants. The original landowners, who had
executed the sale deeds, did not mention the declaration of ‘excess
vacant land’. Moreover, the Competent Authority-II only took ‘paper
possession’ of the sub-plots, and did not take over actual, physical
and legal possession, which has always remained with the
appellants. No notice was served on the appellants and therefore
the possession of ‘excess vacant land’ was not taken over legally by,
for and on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, the High Court
11


should have declared the proceedings ‘abated’ under Section 4 of
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for the
sake of convenience, “Repealing Act”), which speaks of abatement
of legal proceedings and granted relief to the appellants herein.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted as
follows:
4.1 At the outset, while arguing before the learned Single Judge
of the Gujarat High Court, the appellants conceded all claims,
except the prayer to direct the Competent Authority-II to issue
necessary NOCs for the purpose of getting the registered sale deed
that was withheld by the Joint Sub-Registrar, Surat. Therefore, the
High Court was constrained to not consider the challenge to the
order dated 16.06.1989 on merits. The High Court thus never had
to consider the applicability of the Repealing Act, the challenge to
the order dated 16.06.1989, or the claims regarding the appellants’
right to receive notice under Section 10(5). The concessions made
by the appellants cannot now be raised before this Court.
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4.1.1 The appellants have no locus to challenge any order passed
since the alleged sales were made without obtaining permission
from the Competent Authority-II and were in violation of Sections
5(3) and 27 of the ULC Act. The concerned lands were recorded in
the name of the State Government by an entry dated 22.10.1993,
well before the repeal of the ULC Act. The appellants have
challenged the order dated 16.06.1989 after almost twenty-one
years.
4.1.2 The possession claimed by the appellants traces back to
possession receipts issued by the Society, in whose favour the land
was transferred by auction dated 28.04.1981. However, this
auction was cancelled by order dated 12.10.1984, following which
the registration in the name of the Society was cancelled, and
possession of the land was restored to the original landowner. The
fact that the landowner challenged the order dated 16.06.1989 by
an appeal under Section 33 of the ULC Act, shows that possession
was with the landowner.
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4.1.3 It was further submitted that Section 4 of the Repealing Act
does not apply in the present case, since the appellants had no
pending proceedings under the ULC Act before the commencement
of the Repealing Act. On 24.09.1992, a final order was passed
under Section 11 of the ULC Act regarding compensation for ‘excess
vacant land’. This marked the conclusion of proceedings under the
ULC Act.
4.1.4 The claim of the appellants depends solely upon the alleged
non-issuance of mandatory notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC
Act. However, the legislature did not intend that illegal possessors
be provided the requisite notice under Section 10(5). In this regard,
the judgement of this Court in C. Albert Morris vs. K.
Chandrasekaran, (2006) 1 SCC 228 was referred to.
4.1.5 Possession was restored to the landowner upon cancellation
of the auction. Therefore, the subsequent sale deed executed in
favour of the appellants was in violation of Section 5(3) of the ULC
Act. If a right is borne out of an act that does not have legal
sanction, such a right may exist, but is not enforceable. Therefore,
14


the appellants cannot contend that they had an enforceable right
to receive notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act.
Points for consideration:
5. The following points would arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the
Writ Petitions by not applying Section 4 of the Repealing
Act and thereby not granting relief to the appellants herein.
(ii) What Order?
6. Section 10 of the ULC Act reads as under:
“10.Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling
limit. –
(1) As soon as may be after the service of the
statement under section 9 on the person concerned,
the competent authority shall cause a notification
giving the particulars of the vacant land held by
such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating
that-
(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the
concerned State Government; and
(ii) the claims of all person interested in such
vacant land may be made by them personally
or by their agents giving particulars of the
nature of their interests in such land,
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to be published for the information of the general
public in the Official Gazette of the State concerned
and in such other manner as may be prescribed.
(2) After considering the claims of the persons
interested in the vacant land, made to the competent
authority in pursuance of the notification published
under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall
determine the nature and extent of such claims and
pass such orders as it deems fit.
(3) At any time after the publication of the
notification under sub-section (1), the competent
authority may, by notification published in the
Official Gazette of the State concerned, declare that
the excess vacant land referred to, in the notification
published under sub -section (1) shall, with effect
from such date as may be specified in the
declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the
State Government and upon the publication of such
declaration, such land shall be deemed to have
vested absolutely in the State Government free from
all encumbrances with effect from the date so
specified.
(4) During the period commencing on the date
of publication of the notification under sub-section
(1) and ending with the date specified in the
declaration made under sub-section (3) –
(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale,
mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess
vacant land (including any part thereof)
specified in the notification aforesaid and
any such transfer made in contravention of
this provision shall be deemed to be null
and void; and
(ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered
the use of such excess vacant land.
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(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3), the competent
authority may, by notice in writing, order any person
who may be in possession of it to surrender or
deliver possession thereof to the State Government
or to any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf within thirty days of the
service of the notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with
an order made under sub-section (5), the competent
authority may take possession of the vacant land or
cause it to be given to the concerned State
Government or to any person duly authorised by
such State Government in this behalf and may for
that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
Explanation.- In this section, in sub-section (1) of
section 11 and in sections 14 and 23, “State
Government”, in relation to-
(a) any vacant land owned by the Central
Government, means the Central Government;
(b) any vacant land owned by any State
Government and situated in a Union Territory or
within the local limits of a cantonment declared as
such under section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 1924,
means that State Government.”

7. Section 10 of the ULC Act speaks of acquisition of vacant land
in excess of the ceiling limit. Once a final statement is issued under
Section 9 of the ULC Act, the same has to be served on the person
concerned by the Competent Authority which shall also issue a
17


notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such
person in excess of the ceiling limit. The said notification shall also
state that:
(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State
Government;
(ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land may
be made by them personally or by their agents giving
particulars of the nature of their interests in such land.
8. The said notification has to be published in the Official
Gazette of the State concerned. The Competent Authority shall
thereafter consider the claims of the persons interested and
determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass orders
accordingly. From the date of the publication of the notification in
the Official Gazette of the State as per sub-Section (1) of Section 10
of the ULC Act, the vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by
the State Government. Also, the publication of such a notification
implies a declaration that such land shall be deemed to have vested
absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances
with effect from the date so specified. No person can transfer any
18


excess vacant land specified in the notification in any manner
known to law and no person shall alter or cause to be altered the
use of such excess vacant land once the publication of the
notification under sub-Section (1) is made till the dates specified in
the declaration made under sub-Section (3) of Section 10 of the ULC
Act.
9. On the basis of the vacant land having vested in the State
Government as per sub-Section (3) of Section 10 of the ULC Act,
the Competent Authority, by notice in writing, order any person
who may be in possession of vacant land of it to surrender or deliver
possession to the State Government or to any person duly
authorised by the State Government within thirty days of the
service of the notice ( vide Section 10(5) of the ULC Act). In case, if
any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under
sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the ULC Act, the Competent
Authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be
given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly
authorised by such State Government and may for that purpose
use such force as may be necessary.
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10. Therefore, Section 10 of the ULC Act categorically
distinguishes between the vesting of land in the State Government
and taking possession of the vested land from any person who is in
possession of the said land. The two legal consequences are distinct
and have to be borne in mind while considering the savings clause
as well as the abatement clause under Sections 3 and 4,
respectively of the Repealing Act.
11. The Explanation to Section 10 does not require any discussion
for the purpose of this case.
12. In the State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC
280 (“Hari Ram”) , a two-judge bench of this Court explained the
enactment of the ULC Act, as well as the Repealing Act, in great
detail including the history of the ULC Act. Then, this Court
referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Repealing
Act, outlining as follows:
“12. Before examining the scope of sub-section (3) of
Section 10 as well as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10,
reference may be made to the Repeal Act, 1999 and its
object and reasons which are as follows:

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Statement of Object and Reasons:
“1. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 was passed when Proclamation of
Emergency was in operation with a laudable social
objective in mind…….Unfortunately public
opinion is nearly unanimous that the Act has
failed to achieve what was expected of it. It has on
the contrary pushed up land prices to
unconscionable levels, practically brought the
housing industry to a stop and provided copious
opportunities for corruption. There is widespread
clamour for removing this most potent clog on
housing.
xxx
4. The proposed repeal, along with some other
incentives and simplification of administrative
procedures is expected to revive the stagnant
housing industry and provide affordable living
accommodation for those who are in a state of
underserved want and are entitled to public
assistance. The repeal will not however, affect land
on which building activity has already
commenced. For that limited purpose, exemptions
granted under Section 20 of the Act will continue
to be operative. Amounts paid out by the State
Government will become refundable.”

13. While the Repealing Act thus sought to put an end to the
substantive operation of the ULC Act, it contained a savings clause,
which is as follows:

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“ 3. Savings.— (1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not
affect—
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of
Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by
the State Government or any person duly authorised by
the State Government in this behalf or by the competent
authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-
section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder,
notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the
contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a
condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of
Section 20.
(2) Where—
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the
principal Act but possession of which has not been taken
over by the State Government or any person duly
authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by
the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government
with respect to such land,
then, such land shall not restored unless the amount paid,
if any, has been refunded to the State Government.”

14. On the other hand, Section 4 of the Repealing Act provides for
abatement of proceedings pending immediately before the
commencement of the Act, and for immediate reference, is
reproduced once as under:
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“ 4. Abatement of legal proceedings.— All proceedings
relating to any order made or purported to be made under
the principal Act pending immediately before the
commencement of this Act, before any court, tribunal or
other authority shall abate:
Provided that this section shall not apply to the
proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the
principal Act in so far as such proceedings are relatable to
the land, possession of which has been taken over by the
State Government or any person duly authorised by the
State Government in this behalf or by the competent
authority.”

15. The core of the dispute at hand centers around the proper
application of Section 4 of the Repealing Act to the facts of this case.
The appellants contended that without notice being delivered to
them under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act (since they were in actual
possession of the concerned land), possession has not been legally
transferred to the State. Therefore, the proceedings relating to
transfer of possession of the sub-units was ‘pending’ at the time of
commencement of the Repealing Act, resulting in their abatement
under Section 4 of the Repealing Act.
15.1 , the respondents submitted that a ‘final order’
Per contra
regarding compensation for the land deemed to be “excess” and
23


“vacant” was passed on 24.09.1992. With this order, the
proceedings concluded and hence there is no question of the matter
of possession having been ‘abated’ with the advent of the Repealing
Act.
16. The legal questions that arise for our consideration in the
present appeal are therefore as follows:
i) Was the delivery of notice under Section 10(5) to the appellants
(as possessors of the concerned lands) a mandatory step, the
non-fulfilment of which would render abatement of the
proceedings in terms of Section 4 of the Repealing Act?
ii) Despite the recording of lands in the name of the State
Government, if actual possession was not subsequently
transferred to the Government, would this render the
proceedings to abate under Section 4 of the Repealing Act?
The aforesaid questions shall be considered together.
17. In Hari Ram , this Court considered the proper meaning of the
phrases “deemed to have been acquired by the State Government”
and “vested absolutely in the State Government” in Section 10(3) of
24


the ULC Act. The relevant paragraphs containing this Court’s
reasoning are reproduced below:
“24. The expression “deemed to have been acquired” used
as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section 10
can only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interests
because till that time the land may be either in the
ownership of the person who held that vacant land or to
possess such land as owner or as a tenant or as mortgagee
and so on as defined under Section 2(1) of the Act. The
word “vested” has not been defined in the Act, so also the
word “absolutely”. What is vested absolutely is only the
land which is deemed to have acquired and nothing
more….
xxx
29. What is deemed “vesting absolutely” is that “what is
deemed to have acquired”. In our view, there must be
express words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold
that the legislature intended to divest possession also,
since the owners or holders of the vacant land are pitted
against a statutory hypothesis….
30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired
but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things
to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not
take possession unless there is an indication to the
contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming
provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative
purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on
vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the
ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such
lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in the
hands of a few persons, so as to bring about equitable
distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures
have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we
look at those words in the above setting and the provisions
25


to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the
words “acquired” and “vested” have different meaning and
content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure
possession not de facto, for more reasons than one
because we are testing the expression on a statutory
hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to
the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent.”
(underlining by us)

17.1 Therefore, the land ‘vesting’ with the State Government does
not connote the transfer of possession. Rather, what is ‘deemed’ to
have ‘vested’ are the aspects that have deemed i.e., by a legal fiction
to have been ‘acquired’, i.e., title or interests. Possession, as
explained in Hari Ram vests de jure and not de facto . ‘Acquisition’
(of title or interests) does not necessarily involve the transfer of such
de facto possession. Such transfer requires certain explicit steps to
be taken, which were also outlined by this Court in Hari Ram as
follows:
“Voluntary Surrender
31. The “vesting” in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our
view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession
though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily
surrendering or delivering possession…
32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is
concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in the
property including de jure possession and, not de facto but
26


it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and
deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act.
33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6)
of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section
(4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the
period commencing on the date of publication under sub-
section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration
made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by
way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant
land, specified in the notification and any such transfer
made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be
null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall
alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant
land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the
notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date
specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there
is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the
possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of
the land.
Peaceful dispossession
34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks
of “possession” which says that where any land is vested
in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section
10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing,
order any person, who may be in possession of it to
surrender or transfer possession to the State Government
or to any other person, duly authorised by the State
Government.
35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the
State Government by the two deeming provisions under
sub-section (3) of Section 10, there is no necessity of using
the expression “where any land is vested” under sub-
section (5) of Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of
possession under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can be
voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as
27


provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is
no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession,
necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in
writing under sub-section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or
deliver possession……
Forceful possession
36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only
when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order
under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) of
Section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any
person refuses or fails to comply with the order made
under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take
possession of the vacant land to be given to the State
Government and for that purpose, force—as may be
necessary—can be used…. Forcible dispossession of the
land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation
which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-
section (5) of Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6),
therefore, take care of both the situations i.e. taking
possession by giving notice, that is, “peaceful
dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give delivery
of possession under Section 10(5), then “forceful
dispossession” under sub-section (6) of Section 10.”
(underlining by us)

17.2 Hence, after possession is vested, there are three
de jure
methods by which de facto possession may be transferred: the first
is voluntary transfer by the possessor under Section 10(3) of the
ULC Act. If possession is not voluntarily transferred, then the
second method is through delivery of notice under Section 10(5) of
28


the ULC Act to the possessor. In case possession is still not
transferred, then the third method involves the Competent
Authority taking possession under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act (by
force, if required) and delivering it to the State Government.
18. On the question of delivery of notice under Section 10(5), this
Court observed in Hari Ram as under:
“37. The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections
(5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word
“may” has been used therein, the word “may” in both the
sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a
court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs
to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to
follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of
non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section
(6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder
being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word
“may” has to be read as “shall”.
xxx
39. The abovementioned directives make it clear that sub-
section (3) takes in only de jure possession and not de facto
possession, therefore, if the landowner is not surrendering
possession voluntarily under sub-section (3) of Section 10,
or surrendering or delivering possession after notice,
under Section 10(5) or dispossession by use of force, it
cannot be said that the State Government has taken
possession of the vacant land.”
(underlining by us)
29


18.1 We, therefore, see that the requirement of issuance of
notice under Section 10(5) is mandatory and must be issued to the
person(s) actually in possession of the concerned land. This is clear
from the wording of the statute (“order any person who may be in
possession of it”), which are interpreted by this Court in Hari Ram .
This Court opined that the importance of delivering notice lay in
avoiding a situation where a person is “dispossessed” without
notice which would be in violation of the principles of natural
justice, thereby clearly envisioning that the possessor must be
served with notice.
18.2 Having held thus, this Court concluded by establishing the
proper scope of application of Section 4 of the Repealing Act, as
under:
“ Effect of the Repeal Act
41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of Repeal
Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act.
The Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly repealed Act 33 of
1976. The objects and reasons of the Repeal Act have
already been referred to in the earlier part of this
judgment. The Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving
clause. The question whether a right has been acquired
or liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed
30


will in each case depend on the construction of the
statute and the facts of the particular case.
42. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of
Section 10 would not confer any right on the State
Government to have de facto possession of the vacant
land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of
vacant land before 18-3-1999. The State has to establish
that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land
or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under
sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession
under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to
establish any of those situations, the landowner or holder
can claim the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. The
State Government in this appeal could not establish any
of those situations and hence the High Court is right in
holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit
of Section 4 of the Repeal Act.”
(underlining by us)

18.3 Therefore, landowner/holder of land may claim the
benefit of Section 4 of the Repealing Act (abatement of proceedings)
if de facto possession has not yet been transferred either through
voluntary surrender, peaceful transfer under Section 10(5) (which,
as observed earlier, requires notice to the possessor) or forceful
dispossession under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act.
19. It would also be apt to refer to a more recent judgment of this
Court in AP Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar,
31


2025 SCC OnLine SC 447 (“AP Electrical”), in which a Bench
comprising J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. (one of us) ruled
on the acquisition of ‘possession’ under the ULC Act. Writing for
the bench, Pardiwala, J. observed:
“20. Thus, by virtue of the provisions of Section 3 of the
Repeal Act, 1999, if possession of vacant land has been
taken over on behalf of the State Government before the
coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999, the repeal of the
Principal Act would not affect the vesting of such land
under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of Act, 1976. Hence,
the issue as to whether actual possession of land declared
excess under the Act has been taken over or not assumes
great significance after the coming into force of the Repeal
Act, 1999 inasmuch as if possession has not been taken
over, the proceedings would abate under Section 4 of the
Repeal Act, 1999 and the ownership of the land, if vested
in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the Act,
1976 would be required to be restored to the original land-
holder subject to repayment of any amount that has been
paid by the State Government with respect to such land.”
(underlining by us)

19.1 On the specific question of delivery of notice under
Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, it was held as follows:
“22. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is
apparent that the statute contemplates giving an
opportunity to the landholder or any person in possession
of excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possession
thereof to the State Government and for this purpose
provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person
32


to surrender or deliver possession of such land. It is only
when pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails
to comply with an order under sub-section (5) within a
period of thirty days of the service of notice, that the
competent authority is required to take over possession of
the vacant land and for that purpose may use force, if
necessary. Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (6) are
to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-
compliance of an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10
of the Act, 1976 within the prescribed period.
xxx
25. ….when sub-section (5) of Section 10 mandates giving
notice of an order under the said sub-section to the person
in possession, the same is required to be complied with in
its true letter and spirit. Considering the nature of rights
involved, mere issuance of notice without service thereof,
cannot be said to be due compliance with the provisions of
the statute. Besides, the provisions of subsection (6) of
Section 10 can be resorted to only if the person fails to
comply with an order under sub-section (5) thereof, within
a period of thirty days of service of notice. Hence,
possession cannot be taken over under Section 10(6) of the
Act, 1976 unless a period of thirty days from the date of
service of notice has elapsed. In absence of service of notice
under sub-section (5) of Section 10, there will be no
starting point for calculating the period of thirty days. In
other words, time will not start running, hence the
question of taking over possession under sub-section (6) of
Section 10 of the Act, 1976 will not arise at all….
(underlining by us)

19.2 The delivery of notice to the person in possession was
therefore unequivocally held to be mandatory. Indeed, the
33


emphasis was on the service of notice on the possessor, as opposed
to mere issuance of the same. In the absence of such service of
notice, any attempt at forced dispossession was held to be contrary
to the statute and hence illegal.
19.3 This Court reiterated the conclusion in Hari Ram, i.e., that
if possession has not been taken over by the State Government,
then the proceedings under the Act would abate under Section 4 of
the Repealing Act. The “mere vesting of the vacant land with the
State Government by operation of law, without actual possession,
is not sufficient”. This Court in AP Electrical phrased the
conclusion of Hari Ram in the following manner:
“29. ….To put it in other words, the mere paper possession
would not save the situation for the State Government
unless the State is able to establish by cogent evidence
that actual physical possession of the entire land was
taken over by evicting each and every person from the
land. The onus is on the State to establish that actual
physical possession of the excess vacant land was taken
over before the repeal.”
(underlining by us)

19.4 A situation in which possession was not actually transferred
to the State Government under the provisions of Section 10 of the
34


ULC Act, was thus deemed to be ‘paper possession’, and incapable
of preventing proceedings from abating under Section 4 of the
Repealing Act.
19.5 This Court in AP Electrical examined a prior decision of
this Court in State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (2015)
5 SCC 321 (“Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma”), since it appeared to “at the
first blush create an impression that the dictum as laid in Hari
Ram has been diluted”. It assessed the effect of Bhaskar Jyoti
Sarma on the dictum on Hari Ram as follows.
“33. We quote few relevant paras of the said judgment as
under:—
xxx
“15. The High Court has held that the alleged
dispossession was not preceded by any notice
under Section 10(5) of the Act. Assuming that to
be the case all that it would mean is that on
7th December, 1991 when the erstwhile owner
was dispossessed from the land in question, he
could have made a grievance based on Section
10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to
him no matter he would upon such restoration
once again be liable to be evicted under Sections
10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure to
deliver or surrender such possession. In reality
therefore unless there was something that was
inherently wrong so as to affect the very process
35


of taking over such as the identity of the land or
the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance
of a similar nature going to the root of the matter
hence requiring an adjudication, a person who
had lost his land by reason of the same being
declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not
consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of
Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even
when this Court may uphold his contention that
the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed,
it may still be not enough for him to retain the land
for the authorities could the very next day
dispossess him from the same by simply serving a
notice under Section 10(5). It would, in that view,
be an academic exercise for any owner or person
in possession to find fault with his dispossession
on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5)
had been served upon him.
16. The issue can be viewed from another angle
also. Assuming that a person in possession could
make a grievance, no matter without much gain in
the ultimate analysis, the question is whether
such grievance could be made long after the
alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical
possession was taken over from the erstwhile land
owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the
present case any grievance based on Section 10(5)
ought to have been made within a reasonable time
of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so,
forcible taking over of possession would acquire
legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such
situation the owner or the person in possession
must be deemed to have waived his right under
Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in
our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a
grievance not because he has suffered any real
prejudice that needs to be redressed but only
36


because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal
Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his
dispossession being in violation of the prescribed
procedure.
17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon
the decision of this Court in Hari Ram's
case (supra). That decision does not, in our view,
lend much assistance to the respondents. We say
so, because this Court was in Hari Ram's
case (supra) considering whether the word ‘may’
appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent
authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a
notice before taking physical possession of the
land in question under Section 10(6). The
question whether breach of Section 10(5) and
possible dispossession without notice would
vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it
non est in the eye of law did not fall for
consideration in that case. In our opinion, what
Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical
course of action that ought to be followed before
the authorities decided to use force to dispossess
the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at
hand if the appellant's version regarding
dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December
1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession
was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of
no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate
the act of taking possession for the purposes of
Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because
Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made
any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at
any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that
he had waived his right to do so.”
(Emphasis supplied)
37


34. We have supplied emphasis on paras 15 and 17
of Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra) referred to above, for the
purpose of highlighting that Hari Ram (supra) has not
been diluted in any manner. We are of the firm view
that Hari Ram (supra) holds the field even as on date. The
statements of law in Hari Ram (supra) are absolutely
correct.
35. If two decisions of this Court appear inconsistent with
each other, the High Courts are not to follow one and
overlook the other, but should try to reconcile and respect
them both and the only way to do so is to adopt the wise
suggestion of Lord Halsbury given
in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 and reiterated by
the Privy Council in Punjab Cooperative Bank
Ltd. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Lahore AIR 1940 PC 230:
“…… every judgment must be read as applicable
to the particular facts proved or assumed to be
proved, since the generality of the expressions,
which may be found there, are not intended to be
expositions of the whole law, but governed or
qualified by the particular facts of the case in
which such expressions are to be found.” and
follow that decision whose facts appear more in
accord with those of the case at hand.”

20. We are inclined to agree with this view of this Court in AP
Electrical regarding the effect of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma on the
dictum in Hari Ram . In the former, de facto possession had
actually been transferred to the State Government. Albeit, this was
done by force in contravention of the requirement to mandatorily
38


issue notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act. In this regard, this
Court held that if the objection regarding the non-compliance with
Section 10(5) is not made within a “reasonable time”, then the right
to so object is “waived”.
20.1 However, the facts of Hari Ram (and indeed, the present
case) are different insofar as de facto possession was not
transferred, by force or otherwise. Therefore, the question is not
whether an actual transfer of possession by force is vitiated by a
delay in raising objections to the transfer. Rather, the question is
whether actual possession has been transferred at all, if no process
of transfer has been conducted under the various provisions of
Section 10 of the ULC Act. Therefore, the dictum in Hari Ram
stands undisturbed by the judgment in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma.
20.2 In fact, this Court in AP Electrical wholly aligned with the
dictum in Hari Ram regarding the difference between ‘vesting’ and
‘possession’, observing as follows:
“38. If de facto possession has already passed on to the
State Government by the two deeming provisions under
sub-section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using
39


the expression “where any land is vested.” under sub-
section (5) to Section 10…
39. The mere vesting of the land under subsection (3) of
Section 10 would not confer any right on the State
Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land
unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land
before 18.03.1999. State has to establish that there has
been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender
and delivery of peaceful possession under subsection (5) of
Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6)
of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those
situations, the landowner or holder can claim the benefit
of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. In the case on hand,
the State Government has in our considered view not been
able to establish any of those situations and hence the
learned Single Judge was right in holding that the
appellant herein is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3
of the Repeal Act, 1999.”
(underlining by us)

20.3 Finally, bringing all the above concepts together, this Court
summed up the proper effect of the Repealing Act, as also the
question of possession under Section 10 of the ULC Act, as follows:
“40. The effect of Repeal Act, 1999 is further clear. If the
landowner remains in physical possession, then
irrespective of his land being declared surplus and/or
entry being made in favour of the State in revenue records,
he will not be divested of his rights….
41. The propositions of law governing the issue of
possession in context with Sections 10(5) and 10(6)
respectively of the Act, 1976 read with Section 3 of the
Repeal Act, 1999 may be summed up thus:
40


[1] The Repeal Act, 1999 clearly talks about the
possession being taken under Section 10(5) or
Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976, as the case may be.
[2] It is a statutory obligation on the part of the
competent authority or the State to take
possession strictly as permitted in law.
[3] In case the possession is purported to have been
taken under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 the
Court is still obliged to look into whether “taking
of such possession” is valid or invalidated on any
of the considerations in law.
[4] The possession envisaged under Section 3 of the
Repeal Act, 1999 is de facto and not de jure only.
[5] The mere vesting of “land declared surplus” under
the Act without resuming “de facto possession” is
of no consequence and the land holder is entitled
to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999.
[6] The requirement of giving notice under sub-
sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 respectively is
mandatory. Although the word “may” has been
used therein, yet the word “may” in both the sub-
sections should be understood as “shall” because
a Court is obliged to decide the consequences that
the legislature intended to follow from the failure
to implement the requirement.
[7] The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3)
of Section 10 would not confer any right on the
State Government to have de facto possession of
the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary
surrender of vacant land before 18th March 1999.
[8] The State has to establish by cogent evidence on
record that there has been a voluntary surrender
of vacant land or surrender and delivery of
peaceful possession under sub-section (6) of
41


Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-
section (6) of Section 10.”
(underlining by us)

20.4 We find that this view is in accordance with the prior
dictum of this Court in Hari Ram, and agree with the same. At this
juncture, we find it appropriate to briefly go through certain other
pronouncements of this Court, all of which are aligned on the
necessity of serving notice on the possessor under Section 10(5);
the difference between vesting and possession; the difference
between de jure and de facto possession and the effect of the
Repealing Act.
21. The following judgments of this Court could be adverted to at
this stage:
a) In Mangalsen vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 15 SCC
332, this Court observed that the application filed under Section
20 of the ULC Act was still pending and therefore, the State
Government’s claim to taking possession of the surplus land was
found not based on facts. It was also not clear from the record
whether or not the notice under Section 10(5) was served upon the
42


appellant therein. The notice under Section 11(8) of the ULC Act
determining compensation was after a gap of ten years. Hence, it
was observed that there was no evidence to prove that the notice
issued under Section 10(5) had been served upon the appellant
therein or that he had illegally occupied the surplus land after
30.01.1990. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, this Court has also
noted the tardy approach in the matter by the competent authority
which makes an interesting reading.
b) In Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Additional Collector &
Competent Authority, (2014) 12 SCC 523 , it was held that in the
absence of any evidence to show that appellant therein had
voluntarily surrendered or respondents therein had taken peaceful
or forceable possession of the lands in question, the respondents
therein had only de jure possession before coming into force of the
Repealing Act. Since de facto possession of lands was not taken
before execution of possession receipt, it was held that the
respondent therein could not hold on to the lands in question which
were legally owned and possessed by the appellants therein.
Accordingly, it was observed as under:
43


“12. We have, therefore, clearly indicated that it was
always open to the authorities to take forcible possession
and, in fact, in the notice issued under Section 10(5) of the
ULC Act, it was stated that if the possession had not been
surrendered, possession would be taken by application of
necessary force. For taking forcible possession, certain
procedures had to be followed. The respondents have no
case that such procedures were followed and forcible
possession was taken. Further, there is nothing to show
that the respondents had taken peaceful possession, nor
is there anything to show that the appellants had given
voluntary possession. The facts would clearly indicate that
only de jure possession had been taken by the respondents
and not de facto possession before coming into force of the
repeal of the Act. Since there is nothing to show that de
facto possession had been taken from the appellants prior
to the execution of the possession receipt in favour
of M MRDA , it cannot hold on to the lands in question, which
are legally owned and possessed by the appellants….”
(underlining by us)

c) In U.A. Basheer vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 313,
while referring to Sections 3 and 4 of the Repealing Act which deal
with savings clause and abatement of proceeding clause
respectively observed as under:
“18. It is clear from the aforementioned legislative
provisions that the question of current possession of the
suit property is absolutely material to a full adjudication
of the controversy before us. This is because, if the
appellant does enjoy possession, as claimed by him, any
proceedings for any excess land under the principal Act
are liable to abate, as per Section 3 and Section 4 of the
44


Repeal Act, and the appellant would be entitled to
ownership and possession over the suit property……”
(underlining by us)

d) In State of Orissa vs. Sakhi Bewa, (2022) 16 SCC 594, it
was held that the question whether surplus land was taken over by
the State is a question of fact and is not concerned with payment
of compensation to the landowner. That merely because
compensation has not been paid, it cannot be presumed that
possession was not taken over. In the aforesaid context, it was
observed as under:
“4.3. A fair reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1999 Repeal
Act makes it clear that all proceedings relating to any order
made or purported to be made under the principal Act (the
1976 Act) pending immediately before the commencement
of the 1999 Repeal Act, before any court, tribunal or other
authority shall abate. Section 4 of the Repeal Act shall not
apply provided possession of land has been taken over by
the State Government or any person duly authorised by
the State Government in this behalf or by the competent
authority. Therefore, if the possession of the surplus
land/land has been taken over by the State Government
or any person duly authorised by the State Government in
this behalf or by the competent authority, in that case, the
proceedings relating to any order made under the principal
1976 Act shall not abate, meaning thereby that the 1999
Repeal Act shall not affect all those proceedings with
respect to the land of which the possession has been taken
over. Therefore, before declaring the proceedings as having
abated in view of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1999 Repeal Act,
45


it has to be considered and decided whether possession of
the surplus land/land has been taken over by the State
Government or any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the competent authority
or not. If it is found and held that the possession of the
surplus land has been taken over, in that case, the
proceedings shall not be declared as having been abated.”
(underlining by us)

22. The land in question is admeasuring 9303 square metres in
Village Katargam, Surat, Gujarat which initially belonged to one
Nathubhai Ranchhodbhai and on his demise to his heir Kuberbhai
Nathubhai. That on the enforcement of ULC Act proceedings were
initiated under the said Act on Kuberbhai Nathubhai filing a Form
under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act and by making a declaration
thereby. Initially, the Competent Authority-I under the ULC Act
held that the land in question was exempt as per Section 21 of the
said Act and the remaining land was within the ceiling limit. The
Society purchased the land bearing Survey No.339 at a public
auction on 28.04.1981 conducted by the Special Recovery Officer
and the name of Society was entered in the Mutation records.
Industrial units were developed on the said land. Thereafter, the
Assistant Collector passed an order cancelling Mutation entries on
46


the premise that the public auction dated 28.04.1981 was not
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the ULC Act which
order was challenged before the Collector and on being
unsuccessful, it was challenged before the Assistant Secretary,
Revenue Division by filing a revision petition.
22.1 When the matters stood thus, the Government of Gujarat
exercised its revisional powers under Section 34 of the ULC Act and
set aside the initial order dated 18.02.1980 passed by the
Competent Authority-II and remanded the matter for
reconsideration and on 16.01.1989 it was held that 662.18 square
metres was ‘excess land’. None of the appellants herein were parties
to the proceedings culminating in the order dated 16.01.1989.
Further, on the cancellation of the auction purchase in favour of
Khodidas Kanjibhai Patel, the original landowner, Kuberbhai
Nathubhai, entered into an agreement of sale of the sub-plots in
favour of the appellants herein, and they became owners in
possession of the said sub-plot Nos.1 to 77 situated upon Survey
No.339. When such being the position, on 22.11.1990, a notice was
issued under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act to the original landholder
47


directing him to vacate and handover possession of the “excess
land” to the respondent/State Government within a period of thirty
days. The said notice has been extracted below. The said notice
was not issued to the appellants herein and despite that it appears
that the Deputy Collector, ULC drew a Panchnama dated
21.01.1992, “taking over possession” of the ‘excess land’ to the tune
of 662.18 square metres out of the total area of the land
admeasuring 9303 square metre s. It is only when the appellants
herein sought ‘No Objection Certificates’ for further sale that they
became aware that ‘excess land’ was taken over by the State
Government and had vested with them. Hence, they filed the Writ
Petition before the High Court which was dismissed.
22.2 The fact that notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act was
issued to the original owners implies that the respondents were
aware that the possession of the said land had to be taken in
accordance with Section 10 of the ULC Act. This was without
ascertaining the fact that possession of the said land was with the
appellants herein but no notice was issued to the appellants herein
who were in actual possession of the subject land.
48


22.3 Applying the above settled law to the facts at hand, we find
the following facts on the face of the record:
a) The appellants herein were in actual possession of the sub-
plots in question at the time of enforcement of the Repealing
Act.
b) On 22.11.1990, a notice under Section 10(5) regarding transfer
of possession to the State Government was issued to the
original landowner but not the appellants herein, who were in
possession of the concerned sub-plots. The said notice reads
as under:
“Regd. Post A.D. No.ULC/6(1)2/773/3912/733/
Section – 10(5)
Competent Authority and
Additional Collector Office,
First Floor, Nanpura, Surat

Date : 22-11-90
To,
Smt. Maniben wd/o Kuberbhai Nathubhai
Resident: Gotalavadi, Katargam,
Dist. Surat

Pursuant to Section – 9 of the Urban Land Ceiling
and Regulation Act, Part “CH” of Form – 3 of the Final
Statement made surplus and notice to the land holder
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under Section – 10(5) regarding entrusting the possession
of the land forfeited to the government vide Notification of
Section – 10(3).
It is hereby informed to you that by passing an order
under Section – 8(4) of the above act regarding the land as
described in the schedule below, Final Statement under
Section – 9 was forwarded on 16-6-89, after that
Notification of Section – 10(1) was published vide dated 28-
9-89. Now Final Notification of Section – 10(3) has been
published on dated 21-8-90 in Government Gazette in Part
4-C in English and Gujarati on Page No.1316 to 1317.
According to that notification, a land mentioned in the
schedule below has been forfeited to the government from
the date of publication as an additional land free from all
encumbrances.
So, it is hereby ordered under Section – 10(5) of the
above Act that person holding the possession / usage of
the land mentioned in the schedule below to entrust the
possession of the said land to the officer authorized by the
state government i.e. Additional Collector, Urban Land
Ceiling, Surat within days – 30 (thirty) from the receipt of
this notice.
If you may commit any delay or failure in entrusting
the possession of the land mentioned in the schedule,
possession shall be taken by using required force by taking
requisite steps under Section 10 – (6) of the above act. So
this notice is for entrusting the possession of the land
within time limit of 30 days.

SCHEDULE

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Sd/-
Competent Authority and
Additional Collector, Surat
Copy forwarded: -

Surveyor – Shree I.G. Parekh
2/- For preparing map of the above surplus land in
triplicate.”

22.4 Therefore, as per the provisions of Sections 10(3) and 10(5)
of the ULC Act, the subject land, despite having ‘vested’ (along with
acquisition of title or interests) in the State Government, was not in
the possession of the Government. Further, possession was not
taken by any of the three possible means, i.e., voluntary transfer
by the appellants, issuance of notice under Section 10(5) to the
appellants followed by peaceful transfer or forceful acquisition of
possession under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act. The possession of
the land continues with the appellants herein till date.
22.5 Such a scenario is clearly one where the provision of
abatement under Section 4 of the Repealing Act applies. The
proviso to Section 4 states that the section would not apply to
proceedings under Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the ULC Act
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relating to land that has already been taken possession of by the
State Government. Therefore, the proviso has no applicability to the
facts at hand and the benefit of abatement under the section would
apply wholesale.
22.6 That the approach to be had with cases such as the present
one is also evident upon a reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the
Repealing Act. Clearly, the legislative intent is that in cases where
lands were deemed to have been vested but possession was not yet
transferred as on date of enforcement of the Repealing Act (such as
the present case), the lands were to remain in possession of the
private parties. Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act prescribes the
procedure to be followed in specific types of situations, i.e., where
amounts paid by the State Government must be refunded. This is
not so in the present case. However, the underlying concepts are
clear – that vesting and possession are distinct and that without
the latter, the private parties have a claim over continuing to be in
possession. This is subsequently further emphasised in Section 4
of the Repealing Act, as explained earlier under which proceedings
abate as a result.
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22.7 We are therefore unable to agree with the contentions of the
respondents herein. Also, it is not correct to submit that the
proceedings under the Act had concluded with the ‘final order’
regarding compensation dated 24.10.1992. The matter could only
have concluded by transfer of possession through one of the three
possible means explained above. The mere recording of the lands
in the name of the State Government by entry dated 22.10.1993
does not demonstrate transfer of possession. Rather, the same only
denotes de jure possession with the de facto possession remaining
in the hands of the appellants herein.
22.8 Similarly, we are unable to agree with the contention of the
respondents that the appellants cannot claim a right to receive
notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act. The propriety of the sale
deed executed in favour of the appellants is immaterial. Section
10(5) mandates the delivery of notice to the person(s) in possession
of the concerned lands. On the date of issuance of notice
(22.11.1990), the appellants as possessors did not receive the
same. It was sent to the erstwhile owner of the subject land. This
also implies that the respondents also were aware of the fact that
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actual possession was not with them and there was a need to issue
notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act before taking over actual
possession. However, the respondents did not ascertain as to in
whose name actual possession stood. Therefore, no notice was
issued to the appellants and hence there being no transfer of
possession in accordance with Section 10 of the ULC Act, it
continues with the appellants both in fact as well as in law. Hence,
they are entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Repealing Act as
they do not fall within the scope of Section 3 of the said Act which
is the savings clause. The omission to issue notice to the appellants
violated the mandatory requirement of serving notice under Section
10(5) and meant that the legal process of acquiring possession was
still ongoing, leading to abatement of proceedings under Section 4
of the Repealing Act on its enforcement.
22.9 Another argument of learned standing counsel for the
respondent-State is to the effect that the appellants herein had not
pressed the main reliefs in Special Civil Application No.533/2009
and had only sought prayer in terms of paragraph 26(c) i.e.,
directing the competent authority and Additional Collector, ULC,
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Surat to issue necessary “NOC” for the purpose of getting the
registered sale deeds released by the Joint Sub-Registrar, Surat,
and the said prayer was not rightly granted as the other prayers
were not pressed is also not correct. Further, in the writ petition,
the learned Single Judge of the High Court also observed that the
appellants herein cannot be granted NOC as they did not have a
valid title. We find that the said reasoning is contrary to Section 4
of the Repealing Act inasmuch as the abatement of proceedings is
by operation of law based on the facts of each case and once the
proceedings under Section 10 of the ULC Act abate, the
consequential reliefs would have to be granted to the appellants
herein. Hence, the appellants are entitled to all consequential
reliefs pursuant to the abatement of the proceedings under Section
4 of the Repealing Act as the case of the appellants squarely falls
within the scope of the provision.
The consistent reasoning adopted by this Court in similar
cases, as detailed above squarely applies to this case also.
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23. In this case, the Division Bench of the High Court was not
right in holding that the appellants were not in possession of the
subject land on the date on which the ULC Act came into force and
they were illegal occupants. Further, the High Court was also not
right in holding that although the electricity bills showed the name
of the appellants, it did not establish their possession under
Section 10(5) of the ULC Act.
24. Consequently, the impugned orders of the High Court in LPA
No.2024/2010 in Special Civil Application No.533/2009 dated
23.07.2014 and in Special Civil Application No.533/2009 dated
08.02.2010 are set aside. This appeal is allowed in the aforesaid
terms.
No costs.
….….……..………………….J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)




….….……..………………….J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 06, 2026.

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