Dr. Anand Rai vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

2026 INSC 141
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. __________________ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10711of 2025)


DR. ANAND RAI ... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF
MADHYA PRADESH & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave Granted.
2. This appeal at the instance of the accused calls into
question the correctness of the final judgment and order in
rd
Criminal Appeal No. 3945 of 2025, dated 3 July 2025 by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore. In terms of the
impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the accused’s
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
KANCHAN CHOUHAN
Date: 2026.02.11
11:11:52 IST
Reason:
appeal arising out of the proceedings before the learned Special
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 1 of 29



1
Judge , Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
2
Atrocities) Act, 1989 whereby his prayer for discharge under
3 4
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , was
allowed only in part. The chargesheet that was filed upon
completion of the investigation in FIR No. 0653 of 2022 dated
th
15 November 2022 registered at PS Bilpank, District Ratlam.
The said chargesheet, being Chargesheet No.1 of 2023 dated
th
16 February 2023, sent the matter up for trial against the
accused on charges under Sections 294, 341, 383, 332, 146, 147,
5
336, 506, 333, 188, 326 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and
Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(va) of the SCST Act as amended in 2015
and 2018, whereas charges were framed against him under the
following Sections 147, 341, 427, 353, 332, 333, 326, 323, 352
read with 149 IPC and 3(2)(v), 3(2)(va) of the SCST Act.

3. The facts that culminated in the position as above were that
th
on 15 November 2022 while a large congregation of persons
had gathered at Bachhadapara, to witness the unveiling and
installation of a statue of Bhagwan Birsa Munda - the
complainant, namely, Vikas, had witnessed members of JAYS
organisation intercept the vehicles of the members of Parliament

1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’
2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘SCST Act’
3
SC ATR No. 28/2023
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’
5
Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 2 of 29



and Legislative Assembly, as also other district officials, who
were arriving at the event, and when they were attempted to be
removed by the security, the said persons initiated an altercation
and scuffle with them along with pelting stones at the vehicles.
One security personnel namely Sandeep Chandel suffered
injuries as a result. In the FIR, the persons involved were
described as follows:-
“….due to snatching and pelting of stone by these
persons Gunman of Collector sir has suffered
injuries near his nose and due to that injury blood
oozed out. These persons were not ready to
understand anybody’s advice and these were
misbehaving with police personnel and were
causing hurdle in government work and they were
speaking irrelevant things and extending threats of
life. Then me and other police personnel present
there have made a video of all these persons. Out
of these persons I know and identify D. Abhay
Ohari Resident of Ratlam, D. Anand Rai Resident
of Ratlam, Kamal Bhuriya Resident of Dharad,
Manoj Parmar Resident of Dharad, Kishan Sighad
Resident of Amleti, Dilip Bhuria Resident of
Dharad, Anil Ninama, Resident of Satrunda,
Sanjay Girwal Resident of Bhati Badodiya, Ajay
Son of Kailash Bheel Resident of Dharad, Vijay
Son of Shambhu Lal Bhuria Resident of Nalkui,
Chhagan Lal Son of Choga Lal Meena Resident of
Patrakar Colony Jawra, Mohan Singh Son of Mann
Singh Dewda Resident of Lambi Sadadi Rani
Singh Vilesh Kharadi Resident of Lambi Sadadi
Baazna, Gopal Waghel Resident of Nagra, Gopal
Ninama, Resident of Kundal, Deepak Ninama
Resident of Vinobha Nagar, Ratlam, Chhotu
Bhabhar Resident of Jamthun, Jitendra Katariya
Resident of Surajpur and Kalu Baarot Resident of
Shubham Shri Colony Ratlam, 40-50 more
persons were also accompanying them. These
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persons have jammed the road for about 01
hours…”

It is also important to note the role of these persons as
described in the chargesheet, which, obviously, is a document
that signals the completion of the investigation. It essentially is a
recapitulation of the statement of the complainant, and it records
that during the investigation statement of the complainant and
witnesses was recorded and after which the accused persons were
separately interrogated and taken into custody upon confession
to the crime. It is important to note that the present accused’s
vehicle, a Scorpio that was allegedly used in the incident, was
also seized. Another essential aspect is that the complainant had
allegedly video-graphed the incident and such video was
submitted to the police.

4. The accused sought bail which was rejected by the Trial
Court. Such conclusion was affirmed by the High Court, but then
th
he was granted bail by this Court on 13 January 2023.
Disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against him, and he
received notice thereof from the Regional Manager, Health
Services, Indore Division. These facts have only been mentioned
for completing the factual arc and are not in issue before us.

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5. The Trial Court, as we have already observed, partly
allowed the application. The High Court dismissed the appeal
thereagainst. The findings of the High Court are summarised as
below along with the relevant case laws cited by the Court below:
▪ First addressed was the appellant’s objection
regarding the legality of the investigation, which
was alleged to be vitiated on the ground that it was
conducted by an Inspector instead of a Deputy
6
Superintendent of Police . Upon examining
Section 9 of SCST Act along with the State
th
Government Notification dated 13 October 2017
and the consequential circular issued by the
Director General of Police, the Court held that the
State Government is expressly empowered to
confer powers of investigation on officers below
the rank of DSP for specified categories of
offences. Since the offences registered against the
appellant fell within the ambit of those notified, the
investigation conducted by an Inspector was held
to be legally authorised and not in violation of Rule
7 of the SC/ST Rules, 1995. The challenge to the

6
Hereinafter referred to as ‘DSP’
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investigation was, therefore, found to be without
7
merit. ( State of Bihar v. Anil Kumar )
▪ Thereafter, the Court reiterated the settled legal
position governing the scope of judicial scrutiny at
the stage of framing of charges. It held that, at this
preliminary stage, the Court is not required to
conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence or
adjudicate upon the probable defence of the
accused. The exercise is limited to examining
whether the material placed by the prosecution, if
taken at face value, discloses sufficient ground to
presume that the accused has committed the
alleged offences. The degree of satisfaction
required is only that of a strong suspicion and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt. A meticulous
analysis of contradictions, credibility of witnesses,
or likelihood of conviction would amount to a mini
trial, which is impermissible at this stage. ( Vinay
Tyagi v. Irshad Ali,; Ram Prakash Chadha v.
8
State of U.P. .)
▪ While dealing with the applicability of Section 149
of the IPC, the Court observed that the appellant
has been implicated as a member of an unlawful

7
(2017) 14 SCC 304
8
(2024) 10 SCC 651
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assembly, and the offences alleged are stated to
have been committed in prosecution of the
common object of such assembly. The Court
clarified that, at the stage of framing of charges, it
is not necessary that a specific overt act be
attributed to each individual accused. What is
required is prima facie material indicating
membership of the unlawful assembly and the
likelihood that the accused shared the common
object or had knowledge that such offences were
likely to be committed. The Court noted that
multiple witnesses, including injured police
personnel, have categorically stated that the
appellant was a participant in the JAYS rally and
was present at the place of occurrence when public
officials were restrained and assaulted. Whether
the appellant merely happened to be present, or
whether he shared the common object of the
assembly, are matters that can only be conclusively
determined after evidence is led during trial. At this
stage, the prosecution material was held sufficient
to attract Section 149 IPC. ( State of Maharashtra
9
v. Kashirao .)

9
(2003) 10 SCC 434
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▪ The Court further held that challenges raised by the
appellant concerning his exact presence at the spot,
the credibility of the medical evidence, the
qualifications of the doctor who conducted the
radiological examination, and the precise role
attributed to him, all involve disputed questions of
fact. Such issues necessarily require appreciation
of evidence and cannot be conclusively
adjudicated either at the stage of framing of
charges or while exercising appellate jurisdiction
against an order framing charge. These matters
were held to fall squarely within the domain of
trial.
▪ Upon an overall consideration of the impugned
order, the High Court found that the Special Judge
had applied the correct legal principles, considered
the material available on record, and assigned
cogent reasons while framing charges against the
appellant. The order was found to be free from
perversity, procedural impropriety, or patent
illegality. Consequently, the High Court held that
no case was made out for interference in exercise
of appellate jurisdiction under Section 14(A)(1) of
the SCST Act, and affirmed the order framing
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charges. ( Amit Kapoor (supra) ; Vinay Tyagi ,
(supra)

6. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for
the accused and Mr. Pashupati Nath Razdan, learned Advocate-
on-Record for the State. The sole point of challenge raised before
this Court is the subsistence of charges under the SCST Act
against the accused.

7. As such, let us look at the relevant provisions thereof-
“3. Punishments for offences atrocities.—3 [(1)
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

xxx--------------------xxx-----------------------xxx

(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—
xxx--------------------xxx------------------------xxx
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment
for a term of ten years or more against a person or
property 1 [knowing that such person is a member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such
property belongs to such member], shall be
punishable with imprisonment for life and with
fine;
(va) commits any offence specified in the
Schedule, against a person or property, knowing
that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to
such member, shall be punishable with such
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punishment as specified under the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also
be liable to fine;…”


8 . At this stage, it is important to take note of the objects and
reasons for the enactment of the SCST Act. Sujata Manohar J, in
10
State of M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia , while dealing with the
constitutionality of Section 18 thereof which takes the
applicability of the provisions of anticipatory bail housed in the
provisions of the Cr.P.C. for offences under this Act, as follows:

“6… In this connection we may refer to the
Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Bill, 1989, when it was
introduced in Parliament. It sets out the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
said Act and points to the evil which the statute
sought to remedy. In the Statement of Objects and
Reasons it is stated:
“Despite various measures to improve the socio-
economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable.
They are denied number of civil rights. They are
subjected to various offences, indignities,
humiliations and harassment. They have, in
several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life
and property. Serious crimes are committed
against them for various historical, social and
economic reasons
2. … When they assert their rights and resist
practices of untouch-ability against them or
demand statutory minimum wages or refuse to do
any bonded and forced labour, the vested interests

10
(1995) 3 SCC 221
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try to cow them down and terrorise them. When
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes try
to preserve their self-respect or honour of their
women, they become irritants for the dominant and
the mighty. Occupation and cultivation of even the
Government allotted land by the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes is resented and more often
these people become victims of attacks by the
vested interests. Of late, there has been an increase
in the disturbing trend of commission of certain
atrocities like making the Scheduled Caste persons
eat inedible substances like human excreta and
attacks on and mass killings of helpless Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes and rape of women
belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes…. A special legislation to check
and deter crimes against them committed by non-
Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes has,
therefore, become necessary.”
The above statement graphically describes the
social conditions which motivated the said
legislation. It is pointed out in the above Statement
of Objects and Reasons that when members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes assert
their rights and demand statutory protection,
vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise
them….”

9 . While the Constitution guarantees equality, freedom from
discrimination, and the right to live with dignity, these ideals
often remained abstract for SC and ST communities because of
centuries of social exclusion, oppression, and violence.
Recognizing this gap, the Act provides targeted legal protection,
ensuring that the constitutional promises of equality and justice
are realized in practice. At its core, the Act embodies the principle
of equality before the law, as enshrined in Article 14 of the
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 11 of 29



Constitution. It goes beyond formal equality, acknowledging that
SC/ST communities face unique social vulnerabilities. By
defining specific offences such as physical assault, sexual abuse,
humiliation, and social ostracism, and prescribing stricter
punishments, the law ensures substantive equality, allowing these
individuals to live with safety, respect, and dignity in a society
that has historically denied them these rights. The Act also
reinforces the constitutional mandate under Article 17, which
prescribed the abolishment of untouchability. Modern forms of
caste-based indignity, like forcing individuals into menial or
degrading labour, denying them access to public spaces, or
socially boycotting them, are specifically criminalized. These
provisions help translate the ideals of the Constitution, of freedom
from untouchability into actionable legal protection, restoring
both social and personal dignity to victims. Furthermore, the Act
embodies Article 15’s prohibition against discrimination,
ensuring that SCST persons can access education, employment,
and civic life without fear of prejudice. By shielding these
communities from targeted harassment and violence, the law
turns the promise of non-discrimination into a lived reality. At the
same time, it safeguards the right to life and dignity under Article
21, recognizing that life is not merely about survival, but about
living with respect, security, and freedom from humiliation.
Relief, rehabilitation, and special protective measures under the
Act directly uphold this principle. Finally, the SCST Act advances
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the broader goals of social justice and positive discrimination,
reflected in Articles 38 and 46. By creating a safe and supportive
environment, the Act enables SCST communities to participate
fully in social, educational, and economic opportunities, helping
to break cycles of historical oppression. In this sense, the Act is a
transformative instrument, bridging the gap between
constitutional ideals and everyday realities, ensuring that SC/ST
citizens can live as equal, dignified, and empowered members of
society.

10. We must turn back to the application for discharge and
examine the averment regarding changes under the SCST Act.
The relevant portion of the application is extracted as under:-
“h) Charges levied under SC/ST Act –
Applicant was charged under Section 3(1)(r)
3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The
essential ingredient to constitute this offence are-
There must be victim of Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe.
iii Use of casteist or derogatory word
in Public place against the victim
iii. Knowledge of accused regarding the caste
of the victim.
iv. Physical Presence of accused at the time of
Incident.
That, it is essential to mention here that the FIR
and Final Report both are silent pertaining to use
of derogatory word or casteist term. Further, there
is no specific averment pertaining to use of casteist
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 13 of 29



word against the original complainant. None of
the above mentioned ingredient is available in the
present matter, hence the applicant may kindly be
discharged from this charge.”

In its judgment on the application, the learned Trial Court
dealt with the proposed charge under the SCST Act alongside a
number of provisions of IPC. For a charge under the above quoted
provisions of the SCST Act to be established, several elements
must be present. The accused must first commit an offence under
the IPC, such as assault, robbery, or any other crime punishable
with ten or more years of imprisonment. The act must be directed
against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, or
against property that belongs to them, reflecting the special
protection the law affords to historically marginalized
communities. In addition, the accused must have knowledge that
the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or
that the property belongs to such a person. This requirement of
awareness is essential to the application of the law. Finally, the
punishment prescribed under this sub-section is life
imprisonment along with a fine, underscoring the gravity of
offences committed against vulnerable communities.

Section 3(va) deals with specific atrocities listed in the
Schedule of the Act, including forced labour, harassment, social
exclusion, or damage to property that target SC or ST persons. To
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attract liability under this provision, the accused must commit one
of the scheduled offences against a member of a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe or their property. The offender must know the
caste identity of the victim or that the property belongs to them,
ensuring that the law applies to deliberate acts of caste-based
harm. The punishment for these offences is as specified under the
Indian Penal Code along with an additional fine, providing
flexibility to address a range of atrocities that may not carry ten
years or more of imprisonment but still require special protection
for the victim.

The question that then arises, is - who were present before
the learned Trial Court that, in its appreciation of the material on
record, met the standard required for framing of charge?
11. Section 227 and 228 of the CrPC are as below:
“227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the
accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge
considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.
228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such
consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of
opinion that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence which—
(a) …
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall
frame in writing a charge against the accused.
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 15 of 29



(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under
clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be
read and explained to the accused and the accused
shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the
offence charged or claims to be tried.”

Even though the instant case is governed by the prior
regime of substantive and procedural criminal laws, we may
observe that in the new legislation, now occupying the field, the
position remains the same. On a close reading of the statutory text
of the Cr.P.C. and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,
the position is one of continuity rather than change in relation to
the Court’s power at the stages of discharge and framing of
charge. In both enactments, the governing standards are framed
in materially the same language. At the stage of discharge, the
Court is required to consider whether there is any sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused in sessions cases, or
whether the charge is groundless in Magistrate warrant cases. At
the subsequent stage, charges are to be framed only if the Court
forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence. These formulations, which
have long anchored the exercise of judicial discretion under the
Cr.P.C., are carried forward in substance in the corresponding
provisions of the BNSS, without any textual indication that the
level of scrutiny is intended to be either heightened or diluted.
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 16 of 29



What the BNSS does is to change the procedural setting
within which this discretion is exercised. The new statute
introduces express timelines for the filing of discharge
applications and for the framing of charges, and it expressly
recognises the possibility of the accused being heard or examined
through electronic means. These changes are regulatory in nature.
They are aimed at structuring the process and reducing delay, not
at transforming the judicial task itself. The Court’s obligation to
apply its mind to the record, to hear both sides, and to record
reasons where discharge is ordered remains exactly as before, as
does the caution against weighing evidence or conducting a mini
trial at these preliminary stages.

Accordingly, the established jurisprudence developed
under the Cr.P.C. on the scope and limits of consideration at the
stages of discharge and framing of charge continues to hold the
field under the BNSS. The statutory language supports the
conclusion that the Legislature has retained the same substantive
balance between the rights of the accused and the interest of
prosecution, while seeking to impose greater procedural
discipline and expedition. In substance, the power remains the
same; only the manner of its exercise has been more tightly
structured.
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11
12 . Sajjan Kumar v. CBI , which has been relied upon a
bench of three judges in Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd.
12
Maqbool Magrey , formulated the following principles
regarding the scope of the above quoted sections :
21. …
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out. The test to determine
prima facie case would depend upon the facts of
each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
has not been properly explained, the court will be
fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or
a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the
total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the court, any basic infirmities,
etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a
trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the
court could form an opinion that the accused might
have committed offence, it can frame the charge,
though for conviction the conclusion is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused has committed the offence.

11
(2010) 9 SCC 368
12
(2022) 12 SCC 657
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(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the
probative value of the material on record cannot be
gone into but before framing a charge the court
must apply its judicial mind on the material placed
on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was
possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court
is required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to find out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value
disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. For this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected
even at that initial stage to accept all that the
prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is
opposed to common sense or the broad
probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them
gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from
grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered
to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not
to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.

13. Having discussed the sections proposed to be charged
against the appellant, let us now examine the discussion of the
Trial Court. In part D of its order, the learned Trial Court deals
with the charges under Sections 341, 146, 147, 353, 333, 326,
332, 336, IPC and charges under the SCST Act. Having
considered the above said sections from Paras 26 to 37, para 38
records thus:
“38.Consequently, on the basis of the above
discussion, in the light of the evidence collected by
the investigation officer on record and the
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documents presented by the prosecution, the
accused were charged under Section 147, 341,
427, 353, 332, 333, 326, 352, 323 of IPC read with
Section 149 and Section 3(2)(v) and Section
3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, there
being sufficient grounds for framing charges under
these Sections charges were framed separately
against the accused under the said Sections. It is
noteworthy that apart from accused Dr Anand Rai,
other accused have produced their caste certificate
declaring themselves to be members of Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribes. In such a situation,
provisions of the Act, 1989 are attracted only in
respect of Dr Anand Rai…”

Here itself it be noted that in Part C of the judgment, the
learned Trial Court recorded as follows in respect of Section
3(1)(r) of the SCST Act:-
“23. It is a well settled principle that Section 149
of IPC is not applicable in respect of Section 294
of IPC and 506 of IPC invoked in relation to the
Act of giving threat to kill. Sections 294 and 506
of IPC (Part 2) read with Section 3(1) (F) and
3(1)(s) of the Act, 1989 are applicable in respect of
the person who has used abusive language or who
has threatened to kill or who has used abusive
caste-specific words with the intent of insult.
24. In the evidence collected by the Investigation
Officer and in the statement recorded under
Section 161 of Cr.P.C., none of the witnesses have
specifically stated as to which of the accused
persons used casteist slurs to insult, abuse and
threaten to kill.
25. Consequently, on the basis of the above
discussion, sections 294 and 506 (part-2) of IPC
read with sections 3(1) (r) and 3(1) (s) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1989 are not
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 20 of 29



attracted against the accused and hence, all the
accused are acquitted under the said sections.”

14. In view of the requirements of the sections proposed to be
charged, as discussed in para 9 of this Judgment, we are at a loss
to understand that when the Trial Court itself acknowledges that
none of the statements under Section 161 CrPC, state the specific
slurs uttered by the accused with the intent to insult threaten or
kill, then how is it found, on the same bundle of evidence, and
with the same level of scrutiny thereof, that the alleged acts of
the accused were informed by caste awareness. There does not
appear to be any other material on record either, to establish
knowledge on part of the accused. Once the knowledge on part of
the alleged offender is in question, it is but certain that the charge
cannot stand.

15. Curiously, the impugned judgment/order of the High
Court, although running into eighteen pages, does not deal at all
with the charge under SCST Act. All that is said, is that the Trial
Court has ‘ assigned elaborate reasons ’. As demonstrated above,
those reasons are lacking and insufficient. Only for the reason that
on a facial analysis of the evidence placed on record, some of the
charges of the IPC, appear to be met, the SCST Sections have also
been charged against the accused. However, we are of the
considered view that the apparent evidence on record is in no way
Crl.Appeal@SLP(Crl)No.10711 of 2025 Page 21 of 29



sufficient for a facial analysis of the case at hand, or for a ‘ prima
facie ’ view to be taken, or enough to distinguish suspicion from
grave suspicion, in so far as the knowledge is concerned that
would inform the accused’s alleged misdeeds. That apart, it may
also be observed that there is no averment whatsoever that the
complainant was a member of the SCST Community. Still
further, when the complaint, and the subsequent statements under
Section 161 CrPC, both, appear to be lacking in averments for
caste motivated acts allegations, one where intent is absent, and
the other where knowledge is apparently present, seems difficult
to accept.

16. Further, it may be observed that the High Court in deciding
the appeal against the partial order of discharge, has not carried
out its duty as the first court of appeal. The Section of the Act
pertaining to appeals is:
“[14-A. Appeals.— (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment,
sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order,
of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court,
to the High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (3) of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to
the High Court against an order of the Special
Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or
refusing bail.
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(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, every appeal
under this section shall be preferred within a
period of ninety days from the date of the
judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an
appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety
days if it is satisfied that the appellant had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within the period of ninety days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained
after the expiry of the period of one hundred and
eighty days.
(4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1)
shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a
period of three months from the date of admission
of the appeal.]
(emphasis supplied)

13
17. Even though Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P . , holds
that orders framing charge or refusing discharge are neither
interlocutory nor final, an appeal thereagainst would fall under
Section 14-A above, since the words used are “any judgment,
sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order”. An appeal
under Section 14-A of the SCST Act is a statutory first appeal.
It is well settled that a first appellate Court in criminal matters is
a Court of both fact and law and is obliged to independently
evaluate the material on record before either affirming or
reversing the findings of the Courts below. This Court has

13
(2022) 15 SCC 720
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consistently emphasised that such an appeal is a valuable right
and that its disposal must reflect due application of mind. In
14
Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , the Court held that the
appellate Court cannot dispose of a criminal appeal in a cursory
manner and must itself examine the evidence and the reasoning
of the Trial Court. Similarly, in Chandrappa v. State of
15
Karnataka , this Court reiterated that the appellate Court has
full power to reappreciate, reconsider, and review the evidence
upon which the order of the lower court is founded and to arrive
at its own conclusions.

18. This principle applies with equal force to appeals under
Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act. The provision does not curtail
or dilute the ordinary appellate powers of the High Court.
Consequently, the High Court does not function as a revisional
or supervisory Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section
14-A but assumes the role of a first appellate court. A mechanical
affirmation of the order of the Special Court, without
independent scrutiny, would therefore be inconsistent with
settled appellate jurisprudence and would amount to a failure to
exercise jurisdiction. Even where the appellate Court ultimately
agrees with the reasoning of the Courts below, the judgment
must disclose that the material was independently examined.

14
(1996) 4 SCC 720)
15
(2007) 4 SCC 415)
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However, the width of the appellate power under Section 14-A
must be understood in the context of the nature of the order
under challenge. The Supreme Court has repeatedly drawn a
distinction between appellate scrutiny of final judgments and
judicial intervention at threshold stages of criminal proceedings.
Where an appeal arises from a conviction or acquittal, the
appellate Court is entitled to undertake a comprehensive
reappreciation of evidence and to reassess witness credibility.
This flows from the settled principle that the first appellate Court
is the final Court of fact, subject of course to self-imposed
restraint in appeals against acquittal.

19. A different discipline governs cases arising at the stage of
discharge, framing of charge, or prima facie satisfaction. The
Court has consistently held that at this stage the Court is not
concerned with proof of guilt or the sufficiency of evidence for
16
conviction. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh and later in
17
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal , the Court clarified
that the test is whether the material on record, taken at face
value, discloses the essential ingredients of the alleged offence
and gives rise to a strong or grave suspicion against the accused.
The Court is expressly cautioned against conducting a roving
inquiry or weighing the evidence as if at trial. When these

16
(1977) 4 SCC 39
17
(1979) 3 SCC 4
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generally applicable principles are applied to an appeal under
Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act arising from a threshold order,
the High Court’s role, though appellate in nature, stands
circumscribed by the limits governing discharge. The High
Court may examine whether the allegations disclose the basic
statutory ingredients of the offence under the Act, including
whether the alleged act was committed on account of the
victim’s caste and whether other foundational requirements are
satisfied. Where these ingredients are conspicuously absent,
interference is justified, as continuation of proceedings would
amount to an abuse of the process of law. This form of scrutiny
does not amount to appreciation of the material but is an exercise
in legal evaluation of the allegations as they stand.

At the same time, even while exercising first appellate
jurisdiction, the High Court cannot, at the discharge or prima
facie stage, adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact, assess
the reliability of witnesses, or compare the prosecution case with
the defence version. To do so would collapse the distinction
between trial and threshold scrutiny and would result in a
premature determination of guilt or innocence. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly cautioned that defences available to the
accused are matters for trial and cannot ordinarily form the basis
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for discharge unless the material relied upon is of sterling and
unimpeachable character.

Thus, the appellate power under Section 14-A of the
SC/ST Act must be exercised in harmony with the broader
framework of criminal procedure. While the High Court is duty-
bound, as a first appellate Court, to independently apply its mind
and correct errors committed by the Special Court, it must
remain conscious of the stage of the proceedings and the
corresponding limits of judicial scrutiny. This calibrated
approach ensures that the protective object of the SC/ST Act is
preserved, while simultaneously safeguarding against
mechanical application of its provisions in cases where the
statutory ingredients are not even prima facie disclosed.

20. In that view of the matter, the charges upon the accused
in so far as the SCST Act stand quashed. The matter is remitted
back to the Trial Court to proceed in accordance with law
regarding the other changes framed against the accused. It stands
clarified that no part of the consideration made herein shall be
construed as a comment on any of the charges other than the
provisions of the SCST Act. The Criminal appeal is allowed to
the above extent.

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21. Before parting with the matter, it is observed that at the
stage of framing of charge or considering discharge, the Court is
not dealing with an abstract legal exercise. It is dealing with real
people, real anxieties, and the real weight of criminal
prosecution. Judicial responsibility at this stage calls for care,
balance, and an honest engagement with the facts on record. The
power to frame a charge is not meant to be exercised by default
or out of caution alone. When the material placed before the
Court, taken at face value, does not disclose the ingredients of
an offence, the law expects the Court to have the clarity and
courage to say so and to keep such a case aside.

Discharge, in that sense, is not a technical indulgence but
an essential safeguard. The Court must consciously distinguish
between a genuine case that warrants a trial and one that rests
only on suspicion or assumption or for that matter without any
basis. To allow a matter to proceed despite the absence of a
prima facie case is to expose a person to the strain, stigma, and
uncertainty of criminal proceedings without legal necessity.
Fidelity to the rule of law requires the Court to remember that
the process itself can become the punishment if this
responsibility is not exercised with care.

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This responsibility weighs heaviest on Trial Courts,
which are the first courts most people ever step into. For a
litigant or an accused, the Trial Court is not just one level in a
hierarchy. It represents the face of the judiciary itself. The
sensitivity, fairness, and legal discipline shown at this stage
shape how ordinary citizens understand justice. The impression
a Trial Court creates, through its approach to facts and law, often
becomes the impression people carry of the entire judicial
system. That is why, at every stage and especially at the
threshold, Trial Courts must remain alive to the human
consequences of their decisions and to the trust that society
places in them.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.



………………….………………………..…J.
(SANJAY KAROL)



………….……………………………….…..J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)



New Delhi;
th
February 10 , 2026
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