Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
T.A. ABDUL RAHMAN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1989
BENCH:
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
BENCH:
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
RAY, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 225 1989 SCR (3) 945
1989 SCC (4) 741 JT 1989 (3) 444
1989 SCALE (2)388
CITATOR INFO :
R 1990 SC 231 (18)
D 1990 SC1446 (15)
R 1990 SC1597 (16)
ACT:
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of
Smuggling Activities Act, 1974--Section 3(1)(iii) &
3(1)(iv)--Detention order-Time lag between the passing of
the detention order and the actual arrest--Whether affects
the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority--Legality of such detention order--Challenged.
HEADNOTE:
This appeal has been filed by the brother of the detenu
T.A. Sirajudeen who was detained pursuant to an order of
detention passed by the first respondent under Section
3(1)(iii) and 3(1)(iv) of the Conservation of Foreign Ex-
change and Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 with a view to
preventing the said detenu to take part in the smuggling
activities of Gold. The circumstances under which the deten-
tion order in question was passed may now be stated.
On 30.11.1986, Superintendent of Central Excise, Manjeri
Range searched the residential premises of the detenu but
did not discover any contraband goods. However on question-
ing the detenu confessed that he had burried eleven gold
biscuits in the back yard, which were recovered after dig-
ging the ground and the statement of the detenu was recorded
under Section 108 of the Customs Act, that very day.
On 9.12.1986 again the Authorities concerned searched
the residence of the detenu in the belief that there was
concealment of more gold. During the search the detenu
pointed out to the Superintendent one packet which had been
placed in the thatched roofing of the house.
The detaining authority taking into consideration the
fact of seizure effected on two occasions and the statement
of the detenu admitting his involvement in the prejudicial
activities mentioned in the grounds of detention reached
subjective satisfaction and passed the impugned order of
detention on 7.10.87. The detenu was arrested on 18.1.1988
and detained in Central Prison, Trivandrum from 19.1.1988
onwards Grounds of detention and other relevant material
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were furnished to the detenu on 21.1.1988. The detenu made
representation for revocation of the detention order on
25.1.1988 which was rejected
946
on 11.4.1988. The first respondent made a reference under
Section 8 of the Act on 5.5.88 to the Advisory Board which
reported that in its opinion sufficient cause existed for
the detention of the detenu.
The appellant challenged the detention of his brother in
the High Court by means of Writ Petition but, having failed,
he filed this appeal by special leave.
The appellant primarily urged two contentions before
this Court. It was urged that there was no proximity in time
to provide a rational nexus between the alleged prejudicial
activity and the passing of the impugned order of detention
after 11 months i.e. on 7.10.87 and as there was no reasona-
ble and satisfactory explanation for the said long delay,
the detention order is liable to be quashed on the ground
that the credible chain between the grounds of the alleged
criminal activities and the purpose of detention stood
snapped. The delay throws doubt on the genuineness of the
subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authori-
ty. Secondly it was contended that the representation sub-
mitted by the detenu on 25.1.88 challenging the impugned
order clamped on him had been disposed of by a delay of 72
days i.e. on 11.4.88 and this long and avoidable delay
vitiates the detention order being violative of Art. 22(5)
of the Constitution.
The first respondent in the counter affidavit explained
the delay and attributed the same to the extensive search of
various premises in different places and examination of
persons apart from departmental delays. It is only after
completing the necessary investigation customs authorities
sponsored the case for detention of the detenu.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: There is no denying the fact that the impugned
order has been passed after lapse of 11 months from the date
of seizure of the eleven gold biscuits from the back court-
yard of the house of the detenu. The test of proximity is
not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of
months between the offending acts and the order of deten-
tion. However, when there is undue and long delay between
the prejudicial activity and the passing of the detention
order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining
authority has satisfactionly examined such a delay and
afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such
a delay has occasioned and further the court has to investi-
gate whether the causal connection has been broken in the
circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule
947
can precisely be formulated and guidelines can be laid down
in that behalf. [951G-952A]
When there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay
between the date of the order of detention and the date of
securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw
considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority. [954C]
See Gora v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCR 996;
Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, [1981] 4 SCC
647; Golam Hussain @ Gamal v. Commr. of Police of Calcutta &
Ors., [1974] 4 SCC 530; sk Serajul v. State of West Bengal,
[1975] 2 SCC 78; Rekhaben Virendra Karadia v. State of
Gujarat & Ors., [1979] 2 SCR 257; Harnek Singh v. State of
Punjab, [1982] 1 SCC 116; Shiv Ratan Makin v. Union of India
and Others, [1986] 1 SCC 401; Smt. K. Aruna Kumari v. Gov-
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ernment of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., [1988] 1 SCC 296 and
Rajendra Kumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat & Ors.,
[1988] 3 SCC 153.
The Court in the instant case, noticed from the Counter
affidavit filed on behalf of the first Respondent, that the
detaining authority has attempted to explain the laxity that
has occasioned in passing the impugned order but miserably
failed in explaining the delay of three months in securing
the arrest of the detenu from the date of passing of the
order and keeps stunned silence on that score. Counsel when
queried by the Court whether he could give any reason for
this undue delay in arresting the detenu on 18.1.1988 in
pursuance of the impugned order made on 7.10.1987, frankly
admitted that he could not do so. Under the circumstances,
the Court held that leaving apart the question of delay in
passing the order of detention, the fact remains that the
detaining authority has failed to explain the long delay in
securing the arrest of the detenu after three months of the
passing of the detention order and this non-explanation
throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the sub-
jective satisfaction of the detaining authority vitiating
the validity of the order of detention. [954E-955A]
The long interval in receipt of the representation and
the comments of the Collector of Customs, Cochin, indicate
the casual and indifferent attitude, displayed by the au-
thorities concerned dealing with the representation. The
manner in which the representation has been dealt with
reveals a sorry state of affairs in the consideration of the
representation made by the detenu. [955G-956A]
948
The Court took firm view that the representation of the
detenu has not been given prompt and expeditious considera-
tion and was allowed to lie without being properly attended
to. The delay of 72 days in the absence of satisfactory
explanation is too long a period for ignoring the indolence
on the part of the concerned authority. The unexplained
delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu is
violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India
rendering the order of detention invalid. [956H-957B]
The Court set aside the judgment of the High Court,
quashed the order of detention and directed that the detenu
be set at liberty forthwith. [957C]
Rama Dhondu Borade v. Shri V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of
Police & Ors., [1989] 1 Scale 22.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3
18 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.6.88 of the Kerala
High Court in Original Petition No. 3299 of 1988.
R. Sasiprabhu and P.K. Manohar for the Appellant.
B. Dutta, Additional Solicitor General, P. Parmeshwaran,
Pramod Swarup and T.T. Kunhikannan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. This appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India is preferred by the appellant,
Abdul Rahman questioning the validity and correctness of the
order of detention passed by the first Respondent on
7.10.1987, in exercise of the powers conferred by section
3(1)(iii) and 3(1)(iv) of the Conservation of Foreign Ex-
change and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974
(Central Act 52 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as the
’Act’) whereby detaining the appellant’s brother Sri T.A.
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Sirajudeen @ Siraj (the detenu herein) with a view to pre-
venting the detenu from engaging in transporting or conceal-
ing or keeping smuggled gold or dealing in smuggled gold
otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or
keeping smuggled gold.
Though the impugned order was passed on 7.10.1987, the
detenu
949
was arrested on 18.1.1988 and detained in the Central pris-
on, Trivandrum from 19.1.1988 onwards. The detenu was fur-
nished with copies of the grounds of detention and other
connected material documents on 21.1.1988. The detenu made a
representation to the third Respondent praying for revoca-
tion of the detention order on 25.1.1988 which was rejected
on 11.4.1988. Meanwhile on 11.2.1988 a declaration by the
third Respondent under Section 9(1) of the Act was made,
whereby the detenu was ordered to be detained for a contin-
ued detention for a further period of 6 months over one
year. The first Respondent made a reference under section 8
of the Act on 5.5. 1988 to the Advisory Board which has
reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for
the detention of the detenu. The material facts which neces-
sitated the passing of the detention order can be briefly
stated thus:
On 30.11.1986, Superintendent of Central Excise, Manjeri
Range and party searched the permanent residence of the
detenu in his presence which did not result in the seizure
of any contraband goods or the recovery of any incriminating
documents. But on questioning by the officer, the detenu
confessed that he had buried eleven gold biscuits in the
backyard of his house. He dug up the spot and produced the
relavent gold biscuits which were kept concealed under the
ground. Each of the gold biscuits was found wrapped in black
carbon paper bearing foreign markings and weighing 10 tolas
each with the purity of 24 carats. The total weight of the
eleven gold biscuits was 1282.600 gms., the market value of
which as on that date was Rs.3,14,237. The contraband goods
were seized under a Mahazar. On 30.11.1986 a statement was
recorded from the detenu by the Superintendent of the Cen-
tral Excise under section 108 of the Customs Act in which
the detenu had given a detailed note of his involvement in
the smuggling activities. On 9.12.1986 also the Superintend-
ent of Central Excise searched the residence of the detenu
in the reasonable belief that there was concealment of more
smuggled gold in the said house. During this search, the
detenu pointed out to the Superintendent one packet which
had been placed in the thatched roofing of his house. The
Superintendent took out the packet and it was found contain-
ing four gold ingots bearing foreign markings weighing
466.400 gms. with 24 carat purity, all to the value of Rs.
1,14,268. The detaining authority taking into consideration
of the seizure effected on two occasions and the statement
of the detenu admitting his involvement in the prejudicial
activities mentioned in the grounds of detention reached its
subjective satisfaction of the necessity of passing the
impugned order and passed the same on 7.10.1987. The appel-
lant filed a Writ Petition under Article
950
226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned
order of detention, but was not successful. Hence this
appeal.
Of the several grounds urged in the Special Leave Peti-
tion, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appel-
lant stressed only the following two contentions seeking to
set aside the order of detention.
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(1) As there is no proximity in time to
provide a rational nexus between the alleged
prejudicial activity, that is the seizure of
the gold biscuits on 30.11.1986 and the pass-
ing of the impugned order of detention after
11 months i.e. on 7.10.1987 and as there is no
reasonable and satisfactory explanation given
by the first Respondent for this undue and
unreasonable delay, the order is liable to be
quashed on the ground that the credible chain
between the grounds of the alleged criminal
activities and the purpose of detention is
snapped. Further the unreasonable and unex-
plained delay between the date of the order of
detention on 7.10.87 and the date of arrest of
the detenu after a lapse of 3 months on
18.1.1988 throws considerable doubt on the
genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority leading to an infer-
ence that there was no real and genuine sub-
jective satisfaction as regards the necessity
to detain the detenu with a view to preventing
him from acting in prejudicial manner.
(2) The representation submitted by the
detenu to the third Respondent on 25.1.1988
challenging the impugned order clamped upon
him had been disposed of by a delay of 72 days
i.e. on 11.4.1988 and this long and avoid-
able delay vitiates the order of detention as
being violative of Article 22(5) of the Con-
stitution of India.
We shall now deal with the first contention which is
referred under ground Nos. II & III of the Grounds in the
Special Leave Petition which read thus:
"For that the High Court ought to have seen
that the petitioner was detained on the basis
of a alleged solitary incident occurred on
30.11.1986 and the detention order was passed
after lapse of 11 months, i.e. on 7.10.1987,
and the petitioner was arrested and detained
on 19.1.1988."
"For that the High Court ought to have seen
that there was
951
no proximity between the alleged incident and
subsequent detention. The time factor has not
been considered by the detaining authority and
he has mechanically passed the detention order
without paying any attention to the loose
grounds and quick sands in the reports of the
sponsoring officer."
The above two contentions are sought to be answered by
the first Respondent in his counter stating that the inves-
tigating officer had to question a number of persons and to
conduct extensive search of various premises in different
places in connection with the information gathered during
interrogation and the Superintendent issued summons to the
brothers of the detenu, namely, Haneefa and Abdul Rahman for
appearance on 10.3.87 and 3.3.87 respectively, but Abdul
Rahman was absconding and that on 10.2.87, the statement of
C.K. Madhavan referred to in the statement of the detenu was
recorded and that on 18.5.1987 show cause notices were
issued to persons connected with this case and immediately
after completion of the investigation the Customs authori-
ties sponsored the proposal for detention of the detenu by
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their letter dated 26.8.1987 and that the proposal was
screened by the Screening Committee on 11.9.1987 and there-
after the detention order was passed on 7.10.1987.
Coming to the delay in securing the detenu by arrest the
explanation is given as follows:
"The detention order was forwarded to the
Malappuram Superintendent of Police for its
execution by letter dated 9.10. 1987. The
Police executed the order on 18.1. 1988. From
the above facts it is clear that there is no
delay in passing or executing the order of
detention as alleged in the petition for
Special Leave to Appeal."
There is no denying the fact that the impugned order has
been passed after lapse of 11 months from the date of sei-
zure of the eleven gold biscuits from the back courtyard of
the house of the detenu. As repeatedly pointed out by this
court that there is no hard and fast rule that merely be-
cause there is a time lag between the offending acts and the
date of order of detention, the causal link must be taken to
be snapped and the satisfaction reached by the detaining
authority should be regarded as unreal, but it all depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature
of the explanation offered by the detaining authority for
the delay that had occurred in passing the
952
order. There is a catena of decisions on this point, but we
feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate all those
decisions except a salient few. This court in Golam Hussain
alias Garna v. Commnr. of Police of Calcutta & Ors., [1974]
4 SCC 530 wherein there was a time lag of 6 months between
the incident and the date of order of detention while an-
swering a similar contention, laid down the ratio of proxim-
ity as follows:
"No authority, acting rationally, can be
satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of
future mischief merely because long ago the
detenu had done something evil. To rule other-
wise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statuto-
ry requirement. But no mechanical test by
counting the months of the interval is sound.
It all depends on the nature of the acts
relied on, grave and determined or less seri-
ous and corrigible, on the length of the gap,
short or long, on the reason for the delay in
taking preventive action, like information of
participation being available only in the
course of an investigation. We have to inves-
tigate whether the causal connection has been
broken in the circumstances of each case. Gora
v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCR 996 has
held thus: There is, therefore, no hard and
fast rule that merely because there is a time
lag of about six months between the ’offending
acts’ and the date of the order of detention,
the causal link must be taken to be broken and
the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived
at by the District Magistrate must be regarded
as sham or unreal. Whether the acts of the
detenu forming the basis for arriving at a
subjective satisfaction are too remote in
point of time to induce any reasonable person
to reach such subjective satisfaction must
depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. The test of proximity is not a rigid or
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mechanical test to be blindly applied by
merely counting the number of months between
the ’offending acts’ and the order of deten-
tion. It is a subsidiary test evolved by the
court for the purpose of determining the main
question whether the past activities of the
detenu is such that from it a reasonable
prognosis can be made as to the future conduct
of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies
only in so far as it subserves that purpose
and it cannot be allowed to dominate or drawn
it. The prejudicial act of the detenu may in a
given case be of such a character as to sug-
gest that it is a part of an organised opera-
tion of a complex of agencies collaborating
953
to clandestinely and secretly carry on such
activities and in such a case the detaining
authority may reasonably feel satisfied that
the prejudicial act of the detenu which has
come to light cannot be a solitary or isolated
act, but must be part of a course of conduct
of such or similar activities clandestinely or
secretly carried on by the detenu and it is,
therefore, necessary to detain him with a view
to preventing him from indulging in such
activities in the future."
In Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of
Maharashtra 1981 4 SCC 647, this Court held:
"Delay ipso facto in passing an order of
detention is not fatal to the detention of a
person, for, in certain cases delay may be
unavoidable and reasonable. What is required
by law is that the delay must be satisfactori-
ly examined by the detaining authority."
See also SK Serajul v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2
SCC 78; Rekhaben Virendra Karadia v. State of Gujarat &
Ors., [1979] 2 SCR 257; Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab,
[1982] 1 SCC 116: Shiv Ratan Makin v. Union of India and
Others, [1986] 1 SCC 40l; Smt. K. Aruna Kumari v. Government
of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [1988] 1 SCC 296 and Rajendra
Kumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Others, [1988]
3 SCC 153.
In a recent decision in Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P.
and Others 1988 (4) SCC 559, this Court has reiterated the
earlier view consistently taken by this Court observing:
"......... it is not right to
assume that an order of detention has to be
mechanically struck down if passed after some
delay ............ It is necessary to con-
sider the circumstances in each individual
case to find out whether the delay has been
satisfactorily explained or not."
The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised
thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a
person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proxi-
mate to the time when the order is made or the live-link
between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of deten-
tion is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated
that would be applicable under all circumstances and no
exhaustive
954
guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that
the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by
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merely counting number of months between the offending acts
and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and
long delay between the prejudicial activities and the pass-
ing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether
the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a
delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as
to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to
answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the
causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of
each case.
Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained
delay between the date of order of detention and the date of
securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw
considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legiti-
mate inference that the detaining authority was not really
and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detain-
ing the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in
a prejudicial manner.
In the light of the above proposition of law, we shall
now examine the first contention which has been raised for
the first time before this Court. From the reading of the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the first Respondent,
it is seen that the detaining authority has attempted to
explain the laxity that has occasioned in passing the im-
pugned order, but miserably failed in explaining the delay
of three months in securing the arrest of the detenu from
the date of the passing of the order, and keeps stunned
silence on that score. The learned counsel appearing for the
first respondent when queried by this Court whether he could
give any reason for this undue delay in arresting the detenu
on 18.1.1988 in pursuance of the impugned order of detention
made on 7.10.1987, he has frankly admitted that he could not
do so--rightly so in our view--in the absence of any expla-
nation in the counter affidavit. The Superintendent of
Police, Malapurram to whom the detention order was forwarded
for execution has not filed any supporting affidavit ex-
plaining the delay in securing the arrest of the detenu.
Under these circumstances, we hold that leaving apart the
question of delay in passing the order of detention from the
date of the seizure of the gold, the fact remains that the
detaining authority has failed to explain the long delay in
securing the arrest of the detenu after three months from
the date of the passing of the detention order and this
non-explanation in our view throws a considerable doubt on
the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the de-
taining authority
955
vitiating the validity of the order of detention.
The next contention stressed by the learned counsel for
the appellant is with regard to the delay of 72 days in the
disposal of the representation made by the appellant to the
third respondent on 25.1. 1988. This contention is raised in
ground Nos. VIII and IX of the Grounds in the Special Leave
Petition. This is resisted by the third respondent in para-
graph 8 of his counter stating that a representation dated
2.2.1988 was received in the COFEPOSA Section of Ministry of
Finance on 16.2.1988 with a letter dated 5.2.1988 from the
Government of Kerala; that as certain information was not
available with the Central Government, the Collector of
Customs, was asked to get a copy of the representation from
the State Government and to send his comments; that Collec-
tor of Customs, informed the Central Government by a telex
message dated 1.3.1988 which was received in the COFEPOSA
Section on 8.3.1988 informing that the representation was
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not available with the Home Department; that thereafter a
copy of the representation was forwarded to the Collector of
Customs by post on 8.3.1988; that the comments of the Col-
lector were received back on 28.3.1988; that then the repre-
sentation along with the comments were placed before the
Joint Secretary, COFEPOSA Section on 30.3.88, who forwarded
the same to the Minister of State for Revenue on the same
day and on 4.4.88 the Minister of State forwarded his com-
ments to the Finance Minister who considered and rejected
the representation on 8.4.88. According to the third Re-
spondent, the representation was considered expeditiously
and as such there is no violation of Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India.
The learned counsel for the appellant has explained that
the representation was submitted originally on 25.1.1988,
but was got back and resubmitted on 2.2.1988. According to
him, it is surprising that the said representation was
received by the third respondent only on 16.2.1988 after a
considerable delay of two weeks and thenceforth there was a
considerable delay from 16.2.88 to 28.3.88 in receiving the
comments of the Collector of Customs, and again there was a
delay of 7 days in forwarding the representation to the
Minister of State for Revenue with the comments of the Joint
Secretary, COFEPOSA Section. The long interval in receipt of
the representation and the comments of the Collector of
Customs, Cochin indicate the casual and indifferent attitude
displayed by the authorities concerned dealing with the
representation.
In our opinion, the manner in which the representation has
been
956
dealt with reveals a sorry state of affair in the matter of
consideration of the representation made by the detenu.
Further we fail to understand why such a long delay from
16.2.88 to 28.3.88 had occasioned in getting the comments
from the Collector of Customs. The only futile explanation
now offered by the third respondent is that this delay had
occasioned because the Collector of Customs was not able to
get a copy of the representation from the Home Department,
Kerala and thereafter the Collector got a copy of the repre-
sentation on being forwarded by the third respondent on 8.3.
1988. Even then there is a delay of 20 days in getting the
comments of the Collector and that delay is not at all
explained.
This Court in Rama Dhondu Borade v. Shri V.K. Saraf
Commissioner of Police & Ors., [1989] I Scale Vol. 4 22
after referring to various decisions, has observed thus:
"The detenu has an independent constitutional
right to make his representation under Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India. Corre-
spondingly, there is a constitutional mandate
commanding the concerned authority to whom the
detenu forwards his representation questioning
the correctness of the detention order clamped
upon him and requesting for his release, to
consider the said representation with reasona-
ble dispatch and to dispose the same as expe-
ditiously as possible. This constitutional
requirement must be satisfied with respect but
if this constitutional imperative is observed
in breach, it would amount to negation of the
constitutional obligation rendering the con-
tinued detention constitutionally impermissi-
ble and illegal, since such a breach would
defeat the very concept of liberty--the highly
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cherished right--which is enshrined in Article
21 of the Constitution."
" ....... What is reasonable dispatch de-
pends on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no hard and fast rule can be laid
down in that regard. However, in case the gap
between the receipt of the representation and
its consideration by the authority is so
unreasonably long and the explanation offered
by the authority is so unsatisfactory, such
delay could vitiate the order of detention."
Bearing in mind the above principle when we approach the
facts of the present case, we are of the firm view that the
representation of
957
the detenu has not been given prompt and expeditious consid-
eration, and was allowed to lie without being properly
attended to. The explanation now offered by the third re-
spondent that the delay has occurred in seeking the comments
of the Collector of Customs etc. is not a convincing and
acceptable explanation. In our view the delay in 72 days in
the absence of satisfactory explanation is too long a period
for ignoring the indolence on the part of the concerned
authority. Hence we hold that the unexplained delay in
disposal of the representation of the detenu is violative of
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, rendering the
order of detention invalid.
For all the above mentioned reasons, we allow this
criminal appeal by setting aside the judgment of the High
Court, quash the impugned order of detention and direct the
detenu to set at liberty forthwith.
Y. Lal Appeal allowed.
958