Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 6195 of 2000
PETITIONER:
M. DURAI
RESPONDENT:
MADHU AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/01/2007
BENCH:
S.B. SINHA & MARKANDEY KATJU
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
S.B. SINHA, J. :
1. The Plaintiff is in appeal before us from a judgment and decree dated
16.2.1999 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal
No. 671/87 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the respondents
herein from a judgment and order dated 25.11.1986 of the Subordinate Judge.
Tiruvallur, Tamil Nadu which in turn reversed the judgment and decree dated
10.9.1984 dismissing the Suit of the appellant was allowed. The plaintiff
claimed title over the suit property by reason of a deed of sale dated
19.8.1978. The respondent, admittedly, are in possession of the said
property. As the respondents refused to vacate the suit land, the
aforementioned suit was filed. The respondents in their written statement,
inter alia, contended as follows :
"...The Plaintiff is not the owner of the suit items. These defendants are
living in the Cherinatham and the defendants are in continuous, open and
uninterrupted possession of the house site and the backyard. In the
backyard, there are very huge Othia trees, date trees. Portia trees and
other trees which are there for generations. They were planted by the
defendants’ ancestors. These defendants have also perfected title to the
said portions in their occupation for more than the statutory period"
2. The learned trial Judge framed several issues; one of them being
"Whether the defendants perfected title to the suit property by adverse
possession?"
3. As indicated hereinbefore, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit of
the appellant holding that the defendants have perfected their title by
remaining in possession of the suit land for a period of more than twelve
years. In the appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellant, the
Subordinate Judge. Tiruvallur reversed the said findings of the learned
trial Judge holding as follows :
"There is no proof to the order to say that the vendor of the suit property
who sold the same to the plaintiff in 1969 had the knowledge of the
Defendant’s possession over the property, that though he sold the land to
the extent of 1.59 acres in Survey No. 83, the possession was obtained only
after deducting the 5 cents of the land under the possession and the
defendants and that the same was the intention of the plaintiff and further
as pointed out by the learned counsel for Appellant that the order of the
Lower Court that it is the intention of the plaintiff is only the Lower
Court’s assumption."
4. A Second Appeal thereagainst was filed by the respondents. The High
Court framed the following substantial question of law.
"Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in having reversed the
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judgment of the trial court without even adverting its attention to
important question like adverse possession and without even considering the
evidence available on record, but misguiding itself by a strange
proposition that the burden lies on the defendants in this case whereas the
onus is entirely on the plaintiff to prove the case put forward by him?"
5. The High Court sought to appreciate the entire evidence and came to the
following conclusion :
"........The trial Court on a careful analysis of the entire evidence has
considered that the physical possession of the plaintiff excludes the
defendants’ possession and actually the extent to the west of the suit
property alone was in the physical possession and enjoyment of the
plaintiff, which extent was alone in the possession and enjoyment of the
vendor. Even though an extent of 1.59 cents was conveyed to the plaintiff
under Ex.A.1, the evidence adduced proves that only the defendants are in
possession and enjoyment of the suit property for over the statutory
period. So the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court has
to necessarily be interfered with. It is for the plaintiff to establish his
title over the suit property. Even though the judgment and decree of the
first Appellate Court being based on facts, cannot be interfered with in
this Second Appeal, the first appellate court has not considered the
evidence adduced in coming to such conclusion and this has necessitated
this Court to interfere with the finding of the first Appellate Court in
the Second Appeal."
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant inter alia
submitted that the purported substantial question of law formulated by the
High Court was mis-conceived inasmuch as in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, the burden of proof to establish that they had
perfected their title by remaining in possession would be on the
defendants. We see force in the submissions of the learned counsel.
7. The change in the position in law as regards the burden of proof as was
obtaining in the Limitation Act, 1908 vis-\005-vis Limitation Act, 1963 is
evident. Whereas in terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation
Act, the Plaintiff was bound to prove his title as also possession within
twelve years preceding the date of institution of the suit under the
Limitation Act, 1963, once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden
shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by
adverse possession.
8. The High Court, therefore, evidently formulated a wrong question.
9. This aspect of the matter has since been considered by this
Court in Saroop Singh v. Banio & Ors., [2005] 8 SCC 330 wherein it was held
thus:
"28. The statutory provisions of the Limitation Act have undergone a change
when compared to the terms of Article 142 and 144 of the Schedule appended
to the Limitation Act, 1908, in terms whereof it was imperative upon the
plaintiff not only to prove his title but also to prove his possession
within twelve years, preceding the date of institution of the suit.
However, a change in legal position has been effected in view of Articles
64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the instant case, .the plaintiff-
respondents have proved their title and thus, it was for the first
defendant to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession. As noticed
hereinbefore, the first defendant-appellant did not raise any plea of
adverse possession. In that view of the matter the suit was not barred.
29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation does not
commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff
but commences from the date the defendant’s possession becomes adverse.
(See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muyibhat Nayak.)
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30. "Animus Possidendi’ is one of the ingredients of adverse possession.
Unless the person possessing the land had a requisite animus the period for
prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant
categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true
owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus.
(See Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagdish Kalita, SCC 21.)"
10. Yet again in T. Anianappa & Ors. v. Somalingappa & Anr., [2006] 7 SCC
570 this Court opined as under:
"Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which
is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner and tends to
extinguish that person’s title. The person setting up adverse possession
may have been holding under the rightful owner title e.g. trustees,
guardians, bailiffs or agents......"
It was further more held as under :
"It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long
does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse
possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or
impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner and in order to
constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in
continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to
the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by
adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s
title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open
and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested
in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence
of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s
hostile action."
11. In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of this
Court, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained
and this should be set aside and the matter be remitted to the High Court
for consideration of the Second Appeal afresh after formulating an
appropriate substantial question of law arising, if any. The appeal is
allowed. No. costs.