Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
WORKMEN OF M/S DHARAMPAL PREMCHAND(SAUGHANDHI)
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/S. DHARAMPAL PREMCHAND (SAUGHANDHI)
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
16/03/1965
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
WANCHOO, K.N.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1966 AIR 182 1965 SCR (3) 394
CITATOR INFO :
R 1970 SC 737 (7,8)
E 1970 SC1205 (6)
R 1978 SC 828 (16)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (14 of 1947), ss. 2(k), 10 and
36--"Industrial dispute"-Meaning-Dismissed Employees only
members of Union-Union raises dispute-Maintainability.
HEADNOTE:
Out of 45 employees of the respondent, 18 had become members
of a Trade Union. Later, these 18 employees were dismissed
by an order passed on the same day. The Union took up the
cause and ultimately the dispute was referred to the
Tribunal, where the respondent raised the preliminary
objection that the reference was invalid inasmuch is the
dispute referred to the Tribunal was not an industrial
dispute but was merely an individual dispute, and besides
these dismissed employees no other employees of the respon-
dent was a member of the Union, and so the Union could not
raise the dispute. This was upheld by the Tribunal. In
appeal by special leave;
HELD:The appeal must be allowed.
The definition of "industrial dispute" in s. 2(k) shows that
before any dispute raised by any person can be said to be an
industrial dispute, it must be shown that it is connected
with the employment or non-employment of that person. This
condition is satisfied in the present case. [396 D]
Having regard to the broad policy underlying the Act, this
Court and indeed a majority of Industrial Tribunals are
inclined to take the view that notwithstanding the width of
the words used by the Act in defining an "industrial
dispute" it would be expedient to require that a dispute
raised by a dismissed employee cannot become an industrial
dispute, unless it is supported either by his Union or, in
the absence of a Union by a number of workmen. [397 B-C]
Considerations which would be relevant in dealing with a
dispute relating to an individual employee’s dismissal,
would not be Material in dealing with a case where a large
number of employees have been dismissed on the same day.
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[399 G-H]
A Union of workmen may validly raise a dispute as to
dismissal even though it may be a union of minority of the
workmen employed in any establishment. Similarly if there
is no union of workmen in any establishment, a group of
employees can raise the dispute and the dispute then becomes
an industrial dispute, though it may relate to the dismissal
of an individual employee. [399 H]
In a given case it is conceivable that the workmen of an
establishment have no union of their own and some or all of
them join the union of another establishment belonging to
the same industry. In such a case if the said union take up
the cause of the workmen working in an establishment which
has no union of its own, it would be unreasonable to hold
that the dispute does not become an industrial dispute
because the Union which has sponsored it is not the union
exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment
concerned. In every case where industrial adjudication has
to decide
395
whether a reference in regard to the dismissal of an
industrial employee is validly made or not it would be
necessary to inquire whether the Union which has sponsored
the case can fairly claim a representative character, in
such a way that its support to the case would make the
dispute an industrial dispute. [400 F-H]
Besides, 18 workmen, dismissed by an order passed on the
same day, themselves form a group of workmen which would be
justified in supporting the cause of one another. [401 C]
Central Provinces Transport Service v. Raghunath Gopal
Patwardhan, [1956] S.C.R. 956 and The Newspapers Ltd. v. The
State Industrial Tribunal, U.P., [1957] S.C.R. 754, relied
on.
Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu, Bombay, [1961] 11
L.L.J. 436, explained and distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 532 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated February 9,
1962, of the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in I.D. No. 294 of
1961.
Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.
S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, S. Murthy and B. P.
Maheshwari, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C. J. The short question of law which arises
for our decision in this appeal is whether the order passed
by the Delhi Administration referring the dispute between
the appellants, the workmen of M/s Dharampal Premchand, Sau-
ghandhi and the respondent, the employer, M/s Dharampal
Premchand Saughandhi, Delhi was valid. The order of
reference has been passed by the Delhi Administration under
ss. 10(1)(d) and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act). When the
Industrial Tribunal, Delhi took up this matter for hearing,
the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the
reference was invalid inasmuch as the dispute referred to
the Tribunal by the impugned order of reference is not an
industrial dispute. but is merely an individual dispute
which cannot be the subject-matter of a valid reference
under s. 10(1) of the Act. This contention has been upheld
by the Tribunal, with the result that the Tribunal has held
that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of
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the dispute referred to it. It is against this order that
the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. On
behalf of the appellants, Mr. Sukumar Ghose contends that
the view taken by the Tribunal is not sound, and that raises
the question as to whether the dispute referred to the
Tribunal for its adjudication in the present case can be
said to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of s.
2(k) of the Act.
The facts which it is necessary to state for the purpose of
dealing with this point are very few and they are not in
dispute. The respondent is a firm which carries on business
as perfumers and tobacconists in Chandni Chowk, Delhi. On
the 28th July, 1961, the respondent passed the impugned
order dismissing the services of its 18 employees. On that
date, the respondent had in its employment 45 employees. It
appears that on the 16th July,
396
1961, the 18 employees who were dismissed by the respondent
had become members of the Mercantile Employees’ Association
which is a registered Trade Union in Delhi. On the 29th
July, 1961, the said Association took up the cause of the
dismissed employees and carried the dispute before the
Conciliation Officer, Delhi. The conciliation proceedings,
however, failed, and at the instance of the Association the
present reference was made on the 6th September, 1961. It
is in the light of these facts that we have to decide
whether the dispute referred to the Tribunal for its adjudi-
cation is an industrial dispute within the meaning of s.
2(k) of the Act or not.
Section 2(k) defines an "industrial dispute" as meaning any
dispute or difference between employers and employees, or
between employers and workmen, or between workmen and
workmen, which is connected with the employment ’or non-
employment or the terms of employment or with the condition
of labour, of any person. This definition shows that before
any dispute raised by any person can be said to be an
industrial dispute, it must be shown that it is connected
with the employment or non-employment of that person. This
condition is satisfied in the present case, because the
dispute is in relation to the dismissal of 18 workmen, and
in that sense, it does relate either to their employment or
non-employment. The question, however. still remains
whether it is a dispute between employers and workmen.
Literally construed, this definition may take within its
sweep a dispute between a single workman and his employer,
because the plural, in the context, will include the
singular. Besides, in the present case, the dispute is in
fact between 18 workmen on the one hand, and their employer
on the other, and that satisfies the requirement imposed by
the fact that the word "workmen" in the context is used in
the plural. But the decisions of this Court have
consistently taken the view that in ’order that dispute
between a single employee and his employer should be validly
referred under s. 10 ’of the Act, it is necessary that it
should have been taken up by the Union to which the employee
belongs or by a number of employees. On this view, a
dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot, by
itself, be treated as an industrial dispute, unless it is
sponsored or espoused by the Union of workmen or by a number
of workmen. In other words, if a workman is dismissed by
his employer and the dismissed workman’s case is that his
dismissal is wrongful, he can legitimately have the said
dispute referred for adjudication before an Industrial
Tribunal under s. 10(1) of the Act, provided a claim for
such a reference is supported either by the Union to which
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he belongs or by a number of workmen, vide Central Provinces
Transport Services v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan(1) and The
Newspapers Ltd. v. The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P. (2).
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 956.
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 754.
397
This view is based on a consideration of the general policy
underlying the provisions of the Act. As is well-known, the
Act has been passed for the investigation and settlement of
industrial disputes, and its material provisions have been
enacted, because it was thought expedient to make provision
for such investigation and settlement of disputes, keeping
in mind the importance of the development of Trade Union
Movement on proper lines in this country. Having regard to
this broad policy underlying the Act, this Court and indeed
a majority of Industrial Tribunals are inclined to take the
view that notwithstanding the width of the words used by the
Act in defining an "industrial dispute", it would be
expedient to require that a dispute raised by a dismissed
employee cannot become an industrial dispute, unless it is
supported either by his Union or, in the absence of a Union,
by a number of workmen. Unless such a limitation was
introduced, claims for reference may be made frivolously and
unreasonably by dismissed employees, and that would be
undesirable.
Besides, in order to safeguard the interests of the working
class in this country, it was thought that the development
of Trade Union movement on healthy Trade Union lines was
essential and that requires that disputes between employers
and employees should be settled on a collective basis. A
complaint against a wrongful dismissal should, therefore, be
the subject-matter of reference, provided the workmen acting
collectively take up the case of the dismissed employee and
contend that the dismissal is unjustified or wrongful. It
is on these grounds that this Court has held that an
individual dispute arising from an alleged wrongful
dismissal of an employee can be validly referred under s. 10
only if it is supported by the Union of the workmen to which
the dismissed employee belongs or by a group of his co-
employees. There is no dispute that the Mercantile
Employees’ Association has taken up the dispute on behalf of
the 18 dismissed employees. In fact, as we have already
indicated, the said Association took up this dispute before
the Conciliation Officer and when the conciliation proceed-
ings failed, it successfully moved the Delhi Administration
to make a reference under s. 10(1) of the Act.
It was, however, urged before the Tribunal that besides the
18 dismissed employees, no other employee of the respondent
is a member of the said Association, and so, it was
contended that the said Association was not authorised to
raise the dispute, and in the absence of proof of the fact
that the dispute had been sponsored or espoused by the Union
of the employees of the respondent, the reference should be
held to be invalid. This contention has been upheld by the
Tribunal; and so, the question which we have to decide is
whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the
Mercantile Employees’ Association had no authority to raise
and support the present dispute.
398
In support of its conclusion, the Tribunal has relied upon
the decision of this Court in Bombay Union of Journalists
and others v. The "Hindu", Bombay & Anr.(1). In that case,
the services of one Salivateeswaran, who claimed that he was
a full-time employee of the "Hindu", a daily newspaper
published in Madras, were terminated and an industrial
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dispute was raised in respect of the said termination by the
Bombay Union of Journalists. The contention raised by the
employer was that the reference was invalid inasmuch as the
dispute referred for adjudication was an individual dispute
and not an industrial dispute. This contention was accepted
by the Tribunal; and that brought the dispute before this
Court.
In dealing with the effect of the decision pronounced by
this Court in that case and particularly of certain
observations made in the course of the judgment, it is
necessary to bear in mind one finding of fact which had been
recorded by the Tribunal and confirmed by this Court. It
appears that in that case, the appellants strongly relied
upon a resolution passed on April 17, 1948, by which it was
alleged that the Bombay Union of Journalists had taken up
the dispute of Salivateeswaran against the "Hindu" and had
decided to demand reliefs for the "retrenched Journalist".
Evidence was led to prove that such a resolution had been
passed, but that evidence was discarded both by the Tribunal
and this Court, and this Court definitely found that "the
evidence tends to establish the plea raised by respondent
No. 1 that the record of the alleged resolution was
fabricated with a view to support the case of
Salivateeswaran". In other words, in point of fact, there
was no reliable evidence to show that the Bombay Union of
Journalists had taken up the case of the retrenched employee
Salivateeswaran. In view of this finding, it follows that
the ’observations made by this Court in regard to the
requirements of a valid reference under s. 10(1) of the Act
are in the nature of orbiter observations.
It does appear that in dealing with the point of law as to
the requirements of a valid reference, this Court ’observed
that "the dispute, in the present case, being prima facie an
individual dispute, in order that it may become an
industrial dispute, it had to be established that it had
been taken up by the Union of employees of the "Hindu",
Bombay, or by appreciable number of employees of the
"Hindu", Bombay. Similarly, it was also observed that the
"principle that the persons who seek to support the cause of
a workman must themselves be directly and substantially
interested in the dispute, applied to the case before the
Court"; and so, one of the tests which this Court applied
was whether the persons who supported the cause, were
employees of the same employer; if they were not, it was
thought that they could not be regarded as interested in the
dispute and as such, their support may not
(1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 893.
399
convert an individual dispute into an industrial dispute.
That is why the support lent to the cause of Salivateeswaran
by the Bombay Union of Journalists was found to be
insufficient to convert the cause into an industrial
dispute.
These observations, no doubt, prima facie lend support to
the view which the Tribunal has accepted. It appears that
the Bombay Union of Journalists had on its roll several
working Journalists in other journals; but out of the three
working journalists working with the "Hindu" at its Bombay
office, two had become the members of the Bombay Union of
Journalists, viz., Salivateeswaran and Venkateswaran.
Tiwari, the third working journalist working in the office
of the "Hindu", Bombay, had not become a member of the said
Union. In the Office of the "Hindu", there were seven other
workmen, but they were working on the administrative side.
In other words, out of the ten employees in the office of
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the " Hindu", seven were on the administrative side, and
three on the journalism side; and out of these three, two
were members of the Union. It is in the light of these
facts that this Court expressed the opinion that the Bombay
Union of Journalists was not competent to raise the dispute,
and even if it had raised it, the dispute could not have
become an industrial dispute.
In our opinion, the observations on which the Tribunal has
relied in support of its conclusion in the present case,
should not be read as laying down any hard and fast rule in
the matter. Take, for instance, the case of an employer who
employs 20 workmen, and assume that these workmen have not
formed any Union. If the employer illegally dismisses all
the workmen employed by him, it cannot be suggested that the
dispute about the dismissal of these employees would not
become an industrial dispute because there is no Union to
support them and the dismissed employees themselves cannot
convert their individual dispute into an industrial dispute.
In the present case, out of 45 employees 18 have been
dismissed, and there is no evidence to show that these
employees have a Union of their own. In such a case, it
would be difficult to hold that though the number of
employees dismissed is 18, they cannot raise a dispute by
themselves in a formal manner. Considerations which would
be relevant in dealing with a dispute relating to an
individual employee’s dismissal, would not be material in
dealing with a case where a large number of employees have
been dismissed on the same day. It is not disputed that a
union of workmen may validly raise a dispute as to dismissal
even though it may be a union of the minority of the workmen
employed in any establishment. The majority union, of
course, can raise a dispute, and if a reference is made
under s. 10(1) of the Act at its instance, the reference, is
valid. Similarly, if there is no union of workmen in any
establishment, a group of employees can raise the dispute
and the dispute then becomes an industrial dispute, though
it may
400
relate to the dismissal of an individual employee. This
position is not disputed. If that is so, it is difficult,
we think, to apply or extend the observations made in the
case of the Bombay Union of Journalists(1) to the present
case. In the present case, we are dealing with a reference
made by the Delhi Administration in relation to the
appellants’ contention that the dismissal of 18 employees is
invalid, and not with a case of the dismissal of a single
employee. Therefore, we do not think that the Tribunal was
right in relying upon the decision in the case of the Bombay
Union of Journalists(1) in support of its conclusion that
the present reference was invalid.
It is well-known that in dealing with industrial disputes,
industrial adjudication is generally reluctant to lay down
any hard and fast rule or adopt any test of general or
universal application. The approach of industrial
adjudication in dealing with industrial disputes has
necessarily to be pragmatic, and the tests which it applies
and the considerations on which it relies would vary from
case to case and would not admit of any rigid or inflexible
formula. There is no doubt that the limitations introduced
by the decisions of this Court in interpreting the effect of
the definition prescribed by s. 2(k) of the Act were based
’on such pragmatic considerations. It may also be conceded
that if the dismissal of an individual employee working in
an establishment in Delhi is taken up by the union of
workmen in a place away from Delhi, that would clearly not
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make the dispute an industrial dispute. Section 36 of the
Act which deals with the representation of parties,
incidently suggests that the union which can raise an
individual dispute as to a dismissal validly, should be a
union of the same industry. Generally, it is the union of
workmen working in the same establishment which has passed
the impugned order of dismissal. But in a given case, it is
conceivable that the workmen of an establishment have no
union of their own, and some ’or all of them join the union
of another establishment belonging to the same industry. In
such a case, if the said union takes up the cause of the
workmen working in an establishment which has no union of
its own, it would be unreasonable to hold that the dispute
does not become an industrial dispute because the union
which has sponsored it is not the union exclusively of the
workmen working in the establishment concerned. In every
case where industrial adjudication has to decide whether a
reference in regard to the dismissal of an industrial
employee is validly made or not, it would always be
necessary to enquire whether the union which has sponsored
the case can fairly claim a representative character in such
a way that its support to the cause would make the dispute
an industrial dispute. "Industry" has been defined by s.
2(j) of the Act and it seems to us that in some cases, the
union of workmen working in one industry may be competent to
raise a dispute about the wrongful dismissal of an employee
engaged in an establishment belonging to the same industry
where workmen
(1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 893,
401
in such an establishment have no union of their own, and an
appreciable number of such workmen had joined such other
union before their dismissal. In fact, the object of trade
union movement is to encourage the formation of larger and
bigger unions on healthy and proper trade union lines, and
this object would be frustrated if industrial adjudication
were to adopt the rigid rule that before any dispute about
wrongful dismissal can be validly referred under s. 10(1) of
the Act, it should receive the support of the union
consisting exclusively of the workmen working in the estab-
lishment concerned.
Besides, there is another way in which this question can be
considered. If 18 workmen are dismissed by an order passed
on the same day, it would be unreasonable to hold that they
themselves do not form a group of workmen which would be
justified in supporting the cause of one another. In
dealing with this question, we ought not to forget the basic
theory on which limitation has been introduced by this Court
on the denotation of the words "industrial dispute" as
defined by s. 2(k) of the Act. Therefore, we are satisfied
that the Tribunal was in error in rejecting the reference on
the preliminary ground that the dispute referred to it was
an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute within
the meaning of s. 2(k).
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the finding of the
Tribunal on the preliminary issue is reversed, and the
matter is sent back to the Tribunal for disposal in
accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
402