Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1106
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17936 of 2025)
VANEETA PATNAIK …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NIRMAL KANTI CHAKRABARTI & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. Leave granted
2. Heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, senior counsel and Ms.
Madhavi Divan, senior counsel, appearing for the
appellant and the respondent no.1 respectively.
3. The appellant-Ms. Vaneeta Patnaik is a faculty member of
1
the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences ,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
geeta ahuja
Date: 2025.09.12
16:26:27 IST
Reason:
Kolkata. Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, respondent no.1
1
Hereinafter referred to as “NUJS” or “University”
1
was appointed as a Vice Chancellor of NUJS on
03.07.2019
4. The appellant lodged a formal complaint on 26.12.2023
2
with the Local Complaint Committee alleging sexual
harassment on part of respondent no.1. The LCC rejected
the complaint as barred by time inasmuch as the last
alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred in April
2023; whereas the complaint was filed on 26.12.2023
which was not only beyond the prescribed period of
limitation of three months but also beyond the extendable
period of limitation of six months.
5. The appellant, aggrieved by the rejection of her complaint,
preferred a writ petition before the High Court. The single
Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated
22.05.2024 quashed the order of the LCC and directed for
rehearing of the complaint on its merit. The single Judge
held that the appellant was subjected to threat of
detrimental treatment in her employment even after April
2023 and as the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating,
offensive and hostile work environment for her, as such
2
Hereinafter referred to as “LCC”
2
the complaint was within time, taking the subsequent
event as the last incident of sexual harassment.
6. The aforesaid judgment and order of the single Judge of
the High Court was taken up by the Division Bench in a
writ appeal, FMA No. 873 of 2024 (M.A.T. No. 1295 of
2024) and the same was allowed by the impugned
judgment and order dated 23.12.2024.
7. The Division Bench held that administrative actions taken
against the appellant after April 2023 were collective
decisions of the Executive Council, consisting of eminent
academicians, jurists and even Supreme Court Judges
and were not just personal actions of the Vice-Chancellor.
It was improbable for the Vice-Chancellor to have prevailed
over the decision of the Executive Council, exerting his
pressure. He was not in a position to manipulate the
decision of the Executive Council. The alleged incidents of
harassment, if any, after April 2023, did not constitute
sexual harassment and that even the appellant in all her
communications to the Chancellor and Executive Council
prior to December 2023, had not made any allegation of
such sexual harassment against the Vice-Chancellor.
3
Therefore, the complaint filed on 26.12.2023, after the last
incident of sexual harassment that took place in April
2023, is beyond the normal period of limitation and even
the extended period. It was, therefore, rightly rejected by
the LCC as barred by time and the Single Judge of the High
Court was not justified in overturning the said decision.
8. The neat question which falls for consideration of this
Court is: whether the Division Bench of the High Court is
justified in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that
her complaint was barred by limitation.
9. To decide the above issue in the facts of the present case,
it would be beneficial to first consider not only the
definition of ‘sexual harassment’ but also what other
circumstances, acts or behaviours would constitute as
sexual harassment, vis-a-vis the period of limitation
provided for making complaint in that regard.
10. ‘Sexual harassment’ is defined in Section 2(n) of the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
3
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 to include any one
or more of the unwelcome act or behaviour (whether
3
Hereinafter referred as the “POSH Act”
4
directly or by implication) such as physical contact and
advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or
making sexually coloured remarks; or showing
pornography; or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or
non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.
11. Section 3 of the POSH Act, while providing that no woman
shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace,
describes certain circumstances that would amount as an
act or behaviour of sexual harassment, i.e., implied or
explicit promise of preferential treatment in her
employment; or implied or explicit threat of detrimental
treatment in her employment; or implied or explicit threat
about her present or future employment status; or
interference with her work or creating an intimidating or
offensive or hostile work environment for her; or
humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.
12. On a combined reading of both the above provisions, it is
manifest that not only the unwelcome act or behaviour in
the form of physical contact or advances, a demand or
request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured
remarks, showing pornography or any unwelcome
5
physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature
but also any other circumstances connected with the act
or behaviour of sexual harassment, like implied or explicit
promise of preferential treatment in employment, threat
about the present and future employment status,
interference with work or creating an intimidating,
offensive or hostile work environment or subjecting to
humiliating treatment which may likely affect her health
or safety, would also amount to acts or behaviour of sexual
harassment.
13. Section 9 of the Act postulates that any aggrieved woman
may make a complaint, in writing, of sexual harassment at
the work place to the Local Committee within a period of
three months from the date of incident, and in the case of
series of incidents, within a period of three months from
the date of the last incident. The second proviso to Section
9 provides that the LCC may for reasons to be recorded in
writing, extend the time of making the complaint not
exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the
circumstances prevailing prevented the woman from filing
of the complaint within the period prescribed.
6
14. In other words, a complaint of sexual harassment is
mandatorily required to be filed within a period of three
months from the date of the last incident of such
harassment or within a further extended period of three
months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months from
the date of the last incident of sexual harassment.
15. No doubt, the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed
question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw
out a complaint at the threshold without collecting
material on the factual aspects relating to the limitation.
Nonetheless, where a complaint on the simple reading of
the averments made therein appears to be patently barred
by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance
on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, without even
calling the other side to participate in the proceedings.
16. In view of the above, it would be prudent to consider the
averments made in the complaint which admittedly was
filed by the appellant on 26.12.2023. The said complaint,
apart from other things, inter alia, alleges that respondent
no. 1 joined the University as the Vice-Chancellor in July
2019. He called her (the appellant herein) in his office in
7
September 2019, and insisted that she should accompany
him for dinner, which would greatly benefit her personally.
He even touched her hand in a manner that made her
extremely uncomfortable, whereupon, she left his office
quietly.
17. The Vice-Chancellor again called her in his office in
October 2019. He asked her whether she (the appellant)
has thought over his proposal for going out for a dinner.
The appellant told him that she is not comfortable and
wants to keep the relationship professional only. He,
thereafter, demanded sexual favour from her and
threatened her if the offers are declined.
18. In October 2019, her promotion was put on hold by the
Executive Council. Finally, the Executive Council in its
meeting held on 02.04.2022 accepted the
recommendations of the Selection Committee and cleared
her for promotion.
19. The appellant was called upon by the Vice-Chancellor in
his office again in April 2023, where he asked the appellant
to accompany him on a trip to a resort which the appellant
flatly refused. Thereupon, he threatened the appellant that
8
her career would suffer badly. On 29.08.2023, the
appellant received a letter from the Vice-Chancellor
removing her as Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory
4
and Governance Studies .
20. In the meantime, some complaints by the faculty members
were made against her, whereupon the Executive Council
resolved to appoint the Principal Secretary, Law,
Government of West Bengal as a ‘one-man enquiry
commission’ for conducting preliminary enquiry into the
issue of misutilisation of the grant received from UGC and
with regard to the issue of National Foundation of
5
Corporate Governance . The Executive Council resolved
that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- be refunded immediately by
the NUJS. Thereafter, the appellant allegedly made
complaints of harassment and victimisation to the
members of the Executive Council through e-mails and
even to the Chancellor.
21. A plain reading of the entire complaint would reveal that
the sexual harassment, if any, of the appellant at the
hands of respondent no.1 commenced sometime in
4
Hereinafter referred to as “CFRGS”
5
Hereinafter referred to as “NFCG”
9
September 2019, and the last incident in that connection
took place in April 2023. Thereafter, no incident of sexual
harassment is alleged to have taken place except for the
fact that on 29.08.2023, the appellant was removed from
the post of Director, CFRGS or that a preliminary inquiry
was instituted against her by the Executive Council.
22. The complaint of the appellant from the last incident of
sexual harassment of April 2023, is certainly beyond time.
However, the issue is whether the subsequent event of
removal of the appellant from the post of the Director,
CFRGS or initiation of inquiry by the Executive Council are
in any way linked to sexual harassment or amounts to
sexual harassment as described under Section 3(2) of the
POSH Act.
23. The last incident of actual sexual harassment took place
in April 2023. The subsequent incident of August 2023,
whereunder the appellant was removed as Director of
CFRGS, with no financial implications arose out of a
complaint received from the Central Government
undertaking i.e. NFCG wherein appellant was specifically
named. The said action was taken completely
10
independently on the basis of the complaint of NFCG
alleging that the project report was not submitted within
time and that the amount sanctioned for the project be
refunded. It may be pertinent to note that the MoU was
signed by the appellant with the NFCG and the bank
account was also under her control.
24. In view of the above, the incident of removal of appellant
as the Director of CFRGS cannot be attributed as an act of
sexual harassment in connection with the previous
incidents. It was based upon the report of NFCG, an
independent body.
25. The inquiry into the project funds was taken up by the
Executive Council and it was a collective decision and not
a unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, the said
act would also not amount to an act of sexual harassment
in conjunction with the previous reported acts.
26. The actions taken against the appellant in August 2023,
are administrative in nature and does not create a gender
based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being
actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.
11
27. It would be important to refer to the expressions “ in
relation to” or “connected with ” used in Section 3(2) of the
Act. The use of the above expression clearly demonstrates
that there has to be a direct link between the action
complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment. In
view of what has been said above, we find no such direct
link between the last incident of sexual harassment which
happened in April 2023, and those referred to
subsequently in August 2023 or December 2023.
28. A distinction has to be made between a “ continuing wrong ”
and a “ recurring wrong ”. The difference between the two
6
has been clarified in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh
where it has been held that a “ continuing wrong ” is when
the injury itself persists, whereas a “ recurring wrong ” is
when a fresh cause of action arises each time.
29. The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a
complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter.
The administrative measures of August 2023, were
independent and were collective decisions of the NFCG and
the Executive Council which cannot be solely attributed to
6
(2008) 8 SCC 648
12
the Vice-Chancellor. The said decision may have caused
inconvenience to the appellant or may have given an
impression that they are in line with previous acts of
harassment, but they were not part of the continued
sexual harassment. The subsequent events have no
connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as
such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours
amounting to sexual harassment. In this way, the incident
of April 2023, remains the last event related to sexual
harassment.
30. The appellant, in addressing her grievances to the
Chancellor, had not made any mention whatsoever of the
sexual harassment which may have taken place in August,
2023 onwards. The appellant initiated the complaint on
26.12.2023, immediately after the Executive Council
meeting on 21.12.2023, which had resolved to inquire into
diverse acts of misconduct on part of the appellant, that
could give an impression that the complaint was filed in
retaliation.
31. The appellant, in filing the complaint, also moved an
application for condonation of delay stating that there were
13
“mitigating circumstances” which she had attempted to
resolve within the institution and when she failed, she then
filed the complaint. The very fact that the appellant was
conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed,
proves that she herself treated the act of April 2023, to be
the last incident of sexual harassment and as such, tried
to explain the delay in filing the complaint.
32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as
the discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench
of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring
the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant
is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.
33. It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget
the wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed
against the appellant may not be investigated on technical
grounds, but it must not be forgotten.
34. In this view of the matter, we direct that the incidents of
alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may
be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever.
Thus, it is directed that this judgment shall be made part
14
of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which
shall be strictly ensured by him personally.
35. The appeal is dismissed with the observations made above.
36.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
.............……………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
.............……………………………….. J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 12, 2025.
15
2025 INSC 1106
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17936 of 2025)
VANEETA PATNAIK …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NIRMAL KANTI CHAKRABARTI & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. Leave granted
2. Heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, senior counsel and Ms.
Madhavi Divan, senior counsel, appearing for the
appellant and the respondent no.1 respectively.
3. The appellant-Ms. Vaneeta Patnaik is a faculty member of
1
the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences ,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
geeta ahuja
Date: 2025.09.12
16:26:27 IST
Reason:
Kolkata. Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, respondent no.1
1
Hereinafter referred to as “NUJS” or “University”
1
was appointed as a Vice Chancellor of NUJS on
03.07.2019
4. The appellant lodged a formal complaint on 26.12.2023
2
with the Local Complaint Committee alleging sexual
harassment on part of respondent no.1. The LCC rejected
the complaint as barred by time inasmuch as the last
alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred in April
2023; whereas the complaint was filed on 26.12.2023
which was not only beyond the prescribed period of
limitation of three months but also beyond the extendable
period of limitation of six months.
5. The appellant, aggrieved by the rejection of her complaint,
preferred a writ petition before the High Court. The single
Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated
22.05.2024 quashed the order of the LCC and directed for
rehearing of the complaint on its merit. The single Judge
held that the appellant was subjected to threat of
detrimental treatment in her employment even after April
2023 and as the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating,
offensive and hostile work environment for her, as such
2
Hereinafter referred to as “LCC”
2
the complaint was within time, taking the subsequent
event as the last incident of sexual harassment.
6. The aforesaid judgment and order of the single Judge of
the High Court was taken up by the Division Bench in a
writ appeal, FMA No. 873 of 2024 (M.A.T. No. 1295 of
2024) and the same was allowed by the impugned
judgment and order dated 23.12.2024.
7. The Division Bench held that administrative actions taken
against the appellant after April 2023 were collective
decisions of the Executive Council, consisting of eminent
academicians, jurists and even Supreme Court Judges
and were not just personal actions of the Vice-Chancellor.
It was improbable for the Vice-Chancellor to have prevailed
over the decision of the Executive Council, exerting his
pressure. He was not in a position to manipulate the
decision of the Executive Council. The alleged incidents of
harassment, if any, after April 2023, did not constitute
sexual harassment and that even the appellant in all her
communications to the Chancellor and Executive Council
prior to December 2023, had not made any allegation of
such sexual harassment against the Vice-Chancellor.
3
Therefore, the complaint filed on 26.12.2023, after the last
incident of sexual harassment that took place in April
2023, is beyond the normal period of limitation and even
the extended period. It was, therefore, rightly rejected by
the LCC as barred by time and the Single Judge of the High
Court was not justified in overturning the said decision.
8. The neat question which falls for consideration of this
Court is: whether the Division Bench of the High Court is
justified in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that
her complaint was barred by limitation.
9. To decide the above issue in the facts of the present case,
it would be beneficial to first consider not only the
definition of ‘sexual harassment’ but also what other
circumstances, acts or behaviours would constitute as
sexual harassment, vis-a-vis the period of limitation
provided for making complaint in that regard.
10. ‘Sexual harassment’ is defined in Section 2(n) of the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
3
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 to include any one
or more of the unwelcome act or behaviour (whether
3
Hereinafter referred as the “POSH Act”
4
directly or by implication) such as physical contact and
advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or
making sexually coloured remarks; or showing
pornography; or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or
non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.
11. Section 3 of the POSH Act, while providing that no woman
shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace,
describes certain circumstances that would amount as an
act or behaviour of sexual harassment, i.e., implied or
explicit promise of preferential treatment in her
employment; or implied or explicit threat of detrimental
treatment in her employment; or implied or explicit threat
about her present or future employment status; or
interference with her work or creating an intimidating or
offensive or hostile work environment for her; or
humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.
12. On a combined reading of both the above provisions, it is
manifest that not only the unwelcome act or behaviour in
the form of physical contact or advances, a demand or
request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured
remarks, showing pornography or any unwelcome
5
physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature
but also any other circumstances connected with the act
or behaviour of sexual harassment, like implied or explicit
promise of preferential treatment in employment, threat
about the present and future employment status,
interference with work or creating an intimidating,
offensive or hostile work environment or subjecting to
humiliating treatment which may likely affect her health
or safety, would also amount to acts or behaviour of sexual
harassment.
13. Section 9 of the Act postulates that any aggrieved woman
may make a complaint, in writing, of sexual harassment at
the work place to the Local Committee within a period of
three months from the date of incident, and in the case of
series of incidents, within a period of three months from
the date of the last incident. The second proviso to Section
9 provides that the LCC may for reasons to be recorded in
writing, extend the time of making the complaint not
exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the
circumstances prevailing prevented the woman from filing
of the complaint within the period prescribed.
6
14. In other words, a complaint of sexual harassment is
mandatorily required to be filed within a period of three
months from the date of the last incident of such
harassment or within a further extended period of three
months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months from
the date of the last incident of sexual harassment.
15. No doubt, the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed
question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw
out a complaint at the threshold without collecting
material on the factual aspects relating to the limitation.
Nonetheless, where a complaint on the simple reading of
the averments made therein appears to be patently barred
by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance
on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, without even
calling the other side to participate in the proceedings.
16. In view of the above, it would be prudent to consider the
averments made in the complaint which admittedly was
filed by the appellant on 26.12.2023. The said complaint,
apart from other things, inter alia, alleges that respondent
no. 1 joined the University as the Vice-Chancellor in July
2019. He called her (the appellant herein) in his office in
7
September 2019, and insisted that she should accompany
him for dinner, which would greatly benefit her personally.
He even touched her hand in a manner that made her
extremely uncomfortable, whereupon, she left his office
quietly.
17. The Vice-Chancellor again called her in his office in
October 2019. He asked her whether she (the appellant)
has thought over his proposal for going out for a dinner.
The appellant told him that she is not comfortable and
wants to keep the relationship professional only. He,
thereafter, demanded sexual favour from her and
threatened her if the offers are declined.
18. In October 2019, her promotion was put on hold by the
Executive Council. Finally, the Executive Council in its
meeting held on 02.04.2022 accepted the
recommendations of the Selection Committee and cleared
her for promotion.
19. The appellant was called upon by the Vice-Chancellor in
his office again in April 2023, where he asked the appellant
to accompany him on a trip to a resort which the appellant
flatly refused. Thereupon, he threatened the appellant that
8
her career would suffer badly. On 29.08.2023, the
appellant received a letter from the Vice-Chancellor
removing her as Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory
4
and Governance Studies .
20. In the meantime, some complaints by the faculty members
were made against her, whereupon the Executive Council
resolved to appoint the Principal Secretary, Law,
Government of West Bengal as a ‘one-man enquiry
commission’ for conducting preliminary enquiry into the
issue of misutilisation of the grant received from UGC and
with regard to the issue of National Foundation of
5
Corporate Governance . The Executive Council resolved
that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- be refunded immediately by
the NUJS. Thereafter, the appellant allegedly made
complaints of harassment and victimisation to the
members of the Executive Council through e-mails and
even to the Chancellor.
21. A plain reading of the entire complaint would reveal that
the sexual harassment, if any, of the appellant at the
hands of respondent no.1 commenced sometime in
4
Hereinafter referred to as “CFRGS”
5
Hereinafter referred to as “NFCG”
9
September 2019, and the last incident in that connection
took place in April 2023. Thereafter, no incident of sexual
harassment is alleged to have taken place except for the
fact that on 29.08.2023, the appellant was removed from
the post of Director, CFRGS or that a preliminary inquiry
was instituted against her by the Executive Council.
22. The complaint of the appellant from the last incident of
sexual harassment of April 2023, is certainly beyond time.
However, the issue is whether the subsequent event of
removal of the appellant from the post of the Director,
CFRGS or initiation of inquiry by the Executive Council are
in any way linked to sexual harassment or amounts to
sexual harassment as described under Section 3(2) of the
POSH Act.
23. The last incident of actual sexual harassment took place
in April 2023. The subsequent incident of August 2023,
whereunder the appellant was removed as Director of
CFRGS, with no financial implications arose out of a
complaint received from the Central Government
undertaking i.e. NFCG wherein appellant was specifically
named. The said action was taken completely
10
independently on the basis of the complaint of NFCG
alleging that the project report was not submitted within
time and that the amount sanctioned for the project be
refunded. It may be pertinent to note that the MoU was
signed by the appellant with the NFCG and the bank
account was also under her control.
24. In view of the above, the incident of removal of appellant
as the Director of CFRGS cannot be attributed as an act of
sexual harassment in connection with the previous
incidents. It was based upon the report of NFCG, an
independent body.
25. The inquiry into the project funds was taken up by the
Executive Council and it was a collective decision and not
a unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, the said
act would also not amount to an act of sexual harassment
in conjunction with the previous reported acts.
26. The actions taken against the appellant in August 2023,
are administrative in nature and does not create a gender
based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being
actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.
11
27. It would be important to refer to the expressions “ in
relation to” or “connected with ” used in Section 3(2) of the
Act. The use of the above expression clearly demonstrates
that there has to be a direct link between the action
complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment. In
view of what has been said above, we find no such direct
link between the last incident of sexual harassment which
happened in April 2023, and those referred to
subsequently in August 2023 or December 2023.
28. A distinction has to be made between a “ continuing wrong ”
and a “ recurring wrong ”. The difference between the two
6
has been clarified in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh
where it has been held that a “ continuing wrong ” is when
the injury itself persists, whereas a “ recurring wrong ” is
when a fresh cause of action arises each time.
29. The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a
complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter.
The administrative measures of August 2023, were
independent and were collective decisions of the NFCG and
the Executive Council which cannot be solely attributed to
6
(2008) 8 SCC 648
12
the Vice-Chancellor. The said decision may have caused
inconvenience to the appellant or may have given an
impression that they are in line with previous acts of
harassment, but they were not part of the continued
sexual harassment. The subsequent events have no
connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as
such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours
amounting to sexual harassment. In this way, the incident
of April 2023, remains the last event related to sexual
harassment.
30. The appellant, in addressing her grievances to the
Chancellor, had not made any mention whatsoever of the
sexual harassment which may have taken place in August,
2023 onwards. The appellant initiated the complaint on
26.12.2023, immediately after the Executive Council
meeting on 21.12.2023, which had resolved to inquire into
diverse acts of misconduct on part of the appellant, that
could give an impression that the complaint was filed in
retaliation.
31. The appellant, in filing the complaint, also moved an
application for condonation of delay stating that there were
13
“mitigating circumstances” which she had attempted to
resolve within the institution and when she failed, she then
filed the complaint. The very fact that the appellant was
conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed,
proves that she herself treated the act of April 2023, to be
the last incident of sexual harassment and as such, tried
to explain the delay in filing the complaint.
32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as
the discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench
of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring
the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant
is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.
33. It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget
the wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed
against the appellant may not be investigated on technical
grounds, but it must not be forgotten.
34. In this view of the matter, we direct that the incidents of
alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may
be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever.
Thus, it is directed that this judgment shall be made part
14
of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which
shall be strictly ensured by him personally.
35. The appeal is dismissed with the observations made above.
36.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
.............……………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
.............……………………………….. J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 12, 2025.
15