Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 305 OF 2007
Manzoor Ali Khan ... Petitioner (s)
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ... Respondent
(s)
J U D G E M E N T
Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.
1. This petition, by way of public interest litigation, seeks
direction to declare Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption
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Act, 1988 (“PC Act”) unconstitutional and to direct prosecution
of all cases registered and investigated under the provisions of
PC Act against the politicians, M.L.As, M.Ps and Government
officials, without sanction as required under Section 19 of the
PC Act.
2. According to the averments in the writ petition, the
petitioner is a practising advocate in the State of Jammu &
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Kashmir. In the said State, several Government officials have
been charged for corruption but in the absence of requisite
sanction, they could not be prosecuted. Referring to several
instances including those noticed by this Court in various
orders, it is submitted that the provision for sanction as a
condition precedent for prosecution is being used by the
Government of India and the State Governments to protect
dishonest and corrupt politicians and Government officials. The
discretion to grant sanction has been misused.
3. The petition refers to various orders of this Court where
incumbents were indicted but not prosecuted for want of
sanction. In Common Cause, a registered Society vs.
Union of India & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 593, Captain Satish
Sharma, the then Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas was
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held to have acted in arbitrary manner in allotting petrol pumps
but since sanction was refused, he could not be prosecuted. In
Shiv Sagar Tiwari vs. Union of India & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC
599, Smt. Shiela Kaul, the then Minister for Housing and Urban
Development, Government of India was indicted for making
arbitrary, mala fide and unconstitutional allotments but still she
could not be prosecuted. In M.C. Mehta ( Taj Corridor Scam)
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vs. Union of India & Ors. , (2007) 1 SCC 110, Ms. Mayawati,
the then Chief Minister of U.P. and Shri Nasimuddin Siddiqui, the
then Minister for Environment, U.P. were indicted and
allegations against them were noticed but they could not be
prosecuted in the absence of sanction. It is further stated that
in Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. ,
2007 (1) SCC 1, Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav vs. State
of Bihar Thr. CBI(AHD) Patna 2007 (1) SCC 49 and K.
Karunakaran vs. State of Kerala 2007 (1) SCC 59, validity of
requirement of sanction was not gone into on the ground of
absence of challenge to its validity. In Shivajirao Nilangekar
Patil vs. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (Dr.) & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC
227, this Court noticed that there was a steady decline of public
standards and morals. It was necessary to cleanse public life
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even before cleaning the physical atmosphere. The provision
for sanction under the PC Act confers unguided and arbitrary
discretion on the Government to grant or not to grant sanction
to prosecute corrupt and dishonest politicians, M.Ps, M.L.As and
Government officials.
4. In response to the notice issued by this Court, affidavits
have been filed by several State Governments and Union
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Territories but no counter affidavit has been filed by the Union
of India. The stand taken in all the affidavits is almost identical.
According to the said stand, the object of Section 19 of the PC
Act is to protect public servants against irresponsible, frivolous
and vexatious proceedings for acts performed in good faith in
the discharge of their official duties and to protect them from
unnecessary harassment of legal proceedings arising out of
unfounded and baseless complaints. In the absence of such a
provision, the public servant may not be inclined to offer his/her
free and frank opinion and may not be able to function freely.
5. We have heard Mr. D.K. Garg, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned Additional Solicitor
General for the Union of India and learned counsel for various
States.
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6. Section 19 of the PC Act is as follows:-
| “ | 19. Previous sanction necessary for | |
|---|---|---|
| prosecution.— | ||
| (1) No court shall take cognizance of an<br>offence punishable under sections 7, 10,<br>11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been<br>committed by a public servant, except with<br>the previous sanction,— | ||
| (a) in the case of a person who is employed<br>in connection with the affairs of the Union<br>and is not removable from his office save |
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| by or with the sanction of the Central<br>Government, of that Government; | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| (b) in the case of a person who is employed<br>in connection with the affairs of a State and<br>is not removable from his office save by or<br>with the sanction of the State Government,<br>of that Government; | |||
| (c) in the case of any other person, of the<br>authority competent to remove him from<br>his office. | |||
| (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any<br>doubt arises as to whether the previous<br>sanction as required under sub-section (1)<br>should be given by the Central Government<br>or the State Government or any other<br>authority, such sanction shall be given by<br>that Government or authority which would<br>have been competent to remove the public<br>servant from his office at the time when the<br>offence was alleged to have been<br>committed. | |||
| (3) Notwithstanding a<br>the Code of Criminal<br>1974),— | nything contained in<br>Procedure, 1973 (2 of | ||
| (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by<br>a special Judge shall be reversed or altered<br>by a court in appeal, confirmation or<br>revision on the ground of the absence of, or<br>JUDGMENT<br>any error, omission or irregularity in, the<br>sanction required under sub-section (1),<br>unless in the opinion of that court, a failure<br>of justice has in fact been occasioned<br>thereby; | |||
| (b) no court shall stay the proceedings<br>under this Act on the ground of any error,<br>omission or irregularity in the sanction<br>granted by the authority, unless it is<br>satisfied that such error, omission or<br>irregularity has resulted in a failure of<br>justice; | |||
| (c) no court shall stay the proceedings<br>under this Act on any other ground and no |
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court shall exercise the powers of revision
in relation to any interlocutory order passed
in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other
proceedings.
(4) In determining under sub-section (3)
whether the absence of, or any error,
omission or irregularity in, such sanction
has occasioned or resulted in a failure of
justice the court shall have regard to the
fact whether the objection could and should
have been raised at any earlier stage in the
proceedings. Explanation.—For the
purposes of this section,—
(a) error includes competency of the
authority to grant sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution
includes reference to any requirement that
the prosecution shall be at the instance of a
specified authority or with the sanction of a
specified person or any requirement of a
similar nature.”
7. Question for consideration is whether Section 19 of the PC
Act is unconstitutional and whether any further direction is
called for in public interest and for enforcement or fundamental
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rights?
8. The issue raised in this petition is no longer res integra.
Requirement of sanction has salutary object of protecting an
innocent public servant against unwarranted and mala fide
prosecution. Undoubtedly, there can be no tolerance to
corruption which undermines core constitutional values of
justice, equality, liberty and fraternity. At the same time, need
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to prosecute and punish the corrupt is no ground to deny
protection to the honest. Mere possibility of abuse cannot be a
ground to declare a provision, otherwise valid, to be
unconstitutional. The exercise of power has to be regulated to
effectuate the purpose of law. The matter has already been
dealt with in various decisions of this Court.
9. In Vineet Narain & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr.
(1996) 2 SCC 199, this Court observed in paragraph 3 as
follows:
“ 3. The facts and circumstances of the
present case do indicate that it is of utmost
public importance that this matter is
examined thoroughly by this Court to
ensure that all government agencies,
entrusted with the duty to discharge their
functions and obligations in accordance
with law, do so, bearing in mind constantly
the concept of equality enshrined in the
Constitution and the basic tenet of rule of
law: “Be you ever so high, the law is above
you.” Investigation into every accusation
made against each and every person on a
reasonable basis, irrespective of the
position and status of that person, must be
conducted and completed expeditiously.
This is imperative to retain public
confidence in the impartial working of the
government agencies.”
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10. Again in a later order in the same case, i.e., Vineet
Narain & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in (1998) 1
SCC 226, it was observed as under:
“ 55. These principles of public life are of
general application in every democracy and
one is expected to bear them in mind while
scrutinising the conduct of every holder of
a public office. It is trite that the holders of
public offices are entrusted with certain
powers to be exercised in public interest
alone and, therefore, the office is held by
them in trust for the people. Any deviation
from the path of rectitude by any of them
amounts to a breach of trust and must be
severely dealt with instead of being pushed
under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to
an offence, it must be promptly
investigated and the offender against
whom a prima facie case is made out
should be prosecuted expeditiously so that
the majesty of law is upheld and the rule of
law vindicated. It is the duty of the judiciary
to enforce the rule of law and, therefore, to
guard against erosion of the rule of law.
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56. The adverse impact of lack of probity in
public life leading to a high degree of
corruption is manifold. It also has adverse
effect on foreign investment and funding
from the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank who have warned that
future aid to underdeveloped countries may
be subject to the requisite steps being
taken to eradicate corruption, which
prevents international aid from reaching
those for whom it is meant. Increasing
corruption has led to investigative
journalism which is of value to a free
society. The need to highlight corruption in
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public life through the medium of public
interest litigation invoking judicial review
may be frequent in India but is not
unknown in other countries: R. v. Secy. of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, 1995 (1) WLR 386.
. ...............................
................................
58 . .........................
15. Time-limit of three months for grant of
sanction for prosecution must be strictly
adhered to. However, additional time of one
month may be allowed where consultation
is required with the Attorney General (AG)
or any other law officer in the AG’s office.”
11. In a recent judgment of this Court in Subramanian
Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh & Anr. , (2012) 3 SCC 64, the
question for consideration was whether a private citizen has
locus to prosecute a public servant and to obtain sanction and
how an application for sanction was to be dealt with. It was
held that any application for sanction sought even by a private
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citizen must be looked into expeditiously and decided as per
the observations of this Court in Vineet Narain case (supra)
and guidelines framed by the CVC which were circulated vide
Office Order No. 31/5/05 dated 12.05.2005. The relevant
clauses have been quoted in the said judgment. In paragraphs
30, 33, 49, 50 of the leading judgment, it was observed:
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“ 30. While dealing with the issue relating
to maintainability of a private complaint,
the Constitution Bench observed: (A.R.
Antulay vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and
Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500, para 6)
“6. It is a well-recognised principle of
criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set
or put the criminal law into motion except
where the statute enacting or creating an
offence indicates to the contrary. The
scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure
envisages two parallel and independent
agencies for taking criminal offences to
court. Even for the most serious offence of
murder, it was not disputed that a private
complaint can, not only be filed but can be
entertained and proceeded with according
to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a
concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence
save and except that where the statute
creating an offence provides for the
eligibility of the complainant, by necessary
implication the general principle gets
excluded by such statutory provision.
Numerous statutory provisions, can be
referred to in support of this legal position
such as (i) Section 187-A of the Sea
Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Section 97 of the
Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of
the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947
(iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi)
Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956
and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity
(Supply) Act, 1948. This list is only
illustrative and not exhaustive. While
Section 190 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure permits anyone to approach the
Magistrate with a complaint, it does not
prescribe any qualification the complainant
is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a
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complaint. But where an eligibility criterion
for a complainant is contemplated specific
provisions have been made such as to be
found in Sections 195 to 199 CrPC. These
specific provisions clearly indicate that in
the absence of any such statutory
provision, a locus standi of a complainant is
a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence.
In other words, the principle that anyone
can set or put the criminal law in motion
remains intact unless contra-indicated by a
statutory provision. This general principle of
nearly universal application is founded on a
policy that an offence i.e. an act or
omission made punishable by any law for
the time being in force … is not merely an
offence committed in relation to the person
who suffers harm but is also an offence
against society. The society for its orderly
and peaceful development is interested in
the punishment of the offender. Therefore,
prosecution for serious offences is
undertaken in the name of the State
representing the people which would
exclude any element of private vendetta or
vengeance. If such is the public policy
underlying penal statutes, who brings an
act or omission made punishable by law to
the notice of the authority competent to
deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant
unless the statute indicates to the contrary.
Punishment of the offender in the interest
of the society being one of the objects
behind penal statutes enacted for larger
good of the society, right to initiate
proceedings cannot be whittled down,
circumscribed or fettered by putting it into
a straitjacket formula of locus standi
unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save
and except specific statutory exception. To
hold that such an exception exists that a
private complaint for offences of corruption
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committed by public servant is not
maintainable, the court would require an
unambiguous statutory provision and a
tangled web of argument for drawing a far-
fetched implication, cannot be a substitute
for an express statutory provision.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In view of the aforesaid judgment of
the Constitution Bench in Antulay case, it
must be held that the appellant has the
right to file a complaint for prosecution of
Respondent 2 in respect of the offences
allegedly committed by him under the 1988
Act.
49. CVC, after taking note of the judgment
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, State of
Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, Supt. of Police (CBI) v.
Deepak Chowdhary, framed guidelines
which were circulated vide Office Order No.
31/5/05 dated 12-5-2005. The relevant
clauses of the guidelines are extracted
below:
“ 2 (i) Grant of sanction is an administrative
act. The purpose is to protect the public
servant from harassment by frivolous or
vexatious prosecution and not to shield the
corrupt. The question of giving opportunity
to the public servant at that stage does not
arise. The sanctioning authority has only to
see whether the facts would prima facie
constitute the offence.
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(ii) The competent authority cannot
embark upon an inquiry to judge the truth
of the allegations on the basis of
representation which may be filed by the
accused person before the sanctioning
authority, by asking the IO to offer his
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comments or to further investigate the
matter in the light of representation made
by the accused person or by otherwise
holding a parallel investigation/enquiry by
calling for the record/report of his
department.
*
(vii) However, if in any case, the
sanctioning authority after consideration of
the entire material placed before it,
entertains any doubt on any point the
competent authority may specify the doubt
with sufficient particulars and may request
the authority who has sought sanction to
clear the doubt. But that would be only to
clear the doubt in order that the authority
may apply its mind properly, and not for the
purpose of considering the representations
of the accused which may be filed while the
matter is pending sanction.
(viii) If the sanctioning authority seeks the
comments of the IO while the matter is
pending before it for sanction, it will almost
be impossible for the sanctioning authority
to adhere to the time-limit allowed by the
Supreme Court in Vineet Narain case.”
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50. The aforementioned guidelines are in
conformity with the law laid down by this
Court that while considering the issue
regarding grant or refusal of sanction, the
only thing which the competent authority is
required to see is whether the material
placed by the complainant or the
investigating agency prima facie discloses
commission of an offence. The competent
authority cannot undertake a detailed
inquiry to decide whether or not the
allegations made against the public servant
are true.”
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In concurring judgment, it was further observed:
“ 68. Today, corruption in our country not
only poses a grave danger to the concept
of constitutional governance, it also
threatens the very foundation of the Indian
democracy and the Rule of Law. The
magnitude of corruption in our public life is
incompatible with the concept of a socialist
secular democratic republic. It cannot be
disputed that where corruption begins all
rights end. Corruption devalues human
rights, chokes development and
undermines justice, liberty, equality,
fraternity which are the core values in our
Preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of
the court is that any anti-corruption law has
to be interpreted and worked out in such a
fashion as to strengthen the fight against
corruption. That is to say in a situation
where two constructions are eminently
reasonable, the court has to accept the one
that seeks to eradicate corruption to the
one which seeks to perpetuate it.
70. The learned Attorney General in the
course of his submission fairly admitted
before us that out of the total 319 requests
for sanction, in respect of 126 of such
requests, sanction is awaited. Therefore, in
more than one-third cases of request for
prosecution in corruption cases against
public servants, sanctions have not been
accorded. The aforesaid scenario raises
very important constitutional issues as well
as some questions relating to interpretation
of such sanctioning provision and also the
role that an independent judiciary has to
play in maintaining the Rule of Law and
common man’s faith in the justice-
delivering system. Both the Rule of Law and
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equality before law are cardinal questions
(sic principles) in our constitutional laws as
also in international law and in this context
the role of the judiciary is very vital. In his
famous treatise on Administrative Law,
Prof. Wade while elaborating the concept of
the Rule of Law referred to the opinion of
Lord Griffiths which runs as follows:
“… the judiciary accepts a responsibility for
the maintenance of the rule of law that
embraces a willingness to oversee
executive action and to refuse to
countenance behaviour that threatens
either basic human rights or the rule of
law.” [See R. v. Horseferry Road
Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett, AC at p.
62 A.]
I am in respectful agreement with the
aforesaid principle.
74. Keeping those principles in mind, as we
must, if we look at Section 19 of the PC Act
which bars a court from taking cognizance
of cases of corruption against a public
servant under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15
of the Act, unless the Central or the State
Government, as the case may be, has
accorded sanction, virtually imposes fetters
on private citizens and also on prosecutors
from approaching court against corrupt
public servants. These protections are not
available to other citizens. Public servants
are treated as a special class of persons
enjoying the said protection so that they
can perform their duties without fear and
favour and without threats of malicious
prosecution. However, the said protection
against malicious prosecution which was
extended in public interest cannot become
a shield to protect corrupt officials. These
provisions being exceptions to the equality
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provision of Article 14 are analogous to the
provisions of protective discrimination and
these protections must be construed very
narrowly. These procedural provisions
relating to sanction must be construed in
such a manner as to advance the causes of
honesty and justice and good governance
as opposed to escalation of corruption.
75. Therefore, in every case where an
application is made to an appropriate
authority for grant of prosecution in
connection with an offence under the PC
Act it is the bounden duty of such authority
to apply its mind urgently to the situation
and decide the issue without being
influenced by any extraneous
consideration. In doing so, the authority
must make a conscious effort to ensure the
Rule of Law and cause of justice is
advanced. In considering the question of
granting or refusing such sanction, the
authority is answerable to law and law
alone. Therefore, the requirement to take
the decision with a reasonable dispatch is
of the essence in such a situation. Delay in
granting sanction proposal thwarts a very
valid social purpose, namely, the purpose of
a speedy trial with the requirement to bring
the culprit to book. Therefore, in this case
the right of the sanctioning authority, while
either sanctioning or refusing to grant
sanction, is coupled with a duty.
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76. The sanctioning authority must bear in
mind that what is at stake is the public
confidence in the maintenance of the Rule
of Law which is fundamental in the
administration of justice. Delay in granting
such sanction has spoilt many valid
prosecutions and is adversely viewed in
public mind that in the name of considering
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a prayer for sanction, a protection is given
to a corrupt public official as a quid pro quo
for services rendered by the public official
in the past or may be in the future and the
sanctioning authority and the corrupt
officials were or are partners in the same
misdeeds. I may hasten to add that this
may not be the factual position in this (sic
case) but the general demoralising effect of
such a popular perception is profound and
pernicious.
77. By causing delay in considering the
request for sanction, the sanctioning
authority stultifies judicial scrutiny and
determination of the allegations against
corrupt official and thus the legitimacy of
the judicial institutions is eroded. It, thus,
deprives a citizen of his legitimate and
fundamental right to get justice by setting
the criminal law in motion and thereby
frustrates his right to access judicial
remedy which is a constitutionally
protected right. In this connection, if we
look at Section 19 of the PC Act, we find
that no time-limit is mentioned therein. This
has virtually armed the sanctioning
authority with unbridled power which has
often resulted in protecting the guilty and
perpetuating criminality and injustice in
society.
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79. Article 14 must be construed as a
guarantee against uncanalised and
arbitrary power. Therefore, the absence of
any time-limit in granting sanction in
Section 19 of the PC Act is not in
consonance with the requirement of the
due process of law which has been read
into our Constitution by the Constitution
Bench decision of this Court in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
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80. I may not be understood to have
expressed any doubt about the
constitutional validity of Section 19 of the
PC Act, but in my judgment the power
under Section 19 of the PC Act must be
reasonably exercised. In my judgment
Parliament and the appropriate authority
must consider restructuring Section 19 of
the PC Act in such a manner as to make it
consonant with reason, justice and fair play.
81. In my view, Parliament should consider
the constitutional imperative of Article 14
enshrining the Rule of Law wherein “due
process of law” has been read into by
introducing a time-limit in Section 19 of the
PC Act, 1988 for its working in a reasonable
manner. Parliament may, in my opinion,
consider the following guidelines:
(a) All proposals for sanction placed before
any sanctioning authority empowered to
grant sanction for prosecution of a public
servant under Section 19 of the PC Act
must be decided within a period of three
months of the receipt of the proposal by
the authority concerned.
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(b) Where consultation is required with the
Attorney General or the Solicitor General or
the Advocate General of the State, as the
case may be, and the same is not possible
within the three months mentioned in
clause (a) above, an extension of one
month period may be allowed, but the
request for consultation is to be sent in
writing within the three months mentioned
in clause (a) above. A copy of the said
request will be sent to the prosecuting
agency or the private complainant to
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intimate them about the extension of the
time-limit.
(c) At the end of the extended period of
time-limit, if no decision is taken, sanction
will be deemed to have been granted to the
proposal for prosecution, and the
prosecuting agency or the private
complainant will proceed to file the charge-
sheet/complaint in the court to commence
prosecution within 15 days of the expiry of
the aforementioned time-limit.”
The above observations fully cover the issue raised in this
petition.
12. Thus while it is not possible to hold that the requirement
of sanction is unconstitutional, the competent authority has to
take a decision on the issue of sanction expeditiously as
already observed. A fine balance has to be maintained between
need to protect a public servant against mala fide prosecution
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on the one hand and the object of upholding the probity in
public life in prosecuting the public servant against whom
prima facie material in support of allegation of corruption
exists, on the other hand.
13. In view of the law laid down by this Court, no further
directions are necessary.
14. The writ petition is disposed of.
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.............................................J.
[ T.S. THAKUR ]
.............................................J.
[ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
New Delhi
August 06, 2014
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