Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 6880-6883 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Union of India & Others
RESPONDENT:
Indian Jute Mills Associations & Others
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/2005
BENCH:
ASHOK BHAN & A.K. MATHUR
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
WITH
CIVIL APPAL NO.7894 OF 2004
BHAN, J.
This order shall dispose of C.A. No.6880-
83 of 2003 arising from the Division Bench
Judgment of the High Court of Calcutta dated
27.06.2003 in G.A. No.3567 of 2002, A.P.O.T.
No.664 of 2002, A.P.O.T. No. 705 of 2002, G.A.
No.3758 of 2002, W.P. No.1059 of 2002, G.A.
No.3568 of 2002, A.P.O.T. No.665 of 2002, W.P.
No.1059 of 2002, A.P.O.T. No.707 of 2002, G.A.
No.3761 of 2002, W.P. No.1207 of 2002 and
Civil Appeal No.7894 of 2004 arising from
another Division Bench Judgment of the same
High Court dated 6.7.2004 in G.A. No.2229 of
2004, A.P.O.T. No.314 of 2004 and W.P. No.870
of 2004.
Before adverting to the facts, it may be
stated that the orders passed by the High
Court have worked out with the lapse of time.
We shall take up the two sets of appeals
separately.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6880-6883 OF 2003
The Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory
Use in Packing Commodities) Act, 1987
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was
enacted by the Parliament to provide for
compulsory use of jute packaging material in
supplying and distribution of certain
commodities in the interests of production of
raw jute and jute packing material and of
persons engaged in the production thereof and
for matters connected therewith.
Section 3 (1) of the said Act empowers the
Central Government, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being
in force and being satisfied, after
considering the recommendations made to it by
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the Standing Advisory Committee, that it is
necessary so to do in the interests of
production of raw jute packaging material and
of persons engaged in the production thereof,
direct from time to time, by order published
in the official Gazette that such commodity or
class of commodities or such percentage
thereof, shall be packed for the purposes of
its supply or distribution in such jute
packaging material as may be specified in the
order.
Under Section 4(1) of the Act it is
incumbent upon the Central Government to
constitute a Standing Advisory Committee with
a view to determining the commodity or class
of commodities or percentages thereof in
respect of which jute packing material shall
be used in their packaging. Under sub-Section
(2) of Section 4 the Standing Advisory
Committee is required to indicate its
recommendation to the Central Government after
considering the matters as indicated in sub-
clause (a) to (g) including the protection of
interest of persons engaged in the jute
industry and in the production of raw jute.
It is not in dispute that such Standing
Advisory Committee was formed and thereafter
from time to time on recommendations of the
said Standing Advisory Committee the Central
Government passed orders for packaging
specified commodities to the extent indicated
in such notification.
Constitutional validity of this Act was
upheld by this Court in the case of Dalmia
Cement (Bharat) Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of
India and Others reported in (1996) 10 SCC
104. It was held that the enactment of the
Act was necessary for agro-based economy of
India and the agricultural crops cultivated in
India. That the \Act was enacted to provide
economic security and justice to producers of
raw jute and the workers engaged in the
manufacturing of jute packaging material and
the Central Government had taken a balanced
view in directing the use of jute packaging
material for compulsory package of certain
specified commodities or percentage thereof
which was subject to Parliamentary control.
One of the challenges put to the
constitutional validity of the Act was that
the constitution of the Standing Advisory
Committee under Section 4 (1), consisting of
only the Secretaries representing various
departments without associating the jute
industry was arbitrary, unjust and therefore
bad in law. This contention was rejected.
However, while doing so, this Court observed
that it would be desirable that the industry
or industries representing through recognised
office-bearers may be nominated or given
notice before the Advisory Committee meets to
place their views and material in support
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thereof to evaluate the need for regulation
and extent of regulation thereof. Para 51 of
this judgment reads:-
"Yet another contention that
requires consideration is that in
the Committee constituted under
Section 4(1) only Secretaries
representing various departments
alone are represented and no one
represents the petitioners in the
Committee and that, therefore, the
Act is void. This contention also
cannot be accepted as a sound
principle of law. However, as seen
from the record, the Committee
consists of the Secretaries
representing various departments.
It would be desirable that the
industry or industries through
recognised office-bearers of the
associations may be nominated or
given notice before the Advisory
Committee meets to place their
views and material in support
thereof to evaluate the need for
regulation and extent of
regulation thereof. The persons
representing the particular
industry would assist the
Committee to properly advise the
Government before issuing
directions/orders under Section 3.
The provisions of the Act contain
guidelines as is self-evident.
Socio-economic justice is the
public policy. It is subject to
parliamentary control. They bear
reasonable nexus to the object
sought to be achieved by the Act."
By an order dated 01.03.2002 the Central
Government issued an order reducing the extent
of protection in respect of sugar from 100% to
90%. Subsequently, the Standing Advisory
Committee in its meeting held on 12.04.2002
after hearing the Indian Jute Mills
Association and others made the
recommendations for formation of inter-
Ministerial Committee consisting of Ministers
of Textiles, Agriculture and Consumer Affairs,
Food and Public Distribution for the purpose
of formulating a road map for the progressive
dilution of compulsory packaging norms for
food grains and sugar under the Act to
facilitate its repeal.
Writ petitions were filed against the
aforesaid order. The Court passed an interim
order on 25.04.2002 directing the Union of
India not to proceed in respect of such
recommendations made by the Standing Advisory
Committee. By an order dated 15.05.2002,
although the interim order was extended, the
Union of India was given liberty to hold
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meeting and take decision, but not to give
effect to the same without the leave of the
Court.
Pursuant to the liberty given, the Central
Government ultimately took the decision on the
recommendation of the inter-Ministerial
Committee to dilute the recommendations in
respect of sugar by 25% and food grains by 20%
for the year July, 2002 to June, 2003 and by
50% and 40% for the year July, 2003 to June,
2004. Second writ petition was filed
challenging the aforesaid order of the Central
Government. Both the sets of writ petitions
were taken up together. The writ petitions
came up for hearing before a Single Judge who
dismissed the same primarily on the ground
that the decision taken by the Central
Government was a policy decision and therefore
beyond the judicial review. Aggrieved against
the aforesaid order of the Single Judge the
Indian Jute Mills Association and another
filed the appeals which have been disposed of
by the impugned order along with other
connected cases.
The Division Bench formulated the
following four questions arising in the
appeals for its determination:-
"1. Whether the Standing Advisory
Committee which is a creature of
the said Act and is statutorily
obliged to act within the frame
work of the said Act can make
recommendations contrary to the
object and purpose of the Act;
2. Whether the impugned
recommendations made by the
Standing Advisory Committee for
creation of a road map for
gradual dilution of the
protection under the Act for
ultimate repeal of the Act and
for formation of an inter-
Ministerial committee for the
aforesaid purpose are dehors the
provision of the Act and without
jurisdiction;
3. Whether the impugned
recommendations made by the
Advisory Committee and the
ultimate order passed by the
Central Government as per the
recommendation of the inter-
Ministerial Committee is in
consonance with object and
purpose of the Act or ultra
vires the same;
4. Whether in absence of specific
recommendation by the Standing
Advisory Committee the Central
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Government has power to make the
impugned order as to the extent
of protection for future year
for which no recommendation was
made by the Standing Advisory
Committee."
Aggrieved against the judgment of the
Division Bench the Union of India has filed
these appeals. As the duration of the
notification was for a period of one year
which has already lapsed the order of the High
Court has worked itself out. The Division
Bench in the course of its judgment observed:-
"The legislative policy as
contained in the Act is clear and
unambiguous namely, protection of
jute industry and the interest of
million of farmers and workers
connected therewith and the jute
industry itself. The Central
Government therefore cannot act
contrary to such legislative
policy and resort to progressive
dilution of the protection of jute
packaging materials for the
purpose of ultimate repeal of the
Act."
Shri A. Sharan, learned Additional
Solicitor General of India does not press the
appeals on any point other than the setting
aside of the above quoted observations of the
High Court. It is contended by him that the
observations made by the Division Bench quoted
above are obiter in nature as the same did not
arise either from the pleadings of the parties
or the contentions raised before the Division
Bench. The challenge in the writ petition was
regarding the extent of power or jurisdiction
of the Advisory Committee to make its
recommendation to the Central Government.
There was no challenge to the power of the
Central Government regarding the progressive
dilution of the protection of the jute
packaging material for the purpose of ultimate
repeal of the Act.
Shri R.F. Nariman, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent submitted that
since the Central Government had acted in its
capacity as a creature under the Act, the High
Court was justified in holding that the
Central Government could not act contrary to
the legislative policy spelt out by the
legislature in the Jute Packaging Materials
(Compulsory Use in Packing commodities) Act,
1987. Shri Nariman, with reference to the
objects and reasons for the enactment of the
aforesaid Act contended that the purpose of
the Act was to provide for the compulsory use
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of jute packaging material in the supply and
distribution of certain commodities in the
interests of production of raw jute and jute
packing material and of persons engaged in the
production thereof, and for matters connected
therewith and not for the ultimate repeal of
the Act.
After considering the respective
submissions put forth by the learned senior
counsels on behalf of the parties we are of
the opinion that the contention raised by the
learned Additional Solicitor General deserves
to be accepted. On perusal of the writ
petition, the prayers made therein, the
contentions raised by the respective counsels
for the parties before the Division Bench and
the points formulated by the Division Bench
for its consideration we are of the opinion
that the question regarding power of the
Central Government to pass any order regarding
the progressive dilution or protection of the
jute packaging material for its ultimate
repeal was not under challenge. This point
did not arise from the pleadings of the
parties. The observations made are without
there being any foundation of facts laid in
the pleadings and the points formulated by the
Division Bench for its consideration. We are
not even sure as to whether the learned
counsels appearing for the parties before the
High Court had addressed arguments on this
point. We do not agree with the submissions
made by Shri Nariman that the Central
Government was acting in its capacity as a
creature under the Act. The Standing Advisory
Committee is constituted under the Act and not
the Central Government. The observations made
by the High Court being contrary to the
pleadings and obiter in nature are set aside.
The same would not be either binding or taken
as a precedent for any future reference.
The appeals filed by the Union of India
are dismissed except to the extent indicated
above.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7894 OF 2004
In this appeal, the challenge before the
High Court was to the notification dated
16.4.2004 issued by the Central Government
under The Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory
Use in Packing Commodities) Act, 1987 for the
period ending 30.06.2004. In spite of the
interim stay granted by the High Court another
notification was issued on 01.07.2004 for a
period of one month. Both these notifications
have been quashed by the judgment under
appeal.
One of the grounds for challenge to the
notifications was that the Central Government
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had issued the notifications on the
recommendations made by the Standing Advisory
Committee, constituted under Section 4(1) of
the Act without associating or hearing the
workers engaged in the jute industry and the
agricultural producers of the jute for whose
benefit the Act had been enacted.
The writ petition was dismissed by the
Single Judge on 19.05.2004 holding that there
was no provision in the Act either to
associate the workers engaged in the industry
and the agricultural producers of the jute or
for giving of hearing to them by the Standing
Advisory Committee before making its
recommendations to the Central Government.
Aggrieved against the order passed by the
Single Judge, appeals were filed before the
Division Bench. One of the grounds taken in
the appeal was that the representatives of the
growers and the workers engaged in the
production of raw jute and jute packaging
material ought to have been heard by the
Standing Advisory Committee before making its
recommendation to the Central Government for
the purpose of Section 3(1) of the Act. That
in their absence no meaningful recommendation
which would serve the purpose of the Act could
be made. The High Court relying upon the
observations made by this Court in para 51
[reproduced in the earlier part of this order]
in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. (supra)] held
that though there was no specific provision
for associating or giving a hearing to the
representatives of the growers and the workers
engaged in the production of raw jute and jute
packaging material it would be proper for the
Standing Advisory Committee to give them
hearing to make a meaningful recommendation to
the Central Government for the purpose of
Section 3(1) of the Act, subject however to
such modification as may be advised by the
Parliament. The appeal was accepted, order
of Single Judge was set aside, notifications
dated 16.4.2004 and 01.07.2004 were quashed
and a direction was issued to the Central
Government to maintain the status quo with
regard to the use of jute packaging material
as was existing prior to the issuance of the
notification dated 16.4.2004 till a fresh
recommendation was made by the Standing
Advisory Committee. Following directions were
given to the Standing Advisory Committee:-
"The Standing Advisory Committee
shall fix a fresh date of hearing
and give notice to the appellants
herein and such other persons as
it may consider necessary and
after considering the submissions
made on their behalf, proceed to
make fresh recommendations to the
Central Government keeping in mind
the provisions of Section 4(2) and
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in particular clause (d) thereof
and the Central Government shall,
thereafter, proceed to act in
accordance with Section 3 of the
Act."
The total duration of the two
notifications was three and a half months
which has lapsed due to efflux of time. The
order of the High Court to that extent has
already worked out. Mr. A. Sharan, learned
Additional Solicitor General of India contends
that although the duration of the notification
has already lapsed and the order of the High
Court has already worked out but the
directions issued by the High Court that the
Standing Advisory Committee is required to
give notice or afford a hearing to the
representatives of the growers and the workers
engaged in the production of raw jute and jute
packaging material, being of far reaching
consequences which would be operative for all
times to come, being contrary to the
provisions of the Act and the observations
made by this Court in Dalmia Cement (Bharat)
Ltd. (supra) deserve to be set aside.
As against this the learned senior counsel
for the respondents contended that to carry
out the objects and purposes for which the Act
was enacted, it was incumbent upon the
Standing Advisory Committee to associate and
hear the representatives of the growers and
the workers engaged in the production of raw
jute and jute packaging material for whose
benefit the Act was enacted, before it could
make any meaningful recommendation to the
Central Government.
Subject matter of the appeal in this Court
today is not regarding the validity of the
notifications dated 16.4.2004 and 01.07.2004
the duration of which has already lapsed due
to efflux of time. The question of law which
is being raised is as to whether the High
Court contrary to the provisions of the Act
and the observations made by this Court in
Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. (supra) could
direct the Standing Advisory Committee to
afford a hearing to the representatives of the
growers and the workers engaged in the
production of raw jute and jute packaging
material. The challenge to the constitution
of Standing Advisory Committee consisting of
only the Secretaries representing various
departments without associating the jute
industry or its representative being void was
rejected by this Court in Dalmia Cement
(Bharat) Ltd. (supra). The Court did not
accept the plea of the appellant that the
representatives of the jute industries should
either be nominated to the Standing Advisory
Committee or that they should be heard by the
Standing Advisory Committee before making its
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recommendations to the Central Government for
the purpose of Section 3(1) of the Act.
While rejecting the contention this Court
further did observe that, "It would be
desirable that the industry or industries
through recognised office-bearers of the
associations may be nominated or given notice
before the Advisory Committee meets to place
their views and material in support thereof to
evaluate the need for regulation and extent of
regulation thereof. The persons representing
the particular industry would assist the
Committee to properly advise the Government
before issuing directions/orders under Section
3."
It would be seen that this Court was
careful not to give a positive direction to
the Central Government either to nominate a
representative of the industry on the Advisory
Board or of affording an opportunity by the
Standing Advisory Committee to hear them
before making its recommendation to the
Central Government. The only desire expressed
by the Court was that the Standing Advisory
Committee should give a notice to the jute
industry to enable it to place its point of
view before the Advisory Committee for its
evaluation before making the recommendations
to the Central Government. It is not disputed
before us that the observations made by the
Court are being carried out meticulously.
There is no provision in the Act requiring the
Standing Advisory Committee to afford a
hearing to any person associated with either
the production of the raw jute or engaged in
the production of the jute packaging material
before making its recommendations to the
Central Government. The directions issued by
the Division Bench run counter to the
provisions of the Act as well as the
observations made by this Court in Dalmia
Cement (Bharat) Ltd. (supra). The same
deserves to be set aside and are hereby set
aside.
For the reasons stated above, Civil Appeal
Nos. 6880-6883 of 2003 and Civil Appeal No.
7894 of 2004 are allowed to the extent
indicated above. Regarding the other points
as the duration of the notification is already
over and the order of the High Court has
worked itself out, the appeals are dismissed
as infructuous. There shall be no order as
to costs.