Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GRAM PANCHAYAT, VILLAGE KANONDA, TEHSILBAHADURGARH, DISTRICT
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DIRECTOR, CONSOLIDATION OF HOLDINGS, HARYANA,CHANDIGARH AND
DATE OF JUDGMENT24/10/1989
BENCH:
SAIKIA, K.N. (J)
BENCH:
SAIKIA, K.N. (J)
RAMASWAMY, K.
FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 763 1989 SCR Supl. (1) 576
1989 SCC Supl. (2) 465 JT 1989 (4) 357
1989 SCALE (2)914
ACT:
East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act 1948/East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules 1949---Sections 21(2)
and 42/Rule 18 Confirmation of Scheme--Whether tantamount to
an order under the Act--Limitation period provided in Rule
18--Whether attracted.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant--Panchayat owned 1200 Bighas of land in
Village Kanonda Distt. Rohtak in Haryana. A Scheme of con-
solidation of Holdings under Section 20 of the East Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act
1948 was confirmed on 15.1.1974, as a result whereof the
Panchayat’s land was consolidated, repartitioned and allot-
ted to persons, allegedly having no right to hold the same
with the result, the Panchayat was reduced as a landless
person, and financially weak. The Panchayat, therefore, on
20.9.1977 moved an application under section 42 of the Act
objecting to the utilization of the Land of the value of
-/2/- (Two annas) and the allotments made to other right
holders.
After hearing the parties, the Director of Consolidation
of Holdings by his order dated 8.2.79 set aside the scheme
and remanded the case to the consolidation officer with some
directions. The Director took the view that even though the
application had been made much beyond the period of limita-
tion of six months contemplated under Rule 18, yet in view
of the fact that the Panchayat had no other land to culti-
vate due to which the Panchayat was unable to develop the
agricultural Schemes, condoned the delay and allowed the
application as aforesaid. Against the said orders the Re-
spondents moved the High Court by means of a Writ Petition
urging inter alia that the Director had condoned the delay
without there being any ground for the same and thus had
acted illegally. The High Court held that the Director
condoned the delay on extraneous considerations and accord-
ingly quashed the impugned
577
order of 8.2.79 passed by the Director. Hence the Panchayat
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has filed this appeal after obtaining Special Leave.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: (Per K.N. Saikia & M. Fathima Beevi, JJ.)
Section 42 of the Act envisages proceedings wherein
order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition
made. These are the distinct proceedings for the purpose of
exercising jurisdiction under this section. [585B]
Applying Rule 18, the application has to be one under
section 42 of the Act, and it has to be against an order and
under the first proviso, a certified copy of the order is
required to accompany the application and in computing the
period of limitation of six months, the time spent in ob-
taining the certified copy is to be excluded. [585F].
Rule 18 has to be interpreted as it is found, and the
words of the rule are simple, precise and unambiguous and no
more is necessary than to understand these words in their
natural and ordinary sense. Two different meanings cannot be
given to the same word "order" namely, that, in section 42
it does not include scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti-
tion made, while in Rule 18, it would include them. [586B-C]
The Rule did not come into play when a petitioner chal-
lenged either the scheme of consolidation including its
preparation or confirmation or the repartition made in
pursuance thereof. The amendment made this position clear.
[586E]
Though section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or
confirmation of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18
provides for limitation only in respect of an application
under that section in a proceeding where an order was
passed. There is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius---expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
another. When mention has been made only of "orders", the
inference would be that preparation or confirmation of
scheme and repartition are excluded. [588F-G]
In matters like consolidation of Holdings by a scheme
and the preparation and confirmation of the scheme and
repartition thereafter, the objections may arise at various
stages for various reasons and it will
578
not be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule as to
the reasonable period after which an application could be
made under section 42 of the Act. The Legislature itself did
not do so. [589C-D]
In the instant case, it has not been shown that the
Panchayat earlier moved an application under section 42 on
the same subject matter. There is no material to hold that
the instant order of the Director is an order of review of
his earlier order. [590A]
(Per K. Ramaswamy, J.)
As regards the exercise of the power under sections 19 &
20, the statute does not envisage passing any orders. But
when exercising the power, the officer is enjoined to pass
orders and appeals are provided within the prescribed limi-
tation against those orders to the appellate forums. This
also, is an indication of the fact that the limitation of
six months is confined to the orders to be revised under
section 42. [580C-D]
The prescription of limitation of six months under Rule
18 would be confined only to order passed by an officer
under the Act, it would not apply to the revision filed
against the scheme prepared on confirmed or repartition made
in pursuance thereof. [580F]
It is undoubted that when there is no limitation pre-
scribed for exercise of the revisional power under section
42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition
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made, it would be exercised within a reasonable time. [580G]
What is reasonable time is always a question of fact
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
[580G]
When legislature chose not to fix a particular period of
limitation, by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit
to a particular period. :While exercising power under Sec-
tion 42, the revisional authority may take into account the
long lapse of time as a factor in the light of the facts and
circumstances obtainable in an appropriate, case. No abso-
lute or precise period of limitation could be predicted or
laid. [580H]
Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of
Holdings, Jullundar, AIR 1984 Punjab & Haryana 216, ap-
proved.
Haqiqat Singh v. Addl. Director, Consolidation of Hold-
ings, AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 204; Joginder Singh & Ors.
v. The Director,
579
Consolidation of Holdings, [1988] Pun. L.J. 535 and Harbha-
jan Singh v. Karam Singh & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 641, referred
to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 584 of
1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.9.1979 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.
2247 of 1979.
A.B. Rohtagi and M.S. Mann for the Appellant.
Harbans Lal and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court were delivered by
K. RAMASWAMY, J. I wholly agree with my learned brother
Saikia, J. with regard to the reasoning and the conclusions.
He has succinctly stated the facts of the case and the
relevant provisions of law and they need no reiteration. I
would add only few points which I deem relevant to be dealt
with. As regards the applicability of the limitation of six
months period prescribed under Rule 18 for the exercise of
the revisional power by the State Govt. under Section 42 of
the Act, assailing legality or propriety of the scheme
prepared or confirmation thereof or repartition made in
pursuance thereof, it could be angulated from yet another
perspective. Indisputably Section 42 was amended by the
Amendment Act of 1960 incorporating after the words any
order passed "(Scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition
made)". Rule 18 was made in exercise of the rule making
power by the subordinate legislation. After the amendment of
Section 42 was made to exercise the revisional power by the
State Govt. against the schemes prepared or confirmed or
repartition made, correspondingly, no amendment to Rule 18
was made bringing within its ambit scheme prepared or con-
firmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof. It is
unnecessary to go into the question whether Rule 18 was
declared to be intra vires or not. We proceed on the footing
that Rule 18 is ultra vires and applies to the exercise of
the revisional power by the State Govt. under Section 42.
The omission to amend the Rule is an indication of the
legislative animation that the limitation of six months
prescribed under the Rule 18 would be confined to be ap-
plicable only to "any order passed by any officer under the
Act. Thereby, by necessary implication the prescription of
the limitation of six months for filing revision petition
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against the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made
in pursuance thereof would stand excluded. It is no
580
doubt true as contended for respondents that the Consolida-
tion Officer who has prepared the scheme or confirmed it or
modified or repartition made when it is objected to by the
affected party, has to consider the objections and, as a
part thereof by necessary implication, has to assign reasons
and the record must contain reasons. But the legislature
made a dichotomy between the orders passed and scheme pre-
pared or confirmation thereof or repartition affected in
pursuance thereof. He is not free to take arbitrary deci-
sion. Assigning reasons are sine quo non for application of
the mind though he does not appear to communicate the rea-
sons therefore. But to an order passed assigning reasons in
its support and communication thereof are necessary concomi-
tants and this was made manifest when Section 19, 20 and 21
are looked into. As regards the exercise of the power under
Section 19 and 20 the statute does not envisage passing any
orders. But when exercise of the power in Sub-sec. 20 of 21,
the officer is enjoined to pass orders and appeals are
provided within the prescribed limitation against those
orders to the appellate forums. This, also, is an indication
of the fact that the limitation of six months is confined to
the orders to be revised under section 42.
It is undoubted that the scheme prepared or confirmed or
modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof are amena-
ble to the revisional jurisdiction under section 42. The
State Govt. would consider the legality or propriety of the
reasons or the grounds on which the scheme was initially
prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in
pursuance thereof. But that does not mean that it is an
order made and the limitation of six months prescribed under
Rule -18 would get attracted to the revision filed against
the scheme prepared or modified or repartition made in
pursuance thereof. Thus I have. little hesitation to hold
that the prescription of limitation of six months
under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by any
officer under the Act; it would not apply to the revision
filed against the scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti-
tion made in pursuance thereof.
It is undoubted that when there is no limitation pre-
scribed for exercise of the revisional power under Section
42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition
made, it would be exercised within a reasonable time. What
is a reasonable time is always a question of fact depending
upon the facts and circumstances in each case. When legisla-
ture chose not to fix a particular period of limitation by
judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a particu-
lar period. The long lapse of time may be a fact for the
revisional authority to take into
581
account in the light of the facts and circumstances obtain-
able in an appropriate case. No absolute or precise period
of limitation could be predicated or laid. Take for instance
the facts of this case. the previous Sarpanch is a benefici-
ary from the impugned order and has chosen not to take steps
to have the scheme impugned by filing a revision under
Section 42 of the Act. The Gram Panchayat, being a juristic
person, could not by itself except through the executive
authority take. any action against the scheme prepared by
the Consolidation Officer to assail its legality or proprie-
ty by filing the revision. The revision petition was filed
soon after the new Sarpanch came into office. Take another
instance of a case where the officer concerned and the
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person benefitted, in confabulation, have made a scheme and
repartition affected in pursuance thereto and kept it in
dark to the knowledge of the person affected by the scheme
prepared or the partition made. Until the person affected
had actual knowledge, it is not possible to become award of
it. The limitation begins to run from the date of the knowl-
edge of the fraud so played. It is always open to the af-
fected person to come forward and say that for the first
time he became aware of the scheme prepared or partition
made in pursuance thereof only when his rights are sought to
be interfered with or exercise of the enjoyment of the
property is interdicted. Therefore immediately within a
reasonable time thereafter he is to file a revision before
the State Govt. Having had the knowledge of the impugned
action if he stood by without taking any further action, it
is always open to the other party to bring it to the notice
of the State Govt. of the ground or the circumstances under
which the revision petitioner when he became aware of the
scheme prepared or the repartition made and he deliberately
chose to acquiesce to it and if the State Govt. is satisfied
of the same, unless satisfactory explanation for the delay
is given, the State Govt. may decline to interfere with the
impugned action or may decline to entertain the revision
petition itself. Thus it could be seen that each case has to
be angulated on its own given facts and circumstances as to
the reasonable period of limitation within which the revi-
sional power is to be filed. Even though more than 5 years
time had elapsed from the date of the preparation of the
scheme till date of the filing of the revision under Section
42, there is sufficient ground in this case for the new
Sarpanch in not filing a revision within six months from the
date of the original scheme and the State Govt. is well
justified in exercising the power under Section 42. The High
Court is unjustified in interfering with the order passed by
the Consolidation Officer. Accordingly, the appeal is al-
lowed.
No costs.
582
K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the
Judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandi-
garh dated 21.9.1979 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979
allowing the petition and setting aside the order of the
Director, Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.
The appellant Gram Panchayat, hereinafter referred to as
the ’Panchayat’, was the owner of 1200 Bighas of land in
village Kanonda, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak. A
Scheme of consolidation of holdings, hereinafter referred to
as ’the Scheme’, of the village was confirmed on 15.1.1974
under section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (50 of 1948),
hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’. The Panchayat, there-
fore, moved an application under section 42 of the Act on
20.9.1977 for setting aside the Scheme, objecting to the
utilisation of the land of value of -/2/- (two annas) and
allotments made to the other rightholders for their benefit.
On 24.1. 1979 a Mushtehri Mundadi was made for information
of all the villagers concerned, but the rightholders were
absent and ex party proceedings were taken against them. The
Panchayat’s case was that under the said Scheme the Panchay-
at land was consolidated, repartitioned and allotted to
persons who did not have any right to hold the land. Be-
sides, the land of Dharat containing two wells and a big
house being religious place of worship was also partitioned
under the Scheme and consequently the Panchayat has been
reduced to a landless person, financially weakened and
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rendered incapable of rendering service in the village.
After hearing the parties the Director in his order
dated 8.2. 1979 observed that it was evident from the perus-
al of the record that the Scheme of Consolidation of the
village was confirmed on 15.1. 1974 whereas the application
had been filed on 20.9. 1977 and as such the application had
been filed too late. After the expiry of six months period
the application was time barred. However, he said in his
order:
"In this case only to benefit some land own-
ers, the land of the value of two annas has
been allotted due to which the deserving
persons have been left over and they have not
been given even Abadi plots. Apart from this
the Panchayat had no other land to cultivate,
due to which the Panchayat is unable to devel-
op the agricultural schemes and in these
circumstances of the matter I condone the
delay in filing the present application."
583
He accordingly set aside the Scheme and remanded the
case to the Consolidation Officer under section 21(2) of the
Act with some directions. Against that order the respondents
moved the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ
Petition No. 2247 of 1979 urging, inter alia, that the
Director of Consolidation of Holdings had condoned the delay
without there being any ground for the same and that, in
doing so, he had acted illegally and with material irregu-
larity. The High Court held that from the observations of
the Director it was evident that the delay was condoned on
extraneous considerations as no reason whatsoever was given
by the applicant in the application filed before him under
section 42 of the Act as to why it was filed after the
period of limitation. In that view of the matter, holding
that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had acted
illegally and with material irregularity in condoning the
delay, the High Court by the impugned order dated 21.9.79
allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the
Director of Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.
Mr. A.B. Rohtagi, the learned counsel for the appel-
lant, submits that the High Court erred in setting aside the
Director of Consolidation’s order applying to the confirma-
tion of the Scheme the period of limitation of six months as
prescribed in Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consoli-
dation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules 1949, herein-
after referred to as ’the Rules’, inasmuch as that rule
speaks only of orders and not of confirmation of the Scheme;
and that a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
in Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of
Holdings, Jullundar, AIR 1984 P & H 216, taking the view
that the bar of limitation under Rule 18 does not apply to
those petitions under section 42 in which the legality or
validity of a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition
made is challenged has overruled AIR 1982 Punjab and Har-
yana-- 148 and that Full Bench decision has since been
followed in 1988 Pun. L.J. 535. Mr. Rohtagi further submits
that on merits also there was ample justification for the
Director to have taken the view it did inasmuch as Panchayat
lands were taken into consolidation and repartitioned and
allotted to persons who had no right to obtain the land
thereby impoverishing the Panchayat and rendering it incapa-
ble of giving any help to the villagers.
Mr. Harbans Lal, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that the Full Bench decision that the limitation
under rule 18 does not cover an order confirming a scheme is
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not tenable inasmuch as confirmation of a scheme is only by
an order as contemplated under rule 18, and an applica-
tion challenging that order of confirmation has, there-
584
fore, to be made within six months thereof; and that even
assuming that there was no bar of limitation, an application
had to be made within a reasonable time which, according to
learned counsel, would be ’about two years’; and that by any
standard the appellant’s application under section 42 was
belated and could not have been allowed. Lastly, counsel
submits that there were three earlier applications dismissed
by the Director under section 42 of the Act, including one
by the Panchayat itself, and the Director had no power to
review his own order.
The questions to be decided therefore are, whether for
the purpose of limitation under rule 18 of the Rules confir-
mation of a scheme would be an order as envisaged in the
rule; if it was not an order, whether the Director was
justified in setting aside the scheme and remanding the
matter to the Consolidation Officer; and whether the Direc-
tor’s order was one of review of his earlier order and as
such beyond his jurisdiction.
To decide the first question we may conveniently refer
to the provisions of the Act and rule 18 of the Rules.
Section 42 of the Act empowers the State Government to
call for proceedings under the Act. It says:
"42. Power of State Government to call for
proceedings:The State Government may at any
time for the purpose of satisfying itself as
to the legality or propriety of any order
passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repar-
tition made by any officer under this Act,
call for and examine the record of any case
pending before or disposed of by such officer
and may pass such order in reference thereto
as it thinks fit:
Provided that no order or scheme or
repartition shall be varied or reversed with-
out giving the parties interested notice’ to
appear and opportunity to be heard except in
cases where the State Government is satisfied
that the proceedings have been vitiated by
unlawful consideration."
From a perusal of this section there arises no doubt that
under it the State Government may for the stated purpose
call for proceedings wherein any order is passed, scheme
prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer
under this Act. Under the proviso the State
585
Government shall not vary or reverse any order or scheme or
repartition without giving the interested parties opportuni-
ty of being heard except in cases where the State Government
is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by
unlawful consideration. There is therefore no doubt that
this section envisages proceedings wherein order is passed,
scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made. These are
the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising
jurisdiction under this section.
Rule 18 deals with limitation for application under
section 42, and it reads:
"18. Limitation for application under section
42:--An application under section 42 shall be
made within six months of the date of the
order against which it is filed:
Provided that in computing the
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period of limitation, the time spent in ob-
taining certified copies of the orders and the
grounds of appeal, if any, filed under sub-
section (3) or sub-section(4) of section 21,
required to accompany the application shall be
excluded:
Provided further, that an applica-
tion may be admitted after the period of
limitation prescribed therefore if the appli-
cant satisfies the authority competent to take
action under section 42 that he had sufficient
cause for not making the application within
such period."
From a perusal of this rule there arises no doubt that for
applying this rule the application has to be one under
section 42 of the Act and it has to be against an order and
under the first proviso a certified copy of the order is
required to accompany the application and in computing the
period of limitation of six months, the time spent in ob-
taining the certified copy is to be excluded.
While the Division Bench comprising P.C. Jain and Tewa-
tia, JJ of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the instant
case applied the period of limitation to the confirmation of
the scheme and in that view of the matter set aside the
Director’s order, the Full Bench comprising P.C. Jain,
Acting C.J., Tewatia and Tiwana, JJ. held:
"A bare perusal of rule 18 of the Rules would
show that .it provides limitation only for
petitions filed against orders
586
passed. There is no reference in the Rules to
a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition
made. The fact that in section 42 of the Act
the words ’scheme prepared or confirmed or
repartition made’ have been added as a result
of amendment, cannot justify the conclusion
that in Rule 18 of the Rules these words have
also to be read."
We respectfully agree with this view. Rule 18 has to be
interpreted as we find it and the words of the rule are
simple, precise and unambiguous and no more is necessary
than to understand these words in their natural and ordinary
sense. Two different meanings cannot be given to the same
word ’order’ namely, that in section 42 it does not include
scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made; while in
rule 18 it would include them. The Full Bench therefore
rightly held that rule 18 of the Rules does not apply to
those proceedings in which the legality or validity of the
scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made is chal-
lenged. The Full Bench rightly approved the decision in
Haqiqat Singh v. Addl. Director, Consolidation of Holdings,
AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 204, wherein it was held that a
reading of section 42 as well as the scheme of the Act
unmistakably pointed out that the statute made a clear
distinction between order passed by an officer under the Act
and the performance of duties by the authorities under the
Act in the matter of preparation and confirmation of scheme
of consolidation and re-partition made in pursuance thereof.
So it could not possibly be held that preparation or confir-
mation of a scheme and the repartition carried would fail
within the scope of ’order’ as used in rule 18 of the rules.
The rule did not come into play when a petitioner challenged
either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation
or confirmation of the repartition made in pursuance there-
of. The amendment made this position clear.
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In a subsequent decision reported in 1988 Pun. L.J. 535:
Joginder Singh and Ors. v. The Director, Consolidation of
Holdings, decided on August 8, 1988, where the direct hold-
ers had not challenged any order of the consolidation au-
thorities but had attacked the validity of the scheme and
the repartition, it was rightly held that the bar of limita-
tion of six months in rule 18 of the Rules was not attracted
to the facts of that case.
Mr. Harbans Lal submits that the above decisions require
reconsideration. We do not agreed. We have perused the
provisions of the Act and rule 18. The Act provides for the
compulsory consolidation of, and for prevention of fragmen-
tation of, agricultural holdings in the
587
State of Punjab and for the assignment or reservation of
land for common purposes of the village. It appears that
prior to the Act there were two methods of consolidation in
vogue in the Province, one through the Revenue Department
and the other through the Cooperative Department but the
progress of consolidation was very slow and lengthy and the
Act sought to remedy those defects. Section 19 of the Act
provides for publication of draft scheme and on such publi-
cation any person likely to be affected by such scheme,
shall, within 30 days of such publication, communicate in
writing to the Consolidation Officer any objections relating
to the scheme. The Consolidation Officer, shall, after
considering the objections, if any received, submit the
scheme with such amendment as he considers necessary togeth-
er with his remarks on the objections to the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation). Thus, in this section we do not
find any provisions for any order being passed. Section 20
deals with confirmation of the scheme. Under sub-section(2)
thereof if any objections are received to the draft scheme
published under sub-section (1) of section 19 and also if no
written or oral objections to the draft scheme are received
under subsection (3) of that section by the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation) he shall confirm that scheme. Under
sub-section (3) if any objections are received to the draft
scheme published under sub-section (1) of section 19 or if
any written or oral objections are received by the Settle-
ment Officer (Consolidation) before the confirmation of the
draft scheme by him the Settlement Officer(Consolidation)
may after taking the objections into consideration together
with the remarks thereon of the Consolidation Officer and
also after considering the written or oral objections either
confirm the scheme with or without modifications, or refuse
to confirm it. In case of such refusal the Settlement Offi-
cer (Consolidation) shall return the draft scheme, with such
directions as may be necessary to the Consolidation Officer,
for reconsideration and resubmission .. Under sub-section
(4) upon the consideration of the scheme under sub-section
(2) or (3) the scheme as confirmed shall be published in the
prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned. Thus,
this section also does not envisage passing of any order
with reference to any person affected by the scheme. It may
be true, as Mr. Harbans Lal submits, that the confirmation
may be done in the form of an order. However, the word
’order’ has not been used by the legislature in this sec-
tion.
Section 21 deals with repartition. Under sub-section (1)
of this section, the Consolidation Officer shall, after
obtaining the advice of the land owners of the estate or
estates concerned, carry out repartition in accordance with
the scheme of consolidation of holdings
588
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confirmed under section 20 and the boundaries of the hold-
ings as demarcated shall be shown on the Shajra which shall
be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or
estates concerned. There is no provision of passing of any
’order’ under this sub-section. Under subsection (2) any
person aggrieved by the repartition may file written objec-
tion within 15 days of the publication before the Consolida-
tion Officer who shall after hearing the objectors pass such
orders as he considers proper confirming or modifying the
repartition. Thus this sub-section envisages passing of
orders on the objections after hearing the objectors. Sub-
section (3) provides that any person aggrieved by the order
of the Consolidation Officer under sub-section (2) may
within one month of that order file an appeal before the
Settlement Officer (Consolidation) who shall after hearing
the appellant pass such order as he considers proper. This
sub-section also clearly envisages passing of an order on
appeal by an aggrieved person as above. Subsection (4)
provides that any person aggrieved by the order of Settle-
ment Officer (Consolidation) under sub-section (3) whether
made before or after the commencement of the East Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation)
Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962 may within 60 days
of that order appeal to the Assistant Director of Consolida-
tion and under sub-section (5) any appeal against an order
of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) pending under
sub-section (4) immediately before the commencement of the
East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Frag-
mentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962, either
before the State or any officer to whom the powers of the
State Government in this behalf have been delegated, shall
be decided by the Assistant Director of Consolidation.
Thus, the above sub-sections clearly envisage passing of
orders by the respective authorities.
We have already extracted section 42 of the Act and Rule
18 of the Rules. It would be clear that though section 42
envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and
repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only
in respect of an application under that section in a pro-
ceeding where an order was passed. There is the maxim ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius--expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another. Mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are
specified in a law an intention to exclude all others from
its operation may be inferred. When mention has been made
only of ’Orders’, the inference would be that preparation or
confirmation of scheme and repartition are
589
excluded. Again, Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima
fit interpretation. The best interpretation is made from the
context. As we have seen, while section 19 and 20 did not
envisage passing of any order section 21 envisaged passing
of orders. Section 42 deals with applications against or-
ders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition.
Rule 18 mentions only orders and hence by inference excludes
’preparation and confirmation of scheme and repartition’. We
have accordingly no doubt in approving the Full Bench deci-
sion in Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation
of Holdings (supra).
Mr. Harbans Lal’s submission that even if no limitation
was prescribed the application of the Panchayat before the
Director was inordinately delayed is not tenable. According
to the learned counsel the period of two years would be
reasonable period. We are unable to agree. In matters like
Consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the preparation
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and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter
the objections may arise at various stages for various
reasons and it will not be possible to prescribe any hard
and fast rule as to reasonable period after which an appli-
cation could be made under section 42 of the Act. The legis-
lature itself did not do so. In the instant case the Pan-
chayat filed the application on 20th September, 1977 before
the Director of Consolidation under section 42 of the Act
praying for the revocation of the Scheme and for directions
for fresh valuation to be ordered and repartition effected
through appropriate authorities stating that the Sarpanch
was not given any Nishan Dehi or demarcation on the spot nor
was issued any passbook, and the petition was not filed
earlier because the new Sarpanch came to know all these only
a month ago and so the petition was claimed to be in time.
The original Sarpanch was a beneficiary out of the Panchayat
land and he took no steps and the present Sarpanch took
charge only a few months ago. There were lot of complaints
about valuation and allotments to rightholders. Under the
above circumstances when the Director himself considered it
fit for granting the prayer, it cannot be said that the
application was unreasonably delayed.
The next submission of Mr. Harbans Lal is equally un-
tenable. It is true that in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh
and Anr., AIR 1966 SC 641, it has been held that there is no
provision in the Act granting express power of Review to the
State Government with regard to an order made under section
42 of the Act and in the absence of any such power the
Director, Consolidation of Holdings could not have reviewed
his previous order dismissing an application of the Panchay-
at
590
under section 42 of the Act, and if so done, the review
order of the Director would be ultra vires and without
jurisdiction. In the instant case it has not been shown to
us that the Panchayat earlier moved any application under
section 42 on the same subject matter and the instant order
of the Director amounted to a review of his own order. There
is no material to hold that the instant order of the Direc-
tor is an order of review of his earlier order; and Mr.
Rohtagi clearly denied that it was so.
In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the im-
pugned order of the High Court and restore that of the
Director, Consolidation. We, however, leave the parties to
bear their own costs.
Y. Lal Appeal allowed.
591