Full Judgment Text
2025:BHC-AS:45818
Diksha Rane 901. fast 5715-24.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 3671 OF 2025
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 3672 OF 2025
IN
FIRST APPEAL STAMP NO. 5715 OF 2024
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY
OF INDIA PIU PANVEL ..APPLICANT
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY
OF INDIA PIU PANVEL ..APPELLANT
VS.
VISHWAS SADASHIV DESHMUKH & ANR. ..RESPONDENTS
------------
Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud with Ms. Kajal Gupta, Shweta Singh i/b. M.
V. Kini & Co. for applicant.
Mr. Sachin S. Punde a/w. Ms. Deepa Punde for respondent no.1.
Mr. A. R. Patil, Addl. G. P. for respondent no.2 – State.
------------
CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.
RESERVED ON : 30 SEPTEMBER 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON : 15 OCTOBER 2025.
JUDGMENT :
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 3671 OF 2025 IN FIRST APPEAL STAMP
NO. 5715 OF 2024 :-
1) This Interim Application is filed by the Acquiring Body seeking
condonation of delay of 598 days in filing the First Appeal which
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challenges the judgment and award dated 2 March 2022 passed by
rd
the 3 Joint Civil Judge, District Alibaug, in L.A.R. No. 24 of 2019.
2) It is submitted on behalf of the Applicant/Acquiring Body that
primarily the delay has been caused due to negligence of one of its
officer for which the applicant – company should not be made to
suffer. Secondly, the applicant was never heard before the Reference
Court and before the Collector, therefore, the delay caused in filing
the present First Appeal needs to be condoned and the First Appeal
should be heard on merits and the impugned award needs to be
stayed, without any conditions being imposed of depositing the entire
decreetal amount along with accrued interest on the applicant. So
also, it is ill-advise of the Panel Lawyer of the applicant, due to which
delay has been caused in filing the First Appeal. As far as merits are
concerned, the applicant is having good case on merits and the
Reference Court has passed the award under Section 28(A)(3) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which has been inserted after the
amendment in the year 1984 to the Land Acquisition Act, the purpose
of the same was meant for poor and illiterate persons. Therefore, the
benefit of Section 28(A)(3) of the Land Acquisition Act would not be
applicable to the present applicant.
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2.1) The delay though mentioned as 598 days, which has been
calculated from the date of the passing of the award by the Reference
Court, till filing of the First Appeal, however, the applicant got
knowledge about passing of the award by the Reference Court much
later. Hence, the actual delay is 262 days.
2.2) On behalf of the applicant, the following judgments were
referred to in support of their submissions:-
1
(i) State of Orissa & Ors. vs. Chitrasen Bhoi ;
2
(ii) Girimallappa Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer ;
3
(iii) State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao & Ors. ;
(iv) Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala Vs. K. v.
4
Ayisumma ;
(v) G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. Vs. Special Land
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Acquisition Officer, Bangalore .
3) On behalf of the respondent no.1 (original claimant) Mr.
Punde, learned counsel made submissions. He submitted that the
applicant has made a false statement on oath by submitting that they
were never given an opportunity by the Reference Court. He
submitted that by a letter dated 3 July 2018, addressed by the Sub-
Divisional Officer, Panvel, to the present applicant, received by the
1 (2009) 17 SCC 74
2 (2012) 11 SCC 548
3 (2005) 3 SCC 752
4 (1996) 10 SCC 634
5 (1988)2 SCC 142
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applicant on 5 July 2018, mentioned whether they would be
challenging the award passed by the Collector, before the Reference
Court. Even after receipt of the said letter dated 3 July 2018, the
applicant chose not to act on. Further, it will be totally incorrect on
the part of the applicant to state that the delay is only of 262 days
when by notice dated 12 May 2022, the Land Acquisition Officer had
informed the Applicant about passing of the award by the Reference
court. So also, the respondent no.1 (original claimant) by their
Advocate’s notice dated 17 August 2022, informed the applicant
(Acquiring Body) about passing of the award by the Reference Court.
Therefore, only on this ground of suppression, the present delay
condonation application requires to be rejected with exemplary cost.
3.1) It is a matter of record that in the present proceedings the
lands are situated in village Padegat, Taluka Panvel, District Raigad.
The Reference Court has allowed the rate of Rs.751/- per square
meters. The Division Bench of this Court has granted rate
compensation @ of Rs.851/- per square meters to the land of
adjoining village Bambavi. It is the argument of the landowners that
the actual rate of acquisition of lands in Taluka Panvel should be
Rs.1725/- per square meters which in fact was allocated by the
Division Bench of this Court. However, on technical grounds, the
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Supreme Court remanded back the matter and those First Appeals are
awaiting to be heard finally. Therefore, the present applicant refusing
to deposit the award amount @ of Rs.751/- per square meters along
with accrued interest will have no merits and hence, such kind of
delay condonation application should not be allowed.
3.2) It is very easy now at this stage to blame the officer, after delay
condonation application being filed, affirmed by the same officer of
the applicant, who has also filed affidavit-in-rejoinder, and only by
oral submissions the blame is put on the said officer for the delay
caused in filing the appeal and coupled with blaming the Panel
Lawyer. Admittedly, no action is taken against the said officer and the
Panel Lawyer of the applicant.
3.3) Mr. Punde, learned counsel referred to the following three
judgments:
(i) Pundlik Jalam Patil (deceased) by Lrs vs. Executive
6
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & another
(ii) Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of
7
Brihan Mumbai
8
(iii) State of Madhya Pradesh & ors. vs. Bherulal
4) I have carefully heard learned counsel for Applicant (Acquiring
6 (2008) 17 SCC 448
7 (2012) 5 SCC 157
8 (2020) 10 SCC 654
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Body), original claimant and State and have gone through the
documents on record and the judgments referred by both sides.
5) The present application for delay condonation is filed by an
officer of the applicant who has further filed an additional affidavit
and affidavit-in-rejoinder in the present delay condonation
application. Now the case as tried to be made out that, it is due to
negligence and mistake of the said officer, the delay was caused and
for which the applicant should not be punished by way of rejecting
the delay application. Admittedly, learned counsel for the applicant
could not make any statement whether they intend to take any action
against the said officer, so also, against the Panel Advocate no action
as of now has been taken by the applicant though even the Panel
Advocate has been blamed for delay caused for wrong advice.
6) Before the proceedings could have started before the Reference
Court for hearing the original claimant and the Government by its
letter dated 3 July 2018, addressed by the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Panvel, to the claimant, specifically informed and sought information
from the present applicant whether they would be approaching the
Reference Court. It seems that thereafter, no steps were taken by the
applicant in that direction.
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7) Hence, the argument made on behalf of the applicant that they
were having no knowledge ‘fails’. As one goes through the delay
condonation application in which the cause of delay is narrated in
paragraph 11 which reads as under :-
11) The Applicant further states that since the Applicant is a government
company, it required sometime in the decision-making process regarding
filing of Appeal, and then approving of the same to be filed in the Hon'ble
High Court. All these steps re-quired approval from various authorities and
some amount of time has been consumed in the said process. The Applicant
states that the Applicant tried to complete the entire exercise of seeking
approval from the various authorities as early as possi-ble. It was imperative
to consider the merits of the matter the financial implications and other
modalities which took some time.
8) By an additional affidavit it has been further tried to be
explained by the applicant the cause of the delay in Paragraph No.3.
Apart from the above paragraphs, there is no further paragraphs to
explain the delay caused in filing the First Appeal.
9) I have also gone through the copy of the reply filed on behalf
of the respondent no.1 (original claimant). The said reply dated 9
November 2024, has been affirmed by the original claimant who is
68 years of age and the same has been signed in vernacular language
(Marathi language). Therefore, according to me, the said original
claimant is not conversant with the English language, and seems to
have barely studied.
9.1) Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act does not mention
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that the benefits of the said section which has been inserted after
1984 amendment, will apply only to poor and illiterate persons. In
the present proceedings, the Reference Court has granted
compensation at the rate of Rs.751/- per square meters, whereas,
admittedly in the adjoining village the rate granted is Rs.851/- per
square meters. The present applicant is not ready to deposit entire
award amount along with accrued interest before this Court or
Reference Court, which is normally done by the Applicant – State or
Acquiring Body in First Appeal pertaining to the Land Acquisition
matters. It is nobody’s case that award was an ex-parte award. The
State was represented before the Reference Court by Government
Pleader, who had opposed the Claim Petition, and even cross-
examined the witness of the claimant.
10) After going through the reasons stated in the delay
condonation application, I do not find reasons to be bonafide, to
allow the application.
11) Coming to the judgments referred by the applicant, the
judgments referred of Lipok Ao (supra) and G. Ramegowda, Major
(supra), both the judgments were considered by Supreme Court in its
later judgment of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media
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9
India Limited and another . In the said judgment of the Postmaster
General (supra), the Supreme Court refused to condone the delay of
437 days in filing the SLP on the ground that condonation of delay is
an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the
Government Departments and it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless
they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and
there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation degree of procedural red tape in the process. Paragraph
Nos. 25 to 30 reads as under:-
25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the
"better affidavit" sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail
Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said
affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the
date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in
Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-
2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for
the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1- 2010 and the
same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is
no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the
impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable
time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only
on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit
by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the
person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the
certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates
mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly
show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the
dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no
explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was
stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable
circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from
9 (2012) 3 SCC 563
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day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not
evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking
appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware
or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a
special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have
a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed
with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party
before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage
of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation
that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for
the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed
to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such
a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on
the ground of delay.
(Emphasis supplied)
12) Similarly in the judgment of Pundlik Patil (supra), the Supreme
Court refused to condone the delay. Paragraph No.31 of the said
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judgment reads as under :-
“31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the
applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain
amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for
governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a
different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as
such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a
case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of
fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the
officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such
facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration
and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no
such facts are pleaded and proved through a feeble attempt by the learned
counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but
without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the
Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13) In the judgment of Maniben Shah (supra), the Supreme Court
refused to condone the delay. The Supreme Court had considered the
judgment of Lipok Ao (supra). Paragraph Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of the
said judgment read as under :-
“13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought
to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology
imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts,
therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of
sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in
turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the
appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the
matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after
affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash
Kalrall this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-
oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.
The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was
remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.
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14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer it was held that no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could
be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in
preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of
justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona
fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In
litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect
which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government
are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in
the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of
Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share
the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of
limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility
for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a
case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of
fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the
officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that
in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it
might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are
peculiar to and characteristic of the g functioning of the Government.
Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by
a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their
making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It
is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must
have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning of course, within reasonable limits -
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
Government is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered
and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters.
Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural
delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one
year was accordingly condoned.
15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies
proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files
from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time
causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay
of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a
common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not
impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such
default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate
analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause"
should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented
approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for
explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and
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characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would
be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-
oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless
the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine
the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove
strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level
should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal
principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases
require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision
or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to
file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer
responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally
responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the
same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in
taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an
appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State
is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.
(Emphasis supplied)
14) In Bherulal (supra), the Supreme Court refused to condone the
delay of 663 day on the ground that the Government must pay a cost
for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. The Supreme
Court refused to condone the delay mechanically merely because the
Government or a State is party to a case. Law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. Paragraph
Nos. 2 to 8 of the said judgment read as under:-
2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our
counselling to the Government and government authorities has fallen on deaf
ears ie. the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to
walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We
have raised the issue that if the government machinery is so inefficient and
incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in
requesting the legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for
government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so.
Till the statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the
statutes prescribed.
3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the
sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements
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for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway
was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji¹]. This position is more than
elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd. wherein the Court observed as under; (Postmaster General
case, SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-30)
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition
in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of
limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation. we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation
of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack
of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances.
the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies,
their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there
is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red
tape in the process. The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be
used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by
the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates,
according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay."
Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!
4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an
inordinate delay is stated to be only "due to unavailability of the documents
and the process of arranging the documents". In para 4, a reference has
been made to "bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay
occurs",
5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is
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some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is
good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation
which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the
jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.
6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in
what we have categorised earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to
be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the
highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and
save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is
followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a
practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of
coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government
suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same
bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is
taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed
that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions,
straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even
to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the
counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all
matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government
or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time
which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers
responsible.
8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the
application has been worded, we consider it appropriate to impose costs on
the petitioner State of Rs 25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand) to be
deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The
amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a
certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within
the said period of time.
15) The Supreme Court in the judgment of P. K. Ramachandran vs.
10
State of Kerala and another refused to condone the delay of 565
days in filing the First Appeal. Since there was no explanation, much
less reasonable or satisfactory explanation offered by the respondent -
State for condonation of delay.
10 (1997) 7 SCC 556
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16) Taking into consideration the judgments of Pundlik Patil
(supra) and Postmaster General (supra), the Division Bench of this
Court in Appeal (Stamp) No.29 of 2020 filed at Original Side of this
Court refused to condone the delay of 315 days, to the said Bench I
was one of the Member. Paragraph No.8 of the said order reads as
under:-
8. Therefore one thing is clear from the law as laid down by the Apex
Court is that the defence of bureaucratic methodology cannot be and
should not be accepted by the Courts and when there is absence of
diligence by department in prosecuting a matter, delay cannot be
condoned. It is also clear that the condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government department
by offering usual explanation that file was kept pending due to procedural
red tape. In the present case, apart from the incorrect statement as
recorded earlier by us there is also bureaucratic indifference. There is no
proper explanation for not filing the Appeal on time.
17) As far as two judgments relied upon by learned counsel
appearing for the applicant that of State of Orissa (supra), the facts in
the said judgment were quite different based on which the delay was
condoned. Similarly, in Girimallappa (supra), the delay was
condoned because the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact
that the claimant himself had assessed the market value and the
compensation determined, without making any specific prayer for
enhancement. The Court held that no further enhancement could be
directed in the absence of specific pleadings and prayers. Therefore,
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the facts in Girimallappa (supra) was quite different than the present
proceedings. In Girimallappa (supra), it was the claimant who had
approached the Court seeking enhancement of compensation and had
filed delay condonation application, which was rejected. In contrast,
in the present proceedings, it is the Acquiring Body who has
approached this Court, according to me, without giving any bonafide
or sufficient reasons for inordinate delay.
18) In view of the same, according to me, there is no merit in the
delay condonation application and the same requires to be rejected.
19) The application stands rejected and disposed of accordingly.
20) In sequel, First Appeal Stamp No.5715 of 2024 and Interim
Application No.3672 of 2025 stand dismissed.
(Rajesh S. Patil, J.)
21) At this stage, Ms. Gupta prays for keeping this judgment in
abeyance for a period of four weeks from today.
22) Mr. Punde, learned counsel for the original claimant opposes
her prayer.
23) Hence, the request made by Ms. Gupta stands rejected.
(Rajesh S. Patil, J.)
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Signed by: Diksha Rane
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 17/10/2025 19:52:05