NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY vs. ZAHOOR AHMAD SHAH WATALI

2 Special Court (NIA), New Delhi, which came to be rejected on th 8   June, 2018. That order has been reversed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.768/2018 th vide   order   dated   13   September,   2018.   The   High   Court directed release of the respondent on bail subject to certain conditions. That decision is the subject matter of this appeal filed by the prosecuting agency ­ the appellant herein.   3. The   Designated   Court   opined   that   there   are   serious allegations against the respondent Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Accused No.10) of being involved in unlawful acts and terror funding   in  conspiracy   with   other   accused   persons;   he   had acted as a conduit for transfer of funds received from terrorist Accused   No.1   Hafiz   Muhammad   Saeed,   ISI,   Pakistan   High Commission, New Delhi and also from a source in Dubai, to Hurriyat   leaders/secessionists/terrorists;   and   had   helped them   in   waging   war     against   the   Government   of   India   by repeated   attacks   on   security   forces   and   Government establishments and by damaging public property including by burning schools etc. It then noted that the accusation against 3 the respondent (Accused No.10) was of being a part of a larger conspiracy   to   systematically   upturn   the   establishment   to cause secession of J & K from the Union of India.  Keeping in mind the special provisions in Section 43D of the 1967 Act and the exposition  in  Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. Vs. 1 State of Maharashtra and Ors .,   Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate Vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya and 2 3 Ors. ,     Manohar   Lal   Sharma   Vs.   Union   of   India   and Jayanta Kumar Ghosh and Ors. Vs. State of Assam and 4 , Anr.   it   proceeded   to   analyse   the   material   on   record   and observed thus:   “7.5 Let me now see whether on the basis of the material on record, allegations against the accused are prima facie made out or not. Mindful of the fact that this is not the stage to examine and analyze the evidence placed on record in detail,   let   me   refer   to   the   same.   Allegation   against   the accused that certain businesses of his, were just a front/ sham for routing of funds received from abroad/ terrorist A­ 1/ High Commission, Pakistan/ Dubai/other sources and that   there   were,   unaccounted   financial   transactions,   is prima facie borne out from statement of the witnesses PW1, 1   (1994) 4 SCC 602 2   (1990) 4 SCC  76 3   (2017) 11 SCC 783 4   (2010) 6 Gauhati Law Reports 727 4 PW28 and PW29 and documents including D­202 & D­214. It has also come in the statements of PW38 & PW39, who prepared   balance   sheets   of   accused’s   firms/companies namely Trison Farms and Constructions Pvt. Limited, M/s Trison International, M/s Yasir Enterprises, M/s 3Y, M/s Kashmir   Veneer   Industries   &   M/s   Three   Star,   that   the accused   never   produced   any   supporting   documents   with respect to remittances received from NZ­International Dubai­ FZC, owned by him; and that he did not even inform about the actual execution of business despite asking of PW39. The fact that the balance sheets of M/s Trison International, M/s 3Y   were   forcefully   got   signed   from   the   protected   witness PW43 without providing him any document, has come in his statement. It has also come in the statement of PW44 that the audit report of the aforesaid companies were got signed from him without producing books for verification.” Again in paragraph 7.8 to 7.10 the Court observed: “7.8 The   fact   that   the   accused   received   money   from abroad /A­1, chief of proscribed (terrorist) organization, HCP (High Commission, Pakistan) and others and was passing on the said funds to Hurriyat leaders, is prima facie borne out from   D­152   read   with   statement   of   PW29   and   D­154 (Expert’s Report), as per which the signatures of the accused on D­152 were compared with his admitted handwriting and were verified and found to be similar. In view of the same, the Ld. Defence counsel’s argument that the said document/ D­152 cannot be looked into at all even to form prima facie opinion, cannot be accepted. Thus, the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme   court   in   Manohar   Lal   Sharma’s   Case   (Supra), relied upon Ld. Defence counsel is also of no assistance to the accused.  7.9 Further,   the   association/proximity   of   Altaf   Ahmad Shah @ Fantoosh (A­4), Farooq Ahmad Dar @ Bitta Karate 5 (A­6) with accused, is also prima facie borne out from the statement of protected witness PW48. Accused’s links with people who have role in governance of Pakistan and with Hurriyat leaders has also prima facie come on record vide statement of PW52, documents D­3, D­4 (e) etc. and other material on record.  7.10 In   view   of   the   above   facts   and   circumstances,   the statements   of   witnesses/material/documents   and   other material placed on record by NIA, offences as alleged against the accused are prima facie made out. Therefore, in view of the   bar   under   proviso   to   Section   43D(5)   UA(P)   Act,   the accused’s prayer for bail cannot be granted. ”   Further the Court observed: “8.1.1    Ld.   Special   PP,   NIA   also   submitted   that   the applicant/accused is an influential person/ business man and has a  great clout in the valley,  as has come in the statement   of   PW48.   All   the   witnesses   are   known   to   the applicant/   accused.   There   is   every   likelihood   of   the applicant/accused   influencing/   intimidating   witnesses/ tempering with evidence, in the event of his release even on interim bail.”  The   respondent   had   also   prayed   for   grant   of   bail   on 4. health grounds, which plea was duly considered and rejected in the following words: “8.2 I have duly considered the submissions made by both the sides. Perusal of the record reveals that as and when requested   by   the   accused,   he   was   provided   medical treatment from time to time. Pursuant to the directions of this court, the accused was taken to the premier medical institute of India/AIIMS for necessary medical examination. 6 This   was   besides   being   provided   appropriate   medical attention  to Jail hospital  and in­patient   treatment  at  Dr. RML   hospital   from   01.09.2017   to   05.09.2017.   As   per medical status report dated 26.09.2017, the accused was extensively evaluated at Dr. RML Hospital for chest pain and cause of cardiac disease was ruled out. Even subsequently, the   accused   was   reviewed   at   Central   Jail   Hospital   and detailed blood investigation was carried out and medication was provided. On his complaint of anxiety, severe low back pain and bleeding per­rectum on 24.09.2017, the accused was admitted to M.I. Room, Dispensary, Central Jail No. 8/9 from   24.09.2017   to   26.09.2017.   Vide   subsequent   report dated 11.10.2017, Medical Officer  I/c, Central Jail Tihar, Dispensary   8/9,   reported   that   the   accused   was   getting treatement under regular follow up of Medicine Specialist, jail visiting SR surgery. It may further be mentioned that accused was constantly reviewed at short intervals and was provided all advised medication.  8.3 It has also come in order sheet dated 03.01.2018 that as per medical report of accused received from AIIMS New Delhi,   the   accused   was   evaluated   in   seven   speciality/ superspeciality OPDs but was not found to be suffering from any specific ailment except for his known history of Type 2 diabetes mellitus, hypertension & hypothyroidism for which requisite   medications   to   be   taken   regularly,   were   already prescribed.   The   Colonoscopy   test   of   the   accused   was scheduled for 15.01.2018. Medical status report of accused Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali received from the Medical Officer Incharge,   Central   Jail   Dispensary,   Tihar,   New   Delhi, mentioned that the accused despite being counseled several times to continue his treatment at AIIMS Hospital, refused to visit AIIMS for treatment/further management.  9.0 From   the   above,   it   is   evident   that   the   applicant/ accused   is   being   provided   necessary   medical   attention/ treatment as and when prayed for, not only inside the jail but also at AIIMS and other Govt. Hospitals.   Thus, taking into  account  the   law  as  laid   down   in   Redual   Hussain Khan’s case (Supra), no ground for grant of interim bail on health grounds is made out.  9.1 However,   Jail   Superintendent   is   directed   to provide   proper   medical   care   and   treatment   to   the applicant/ accused, as requested/ called for. ”     7 The respondent carried the matter before the High Court 5. by way of Criminal Appeal No.768 of 2018 under Section 21(1) read with Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act,   2008.   The   High   Court   noticed   that   after   filing   of   the charge­sheet,   accused   Nos.11   and   12   had   been   granted regular bail, while accused Nos.1 and 2 had not been arrested. Rest   of   the   accused,   including   the   respondent   (Accused No.10),   were   in   judicial   custody.   The   respondent   (Accused th No.10) was arrested on 17   August, 2017 and had been in judicial   custody   since   then.   His   age,   as   indicated   in   the charge­sheet,   was   about   70   years.   The   High   Court   then adverted   to   paragraph   17.6.5   onwards   of   the   charge­sheet [report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.)] and summarized the allegations against respondent (Accused No.10) as follows: “18. Specific to the Appellant are the allegations made in Paragraph   17.6.5   of   the   charge­sheet   which   is   subtitled ‘Hawala’.   This   being   the   principal   allegation   against   the Appellant, requires to be summarized as under:  (i) The Appellant is one of the conduits to bring money from off­shore   locations   of   India   to  fuel   anti­India   activities   in 8 Jammu and Kashmir. Reference is again made to the same incriminating document i.e. D No.132 (a).  (ii) A­10 was bringing money from off­shore locations to India “by layering it through the scores of firms and companies he has opened”. Reference is made to an NRE account of the Appellant at the J&K Bank where, from 2011 till 2013, he is said  to have  received  Rs.93,  87,   639.   31  from   ‘unknown sources ’ .  (iii) The Appellant was showing foreign remittances under ’ ‘other   income   in   his   proprietorship   M/s   Trison International, Srinagar. Foreign remittances in the sum of Rs.2,26,87,639.31 were received by the Appellant in different accounts   from   2011   to   2016.   It   is   repeated   that Rs.93,87,639.31 was received in his NRE account from 2011 to 2013.  (iv) It is stated that Rs.14 lacs were remitted in the account of a medical college in Jammu through NEFT on 9th April, 2013 against the fees deposited for his son (who incidentally is a medical doctor and through whom the present appeal has been filed). It is stated that Rs.60 lacs were remitted in the current account of the Appellant in J&K Bank. Rs.5 lacs were   remitted   in   the   account   of   M/s   Trison   Farms   and Constructions   Pvt.   Limited   (‘TFCPL ’ ).   It   is   stated   that   all these foreign remittances “are from unknown sources”.  (v) On 7th November, 2014, one Nawal Kishore Kapoor (who initially was a witness but has, since the filing of the charge­ sheet, been arrayed as an accused himself), a resident of United Arab Emirates (‘UAE ’ ) entered into an agreement with TFCPL, whose Managing Director (‘MD ’ ) is the Appellant to take land measuring 20 kanals in Budgam in J&K on lease in consideration of a sum of Rs.6 crores as premium and Rs.1,000/­   annual   rent   for   an   initial   period   of   40   years which could be extended through mutual agreement. In the said agreement, TFCPL was declared as the absolute owner of the land. Mr. Kapoor remitted a total sum of Rs.5.579 crores   in   22   instalments   between   2013   and   2016   to   the Appellant.  (vi) During investigation it was revealed that no land exists in the   name   of   TFCPL   as   per   the   balance   sheet   of   that 9 company. Further, it was ascertained that Rs.5,57,90,000 was mobilized by Mr. Kapoor from unknown sources and remitted to Appellant to lease a piece of land which does not even exist in the name of TFCPL and therefore the agreement itself lacks legal sanctity. According to the NIA, this “proves that   the   said   agreement   was   a   cover”   created   by   the Appellant   “to   bring   foreign   remittances   from   unknown sources to India”.  (vii) The Chartered Accountant (‘CA ’ ) who signed the audited balance sheet of M/s Trison International., TFCPL and M/s Yasir   Enterprises   for   various  years  between   2013­14  and 2015­16 “did so without seeing any supporting documents”. According   to   the   NIA,   the   balance   sheets   of   the   above entities/companies were sent to the CA by Mustaq Mir, Cost Accountant and Shabir Mir, CA from Wizkid Office, Srinagar through email and he was asked to sign on them in Delhi without showing any documents. According to the NIA, this also clearly showed that the Appellant was remitting money received from unknown sources to India.  (viii) TFCPL raised an unsecured loan of Rs.2,65,55,532/­ from the Directors of the company, i.e. the Appellant, his wife, and his three sons in the Financial Year (‘FY ’ ) 2010­11 in the form of both cash and cheque and this was used to repay the secured loan of Rs.2,94,53,353/­ in the books of J&K Bank. The source of money with the Directors could not be explained satisfactorily by the Appellant.  (ix) The seizure from the house of the Appellant of a list of ISI officials and a letter from Tariq Shafi, proprietor of Al Shafi Group addressed to the PHC recommending grant of visa to the   Appellant   “shows   his   proximity   with   Pakistani Establishment”.  It is stated that the name of Tariq Shafi figures in the document of foreign contributions seized from the   house   of   the   Appellant ‟ s   cashier­cum­accountant Ghulam Mohd. Bhatt.”   6. The High Court also adverted to the accusations against respondent (Accused No.10) in paragraphs 17.9 and 17.10 of the charge­sheet, to the effect that CDRs relied upon by the 10 prosecution revealed that the accused persons were in contact “with each other, with some militants/OGWs (Over Ground Workers) and the hawala conduit” i.e. the respondent (Accused No.10) and the other accused, that the respondent (Accused No.10) was in constant contact on telephone with A­3, A­4, A­ 5 and A­6 and that A­3 to A­12 were in contact with each other, either directly or indirectly. In paragraph 17.10 of the charge­sheet, it is stated that respondent (Accused No.10) was a known hawala dealer and financer and a number of cases were registered against him, which were being investigated by the   sister   investigating   agencies.   The   High   Court,   however, noted that the charge­sheet neither gave details of the other cases registered and being investigated against the respondent nor revealed the details thereof to the Court. The High Court also   noted   accusations against   the   respondent   (Accused   No.10) in paragraphs 18.10, 18.13 and 18.14, revealing the linkage between A­3 to A­10 and indicating clear meeting of minds   of   the   said   accused   in   hatching   the   conspiracy   in 11 support of A­1 and A­2 and other Hurriyat leaders and other terrorist organizations in J & K.   7. After   noting   the   relevant   facts   emanating   from   the charge­sheet   filed   against   the   respondent,   the   High   Court adverted to the conclusions recorded by the Trial Court. It then proceeded to analyse the relevant provisions of the 1967 Act and the principle underlying the decisions of this Court concerning  the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (“ TADA ”) and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime   Act,   1999   (“ ”),   in   light   of   the   exposition   in MCOCA Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur   (supra)   and     Niranjan   Singh (supra), and posed a question to itself Karam Singh Punjabi  as to whether the material gathered by the NIA in the present case   could   have   enabled   the   Trial   Court   to   come   to   the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the respondent (Accused No.10) was   prima  facie   true.   After  so   noting,   it  observed   that  the statements   of   the   proposed/prospective   witnesses   recorded under   Section   161   Cr.P.C.   did   not   constitute   admissible 12 evidence. Those could only be used to confront the witnesses who would subsequently appear at the trial. It noted that this crucial aspect had to be kept in view while referring to such statements at that stage. The High Court then noted that the Investigating   Agency   had   recorded   the   statements   of   the witnesses under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. but had kept the same in a sealed cover enclosed to the charge­sheet. The High Court noted that the statements at serial Nos.277 and 278 were of protected witnesses “Charlie” and “Romeo” respectively, and those at serial Nos.279 to 284 were described as statements of protected   witnesses   “Romeo”,   “Alpha”,   “Gamma”,   “Pie”, “Potter”, “Harry” and “xxx”. These statements were kept in a sealed   cover   and   not   supplied   to   the   respondent   (Accused No.10).   Further,   these   statements   were   presumably   not perused   by   the   Designated   Court.   Notably,   the   application moved by the Investigating Agency under Section 44 of the 1967 Act to accord protection to those witnesses remained pending   before   the   Designated   Court.   Here,   it   may   be mentioned   that during  the  pendency of   the  present appeal 13 before this Court, the said application has been decided in th favour   of   the   Investigating   Agency   vide   order   dated   11 January, 2019 passed by the Designated Court. We shall refer to this a little later.  Reverting to the judgment of the High Court, it opined 8. that the said statements under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. could not be considered, as copies thereof had not been provided to the respondent. It then proceeded to hold that Section 44 of the 1967 Act merely permitted the identity and address of such witnesses to be kept secret by the Court. It held that it was not possible to read Section 17 of the NIA or Section 44 of the 1967 Act as an exception to Section 207 read with Section 173   Cr.P.C.,   which   mandates   that   the   accused   shall   be supplied copies of the police report and other documents relied upon by the prosecution in the charge­sheet, without delay and free of cost. It then proceeded to analyse the interplay between Sections 207, 161, 164 and 173 of Cr.P.C. and opined that even in respect of statements recorded under Section 161 of   Cr.P.C.,   there   was   no   wholesale   exclusion   of   the   entire 14 document   from   being   provided   to   the   accused.   What   was permitted was the redaction of such portion of the document which could reveal the identity and address of the maker of the statement.  Be it noted that the High Court did not think it necessary to direct the Designated Court to first decide the application filed by the Investigating Agency under Section 44 of   the   1967   Act  before   proceeding   with   the   hearing   of   the appeal   filed   by   the   respondent.   Instead,   the   High   Court preferred to exclude those statements kept in a sealed cover from consideration. The High Court did not advert to Section 48   of   the   1967   Act,   which   makes   it   amply   clear   that   the provisions   of   the   Act   shall   have   effect   notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than the said Act etc. The High Court then went on to observe   that   the   charge­sheet   made   no   reference   to   the statements recorded under Section 164 of the witnesses in respect of whom protection was sought by the Investigating Agency.   The   High   Court   distinguished   the   decision   of   this 5 Court   in   K.   Veeraswami   Vs.   Union   of   India   and   Ors. 5 (1991) 3 SCC 655 15 pressed into service by the Investigating Agency to buttress its submission that it is not necessary that the charge­sheet must contain detailed analysis of the evidence, and that the Trial Court ought to consider not only the narration in the charge­ sheet but also all documents accompanying thereto. The  High Court, however, opined that in the context of the relatively high burden placed on the accused in terms of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the 1967 Act, of having to demonstrate that the prosecution had not been able to show that there existed reasonable grounds to show that the accusation against him was   prima   facie   true,   the   absence   of   any   reference   in   the charge­sheet   to   the   statements   under   Section   164   Cr.P.C., which are of a higher probative value than the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., was significant. It thus observed that   such   statements   could   not   be   kept   back   from   the accused.   Resultantly,   the   statements   of   the   protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. were kept out of consideration by the High Court, with liberty to the parties to 16 independently make submissions before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage.  9. The High Court then straightaway proceeded to analyse the efficacy of document D­132(a) forming part of the charge­ sheet. In light of the statement of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt from whom the same was recovered, it noted in paragraph 61 of   the   impugned   judgment   that   it   was   unlikely   that   the document   D­132(a)   was   recovered   from   the   residence   of th Ghulam   Mohammad   Bhatt   till   16   August,   2017,   and thereafter proceeded to observe thus:  “62.   While   the   genuineness   and   the   evidentiary   value   of Document 132 (a) is yet to be established by the NIA at the trial, since this one document is being relied upon by the NIA as being central to its case against the Appellant, it is but inevitable that the trial Court and now this Court has to discuss it in some detail for the purpose of deciding whether the Appellant can be released on bail.  63. The question that arises is whether there is anything to show with reference to each of the dates mentioned in the above Document No. 132 (a) that the figures shown against the entry on each date (purporting to be specific amounts of money) was in fact received by the Appellant in his personal accounts or in the accounts of any of his entities. Although the case of the NIA is that the money has been received, there is no document or statement, which forms part of the charge sheet, which in fact indicates this.  64. The above document is also relied upon by the NIA as providing   proof   of   the   linkages   of   the   Appellant   to   A­1, through   the   entry   dated   3rd   May,   2015   and   with   the 17 Pakistan High Commission (PHC) through the entries dated 15th and 20th October, 2016. Yet none from the PHC has been named, much less statement of such a person been recorded to confirm that those figures represented money that was received from the PHC.  65. The case of the NIA in the charge sheet is that the same document   is   also   proof   of   the   fact   that   the   monies   so received were passed on to the Hurriyat leaders. Reference is made to the fourth column of the above document where the names   of   some   of   the   Hurriyat   leaders   are   mentioned. However,   there   is   nothing   to   show   that   the   money   was received by the Appellant and then transmitted by him to any   of  the  named   Hurriyat   leaders.   Nor   have   any   of   the ‘prospective   witnesses’   including   Mr   Bhatt   made   any statement to that effect.  66. Mr. Luthra urged that the signature of the Appellant in the  right   hand   bottom   corner   of   the  document  has   been confirmed by the handwriting expert to match the specimen signature of the Appellant. In reply it was pointed out by Mr. Vikas Pahwa, learned Senior counsel for the Appellant, that the mere fact that the Appellant’s signature appeared on the document   did   not   mean   that   he   had   in   fact   signed   the document   in   acceptance   of   the   truth   of   its   contents. According to him, it is too early to speculate whether the Appellant   when   he   signed   the   paper,   if   at   all,   put   his signature on a blank green legal size paper which may be have then been used for legal purposes for an affidavit etc.  67. It is indeed too early in the case to speculate whether the Appellant in fact signed the document after it was typed out and whether his signature amounts to accepting the truth of its contents or for that matter whether the contents of the document in question constitute conclusive proof of what the NIA alleges the document to be.  68. In the circumstances, the Court is not satisfied that a sheet of paper containing typed entries and in loose form, not shown to form part of the books of accounts regularly maintained by the Appellant or his business entities, can constitute   material   to   even   ‘prima   facie ’   connect   the Appellant   with   the   crime   with   which   he   is   sought   to   be charged.   The   conclusion   of   the   trial   Court   that   this 18 document shows the connection of the Appellant with the other accused as regards terrorist funding does not logically or legally flow from a plain reading of the document.”   The High Court then adverted to the other documents. It 10. analysed the concerned documents and concluded that the entire  bunch of   documents  did  not  reveal that  the  trading activities undertaken by the respondent were geared towards funding of terrorist activities, as alleged in the charge­sheet. It may be apposite to reproduce the relevant extract from the impugned judgment in this regard, which reads thus: “69. Mr. Luthra then referred to the statements of Mustaq Ahmad Mir and Shabbir Ahmad Mir, the reply of Mr Mustaq Ahmad   Mir   (Ex.D­214),   the   CFSL   report   dated   6th November, 2017 (document D­154); the seizure memo dated 3rd June, 2017 (document D­3) regarding the recovery being made from the residence of the Appellant; the seizure memo of  the  same date of the  recoveries   from  the office   of the TFCPL (document D­4); and the bunch of papers seized from the Appellant [D­4(e)] referred to by the trial Court.  70. Beginning with the last referred document, [D­4(e)], it is actually a bunch of documents, the first of which is a letter dated 28th June, 2016,  written by the Prime Minister  of Pakistan   Mr   Mohammad   Nawaz   Sharif   to   the   Appellant thanking him for the bouquet sent to him with wishes for his good health and well being.  71. Then there is a letter dated 20th November, 2007 from the President of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Chambers of Commerce   and   Industry,   addressed   to   the   Appellant, appointing the Appellant as an Honorary Trade Consultant at   Srinagar.   It   notes   that   Pakistan   and   India   had initiated/undertaken   a   number   of   Kashmir   related   CBMs 19 (confidence building measures) in the recent past to provide respite to the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC (Line of Control):  ‘1.Pakistan   and   India   have   initiated/undertaken   a number   of   Kashmir   related   CBMs   in   recent   past   to provide respite to the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC. One such CBM which is under active consideration is   commencement   of   trade   between   both   parts   of Kashmir. Necessary modalities including the items to be traded are being worked out.’  72. The other documents reflect the correspondence carried out   in   the   regular   course   of   business   between   the Appellant ’ s business entities and other entities including the Al­Shafi Group of companies, headquartered at Lahore. A business invitation was extended to the Appellant on 7th February, 2014 by Mohd. Tariq Shafi, the director of Al­Shafi Group of companies to visit them for business negotiations. There is a letter of the same date addressed by Mr. Mohd. Tariq Shafi to the PHC in New Delhi for grant of Pakistan Business Visa to the Appellant.  73. It must be noticed at this stage that the NIA does not dispute   that   the   Appellant   is   a   leading   businessman   in Kashmir. He runs a conglomerate of business entities and has been active in the context of the Indo­Pakistan trade. Nothing has been shown to this Court from the entire bunch of documents which would suggest that these trade activities were geared toward funding of terrorist activities, as alleged in the charge­sheet.” 11. The   High   Court   then   adverted   to   the   statements   of Mustaq Ahmad Mir and Shabbir Ahmad Mir and noted that the   same  had  no  evidentiary  value  since  they  were merely statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and even if taken at their face value, they would only indicate that some of the entries in the accounts and, in particular, the source of credit 20 entries were not explained properly. Further, the accounts of the entities of the respondent were regularly audited and it was not possible to  prima facie  conclude that these unknown sources were, in fact, connected to the other accused and that remittances were received from Pakistan or UAE for terrorist activities. The Court noted that there must be something more substantial than mere audited accounts that may have entries that require explanation to the Income Tax Authorities. As a result, the High Court concluded that the documents relied upon by the Investigating Agency did not persuade the Court to prima facie conclude that the respondent received money from A­1 or Pakistan High Commission or others and was passing on the said funds to the Hurriyat leaders for funding terrorist   activities   and   stone­pelting.     The   High   Court   also adverted   to  the  statement  of  the   ‘protected   witness’    W­48 about the proximity of the respondent (Accused No.10) with A­ 4 and A­6 and opined that the same could not be construed as material   that   would   enable   the   prosecution   to   show   that accusation against the respondent about his funding terrorist 21 activities was   prima facie   true.   Lastly, the High Court dealt with transaction of lease involving Naval Kishore Kapoor and noted thus:  “77. Turing to the transaction of lease involving Mr. Naval Kishore Kapoor, it is explained on behalf of the Appellant that   only   individuals   domiciled   in   Kashmir   can   hold ’ properties there. There was no declaration of ‘ownership  of lands by the companies and in any event it was a lease. The lease itself has not been shown to be a sham transaction. As regards the NRE account, it is pointed out that it has since been closed and the fine amount was also paid. As regards the   CDRs,   it   is   pointed   out   that   there   may   have   been exchange of calls between the Appellant and A­6 but not between the Appellant and A­3, A­4 or A­5. This cannot at this stage be said to constitute material to show that the accusation of a criminal conspiracy between the Appellant and A­6 for commission of terrorist offences is prima facie true. It also emerged during the course of the hearing of this appeal that neither the APHC nor any of its 26 constituent ’ organisations are ‘banned  organisations within the meaning of the UAPA.”  Having said thus, the High Court proceeded to conclude 12. that the order passed by the Designated Court was cryptic and unsustainable both on facts and in law. It then went on to observe   that   there   was   nothing   on   record   to   indicate   the previous criminal involvement of the respondent in any offence or   the   possibility   of   the   respondent   fleeing   from   justice,   if released   on   bail.   Further,   the   respondent   who   was   a septuagenarian   and   was   suffering   from   various   medical 22 ailments, was in judicial custody for more than a year and had not tampered with the evidence or interfered with any of the ‘prospective/protected’ witnesses. The High Court then went on to rely on the dictum in   Davender Gupta Vs. National 6 7 Investigating   Agency   and   Sanjay   Chandra   Vs.   CBI   . Finally, the High Court directed the release of respondent on bail and issued directions in that regard subject to conditions stated in the concluding part of the impugned judgment which reads thus: “ Conclusion   82. The impugned order dated 8th June, 2018 of the trial Court is accordingly set aside. The Appellant is directed to be released on bail subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.2 lakhs with two sureties of like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court, and further subject  to the following conditions:  (i) The Appellant shall report to the IO in charge of the case as and when required. He shall provide to the IO as well as the trial Court the mobile phone on which he can be contacted and his current address where he will be available. He will keep both the IO and the trial Court informed promptly if there is any change in either.  (ii)   He   will   not   influence   or   intimidate   the proposed/prospective   Crl.A.768/2018   Page   40   of   40 prosecution witnesses or tamper with the evidence of the prosecution in any manner.  (iii) The Appellant will surrender his passport before the trial Court at the time of execution of the bail bonds. He will   not   travel   out   of   the   country   without   prior permission of the trial Court.  6   (2014) SCC Online AP 192 7   AIR 2012 SC 830 23 (iv) If there is any breach of the above conditions, it will be   open   to   the   NIA   to   apply   to   the   trial   Court   for cancellation of bail.  83. It is clarified that the observations of this Court in this order   both   on   facts   and   law   are   based   on   the   materials forming   part   of   the   charge   sheet   and   are   prima   facie   in nature and for the limited purpose of considering the case of the Appellant  for   grant  of bail.  They  are not  intended  to influence the decisions of the trial Court at any stage of the case hereafter.  84. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.” The view so taken by the High Court has been assailed by 13. the  Investigating  Agency  – the  appellant  herein,  on diverse counts.   According   to   the   appellant,   the   High   Court   has virtually   conducted   a   mini   trial   and   even   questioned   the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the Investigating Agency. In that, the High Court adopted a curious approach in finding fault with the Investigating Agency for not naming any official from the High Commission of Pakistan as accused or recording   their   statements   as   witnesses,   for   inexplicable reasons.   In so observing, the High Court clearly overlooked the fact that the officials of the High Commission are accorded diplomatic   immunity.   Not   only   that,   while   considering   the statements   of   witnesses   recorded   under   Section   161   of 24 Cr.P.C., the High Court went on to observe that the same were inadmissible in evidence and discarded it from consideration for forming opinion as to whether the accusations against the respondent (Accused No.10) were   true. The Court, prima facie however, was obliged to consider all the statements recorded under   Section   161   of   Cr.P.C.   in   light   of   the   exposition   in   ⁸   Similarly,   the Salim   Khan   Vs.   Sanjai   Singh   and   Anr. statements recorded under Section 164, which were produced in   a   sealed   cover,   had   been   completely   discarded.   The approach of the High Court, to say the least, contends the learned Attorney General, was tenuous and not permissible at the stage of consideration of prayer for bail. The analysis done by the High Court is bordering on being perverse as it has virtually conducted a mini trial at the stage of consideration of the prayer for bail. According to the appellant, the charge­ sheet   filed   against   the   respondent   was   accompanied   by documentary   evidence,   statements   of   prospective   witnesses and   other   evidence   which   indicated   complicity   of   the respondent   and   reinforced   the   aspect   that   the   accusations 8   (2002) 9 SCC 670 25 made against him were  prima facie  true. It is submitted that at the stage of consideration of bail, the totality of the evidence available against the respondent must be reckoned and ought to be taken into account as it is, without anything more. The question of admissibility of such evidence would be a matter for trial. The sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence cannot be  the   basis  to  answer  the   prayer  for  grant  of   bail.   It is contended that after considering the statements of protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 of the Code, the same reinforces   the   accusations   made   against   the   respondent (Accused No.10) as being   prima facie   true. Accordingly, it is submitted  that the   High Court order  be  set aside  and  the application   for   bail   preferred   by   the   respondent   (Accused No.10) be rejected.  14. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits   that   the   High   Court   justly   came   to   hold   that   no evidence   was   forthcoming   to   indicate   the   complicity   of   the respondent in the commission of the alleged offences and that the documents and evidence relied upon by the Investigating 26 Agency were not enough to sustain the accusations,   much less   as   being   prima   facie   true.   It   is   submitted   that   the accusations made against the respondent in the charge­sheet do not fall under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act.  Further, the pivotal document D­132(a) was not sufficient to fasten any criminal liability upon the respondent.  As a matter of fact, the said document is a loose sheet of paper and cannot be looked at in view of the mandate of Section 34 of the Evidence Act. To buttress this submission, reliance has been placed on  Central 9 Bureau of Investigation Vs. V.C. Shukla and Ors.   In any case, the said document itself cannot and does not  prima facie suggest that the funds, as shown, were received and disbursed in the manner described in the document.   Further, there is no   independent   corroboration   forthcoming   much   less   to establish the complicity of the respondent in attracting the imperatives of Section 17 of 1967 Act. It is submitted that even if the contents of the said document were taken as it is, with   the   exception   of   accused   No.4   (Altaf   Ahmad   Shah   @ 9   (1998) 3 SCC 410 27 Fantoosh), no other person to whom the amount was paid or from whom the amount was received, has been arrayed as an accused   in   the   charge­sheet.   The   statements   of   witnesses recorded under Section 161 or Section 164 of Cr.P.C. do not mention anything about the involvement of the respondent in commission of the stated offences. The statements of the co­ accused cannot be considered as admissions, much less used against   the   respondent.   Further,   there   was   no   evidence   to indicate   the   involvement   of   the   respondent   in   the   larger conspiracy   much   less   regarding   terrorist   activity.   It   is submitted that the High Court was justified in analysing the materials   on   record   to   satisfy   itself   as   to   whether   the accusations   made   against   the   respondent   were   prima  facie true. That enquiry was permissible in terms of the exposition in   Ranjitsing   Brahmajeetsing   Sharma   Vs.   State   of 10    and   Maharashtra and Anr. Chenna Boyanna Krishna 11 Yadav Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.    According to the respondent, no fault can be found with the High Court and 10   (2005) 5 SCC 294  11   (2007) 1 SCC 242 28 the view taken by the High Court, being a possible view, did not require any interference in exercise of the power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is finally submitted that   this   Court,   if   it   so   desires,   may   impose   additional conditions whilst upholding the order of bail passed by the High Court.  15. Before we proceed to analyse the rival submissions, it is apposite to restate the settled legal position about matters to be considered for deciding an   application for bail,   to   wit, (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position  and  standing   of  the  accused;  (vi) likelihood  of  the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of 29 justice being thwarted by grant of bail. ( State of U.P. through 12 ).  CBI Vs. Amarmani Tripathi 16. When   it   comes   to   offences   punishable   under   special enactments, such as the 1967 Act, something more is required to be kept in mind in view of the special provisions contained in Section 43D of the 1967 Act, inserted by Act 35 of 2008 st w.e.f.   31   December,   2008.     Sub­sections   (5),   (6)   and   (7) thereof read thus:  “ 43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the     xxx xxx xxx xxx Code.­ (5)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the   Code,   no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on   his   own  bond   unless   the   Public   Prosecutor   has   been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is  prima facie  true.  (6)   The   restrictions   on   granting   of   bail   specified   in   sub­ section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.  (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen   and   has   entered   the   country   unauthorisedly   or illegally   except   in   very   exceptional  circumstances   and   for reasons to be recorded in writing.”  12   (2005) 8 SCC 21 (para 18) 30   By virtue of the proviso to sub­section (5), it is the duty of 17. the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing  that  the   accusation  against  the   accused   is   prima facie   true   or   otherwise.   Our   attention   was   invited   to   the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with   similar   special   provisions   in   TADA   and   MCOCA.   The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to offences under   the   1967   Act   as   well.   Notably,   under   the   special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record   its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “   true. By its prima facie” 31 very nature, the expression “ prima facie  true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the Investigating Agency in reference to the accusation against the concerned accused in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted.  In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “ prima facie  true”, as compared to the   opinion     of     accused   “not   guilty”   of   such   offence   as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for   believing   that   the accusation against the accused is     true, is lighter prima facie than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge   application   or   framing   of   charges   in   relation   to offences   under   the   1967   Act.   Nevertheless,   we   may   take 32 guidance   from   the   exposition   in   the   case   of   Ranjitsing (supra),   wherein   a   three­Judge Brahmajeetsing   Sharma   Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the scope of power of the Court to grant bail. In paragraphs 36 to 38, the Court observed thus:  “36.  Does   this   statute   require   that   before   a   person   is released on bail, the court, albeit prima facie, must come to the conclusion that he is not guilty of such offence? Is it necessary   for   the   court   to   record   such   a   finding?   Would there be any machinery available to the court to ascertain that  once  the accused  is  enlarged on  bail, he would not commit any offence whatsoever? 37.  Such findings are required to be recorded only for the purpose of arriving at an objective finding on the basis of materials on record only for grant of bail and for no other purpose. 38.  We are furthermore of the opinion that the restrictions on the power of the court to grant bail should not be pushed too far. If the court, having regard to the materials brought on record, is satisfied that in all probability he may not be ultimately convicted, an order granting bail may be passed. The satisfaction of the court as regards his likelihood of not committing an offence while on bail must be construed to mean   an   offence   under   the   Act   and   not   any   offence whatsoever be it a minor or major offence. … What would further be necessary on the part of the court is to see the culpability   of   the   accused   and   his   involvement   in   the commission   of   an   organised   crime   either   directly   or indirectly.   The   court   at   the   time   of   considering   the application for grant of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was possessed of the requisite mens rea….” And again in paragraphs 44 to 48, the Court observed:     33 “44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead   to   the   conclusion   that   the   court   must   arrive   at   a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention   of   the   legislature.   Section   21(4)   of   MCOCA, therefore,   must   be   construed   reasonably.   It   must   be   so construed   that   the   court   is   able   to   maintain   a   delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro   must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. 45.  It   is,   furthermore,   trite   that   for   the   purpose   of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail. 46.  The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute   like   MCOCA   having   regard   to   the   provisions contained in sub­section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while   granting   or   refusing   bail   undoubtedly   would   be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby. 34 13 47. In  Kalyan Chandra Sarkar  v.  Rajesh Ranjan  this Court observed: (SCC pp. 537­38, para 18) ‘ 18 . We agree that a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by both the sides is not expected of the court considering a bail application. Still one should not forget, as observed by this Court in the case   Puran   v. 14 Rambilas   : (SCC p. 344, para 8) ‘Giving reasons is different  from discussing  merits or demerits.   At   the   stage   of   granting   bail   a   detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case has not to be undertaken. … That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.’ We   respectfully   agree   with   the   above   dictum   of   this Court. We also feel that such expression of prima facie reasons   for   granting   bail   is   a   requirement   of   law   in cases   where   such   orders   on   bail   application   are appealable,   more   so   because   of   the   fact   that   the appellate court has every right to know the basis for granting the bail. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the accused that the High Court was not expected even to indicate  a  prima   facie  finding  on  all points  urged before it while granting bail, more so in the background of the facts of this case where on facts it is established that a large number of witnesses who were examined after the respondent was enlarged on bail had turned hostile and there are complaints made to the court as to the   threats   administered   by   the   respondent   or   his supporters   to   witnesses   in   the   case.   In   such circumstances, the Court was duty­bound to apply its mind to the allegations put forth by the investigating agency and ought to have given at least a prima facie finding in regard to these allegations because they go to the very root of the right of the accused to seek bail. The non­consideration   of   these   vital   facts   as   to   the allegations   of   threat   or   inducement   made   to   the witnesses by the respondent during the period he was on bail has vitiated the conclusions arrived at by the High Court while granting bail to the respondent. The other   ground   apart   from   the   ground   of   incarceration 13   (2004) 7 SCC 528 14   (2001) 6 SCC 338 35 which appealed to the High Court to grant bail was the fact   that   a   large   number   of   witnesses   are   yet   to   be examined and there is no likelihood of the trial coming to an end in the near future. As stated hereinabove, this ground on the facts of this case is also not sufficient either   individually   or   coupled   with   the   period   of incarceration to release the respondent on bail because of   the   serious   allegations   of   tampering   with   the witnesses made against the respondent.’ 15 48. In  Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal  v.  State of T.N.    this Court observed: (SCC pp. 21­22, para 16) ‘ 16 . … The considerations which normally weigh with the court in granting bail in non­bailable offences have been explained by this Court in   State   v.   Capt. Jagjit 16 17 Singh     and   Gurcharan Singh   v.   State (Delhi Admn.) and basically they are — the nature and seriousness of the   offence;   the   character   of   the   evidence; circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the   accused;   a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case.’ ” 18. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage ­ of giving reasons for grant or non­grant of bail ­ is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence.   The   elaborate   examination   or   dissection   of   the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely   expected   to   record   a   finding   on   the   basis   of   broad 15   (2005) 2 SCC  13 16   (1962) 3 SCR 622 17   (1978) 1 SCC 118 36 probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission   of   the   stated   offence   or   otherwise.   From   the analysis of the impugned judgment, it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence.  For, it noted that the evidence in the form of statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the Investigating Agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till th 16  August, 2017 (paragraph 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly,   the   approach   of   the   High   Court   in   completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the   Designated   Court   and   also   because   reference   to   such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge­ sheet already filed against the respondent  is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record its 37 opinion   that   the   accusation   made   against   the   concerned accused is  prima facie  true or otherwise.  That opinion must be   reached   by   the   Court   not   only   in   reference   to   the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge­sheet (report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered by the Investigating Agency during investigation. Be it noted that the special provision,   Section 43D of the 1967 Act, applies right from   the   stage   of   registration   of   FIR   for   offences   under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge­sheet by the Investigating Agency; after filing of the first charge­sheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final charge­sheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was 38 founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the  existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge­sheet (report under Section 173   of   Cr.P.C.),   do   not   make   out   reasonable   grounds   for believing that the accusation against him is  prima facie  true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.  19. For   that,   the   totality   of   the   material   gathered   by   the Investigating Agency and presented along with the report and including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing   individual pieces of evidence or circumstance. In any   case,   the   question   of   discarding   the   document   at  this stage, on the ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible.   For,   the   issue   of   admissibility   of   the

49 D­3g/20, D­3h/28, D­3j to D­3j/5, D­9b, D­9c, D­154 and D­ 185/10.   Besides   these   documents,   our   attention   was   also invited to the statements of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt (W­29) th rd dated 30  August, 2017, and 23  November, 2017, as well as the   redacted   statements   of   protected   witnesses   (“Charlie”, “Romeo”, “Alpha”, “Gamma”, “Pie”, “Potter”, “Harry” and “xxx”) recorded under Section 164, which have now been taken on th record by the Designated Court in terms of order dated 11 January, 2019.  Notably, the order passed by the Designated Court permitting redaction of those statements has not been assailed by the respondent. In our opinion, the High Court, having noticed that the Designated Court had not looked at the stated statements presented in a sealed cover, coupled with the fact that the application under Section 44 filed by the Investigating Agency was pending before the Designated Court, and   before   finally   answering   the   prayer   for   grant   of   bail, should have directed the Designated Court to first decide the said   application   and   if   allowed,   consider   the   redacted statements,   to   form   its   opinion   as   to   whether   there   are 50 reasonable   grounds for believing that the accusation made against the respondent is prima facie true or otherwise. For, in terms of Section 43D, it is the bounden duty of the Court to peruse the case diary and/or the report made under Section 173   of   the   Code   and   all   other   relevant   material/evidence produced   by   the   Investigating   Agency,   for   recording   its opinion. We could have relegated the parties before the High Court   but   the   counsel   appearing   for   the   respondent,   on instructions, stated that the respondent would prefer to await the decision of the Designated Court and, depending on the outcome of the application under Section 44 of the Act, would contest the proceedings before this Court itself. Accordingly, at the   request of  the  respondent,  we  kept the   present appeal pending.  Since the Designated Court has finally disposed of the   application   preferred   by   the   Investigating   Agency   vide th order dated 11   January, 2019, the correctness whereof has not   been   challenged   by   the   respondent,   the   redacted statements of the concerned protected witnesses have been taken on record.  51 22. Accordingly,   we   have   analysed   the   matter  not   only  in light of the accusations in the FIR and the charge­sheet or the police   report   made   under   Section   173,   but   also   the documentary   evidence   and   statements   of   the   prospective witnesses recorded under Sections 161 and 164, including the redacted statements of the protected witnesses, for considering the prayer for bail.  23. As   regards   the   redacted   statements,   objection   of   the respondent was that the certificate given by the competent authority is not in conformity with the certificate required to be given in terms of Section 164(4) of Cr.P.C.  This objection has been justly countered by the learned Attorney General with the argument that the objection borders on the issue of admissibility   of   the   said   statements.   We   find   force   in   the submission   that   the   issue   regarding   admissibility   of   the statements   and   efficacy   of   the   certificates   given   by   the competent   authority,   appended   to   the   redacted   statements would be a matter for trial and subject to the evidence in reference to Section 463 of Cr.P.C. and cannot be overlooked 52 at   this   stage.   Viewed   thus,   the   exposition   in   the   case   of Ramchandra  Keshav   Adke  (dead)   by  LRs.  and   Ors.   Vs. 18 ,   in   paragraph   25   of   the Govind   Joti   Chavare   and   Ors. reported judgment will be of no avail to the respondent.  24. After having analyzed the documents and the statements forming   part   of   the   charge­sheet   as   well   as   the   redacted statements   now   taken   on   record,   we   disagree   with   the conclusion recorded by the High Court. In our opinion, taking into account the totality of the report made under Section 173 of   the   Code   and   the   accompanying   documents   and   the evidence/material already presented to the Court, including the redacted statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 of the Code, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations made against the respondent are   prima facie   true. Be it noted, further investigation is in progress.  We may observe that since the prayer for bail is to be   rejected,   it   may   not   be   appropriate   for   us   to   dilate   on matters   which   may   eventually   prejudice   the   respondent 18   (1975) 1 SCC 559 = AIR 1975 SC 915 53 (Accused   No.10)   in   any   manner   in   the   course   of   the   trial. Suffice   it   to   observe   that   the   material   produced   by   the Investigating Agency thus far (pending further investigation) shows the linkage of the respondent (Accused No.10) with A­3, A­4,   A­5   and   A­6   and,   likewise,   linkages   between   the respondent (Accused No.10) and A­3 to A­12, as revealed from the CDR analysis. The  Chart A  showing the inter­linkages of the named accused inter se and   Chart B   showing the inter­ linkages of the named accused with others and the frequency of their interaction on phone during the relevant period are as under:  54 55 56 The summing up of the outcome of the investigation done 25. until filing of the first report is noted  in paragraph 17.10, which reads thus: “ 17.10 SUMMING UP: Hence,   as   has   been   discussed   above,   the   investigation   has established that:­ 1. The terrorist and Hurriyat leaders have a close nexus with the active militants, OGWs and stone­pelters in Kashmir Valley. They are closely coordinating with each other and have formed a terrorist gang to achieve their common goal of secession from the Union of India by way of an armed rebellion.  2. To fuel the secessionist activities, Pakistan is providing funds to the Hurriyat leaders and the same are channelized through Hawala, LoC trade and other means. Sometimes, the funds are provided directly by Pakistan High Commission in India.  3. Hurriyat has convenor/representative(s) in Pakistan who liaise with Pakistan agencies and also with the Kashmir Cell of the ISI, the United Jehad Council and the Jamaat­Ud­Dawah.  4. The   benefits  drawn  out   of  the  LoC   trade  are  reaching  the Hurriyat leaders for fuelling the unrest in the Valley.  5. Funds are raised locally by way of collecting donations from the common people in the name of Zakat and Betul Maal.  6. The   Hurriyat   leaders   are   working   in   a   systematic   and organized manner as per the instructions of their Pakistani handlers by setting up a network of their cadres at village level, block level and District level.  7. The   High  Commission   of   Pakistan   organizes   functions   and meetings in New Delhi, to which the Hurriyat leaders from Kashmir are invited and they are given instructions and funds so that the unrest in the Valley can be fuelled in an organized manner.  57 8. The   Hurriyat   leaders   are   raising   funds   from   the   Pakistani establishments/agencies   in   the   name   of   helping   the   youth injured/killed during the action of security forces.  9. The families of the active militants and killed militants are supported by the Hurriyat leaders financially, socially as well as by arranging for the higher education of their wards in Pakistan.  10. The Hurriyat leaders attend the funeral of killed militants, eulogise them as ‘martyrs’, hail their anti­India activities as ‘gallant’ and deliver speeches against the Government of India and motivate the youth of Kashmir to join militancy for the so­ called freedom of Kashmir by way of an armed struggle. They misguide   the   common   man   by  spreading   false   propaganda against the Government of India.  11. To   further   this   conspiracy,   the   Hurriyat   leaders,   the terrorists/terror organizations and stone­pelters are working in tandem and they are getting financial and logistic support from Pakistan.” 26. The   accusation   and   charge   against   the   accused, including the respondent, is in paragraph 18 of the report which reads thus: “ 18.   CHARGE   : 18.1 In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence in the form of incriminating documents, statements of witnesses and digital evidence that establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused persons i.e. the Hurriyat leaders, terrorists and stone­pelters have been orchestrating violence and unrest in Jammu & Kashmir as a part of well­planned conspiracy under the overall patronage and financial support of Pakistani Establishment  and agencies and that all the accused persons were acting in pursuance of their common goal   i.e.   to   achieve   secession   of   the   State   of   Jammu   & Kashmir from the Union of India by waging a war against the Government of India.  58 18.2 The   documentary   evidences   seized   during   various searches   such   as   letters   of   the   banned   terrorist organizations seeking financial assistance from the Hurriyat leaders,   blank   letterheads   of   terror   organisations, conversations between Hafiz Saeed @ Burhan Wani, Hafiz Saeed and Asiya Andrabi, support extended by Hafiz Saeed and Syed Salahuddin to the protest calendars issued by the Hurriyat leaders,  all these show  that Hurriyat and terror organizations   are   working   hand   in   glove.   Their   common objective is to attain secession of Jammu & Kashmir from the Union of India and to achieve this objective, they have established a network of cadres throughout Kashmir Valley who motivate and incite the youth to attack all symbols of Indian authority, especially Indian security forces who have been deployed there for the maintenance of law and order. To achieve their objective, they are mobilizing funds from all possible sources.  They are getting funds from Pakistani Establishment through the Pakistan High Commission; the   funds   are   being   remitted   to   India   from   offshore locations   through   hawala   and   accused   A­10   Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali is an important conduit for the same.  They are raising funds through local donations such as Zakaat & Betulmaal, etc. They are generating funds by resorting   to   illegalities   and   irregularities   such   as   under­ invoicing   and   cash­dealings   in   LoC   barter   trade.   All   this money is used to fund stone­pelting, to support the families of killed and active militants and to help pellet victims and to fuel   terrorism   in   Jammu   &   Kashmir   with   the   ultimate objective   of   breaking   Jammu   &   Kashmir   away   from   the Union of India.  18.3 They are all working in sync to achieve their greater goal. The nexus between the Pakistani agencies, Hurriyat leaders and terror organizations is amply substantiated by the chats retrieved  from their email accounts, WhatsApp, Facebook   profiles   and   Websites   and   also   from   the statements of the protected witnesses.   Their nexus with hawala conduit, Zahoor Watali is also substantiated by   the documentary and digital evidence. Though the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1957, 18.4 declares the State of Jammu & Kashmir to be an integral part of India, and the said pronouncement is irrevocable,   the 59 accused persons have been incessantly engaged in violence and  carrying   out   subversive  and  secessionist  activities  in Jammu & Kashmir by waging a war against the Government of India.  18.5 Hence,   as   discussed   in   the   foregoing   paras,   the evidence   collected   during   investigation,   prima   facie, establishes   a   case   against   all   the   accused   persons   for conspiring to wage war against the Government of India by way of establishing a network of cadres of banned terrorist organizations LeT & HM as well as cadres in the garb of so­ called political front viz., the All Parties Hurriyat Conference. 18.6 The scrutiny of the documents and the recovery from the digital devices have provided a large data of incriminating material in which the above accused A­3 to A­12 are a part of a gang who with the help of A­1 & A­2 and others collaborate and coordinate with each other   to   form   strategies   and   action   plan   to   launch massive   violent   protests,   hartaals,   bandhs,   strikes, processions, demonstrations during which stone pelting is   organised   on   security   forces   and   government establishments.   These   documents   and   digital   evidences clearly indicates an action plan to instigate general public to observe   strikes,   hold   anti­India   protests   through   press releases, social media and use of Immams and mosques. The recovery of protest calendars from A­4 and the direct impact of such orchestrated protests have led to enormous loss of life and property which have been explained in detail.  18.7 The   investigation   have   revealed   linkage   of   A­1 and A­2 with A­3 to A­12 in a web of directions being passed through e­mails, SMSs, WhatsApp, videos and other means of communication to form a clear nexus between the above accused and the leaders of Hurriyat Conference.   The   recovery   of   a   number   of   incriminating videos   in   which   the   separatists   leaders   and   accused   are exhorting   the   general   public,   sympathizing   with   the militants,   seeking   support   and   donations   to   carry   out militant activities and instigating general public, especially youth to raise a revolt and launch violence against security forces   and   wage   a   war   against   Government   of   India,   is clearly established.  60 18.8 The   secessionists,   especially   the   leaders   of   the Hurriyat   Conference   and   the   accused   are   a   part   of   the terrorist designs to raise funds to propagate their ideology and   agenda   of   secessionism   and   subversive   activities prejudicial to the law of the land. The investigations have clearly  brought  out  that  the Hurriyat  has formed  a  well­ developed network of cadres with district presidents, block level leaders and workers who collect donations from public, businessmen, apple growers and draw gains from profits of unregulated LoC trade.   The money is routed through a complex system of hawala transfers and cash couriers using conduits such as A­10 who gathers money from Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi and through fake and bogus companies floated in UAE and other countries   and   delivers   the   funds   to   the   Hurriyat   leadership for subversive activities. The documents recovered and statements of witnesses to that effect also clearly establish the mechanism of funding and complicity of the accused in generating funds for its further use in organizing violent protests, assistance to the militants and creating an atmosphere of terror, chaos and uncertainty.  18.9 During the investigation about the past conduct of the accused,   it   is   ascertained   that   as   A­1   is   a   designated terrorist   being   the   head   of   proscribed   terror   organisation Lashker­e­Toiba, A­2 is the head of proscribed organisation Hizb­Ul­Mujahideen. A­3, A­4, A­5, A­6, A­8, A­9 are former militants with various cases of terrorism against them and have   been   detained   under   the   Public   Safety   Act   on numerous occasions.  A­10 is a known hawala dealer and financer and has a number of cases against him which are being investigated by sister investigation agencies.   18.10   The   CDR   Linkages   and   technical   analysis   of social media clearly establish that the accused A­3 to A­ 10 are in constant communication with each other and there is a clear meeting of minds of the above accused in hatching the conspiracy with the support of A­1 and A­2 as well as other secessionist leaders of the Hurriyat 61 Conference and other proscribed terrorist organizations of Jammu & Kashmir.   18.11   This case is a terror conspiracy case in which the terrorist act is not a single act of terror like an incident or series of incidents. It is a terrorist act as defined under UA (P) Act­1967 wherein the intention is to threaten the unity, integrity and sovereignty of India by striking terror in the people or any section of people in India by overawing by means of criminal force or show of criminal force causing death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary. The terrorist gang of the accused above,   have   also   committed   terrorist   act   as   they   have disrupted the essential services and daily life of the citizenry of   Jammu   &   Kashmir   and   have   caused   damage   and destruction   of   property   in   India   intended   to   be   used   in connection  with any  other   purpose  of the Government  of India, any State Government or any of their agencies.  18.12   The analysis of documentary evidences seized during the   searches,   the   statement   of   witnesses   and   the incriminating   material   recovered   from   the   digital   media seized from the accused clearly bring out the fact that with the   active   support   and   connivance   of   Pakistani establishments,   Pakistani   agencies,   terrorist   groups operating   from   Pakistani   soil,   the   above   accused   have hatched   a   criminal   conspiracy   to   engage   in   violence   and carry out subversive and secessionist activities in Jammu & Kashmir and to achieve their objectives, have established a network   of   cadres   who   are   funded   through   Pakistani agencies   via   hawala   dealers,   local   conduits   and   also   by raising   funds   through   local   donations   and   by   generating illegal   profits   through   the   barter   LoC   trade.   The   accused have used these funds for organised stone pelting through a set charter of protests and demonstrations which are issued in the form of “protest calendars” on regular basis resulting in an atmosphere of chaos, terror, uncertainty and fear in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The main aim and objective of this entire conspiracy is to secede the State of Jammu & Kashmir, which is an integral part of India, from the Union of India and wage war against the Government of India to meet the objectives.  62 18.13  Hence, the accused persons are liable for prosecution under the following sections of law:­ 63

Liable for prosecution under sections  of law section 120B, 121, 121A & 124A of IPC,  section 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 39 & 40 of  Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,  1967.   section 120B, 121 & 121A  of IPC,  section 13, 16, 18 & 20 of Unlawful  64 The sanction for prosecution under section 45(1)(i)(ii) 18.14   of the UA (P) Act in respect of the accused persons for the offences under section 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of the UA (P) Act and under section 196 CrPC for the offences under section 121, 121A and 124A of IPC has been accorded by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India vide th order No.11011/26/2017/IS­IV dated 16   January, 2018. The sanction for prosecution under section 188 CrPC has also   been   accorded   by   Government   of   India   vide   order th No.11011/26/2017/IS­IV dated 16   January, 2018 for the offences committed outside of India. 18.15  It is therefore, prayed that, the Hon’ble Court may please take cognizance of the offences under sections 120B, 121, 121A & 124A of the IPC, sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38, 39 & 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 in respect of the accused A­1 to A­12 (As per the mentioned in para 18.13), issue process to the accused persons and try the   aforesaid   accused   persons   and   punish   them   in accordance with law.”  (emphasis supplied in italics and bold) The charge against respondent is not limited to Section 27. 17 of the 1967 Act regarding raising funds for terrorist acts but also in  reference to Sections 13,16,18,20,38,39 and 40 of the 1967 Act.  Section 13 is in Chapter II of the 1967 Act. The special   provisions   regarding   bail   under   Section   43D(5), however, are attracted in respect of the offences punishable under Chapters IV and VI, such as Sections 16,17,18,20,38,39 and  40 of  the 1967 Act. Sections   39  and 40 form part of Chapter VI, whereas other sections (except Section 13) form 65 part of Chapter IV to which the subject bail provisions are applicable,   mandating   the   recording   of   satisfaction   by   the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is   true.    prima facie 28. Reverting to the documents  on which emphasis has been placed, document D­132 is the Seizure Memo of properties seized from the premises of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt (W­29), the   then   Munshi/Accountant   of   the   respondent   (Accused No.10).     Document   D­132(a)   is   the   green   page   document, seized   during   the   search   of   the   residence   of   said   Ghulam Mohammad   Bhatt,   containing   information   about   foreign contributions   and   expenditures   of   the   respondent   (Accused No.10)   during   2015/2016.   Whether   this   document   is admissible in evidence would be a matter for trial. Be that as it may, besides the said document, the statement of Ghulam th Mohammad Bhatt (W­29) has been recorded on 30   August, st 2017 and 1   November, 2017. Whether the credibility of the said witness should be accepted cannot be put in issue at this stage.   The   statement   does   make   reference   to   the   diaries 66 recovered from his residence showing transfer of substantial cash amounts to different parties, which he has explained by stating   that   cash   transactions   were   looked   after   by   the respondent  (Accused  No.10) himself.   He  had admitted the recovery   of   the   green   colour   document   from   his   residence, bearing   signature   of   the   respondent   (Accused   No.10)   and mentioning about the cash amounts received and disbursed during   the   relevant   period   between   2015   and   2016.   The accusation   against   the   respondent   (Accused   No.10)   is   that accused   A­3   to   A­10   are     part   of   the   All   Parties   Hurriyat Conference which calls itself a political front, whereas their agenda is to create an atmosphere conducive to the goal of cessation of J & K from the Union of India. The role attributed to the respondent (Accused No.10) is that of being part of the larger   conspiracy   and   to   act   as   a  fund   raiser   and   finance conduit.   Ample   material   has   been   collected   to   show   the linkages   between   the   Hurriyat   leaders   of   the   J   &   K   and terrorists/terrorist   organizations   and   their   continuous activities to wage war against Government of India. Regarding 67 the funding of terrorist activities in J & K and, in particular, the   involvement   of   the   respondent   (Accused   No.10),   the charge­sheet mentions as under:  “ 17.6 Funding of Secessionist and Terrorist Activities in Jammu & Kashmir: If publicity and propaganda is oxygen for the terror groups, terror financing  is its life­blood. Terror financing provides funds   for   recruitment,   operationalization   of   training   and training   camps,   procurement   of   arms   and   ammunition, operational cost of planning and resources for terrorist acts, running   of   underground   networks,   well­planned   stone pelting, school burnings, targeted attacks, provision of legal support   for   terrorists   and   over­ground   workers   facing judicial   process,   ex­gratia   payment   for   militants   killed   in terrorist   operations,   regular   payments   to   the   families   of terrorists   and   militants   killed   or   convicted,   funds   for propaganda to clergy as well as relief measures for civilian population   and   also   in   case   of   natural   disasters.   The investigation in the case has revealed that the secessionists are mobilizing funds from all possible sources to fuel unrest and support the on­going secessionist and terrorist activities in Jammu & Kashmir.  17.6.1 Funding from Pakistan: i) The Hurriyat leaders are receiving funds from Pakistan through   conduits   and   also   from   the   Pakistan   High Commission   directly.   It   was   substantiated   by   an incriminating   document   seized   from   the   house   of Ghulam   Mohd.   Bhatt   druing   search.   Ghulam   Mohd. Bhatt   worked   as   the   cashier­cum­accountant   with accused   A­10   Zahoor   Ahmad   Shah   Watali,   a   known Hawala   conduit.     The   document   clearly   shows   that accused A­10 Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali was receiving money from Accused A­1 Hafiz Saeed (Head of Jamaat­ ud­Dawa),   from   the   ISI,   from   the   Pakistan   High Commission at New Delhi and also from a source based in Dubai. Accused A­10 was remitting the same to the Hurriyat   leaders,   separatists   and   stone­pelters   of Jammu   &   Kashmir.   The   said   document   has   been 68 maintained   in   regular  course  of   his   business   and   is signed   by   accused   Zahoor   Watali   himself.   This document   clearly   shows   that   Hurriyat   leaders   were receiving funds from Pakistan through the officials of Pakistan High Commission and through accused A­10 Zahoor Watali.  The signature of Accused A­10 Zahoor Watali has also   been   verified   and   as   per   the   expert   report,   his signature on the questioned document matches with his specimen   handwriting   as   well   as   his   admitted handwriting.  ii) Further, the role of Pakistan in funding secessionist activities   also   surfaced   in   the   scrutiny   of   the   un­edited version of the audio/video  furnished by the office of India Today   T.V.   News   Channel   wherein   accused   A­5   Nayeem Khan   admits   that   the   secessionists   and   terrorists   of   the Valley are receiving   and financial support from Pakistan   would have received approximately Rs.200 crores to organise anti­India protests and agitations after the killing of Burhan Wani, the Commander of the proscribed terror organisation Hizb­ul­Mujahiddin. He further speaks about funds reaching them from Saudi Arabia/Dubai through   Hawala   via Delhi (Balimaran/Chandni Chowk). He admits that S.A.S. Geelani (Chairman, APHC­G), Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (APHC­M) and Yasin Malik (JKLF) are receiving funds from Pakistan. He further admits the pivotal role played by the  Pakistan High Commission   to   convey   and   receive   instructions   from Pakistan. Nayeem Khan also stated that the accused   Hafiz Mohd   Saeed   has   supported   S.A.S.   Geelani,   Chairman, APHC­G by paying at least 10­12 crores during anti­India agitation   after   killing   of   Burhan   Wani.   Accused   Nayeem Khan further admitted that, if funded, he can fuel unrest in the Valley any time.  iii) Similarly, the scrutiny of the  audio/video  of the sting operation   also   reveals   accused   A­6   Farooq   Ahmad   Dar Bitta Karate admitted that the funds are being sent by Pakistan   to   the   secessionists   and   terrorists   in   the Kashmir   Valley   including   him   for   organizing   forcible closures,   anti­India   protests   and   processions   and   stone­ pelting on the security forces. He further claimed that he has 69 his cadres in every part of Kashmir who can act on his call at any given point of time and fuel unrest in the Valley. When   given   an   offer   of   financial   support,   accused   Bitta Karate put forth a demand of Rs.70 crores for fuelling unrest upto six months.  The   voice   samples   of   Nayeem   Khan   and   Farooq Ahmad Dar @ Bitta Karate have been forensically examined and the  CFSL report has confirmed the match with their voices . iv) Further, the investigation has revealed that the senior­ most officials of the High Commission of Pakistan were in regular   contact   with   the   Hurriyat   leaders.   The   High Commission   of   Pakistan   in   New   Delhi   used   to   organise functions and meetings in New Delhi, to which the Hurriyat leaders   from   Kashmir   were   invited   and   they   were   given instructions   and   funds   on  a   regular   basis.   These  funds were given to various allied groups of the APHC and investigation have revealed that a First Secretary level officer   of   Pakistan   High   Commission   in   New   Delhi would act as a channel and A­10 Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watali would act as a courier to deliver the funds to the   Hurriyat   leadership.   These   funds   as   explained above   were   used   to   foment   the   secessionist   and separatist   activities   and   unrest   in   the   valley   in   an   One   such   invitation   card   from   the organized   manner. Pakistan High Commission was seized from the house of A­6 Farooq Ahmad Dar @ Bitta Karate:­ On the occasion of the National Day Pakistan High Commissioner and Mrs. Salman Bashir Request the pleasure of the company of Mr. Farooq Ahmed Dar At a Reception on Friday, 22 March 2013 from 1930 to 2100 hrs. Venue:                        R.S.V.P. 2/50­G, Shantipath, Tel.               011­24121819 Chanakyapuri, New Dehli           Fax 011­26872339                 Dress: National/Lounge Suit/Uniform   E­mail:pakhcnd@gmail.com 70 (Please bring this card with you) Investigation has also established that the accused A­4 was in direct contact with the High Commissioner of Pakistan in New Delhi and would apprise him about the situation in Jammu & Kashmir.  17.6.2  Funding   from   Terrorist   Organisations   based   in Pakistan: During the course of investigation, it is also ascertained that the separatists and secessionists of Jammu & Kashmir were also   receiving   money   from   the   terrorists   and   terrorist organizations   operating   out   of   Pakistan/PoK.   The incriminating   document   seized   from   the   house   of Ghulam   Mohd.   Bhatt   who   worked   as   a   cashier­cum­ accountant   with   accused   A­10   Zahoor   Watali   shows that Zahoor Watali received money from accused A­1 Hafiz Saeed, Head of JuD and Chief of proscribed terror organisation   Lashkar­e­Toiba   and   remitted   it   to   the Hurriyat  leaders espousing the cause of  secession  of Jammu & Kashmir from the Union of India.  17.6.3 Local Donations/Zakat/Baitulmal: During the course of investigation, it is established that the Hurriyat   has   its   network   of   cadres   at   districts   and   local levels. There are District Presidents and block level leaders who   have   the   responsibility   to   raise   the   funds   through donation   during   the   religious   festivals   and   month   of Ramzan. In a well­established system, the receipt books are printed   and   funds   are   collected   from   shopkeepers, businessmen and residents of Kashmir. The money is also collected   to  become   a   member   of   the   Tehreek­e­Hurriyat. Selected members are made as Rukuns and are tasked to propagate the separatist ideology of Hurriyat. These Rukuns act as foot soldiers and ensure that bandhs and hartaals are successful. They also lead the processions and participate in stone pelting.  Investigation   also   established   that   various   District Presidents collect Rs.5 to 10 Lac per district as Baitulmal. Funds   are   also   collected   from   apple­growers   and businessmen   who   are   compelled   to   donate   to   Hurriyat 71 central   office.   This   money   is  used   for   administrative   and operational purposes of organizing protests and strikes as well as for aid to militants and their families.  The   seizure   of   unaccounted   receipts   of   an   amount   of Rs.1,15,45,000/­   from   accused   A­4   Altaf   Ahmad   Shah Fantoosh also shows that money is being raised by way of donations. Similarly, records pertaining to the collection of funds   were   also   seized   from   the   house   of   accused   A­8 Mehrajuddin Kalwal, who was also the District President of Tehreek­e­Hurriyat for Srinagar and Ganderbal.  Further,   during   the   course   of   investigation,   it   is   also established   that   the   Hurriyat   leadership   appeals   to   the public to contribute money generously by way of donations for   their   so­called   freedom   movement.   This   is   clearly reflected   in   the   Website   of   the   Hurriyat   Conference   viz. www.huriyatconference.com,  which shows a message from S.A.S.   Geelani   “Help   the   families   of   martyrs   and prisoners….. people should come forward for donations in   the   month   of   Ramadan   as   the   number   of   people affected by this movement is large”.  This substantiates that Hurriyat is raising  funds through donations  and using the same to fuel secessionist activities and to support the families of killed and jailed terrorists.  17.6.4 LOC Trade: During the course of investigation, it has been established that the secessionist and separatist leaders are raising funds through LoC trade by way of directing the Kashmiri traders to   do   under­invoicing   of   the   goods   which   were   imported through LoC barter trade. They sell the goods to the traders in Delhi and a part of the profit of the same is shared with the Hurriyat leaders and other separatists, which in turn is used on anti­India propaganda, for mobilizing the public to organise protests and stone­pelting and to support families of   killed/jailed   militants.   The   hawala   operators   based   in Srinagar,   New   Delhi   and   other   parts   of   the   country   and abroad are being used to transfer the funds so generated. The investigation has revealed that the funds are generated by  resorting   to sale  of third­party  goods,   under­weighing, under­invoicing, large­scale dealings in cash and committing irregularities   in   maintenance   of   records.   This   modus­ 72 operandi leads to generation of huge cash surpluses on the Indian   side   which   are   then   channelized   through   several formal   banking   channels   as   well   as   cash   couriers   and hawala dealers to the separatists and secessionists active in Jammu & Kashmir.  Investigation   has   revealed   that   a   significant   number   of traders engaged in cross LoC trade have relatives across the border   who   are   closely   associated   with   banned   terrorist organizations,   especially   Hizb­Ul­Mujahideen.   Investigation has also revealed that certain ex­militants and their family members are using proxy companies and are registered as traders. During the course of investigation, use of LoC trade route for smuggling of contraband and weapons has also come to light. A separate investigation is underway regarding the irregularities in the LoC trade.  17.6.5 Hawala: Apart from the above mentioned sources and channels, the secessionists   depend   heavily   on   the   hawala   network   and conduits to bring money from off­shore locations to India to fuel­anti­India activities in Jammu & Kashmir.  i) During the course of investigation, it was ascertained that accused A­10 Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali is one such   conduit.   The   seizure   of   the   incriminating document from the house of his cashier­cum­accountant viz.   Ghulam   Mohd.   Bhatt   regarding   the   foreign contributions received by Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali from Paskistani establishment and terror organizations and   their  further  remittance  to  the  Hurriyat   leaders and secessionists of Jammu & Kashmir clearly shows that he was an active channel to transmit funds from abroad to India to fuel secessionist activities and to wage a war against the Government of India.  ii) During the course of investigation, it is revealed that accused A­10 Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali was bringing money from off­shore locations to India by layering it through   the   scores   of   firms   and   companies   he   has opened. It was ascertained that Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali has an NRE A/c No.0252040200000505 in J&K 73 Bank and he received foreign remittances to the tune of Rs.93,87,639.31/­ in this account from 2011 till 2013 from unknown sources.  iii) During   the   course   of   investigation,   it   was   also ascertained   that   the   accused   Zahoor   Ahmad   Shah Watali was showing foreign remittances under ‘other income’  in   his   proprietorship   firm   viz.   Trison International, Srinagar. From the analysis of his bank accounts,   it   has   been   ascertained   that   foreign remittances   to   the   tune   of   Rs.2,26,87,639.31   were received by the accused Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali in different   accounts   from   the   year   2011   to   2016.   An amount   of  Rs.93,87,639.31/­   came   in   Zahoor   Ahmad Shah   Watali   A/c   No.NRE­0252040200000505   in   J&K Bank from 2011 to 2013. An amount of Rs.14 lakh was remitted   in   the   account   of   Acharya   Shri   Chander College of Medical Sciences (ASCOMs), Jammu account No.1213040100000229   on   09.04.2013   through   NEFT against fee deposited for his son, viz., Yawar Zahoor Shah Watali. An amount of Rs.60 lakh was remitted in current account of accused Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali in J&K Bank A/c No.CD4508. An amount of Rs.5 lakh was   remitted   in   the   account   of   Trison   Farms   & Constructions   Pvt.   Ltd.   A/c   OTN­10162.   The investigation   has   revealed   that   all   these   foreign remittances are from unknown sources.  iv) During the course of investigation, it was also revealed that on 07.11.2014, one Naval Kishore Kapoor, son of Om Prakash Kapoor, resident of P.O. Box­8669, Aman, U.A.E.   entered   into  an   agreement   with   Trison   Farms and   Constructions   Pvt.   Ltd.   through   its   Managing Director Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali to take a piece of land measuring 20 Kanals in Sozeith Goripora Nagbal, Budgam on lease in consideration of an amount of Rs.6 crore   as   premium   and   Rs.1000/­   annual   rent   for   an initial   period   of   40   years   extendable   as   may   be mutually agreed between the parties. In the agreement, M/s   Trison   Farms   and   Constructions   Pvt.   Ltd.   was 74 declared to be the absolute owner of the piece of land in question.   Mr.   Naval   Kishore   Kapoor   remitted   a   total amount of Rs.5.579 crores in 22 instalments between 2013  and   2016  to  the  accused   Zahoor  Ahmad   Shah Watali.  v) During the course of investigation, it was ascertained that no land exists in the name of M/s Trison Farms and Constructions Pvt. Ltd. as per the balance sheets of the said company. (AY 2011­12 to 2016­17). It was also ascertained   that   the   large   sum   of   money   i.e. Rs.5,57,90,000 was mobilized by Naval Kishore Kapoor from   unkown   sources   and   remitted   to   the   accused Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali over a period of 2 years to lease a piece of land which is not even existing in the name of the company mentioned as first party in the agreement   and   the   agreement   itself   lacks   legal sanctity. This proves that the said agreement was a ‘cover’   created   by   the   accused   Zahoor   Ahmad   Shah Watali   to   bring   foreign   remittances   from   unknown sources to India.  vi) During   the   course   of   investigation,   it   is   also ascertained that the Chartered Accountant, who signed the audited balance sheets of the firms belonging to the accused   A­10   Zahoor   Ahmad   Shah   Watali   viz.   M/s Trison   International   (2013­14   and   2015­16),   Trison Farms & Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (2013­14 and 2015­16), M/s 3Y (2012­13, 2013­14 and 2015­16) and M/s Yasir Enterprises   (2013­14   and   2015­16)   did   so   without seeing any supporting documents. The balance sheets of these companies were sent to him by one Mustaq Mir, Cost Accountant and Shabir Mir, Chartered Accountant from Wizkid Office, Srinagar through email and he was asked to sign on them in Delhi without showing any documents.  This clearly shows that Zahoor Watali was remitting money received from unknown sources to India.  75 vii) The investigation has also revealed that in the FY 2010­ 11, a firm belonging to accused A­10 Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali and his family members viz., Trison Farms and Constructions Pvt. Ltd. raised unsecured loan of Rs.2,65,55,532/­ from the Directors of the company, i.e. the   accused   Zahoor   Ahmad   Shah   Watali,   his   wife Sarwa Begum and his sons Yassir Gaffar Shah, Yawar Zahoor & Yamin Zahoor in the form of both cash and cheque and the same was used towards repayment of secured loan of  Rs.2,94,53,353/­ in the books of J&K Bank. The source of money with the Directors could not be   explained   satisfactorily   by   the   accused   Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali.  viii) The   seizure   from   the   house   of   accused   A­10   Zahoor Ahmad   Shah  Watali,   of  a   list   of   ISI   officials   and   a letter from Tariq Shafi, proprietor of AI Shafi group addressed to Pakistan High Commission recommending grant of visa to Zahoor Watali shows his proximity with Pakistani establishment. It is pertinent to mention here that the name of Tariq Shafi figures in the document of foreign contributions seized from the house of Zahoor Watali’s   cashier­cum­accountant   viz.,   Ghulam   Mohd. ”    Bhatt.   (emphasis supplied in italics and bold) In  reference to these accusations, the entry in the diaries 29. and the green­colour document, recovered from the residence of   Ghulam   Mohammad   Bhatt,   is   significant.   Further,   the seizure   memo   described   as   document   D­3/6,   in   respect  of search   and   seizure   of   articles/documents   seized   from   the rd premises of the respondent (Accused No.10) dated 3   June, 2017, would unravel the activities of the respondent, including 76 regarding   his   financial   deals.   Another   crucial   document described   as   D­3g/20   is   a   contact   diary   seized   from   the respondent   vide   Memo   D­3,   which   contains     the   Pakistan National   name   and   contact   “Tariq   Shafi   0092425765022… 26A”  whose name figures in document D­132(a)/23. The Code “0092” pertains to Pakistan. Another contact diary was seized from the respondent vide Memo D­3, which, at page D­3h/28 contains  the same name and contact, namely, “Tariq Shafi 00923008459775/ 0092425765022”. The documents D­3j to D­3j/5   also   indicate   the   involvement   of   the   respondent   in terrorist activities, including that three cases of TADA have been registered against him in the past and investigated and one case of J & K PSA, 1978. The High Court erroneously proceeded   on   the   premise   that   the   charge­sheet  makes   no reference to any other criminal case against the respondent. Additionally, the charge­sheet is accompanied with documents D­9b and D­9c, which are photographs of ex­militant Aftab Hilali Shah @ Shahid­ul­Islam ( A­3 ) holding AK­47, seen with other   terrorists.   These   photographs   were   seized   from   the 77 rd residence   of   the   said   ex­militant   on   3   June,   2017.   The prosecution case is that the respondent (Accused No.10) was in constant touch with the said ex­militant Aftab Hilali Shah @ Shahid­ul­Islam ( A­3 ), as noticed from the inter­linkage chart depicted   above.   That   fact   is   backed   by   the   CDR   analysis report, also part of the charge­sheet. The charge­sheet also contains   document   D­185/10,   which   is   a   contact   list   of accused   Nayeem   Khan   ( A­5 )   retrieved   through   forensic analysis, having mobile numbers of persons associated with Hurriyat party;  and of one Mudasir Cheema Pak who is none other than the First Secretary of Pakistan High Commission. His   name   also   figures   in   document   D­132(a)/23.   The Designated   Court,   besides   adverting   to   the   aforementioned documents,   also   adverted   to   other   documents   and   the statements of the prospective witnesses (Ws­1, 28, 29, 38, 39, 43, 44, 48 and 52). The High Court has not appreciated the said material which found favour with the Designated Court to record   its     opinion   that   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for believing that the accusation against the respondent is  prima 78 facie   true.   The view so expressed by the Designated Court commends to us. Suffice it to observe that the High Court adopted   a   tenuous   approach   ­   by   first   discarding   the document   D­132(a)   and   then   discarding   the   statement   of witnesses recorded under Section 161 and also the statements recorded under Section 164, presented by the Investigating Agency in a sealed cover. As aforesaid, the High Court ought to have taken into account the totality of the materials/evidences which   depicted   the   involvement   of   the   respondent   in   the commission of the stated offences and being a member of a larger conspiracy, besides the offence under Section 17 for raising funds for terrorist activities.  In the case of   30. Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi (supra), the Court essentially considered the scope and ambit of the enquiry by the Trial Court at the stage of “discharge”. In that context, the Court made observations in paragraphs 6 and   8   of   the   said   judgment   which   must   be   understood accordingly. In the present case, however, we are called upon to consider the prayer for bail  in the context of the purport of 79 the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the 1967 Act which mandates that the accused person involved in the commission of offence referable to Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act shall not be released on bail or on bond. However, the Court may release such accused on bail only if it is of the opinion, on perusal of the case diary and/or the report made under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. that there are “no reasonable grounds” for believing that the accusation against such person is   prima facie   true. Conversely, if in the opinion of the Court, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is   prima facie   true, the question of granting bail would not arise as the bar under the first part of the proviso of no bail in such cases would operate. 31. The fact that there is a high burden on the accused in terms of the special provisions contained in Section 43D(5) to demonstrate that the prosecution has not been able to show that   there   exists   reasonable   grounds   to   show   that   the accusation against him is prima facie true, does not alter the legal position expounded in   K. Veeraswami   (supra), to the 80 effect that the charge­sheet need not contain detailed analysis of the evidence. It is for the Court considering the application for   bail   to   assess   the   material/evidence   presented   by   the Investigating Agency along with the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C.   in its entirety, to form its opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the named accused is prima facie true or otherwise.  32. In the case of   Hitendra Vishnu Thakur    (supra), the Court was called upon to consider the following questions as noted in the opening paragraph of the judgment, viz.:   “In this batch of criminal appeals and special leave petitions (criminal) the three meaningful questions which require our consideration are: (1) When can the provisions of Section 3(1)   of  the  Terrorist  and  Disruptive   Activities   (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the TADA) be attracted? (2) Is the 1993 Amendment, amending Section 167(2) of the Code  of Criminal Procedure  by  modifying  Section 20(4)( b ) and adding a new provision as 20(4)( bb ), applicable to the pending cases i.e. is it retrospective in operation? and (3) What   is   the   true   ambit   and   scope   of   Section   20(4)   and Section 20(8) of TADA in the matter of grant of bail to an accused brought before the Designated Court and the factors which   the   Designated   Court   has   to   keep   in   view   while dealing with an application for grant of bail under Section 20(4) and for grant of extension of time to the prosecution for further investigation under clause ( bb ) of Section 20(4) and incidentally   whether   the   conditions   contained   in   Section 20(8) TADA control the grant of bail under Section 20(4) of the   Act   also?   We   shall   take   up   for   consideration   these questions in seriatim”  81 The focus essentially was on matters relevant for consideration of application for bail on the ground of default in filing the charge­sheet within the statutory period. Indeed, one of the questions was about the scope of the provisions relating to grant of bail in respect of offence punishable under special enactment TADA. That has been discussed in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the reported judgment, which reads thus: “13.  We would, therefore, at this stage like to administer a word of caution to the Designated Courts regarding invoking the   provisions   of   TADA   merely   because   the   investigating officer at some stage of the investigation chooses to add an offence under same ( sic  some) provisions of TADA against an accused person, more often than not while opposing grant of bail,   anticipatory   or   otherwise.   The   Designated   Courts should always consider carefully the material available on the   record   and   apply   their   mind   to   see   whether   the provisions of TADA are even prima facie attracted. 14.  The Act provides for  the constitution of one or more Designated Courts either by the Central Government or the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette to try specified cases or class or group of cases under the Act. The Act makes every offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder to be a cognizable offence within the meaning   of   Section   2( c )   of   the   CrPC.   The   Act   vests jurisdiction in the Designated Court to try all such offences under the Act by giving precedence over the trial of any other case against an accused in any other  court (not being  a Designated   Court)   notwithstanding   anything   contained   in the Code or any other law for the time being in force. The conferment of power on the Designated Courts to try the offences triable by them, punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with fine or with both, in a summary   manner   in   accordance   with   the   procedure prescribed in the CrPC notwithstanding anything contained 82 in Section 260(1) or 262 CrPC by applying the provisions of Sections 263­265 of the Act is a marked departure. The right of   appeal   straight   to   the   Supreme   Court   against   any judgment, sentence or order not being an interlocutory order vide Section 19(1) of the Act demonstrates the seriousness with which Parliament has treated the offences under TADA. An onerous duty is therefore cast on the Designated Courts to take extra care to scrutinise the material on the record and   apply   their   mind   to   the   evidence   and   documents available   with   the   investigating   agency   before   charge­ sheeting   an   accused   for   an   offence   under   TADA.   The stringent provisions of the Act coupled with the enhanced punishment prescribed for the offences under the Act make the   task   of   the   Designated   Court   even   more   onerous, because the graver the offence, greater should be the care taken to see that the offence must strictly fall within the four corners   of   the   Act   before   a   charge   is   framed   against   an accused   person.   Where   the   Designated   Court   without   as much as even finding a prima facie case on the basis of the material on the record, proceeds to charge­sheet an accused under   any   of   the   provisions   of   TADA,   merely   on   the statement of the investigating agency, it acts merely as a post office of the investigating agency and does more harm to meet   the   challenge   arising   out   of   the   ‘terrorist’   activities rather than deterring terrorist activities. The remedy in such cases would be worse than the disease itself and the charge against the State of misusing the provisions of TADA would gain acceptability, which would be bad both for the criminal and   the   society.   Therefore,   it   is   the   obligation   of   the investigating agency to  satisfy  the Designated Court from the material   collected   by   it   during   the   investigation,   and   not merely by the   opinion   formed by the investigating agency, that   the   activity   of   the   ‘terrorist’   falls   strictly   within   the parameters   of   the   provisions   of   TADA   before   seeking   to charge­sheet an accused under TADA. The Designated Court must record its satisfaction about the existence of a prima facie case on the basis of the material on the record before it proceeds   to  frame  a   charge­sheet   against   an  accused   for offences covered by TADA. Even after an accused has been charge­sheeted   for   an   offence   under   TADA   and   the prosecution leads evidence in the case, it is an obligation of the   Designated   Court   to   take   extra   care   to   examine   the evidence with a view to find out whether the provisions of the Act   apply   or   not.   The   Designated   Court   is,   therefore, 83 expected   to   carefully   examine   the   evidence   and   after analysing   the   same   come   to   a   firm   conclusion   that   the evidence led by the prosecution has established that the case of the accused falls strictly within the four corners of the Act before   recording   a   conviction   against   an   accused   under TADA.” Again,   in   paragraph   22   of   the   said   judgment,   the   Court observed thus: “22.  ….The   two   provisions   operate   in   different   and independent fields. The basis for grant of bail under Section 20(4),   as   already   noticed,   is   entirely   different   from   the grounds on which bail may be granted under Section 20(8) of the Act. It would be advantageous at this stage to notice the provisions of Section 20(8) and (9) of the Act. ‘(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder  shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless— ( a ) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and ( b ) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that  he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail . (9) The limitations on granting of bail specified in sub­ section (8) are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.’ As would be seen from the plain phraseology of sub­section (8) of Section 20, it commences with a non obstante clause and in its operation imposes a ban on release of a person accused of an offence punishable under TADA or any rule made   thereunder   on   bail   unless   the   twin   conditions contained in clauses ( a ) and ( b ) thereof are satisfied. No bail can be granted under Section 20(8) unless the Designated Court is satisfied after notice to the public prosecutor that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Sub­section (9) qualifies 84 sub­section   (8)   to   the   extent   that   the   two   conditions contained   in   clauses   ( a )   and   ( b )   are   in   addition   to   the limitations prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force relating to the grant of bail. Strictly speaking Section 20(8) is not the source of power of the Designated Court to grant bail but it places further limitations on the exercise of its power to grant bail in   cases   under   TADA,   as   is   amply   clear   from   the   plain language of Section 20(9). The Constitution Bench in  Kartar 19 Singh case  while dealing with the ambit and scope of sub­ sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the Act quoted with 20 approval the following observations from  Usmanbhai case : (SCC p. 704, para 344) ‘Though   there   is   no   express   provision   excluding   the applicability of Section 439 of the Code similar to the one contained in Section 20(7) of the Act in relation to a case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder, but that result must, by   necessary   implication,   follow.   It   is   true   that   the source of power of a Designated Court to grant bail is not Section 20(8) of the Act as it only places limitations on such power. This is made explicit by Section 20(9) which enacts that the limitations on granting of bail specified   in   Section   20(8)   are   ‘in   addition   to   the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force’. But it does not necessarily follow that the   power   of   a   Designated   Court   to   grant   bail   is relatable   to   Section   439   of   the   Code.   It   cannot   be doubted that a Designated Court is ‘a court other than the   High   Court   or   the   Court   of   Session’   within   the meaning of Section 437 of the Code. The exercise of the power to grant bail by a Designated Court is not only subject to the limitations contained therein, but is also subject to the limitations placed by Section 20(8) of the Act.’ and went on to add: (SCC p. 704, para 345) ‘Reverting to Section 20(8), if either of the two conditions mentioned therein is not satisfied, the ban operates and the accused person cannot be released on bail but of course it is subject to Section 167(2) as modified by 19   (1994) 3 SCC 569 20   (1988) 2 SCC 271 85 Section 20(4) of the TADA Act in relation to a case under the provisions of TADA.’ Thus, the ambit and scope of Section 20(8) of TADA is no longer   res integra   and from the above discussion it follows that both the provisions i.e. Section 20(4) and 20(8) of TADA operate in different situations and are controlled and guided by different considerations.”   We fail to understand as to how this decision will be of 33. any avail to the respondent.   In our opinion, the Designated Court had rightly rejected the bail application after adverting to the relevant material/evidence indicative of the fact that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the respondent is  prima facie  true.  34. With reference to the document D­132(a), the High Court was   impressed   by   the   argument   that   the   same   would   be inadmissible. To buttress that opinion of the High Court, the respondent would rely on the decision of this Court in   V.C.   (supra).   Further, it was submitted that in light of Shukla   Section 34 of the Evidence Act, the said document could not be admitted in evidence, since it was not an entry in the books of account regularly kept in the course of business. In any case, that document by itself would not be sufficient in the 86 absence   of   any   independent   evidence.   Learned   Attorney General,   relying   on   the   underlying   principle   in   Khoday Distilleries   Ltd.   and   Ors.   Vs.   State   of   Karnataka   and 21 Ors. ,   would contend that there cannot be business in crime and, as such, Section 34 of the Evidence Act will have no application. He further submits that the prosecution may use the   facts  noted   in  the   said  document and   prove  the   same against the respondent by other evidence. This argument need not   detain   us.   For,   we   find   force   in   the   argument   of   the learned Attorney General that the issue of admissibility and credibility   of   the   material   and   evidence   presented   by   the Investigating Officer would be a matter for trial. Furthermore, indubitably,   the   prosecution   is   not   solely   relying   on   the document D­132(a) recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt  (W­29). There are also other incriminatory documents recovered from respondent (Accused No.10) himself during   the   search,   including   other   independent   evidence, which, indeed, will have to be proved during the trial.  21   (1995) 1 SCC 574 (para 60) 87 35. The   appellant   has   relied   on   the   exposition   in   Salim (supra), to contend that in cases where the High Court Khan  adopted a totally erroneous approach, as in the present case, discarding the crucial material/evidence which is referred to in the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and presented before the Designated Court, then the order granting bail by the High Court   cannot   be   countenanced.   The   argument   of   the respondent is that the said decision would make no difference as it is concerning an application for cancellation of bail made by the informant. However, we find force in the argument of the appellant that the High Court, in the present case, adopted an inappropriate approach whilst considering the prayer for grant of bail. The High Court ought to have taken into account the totality of the material and evidence on record as it is and ought not to have discarded it as being inadmissible. The High Court clearly overlooked the settled legal position that, at the stage of considering the prayer for bail, it is not necessary to weigh the material, but only form opinion on the basis of the material before it on broad probabilities. The Court is expected 88 to apply its mind to ascertain whether the accusations against the accused  are   prima face  true. Indeed, in the present case, we are not called upon to consider the prayer for cancellation of bail as such but to examine the correctness of the approach of the High Court in granting bail to the accused despite the materials   and   evidence   indicating   that   accusations   made against him are  prima facie  true.  36. In a decision of this Court in  Chenna Boyanna Krishna (supra), to which reference has been made, the Court Yadav  has   re­stated   the   twin   conditions   to   be   considered   by   the Court before grant of bail in relation to MCOCA offences. We are of the view that in the present case, the Designated Court rightly opined that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the respondent is  prima facie  true. As we are not inclined to accept the prayer for bail, in our opinion,   it   is   not   necessary   to   dilate   on   other   aspects   to obviate prolixity.  37. A fortiori, we deem it proper to reverse the order passed by the High Court granting bail to the respondent. Instead, we 89 agree with the conclusion recorded by the Designated Court that in the facts of the present case, the respondent is not entitled to grant of bail in connection with the stated offences, particularly   those falling under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act.  38. Accordingly,   this   appeal   succeeds.   The   impugned judgment and order is set aside and, instead, the order passed by the Designated Court rejecting the application for grant of bail made by the respondent herein, is affirmed.    All pending applications are also disposed of. 39. …………………………..….J.           (A.M. Khanwilkar) …………………………..….J.          (Ajay Rastogi) New Delhi; April 02, 2019.