SATBIR SINGH vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA

R EPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 1735­1736 OF 2010 SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER                 …APPELLANTS Versus STATE OF HARYANA              …RESPONDENT JUDGMENT N. V. RAMANA, CJI. 1. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment dated 06.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos. 3­SB of 1998 and 16­SB of 1998, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals preferred by   the   appellants   and   upheld   the   order   of   conviction   and Signature Not Verified sentence passed by the Trial Court on 11.12.1997. Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2021.05.28 18:00:04 IST Reason: 1 2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased and accused­ appellant no.1 were married on 01.07.1994. On 31.7.1995, at about 4 or 4.30 P.M, some persons informed the complainant that his daughter was ailing and admitted in the hospital. On this information he, along with his wife and son, reached the hospital and found that the deceased passed away due to burn injuries.   The   prosecution’s   case   was   that   the   deceased committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year of   her   marriage   and   that   soon   before   her   death   she   was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of bringing less dowry by both the accused. 3. The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court   vide   order dated 11.12.1997 for the offences under Sections 304­B and 306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304­B, IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under Section 306, IPC. 2 4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court to set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. The  High Court   vide   impugned judgment dated 06.11.2008, upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have filed the present   appeals   by   way   of   Special   Leave,   challenging   the concurrent findings of the Courts below. 5. The   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants submitted that the possibility of accidental fire has not been ruled out in the present case. Moreover, most importantly, the prosecution failed to prove that there was a demand for dowry. Lastly, the prosecution has failed to prove that the demand, assuming there was one, was made proximate to the death of the deceased­victim. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent­ State submitted that the appellants had not been able to show any material which would merit the interference of this Court in the   concurrent   findings   of   the   Courts   below.   The   counsel 3 especially emphasized upon the fact that the suspicious death of   the   deceased   victim   occurred   within   almost   1   year   of marriage.   Moreover,   the   witnesses   have   stated   the   specific instances of demand for dowry with consistency. Having heard counsel appearing on either side and perusing 7. the material on record, this Court needs to answer following questions: I. Whether   the   Trial   Court,   and   the   High   Court,   was   correct   in convicting the accused on the charge under Section 304B, IPC? II. Whether   the   Trial   Court,   and   the   High   Court,   was   correct   in convicting the accused on the charge under Section 306, IPC?   I SSUE  I   At the outset, it is pertinent to analyze the law on dowry death. 8. Section 304­B IPC, which defines, and provides the punishment for dowry demand, reads as under: “ 304­B.  Dowry death . —(1) Where the death of a   woman   is   caused   by   any   burns   or   bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal 4

Section 304B (1) defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It provides that   ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is caused by burning   or   bodily   injuries   or   occurs   otherwise   than   under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Sub­clause (2) provides  for punishment for those who cause  dowry  death. 5 Accordingly, in  Major Singh v. State of Punjab , (2015) 5 SCC 201, a three­Judge Bench of this Court held as follows:

9. The first contentious part  that exists in the interpretation of Section 304­B, IPC relates to the phrase “ soon before ” used in the  Section.   Being   a   criminal   statute,   generally   it   is   to   be interpreted strictly. However, where strict interpretation leads to absurdity or goes against the spirit of legislation, the courts may   in   appropriate   cases   place   reliance   upon   the   genuine 6 import of the words, taken in their usual sense to resolve such . ambiguities [ refer   Commissioner   of   Customs   (Import), , (2018) 9 SCC 1, Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company State of   Gujarat   v.   Mansukhbhai   Kanjibhai   Shah,   2020   SCC OnLine SC 412]. At this juncture, it is therefore necessary to undertake a study of the legislative history of this Section, in order to determine the intention of the legislature behind the inclusion of Section 304­B, IPC.  10. Section 304­B, IPC is one among many legislative initiatives undertaken by Parliament to remedy a long­standing social evil. The pestiferous nature of dowry harassment, wherein married women   are   being   subjected   to   cruelty   because   of   covetous demands by husband and his relatives has not gone unnoticed. The Parliament enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as a first step to eradicate this social evil. Further, as the measures were   found   to   be   insufficient,   the   Criminal   Law   (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983) was passed wherein Chapter XX­A was introduced in the IPC, containing Section 498­A.  7 11. However,   despite   the   above   measures,   the   issue   of   dowry harassment   was   still   prevalent.   Additionally,   there   was   a growing   trend   of   deaths   of   young   brides   in   suspicious circumstances   following   demands   of   dowry.   The   need   for   a stringent law to curb dowry deaths was  suo motu  taken up by st the Law Commission in its 91   Law Commission Report. The Law Commission recognized that the IPC, as it existed at that relevant   time,   was   insufficient   to   tackle   the   issue   of   dowry deaths   due   to   the   nature   and   modus   of   the   crime.   They observed as under: “1.3     If, in a particular incident of dowry death, the facts are such as to satisfy the legal   ingredients   of   an   offence   already known to the law, and if those facts can be proved without much difficulty, the existing criminal law can be resorted to for bringing the offender to book.  IN practice, however, two main impediments arise ­­ (i) either the facts do not fully fit into the pigeon­hole of any known offence; or (ii) the peculiarities of the situation are such that proof of directly incriminating facts is thereby rendered difficult .” (emphasis supplied) 8 12. Taking   into   consideration   the   aforesaid   Law   Commission Report,   and   the   continuing   issues   relating   to   dowry   related offences, the Parliament introduced amendments to the Dowry Prohibition   Act,   as   well   as   the   IPC   by   enacting   Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 43 of 1986). By way of this   amendment,  Section   304­B,   IPC   was   specifically introduced   in  the   IPC,  as   a  stringent  provision  to   curb  the menace of dowry death in India. Shrimati Margaret Alva, who presented the Amendment Bill before Rajya Sabha observed as follows: “This is a social evil and social legislation, as I said cannot correct every thing. We are trying to see how and where we can make it a little more difficult and therefore we have increased   the   punishment.   We   have   also provided for certain presumptions because upto now one of our main problem has been the question of evidence. Because the bride is   generally   burnt   or   the   wife   is   burnt behind closed doors in her in­law’s home . You   have   never   really   heard   of   a   girl being   burnt   while   cooking   in   her mother’s house or her husband’s house. It is always in the mother­in­law’s house that she catches fire and is burnt in the kitchen.   Therefore,   getting   evidence 9 immediately   becomes   a   great   bit problem. Therefore, we have brought in a couple   of   amendments   which   give certain presumptions where the burden of proof shifts to the husband and to his people to show that it was not a dowry death   or   that   it   was   not   deliberately done .” (emphasis supplied) 13. There is no denying that such social evil is persisting even today. A study titled “ Global study on Homicide: Gender­related killing of women and girls ”, published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, highlighted that in 2018 female dowry   deaths   account   for   40   to   50   percent   of   all   female homicides recorded annually in India. The dismal truth is that from the  period  1999 to 2016,  these figures have  remained constant.   In   fact,   the   latest   data   furnished   by   the   National Crime Records Bureau indicates that in 2019 itself, 7115 cases were registered under Section 304­B, IPC alone. 14. Considering   the   significance   of   such   a   legislation,   a   strict interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was 10 enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can range   from   physical,   verbal   or   even   emotional.   This   list   is certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore be laid down by this Court to define what exacts the phrase “soon before” entails. The aforesaid position was emphasized by

5 SCC 207, wherein the three­Judge Bench held that: “ 15.  … “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances   of   each   case   and   no straitjacket   formula   can   be   laid   down   by fixing any time­limit. …  In relation to dowry deaths,   the   circumstances   showing   the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct.   Such   conduct   may   be   spread   ….   over a period of time. Proximate and live   link   between   the   effect   of   cruelty based   on   dowry   demand   and   the consequential   death   is   required   to   be 11

Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the 15. period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim   would   come   within   the   term   “soon   before”.   What   is pivotal to the above determination, is the establishment of a “ ”   between   the   cruelty   and   the proximate   and   live   link consequential death of the victim.  16. When the prosecution shows that ‘ soon before her death such woman   has   been   subjected   by   such   person   to   cruelty   or

presumption   of   causation   arises   against   the   accused   under Section 113­B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has 12 to rebut this statutory presumption. Section 113B, Evidence Act reads as under:

Explanation.   ­   For   the   purpose   of   this   section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”  17. This   Court,   in   the   case   of   Bansi   Lal  v.  State   of Haryana ,  (2011)   11   SCC   359,   emphasized   the   mandatory application   of   the   presumption   under   Section   113­B   of   the Evidence Act once the ingredients of Section 304­B of IPC stood proved:  “  It   may   be   mentioned   herein   that   the 19. legislature in its wisdom has used the word ‘shall’ thus, making a mandatory application on   the   part   of   the   court   to   presume   that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection   with   any   demand   of   dowry.   … 13 Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113­B relatable to Section 304­B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. … 20.   Therefore,   in   case   the   essential ingredients   of   such   death   have   been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. ” ( emphasis supplied ) 18. Therefore, once all the essential ingredients are established by the   prosecution,   the   presumption   under   Section   113­B, Evidence Act mandatorily operates against the accused. This presumption of causality that arises can be rebutted by the accused.  The   usage   of   rebuttable   presumption   of   causality,   under 19. Section 113­B, Evidence Act, creates a greater responsibility on Judges, defense and prosecution. They need to be extra careful during   conducting   criminal   trials   relating   to   Section   304­B, IPC. In order to address this precarious situation, procedural law has some safeguards, which merits mentioning herein. 14 20. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual  and   cursory  manner,   without  specifically   questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice­ “ audi alteram partem ”, as   it   enables   the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the incriminatory   material   appearing   against   him.   Therefore,   it imposes an obligation on the part of the Court to question the accused   fairly,   with   care   and   caution.   The   Court   must   put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense, since the inception of the trial, with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act. 21. Section 232, CrPC assumes importance, which reads as, “ If, after   taking   the   evidence   for   the   prosecution,   examining   the 15 accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal ”. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused. Existence of such   procedural   right   cohesively   sits   with   the   rebuttable presumption as provided under Section 113­B, Evidence Act. 22. The second   contentious part relating to Section 304­B, IPC is that  it  does   not   take  a  pigeonhole   approach  in  categorizing death   as   homicidal   or   suicidal   or   accidental,   as   was   done earlier. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that   death   occurring   “otherwise   than   under   normal circumstances”   can,   in   cases,   be   homicidal   or   suicidal   or accidental. However, the Section 304­B, IPC endeavors to also 16 address   those   situations   wherein   murders   or   suicide   are masqueraded as accidents. 23. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304­B IPC are fulfilled, any death whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death" unless proved otherwise. The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death. [ refer   Maya Devi v. State of Haryana , (2015) 17 SCC 405,   Shanti v. State of Haryana , (1991) 1 SCC 371] 24. After having observed the law on Section 304­B, IPC, we may now   turn   to   the   merits   of   this   case.   It   is   clear   that   the submissions of the counsel for the appellants must be rejected. It   is   an   admitted   fact   that   the   deceased   and   accused   were 17 married on 01.07.1994, and the death of the lady occurred on 31.07.1995.   25. With respect to the cause of death, the doctor (P.W.3) found the smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had suffered 85% burn injuries. Therefore, in the present case, the deceased   victim   succumbed   to   burns.   As   the   death   was relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence.   Coming to the issue of dowry demand, the evidence on record 26. indicates that when the brother of the deceased (P.W.7) visited her in the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed that   the   accused,   husband   and   mother­in­law,   used   to physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand   of   a   scooter.   Pursuant   to   this   disclosure,   she   was brought   back   to   her   paternal   house   where   this   fact   was disclosed to father of the deceased (P.W.6). It is pertinent to 18 note that, only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house. However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry. The aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to visit him.  27. It   must   be   emphasized   herein   that,   just   a   week   before  the death, on the occasion of Teej festival, another brother of the deceased   (P.W.10)   had   visited   her   while   she   was   in   her matrimonial home. The deceased had reiterated her plight to her   brother.   Thereafter,   on   31.07.1995,   the   father   of   the deceased was informed by some villagers that his daughter has been   admitted   in   the   hospital.   Upon   reaching,   the   father discovered that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries. The aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased. The Trial Court, and the High Court,   upon   a  close   appreciation   of   the   aforesaid   witnesses came to the conclusion that the statements were corroborative and consistent. They found the witnesses to be reliable and on 19 the basis of the same held that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death as she failed to bring sufficient dowry. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid finding of the Trial Court and the High Court.  From the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was 28. able to successfully prove that the death of the deceased due to burn injuries took place within approximately one year of her marriage. It has further been proved that soon before her death she   was   subjected   to   harassment   and   cruelty   pursuant   to demands of dowry. Since the ingredients of Section 304­B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption under 113­B, Evidence Act operates   against   the   appellants,   who   are   deemed   to   have caused the offence specified under Section 304­B of IPC.  29. The   burden   therefore   shifts   on   the   accused   to   rebut   the aforesaid   presumption.   The   counsel   for   the   appellants   has canvassed before us that it was a case of accidental death, and hence  no liability can be fixed upon them.  However, in the present case, the accused persons failed to place any evidence 20 on   record   to   prove   that   the   death   was   accidental   or unconnected with the accused persons.  30. Here, it ought to be noted that, according to the evidence of the doctor,   the   entire   body   of   the   deceased   was   doused   with kerosene oil. Therefore, the possibility of an accident can be safely ruled out. As the Trial Court concluded: “All these circumstances go to prove that either deceased   committed   suicide   by   sprinkling kerosene oil on her body or she was burnt by sprinkling kerosene on her body either by the accused or by somebody else and the plea of accident  tried to be made out by the  learned counsel for the accused, is not at all proved.” 31. Therefore,   the   presumption   adumbrated   in   Section   113­B, Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has not   been   rebutted   by   the   accused­appellants   herein.   The appellants have failed to make out a case for us to interfere in the concurrent opinions of the Courts below,  convicting the accused­appellants under Section 304­B, IPC.      I SSUE  II   21 32. Apart   from   their   conviction   under   Section   304­B,   IPC,   the appellants   have   also   additionally   challenged   their   conviction under     Section   306,   IPC.   Section   306,   IPC   relates   to   the abetment of suicide and is extracted below: “ 306. Abetment of suicide . —If any person commits   suicide,   whoever   abets   the commission   of   such   suicide,   shall   be punished   with   imprisonment   of   either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 33. A bare reading  of the provision indicates that for the offence under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same. With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113­A, Evidence Act   creates   a   presumption   against   the   husband   and/or   his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married woman,   under   certain   conditions.   Not   going   into   the   other conditions,   a   perusal   of   the   provision   indicates   that   such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has 22 been   established   by   the   prosecution   first.   The   necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306, I.P.C. were considered by this court in   Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana , (1989) 1 SCC 244,  wherein this Court held that: “5.   …Reading   Sections   306   and   307   (  107) sic together it is clear that if any person instigates any other person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the other person commits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished under Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860   for   abetting   the   commission   of   suicide.   A plain   reading   of   this   provision   shows   that before a person can be convicted of abetting the   suicide   of   any   other   person,   it   must   be established that such other person committed .” suicide   (emphasis supplied) 34. In the present case, the Trial Court and the High Court have concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However, we are of the considered opinion that the conclusion reached by the   Courts   below   is   based   on   assumptions,   as   there   is   no evidence on record to support the same. The reasoning of the Trial Court in this regard is as follows: 23 “Further, there is no direct evidence having been   adduced   by   the   prosecution   the   ( sic ) any   of   the   accused   caused   death   by sprinkling   kerosene   on   the   body   of   the deceased, the only possibility is that Meena Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene on her body.” 35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove the   factum   of   suicide   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   the presumption under Section 113­A, Evidence Act, is not of much help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by adducing   sufficient   evidence.   In   the   present   case,   the prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306, IPC merits interference by this Court.   C ONCLUSIONS   36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act can be summarized below: 24 i. Section 304­B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand. ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304­B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption   of   causality,   provided   under   Section   113­B, Evidence Act operates against the accused. iii. The phrase “ soon before ” as appearing in Section 304­B, IPC cannot   be   construed   to   mean   ‘immediately   before’.   The prosecution   must   establish   existence   of   “ proximate   and   live link ” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. iv. Section 304­B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “ otherwise than under normal circumstances ” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.  v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304­B, IPC read with 113­B, Evidence Act,  Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial. vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and 25 cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere   procedural   formality,   as   it   based   on   the   fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “ audi alteram partem ” as it enables   the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the incriminatory   material   appearing   against   him.   Therefore,   it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.  vii. The   Court  must  put  incriminating   circumstances  before  the accused  and  seek  his  response. A duty  is  also cast  on the counsel   of   the   accused   to   prepare   his   defense   since   the inception   of   the   Trial   with   due   caution,   keeping   in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act. viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “ If, after taking the evidence for   the   prosecution,   examining   the   accused   and   hearing   the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal ”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.  26 ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move   on   and   fix   hearings   specifically   for   ‘defence   evidence’, calling  upon  the  accused to  present his  defense as  per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.  x. In   the   same   breath,   Trial   Courts   need   to   balance   other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics. xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines   laid   down   by   this   Court   while   sentencing   and imposing appropriate punishment. xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing   day   by   day.   However,   it   is   also   observed   that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach. 37. In   light   of   the   above   findings,   after   perusing   the   relevant material and the evidence available, we find that the High Court and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the appellants under Section 304­B, IPC as the appellants failed to 27 discharge   the   burden   under   Section   113­B,   Evidence   Act. However, upon appreciation of facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that the offence under Section 306, IPC is not made out. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 306, IPC.  38. Appeals allowed to the above extent. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. ………………………..CJI. (N.V. RAMANA)    …………………………. J. (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) NEW DELHI; MAY 28, 2021 28