Rahul Gupta vs. Station House Officer

Reportable
2026 INSC 374

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 13755 of 2025


Rahul Gupta … Petitioner

versus

Station House Officer and others … Respondents


J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KUMAR, J
1. Matrimonial relations having soured between the couple, the fallout
was litigation and exchange of acrimonious allegations. FIR No. 03 of
2023 was registered on 07.01.2023 by the Mahila Thana, Ambikapur, on
the complaint made by the wife, Radhika Gupta, respondent No. 7,
against the husband, Rahul Gupta, the petitioner, and his family members
for offences punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code,
1 2
1860 , and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 . The petitioner’s
Signature Not Verified
grievance is that a FIR was not registered on his complaint dated
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2026.04.16
17:23:42 IST
Reason:

1
For short, ‘IPC’
2
For short, ‘the DP Act’
1

25.12.2023, wherein he had alleged that the complaint and statements
made by his wife and her family members amounted to acceptance of their
giving dowry and that Section 3 of the DP Act criminalized both the ‘giving’
and the ‘taking’ of dowry, requiring registration of an FIR against them.
The petitioner’s endeavour to get an FIR registered failed before the
2.
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, and then, in revision,
before the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur. Thereupon, he
approached the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, by way of Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition No. 2754 of 2024, under Section 528 of the
3
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 . However, this attempt also
met with failure as the High Court dismissed his petition on 23.04.2025.
Aggrieved thereby, he filed the present petition.
3. Upon hearing the petitioner, who appears as a party-in-person; the
learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondents; and the
learned counsel for the State of Chhattisgarh, this Court, by order dated
22.01.2026, requested Mr. Dhananjaya Mishra, learned counsel, to assist
the Court as amicus curiae .
Facts relevant for the purposes of this order may now be set out.
4.
The marriage between the couple was solemnised on 24.11.2007 at
Raipur, Chhattisgarh. They have three children, two daughters and a son,

3
For short, ‘the BNSS’
2

who are stated to be residing with the father at Raipur. The wife left the
matrimonial home on 25.12.2021 and returned to her parental home. She
sought a divorce while the husband sought restitution of conjugal rights.
5. FIR No. 03 of 2023 was registered on 07.01.2022 at the behest of
the wife against the petitioner and his family members. In her statement
4
recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ,
the wife spoke of dowry being discussed at the time of her marriage and
the payment of dowry before the marriage itself. Similar statements were
made by her family members. After completion of the investigation in
relation to the said FIR, chargesheet dated 07.01.2023 was filed against
the petitioner and his parents for offences under Section 498A IPC and
Section 3 of the DP Act. Thereafter, the petitioner addressed written
complaint dated 25.12.2023 seeking registration of a separate FIR against
his wife and her family members. His allegation was that though dowry
was not taken by him and his family, the statements made by his wife and
her family members to the effect that they had given dowry constituted the
offence of ‘giving’ dowry under Section 3 of the DP Act. He also made
certain other allegations which are not relevant for our purposes presently.
6. As his complaint failed to evoke the expected response, the
petitioner filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the

4
For short, ‘the CrPC’
3

learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur. This application was
dismissed by order dated 19.01.2024. Perusal of the order reflects that
the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that accepting the plea of the
petitioner would amount to directing reinvestigation in the FIR already
registered at the instance of the wife. Holding that he had no such power
to direct reinvestigation or de novo investigation, the learned Magistrate
rejected the plea of the petitioner. Thereupon, the petitioner applied for
review of the aforestated order dated 19.01.2024 passed by the learned
Magistrate under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This
application was rejected on 15.02.2024 by the learned Magistrate, holding
that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
enabling review of an order passed thereunder.
7. The petitioner then filed a revision under Section 397 CrPC before
the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, assailing the orders
dated 19.01.2024 and 15.02.2024. However, the revision was dismissed
by order dated 23.08.2024. Therein, the learned Sessions Judge upheld
the view of the learned Magistrate that there was no provision permitting
review of an order passed in a criminal case. On the rejection of the
petitioner’s application under Section 156(3) CrPC, the learned Sessions
Judge held that, based on the allegations made by the petitioner, it could
not be said that a cognizable offence was made out and the Magistrate
had, therefore, not committed any error in dismissing the said application.
4

8. Assailing this order, the petitioner approached the High Court by
way of the subject petition under Section 528 BNSS. However, by the
order dated 30.07.2025, the High Court dismissed the petition. Perusal of
the said order reflects that the High Court agreed with the petitioner that
he was not seeking further investigation in FIR No. 03 of 2023 and his
grievance was with regard to the failure to register a separate FIR based
on the statements made by his wife and her family members during the
course of investigation in FIR No. 03 of 2023. The High Court, however,
opined that the allegations made by the petitioner would necessarily entail
oblique reinvestigation in FIR No. 03 of 2023. The High Court held that a
Magistrate could not be reduced to a post office to direct registration of an
FIR. In the light of the concurrent orders passed by the learned Magistrate
and the learned Sessions Judge, the High Court concluded that there was
no scope to interfere. The petition was, accordingly, dismissed.
Perusal of the petitioner’s complaint dated 25.12.2023 and his
9.
application under Section 156(3) CrPC manifests that the wife’s written
complaint and the statements made by the wife and her family members,
recorded under Section 161 CrPC, were the only material relied upon by
the petitioner to seek initiation of criminal proceedings against them for
the offence under Section 3 of the DP Act. He also relied upon the decision
of the Delhi High Court in Neera Singh vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
5

5
and others , which held that action must also be taken against those who
give dowry. In effect, the only foundation laid by the petitioner for
registration of an FIR under Section 3 of the DP Act was the wife’s
complaint and the statements of the wife and her family members,
recorded under Section 161 CrPC. No independent evidence in proof of
the ‘giving’ of dowry was offered by the petitioner. Whether this was
sufficient to set the process of criminal law in motion is the question.
10. The DP Act was promulgated to address the evil of dowry system
prevalent in our country. The Statement of Objects and Reasons records
that this legislation aimed at prohibiting the evil practice of ‘giving and
taking’ of dowry. The DP Act came into force on 01.07.1961. Section 3
thereof is titled ‘Penalty for giving or taking dowry’. Section 3 of the DP
Act, as it originally stood, read as under: -
‘3. If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or
abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.’

11. Section 3(1), which was the original Section 3, with later
amendments, now states that if any person, after the commencement of
the DP Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than

5
( 2007) 138 DLT 152 = ILR (2007) 1 DEL 691
6

five years and with fine which shall not be less than ₹15,000/- or the
amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more. The proviso
thereto, however, empowers the Court to impose a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of less than five years after recording adequate
and special reasons therefor.
Mr. Dhananjaya Mishra, learned amicus curiae , placed before us
12.
extracts from the Joint Parliamentary Committee Report dated 11.08.1982
in the context of Section 3 of the DP Act and the offence of ‘giving’ dowry.
The objections of the members of the Committee to the same were
broadly on the ground that the parents of the bride, who submit a
complaint in relation to dowry, would then be open to prosecution; that the
giver of dowry is usually compelled to do so, as girls would remain
unmarried otherwise; that the giver of the dowry should not be dealt with
on equal footing as the taker, being the aggrieved party; and that the giver
of dowry is forced to do so by societal and customary norms. One of the
recommendations of the Committee was that the givers of dowry, i.e., the
parents, should not be equated with those who take the dowry, as the
givers are victims rather than criminals, as parents are compelled to give
dowry and they do not do so out of their free will. The Committee also
observed that if both the giver and the taker are penalised, no giver of
dowry can be expected to come forward to make a complaint, being under
the threat of being prosecuted himself.
7

13. It was pursuant to this Joint Parliamentary Committee Report dated
11.08.1982, that major amendments were made to the DP Act. The first
set of amendments were made in the year 1984 and, thereafter, Act 43 of
1986 brought about further changes therein. It is in this context that the
learned amicus curiae drew our attention to Section 7(3) of the DP Act,
which is of utmost significance. This sub-section was inserted in the DP
Act with effect from 19.11.1986 by Act 43 of 1986. Section 7 is titled
‘Cognizance of offences’. It reads as under: -

8

In essence, Section 7(3) provides that statements made by the wife
and her family members, being the persons aggrieved, against the
husband and his family with regard to the ‘taking’ of dowry cannot be the
substratum for launching prosecution against the wife and her family
members for the offence of ‘giving dowry’ under Section 3 of the DP Act.
Significantly, in ( supra ), a learned Judge of the Delhi
14. Neera Singh
High Court observed that the complaint made by the wife therein showed
that dowry demands were made even before the marriage and despite
being well-educated, the wife went ahead with the marriage. Opining that
these kinds of allegations made after the breakdown of marriage indicated
the mentality of the complainants, the High Court concluded that such
allegations should result in the police registering a case under the DP Act
against the parents of the wife as well, who had gotten their daughter
married despite demand for dowry. Reference was made to Section 3 of
the Act, which prohibits ‘giving and taking’ of dowry but, surprisingly, the
High Court failed to notice Section 7(3), which specifically states that a
statement made by the ‘person aggrieved’ by the offence shall not subject
such person to prosecution under the DP Act. Failing to stop short at this
blunder, the High Court went on to state that Metropolitan Magistrates
should take cognizance under the DP Act in respect of the offence of
‘giving’ dowry whenever allegations were made that dowry was given as
a consideration for the marriage.
9

15. Notably, Neera Singh ( supra ) was a case where the wife’s
complaint of dowry harassment was not accepted by the learned
Magistrate and, thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge held that no prima
facie case was made out under Section 498A IPC against the husband
and his family. This was, thus, not even a case involving an allegation as
to the wife’s family being liable for prosecution for ‘giving’ dowry. The
observations and comments made by the High Court in that regard were,
therefore, completely uncalled for and unnecessary.
16. Section 7(3) of the DP Act did fall for consideration before various
High Courts thereafter. The Delhi High Court had occasion to deal with it
6
in Pooja Saxena vs. State and another . Therein, the wife had sought
quashing of the FIR registered against her under Section 3 of the DP Act
for the offence of ‘giving’ dowry. Adverting to Neera Singh ( supra ), the
learned Judge held that the observations made therein were in the nature
of obiter dicta . Further, the learned Judge noted that Section 7(3) of the
DP Act had not been taken into account and, therefore,
Neera Singh
( supra ) was not of guidance. On facts, the learned Judge held that Section
7(3) of the DP Act would come to the rescue of the wife and she could not,
therefore, be subjected to prosecution under Section 3 of the DP Act. This
Court confirmed the view taken by the learned Judge, as SLP (Crl.) Nos.

6
2011(1) Crimes 378 (Del) = 2010 SCC OnLine Del 3652
10

1339-1340 of 2011 filed against his order were dismissed on 07.03.2011.
7
Again, in Yashpal Kumar vs. Bhola Nath Khanna and another , the
Delhi High Court followed the view taken in Pooja Saxena ( supra ).
17. The Madras High Court had occasion to consider the provision in
8
. Therein,
Ajita David vs. State, by Inspector of Police, and another
the Madras High Court held that Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the DP Act could not
be interpreted to mean that a parent of the bride would not fall within the
category of a ‘person aggrieved’. It was observed that the parent of the
victim girl is definitely a person aggrieved by the offence and, by no stretch
of imagination, the legislature would have thought of excluding the parent
from the purview of the ‘person aggrieved’ by the offence, while drafting
Section 7(3) of the DP Act. The High Court concluded that, at any rate, the
phrase ‘person aggrieved by the offence’ employed in Section 7(3) of the
DP Act could not be construed in such a manner that it would only refer to
the bride as, in its considered opinion, the parents and other relatives of
the bride can safely be classified as ‘persons aggrieved’ by the offence,
as contemplated under Section 7(3) of the DP Act.
18. Similar views were expressed by the Jharkhand High Court in Ram
9
Gopal Sah vs. State of Jharkhand and by the Madhya Pradesh High

7
(2012) 2 DLT (Cri) 41
8
(2009) 2 MWN (Cri) 257
9
2009 (1) JLJR 432 (HC)
11

10
Court in Haji Sayyad vs. State of M.P. and another . The Allahabad
High Court also followed suit in Ram Charitra Tiwari and others vs.
11
State of UP and another . Given the weighty judicial thought process
reflected in the aforestated decisions, with which we are in complete
agreement, the decision in ( supra ), relied upon by the
Neera Singh
petitioner, has no value. The observations therein have no precedential
effect, having been made in ignorance of Section 7(3) of the DP Act.
19. However, as rightly pointed out by the learned amicus curiae , we
may clarify that a second FIR can be registered on the strength of a
complaint, which presents a rival version or a counter claim (See Upkar
12
Singh vs. Ved Prakash and others ). Elaborating on this principle in
13
Anju Chaudhary vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , this Court
opined that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence but
where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even
where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall
within the ambit and scope of the first FIR, then a second FIR can be
registered. The recent decision of this Court in
State of Rajasthan vs.
14
culled out five principles on the issue of
Surendra Singh Rathore
registration of a second FIR: -

10
ILR 2012 MP 2610
11
ILR (2021) 7 ALL 379
12
(2004) 13 SCC 292
13
(2013) 6 SCC 384
14
2025 INSC 248 = 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358
12

‘9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival
version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already
stands registered.
9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they may
arise from the same set of circumstances.
9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or
set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to
the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.’

20. Therefore, had it been a case where independent evidence was
presented with regard to the ‘giving’ of dowry and reliance was not placed
only upon the complaint and statements made by the persons aggrieved,
i.e., the wife and her family members, it would have been possible to
register an FIR for the offence of ‘giving’ dowry under Section 3 of the DP
Act as, in such a situation, the protection afforded to the ‘persons
aggrieved’, under Section 7(3) of the DP Act, would not be available to
them. However, if in a given case all that is projected to establish the
offence of ‘giving’ dowry under Section 3 of the DP Act is the complaint
and/or the statements made by the wife and her family members, it would
invariably mean that they, being the ‘persons aggrieved’, would be fully
covered by the shield of immunity raised under Section 7(3) of the DP Act
and would not be liable to be prosecuted on the strength thereof.
On the above analysis, we find no grounds made out to interfere
21.
with the orders passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned
Sessions Judge, which stood confirmed by the impugned order passed by
13

the High Court, though on the grounds cited hereinabove. To sum up, we
find that the grievance of the petitioner has no merit as his attack against
his wife, Radhika Gupta, respondent No.7, and her family members was
based only upon her complaint and the statements recorded by her and
her family members, under Section 161 CrPC, and the statutory protection
under Section 7(3) of the DP Act was, therefore, applicable to them.
The special leave petition is bereft of merit and is, accordingly,
22.
dismissed.
Last, but not the least, we must place on record our earnest
gratitude and appreciation for the erudite and invaluable assistance
provided by Mr. Dhananjay Mishra, learned amicus curiae .
Pending applications, if any, shall also stand dismissed.



……………………...J

[SANJAY KUMAR]


.……………………...J

[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
New Delhi;
April 16, 2026.

14