Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 427
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9330-9331 OF 2013
SADACHARI SINGH TOMAR …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.
1. The instant Appeals are directed against the judgment and order of the
High Court of Delhi dated 02.02.2012 dismissing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3792
of 2002 filed by the appellant, as well as the subsequent order dated 02.11.2012
in Review Petition No. 239 of 2012, whereby the High Court declined to review
its decision. By way of these impugned orders, the High Court affirmed the order
dated 01.04.2002 passed by the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative
Tribunal (“ CAT ”) at New Delhi in Original Application No. 1276 of 2001, which
had upheld the action taken by respondent no. 2, Indian Council of Agricultural
Research (“ ICAR ”), vide Office Order F. No. 4-2/98-Per. III dated 31.01.2001, of
curtailing the tenure of the appellant as Assistant Director General, Agricultural
Signature Not Verified
Research Information System (“ ADG ‑ ARIS ”) and reverting him to the post of
Digitally signed by
Deepak Guglani
Date: 2026.04.28
17:57:28 IST
Reason:
Senior Scientist, Central Institute of Agricultural Engineering (“ CIAE ”), Bhopal,
which he held prior to his appointment as ADG ‑ ARIS.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 1 of 12
2. The relevant facts, as they emerge from the record, may be summarised
briefly. The appellant joined ICAR as a Scientist on 24.08.1978. Subsequently,
he rose in service to the post of Senior Scientist at CIAE, Bhopal. On the basis
of a selection process conducted by the Agricultural Scientists Recruitment
Board (“ ASRB ”), the appellant applied for and was offered the post of ADG-ARIS
through Office Order F. No. 2(5)/96-Per. III dated 07.01.1998. He accepted and
was subsequently appointed to the post of ADG-ARIS w.e.f. 15.01.1998 “... for a
period of five years or until further orders, whichever is earlier ,” in terms of the
Office Order F. No. 4(2)/93-Per. III dated 11.02.1998.
3. During his tenure as ADG-ARIS, the appellant claims to have acted as a
whistleblower in relation to alleged irregularities in the award of contracts by
ICAR for the procurement of computer equipment worth Rs. 200 crores, as well
as highlighting anomalies with Rs. 1000 crores sanctioned for the National
Agriculture Technology Project (“ NATP ”). He states he raised multiple internal
objections and made recommendations regarding the manner in which certain
officials of ICAR were purportedly favouring certain private companies in the
award of these contracts, and also made complaints to the Central Vigilance
Commission and the Central Bureau of Investigation. He further contends that
this expose led to displeasure at higher levels and triggered retaliatory action
against him in the form of antedated adverse remarks in his Annual Assessment
Reports (“ AARs ”) and eventually, the premature curtailment of his tenure.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 2 of 12
4. In particular, on 27.01.2000, an Office Order F. No. 12(6)/99-NATP was
passed by ICAR removing the appellant from four NATP-related committees and
further directing that NATP Information System Development files be directly
sent to the Deputy Director General (“ DDG ”) (Engineering), without being routed
through the appellant. On 15.05.2000, a report titled “ Scientist is Shunted Out
for Highlighting an ICAR Scam ” appeared in the Indian Express newspaper.
5. Subsequently, the AARs pertaining to the appellant for the assessment
years 1997-1998, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 were communicated to him on
16.05.2000, 19.07.2000 and 07.09.2000, respectively. He, in turn, assailed and
sought to expunge the adverse remarks made in each of these AARs through
representations dated 13.06.2000, 14.08.2000, and 06.10.2000. The latter two
came to be rejected by way of a Memorandum F. No. 4-2/98-Per. III (Pt. II) dated
24.01.2001. Further, on the basis of those two AARs, his tenure was curtailed
on 31.01.2001. The appellant challenged this order by filing OA No. 1276/2001
before the CAT on 21.05.2001.
6. Meanwhile, through Office Order dated F. No. 12(13)/Pt.II/99/NATP dated
04.08.2000, the Union Minister of Agriculture (as the ex-officio President of the
ICAR Society) had authorized the institution of an enquiry against the appellant
for his conduct of allegedly approaching the press, as well as any other lapses or
misconduct, and appointed Dr. Kiran Singh, then DDG (Animal Sciences), ICAR,
as the Enquiry Officer. In compliance therewith, a total of thirty-three charges
were framed by Dr. Anwar Alam, DDG (Engineering). Chargesheet was served on
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the appellant and the enquiry was conducted. On 21.05.2001, Dr. Singh
submitted the Enquiry Report exonerating the appellant of all charges, including
that of going to the press, and described them as “ baseless and motivated ” in
nature.
7. Subsequently, on 04.01.2002, ICAR vide Office Order F. No. 4-2/98-Per.
III partially modified its earlier order dated 31.01.2001 and transferred the
appellant from CIAE, Bhopal to Indian Agricultural Research Institute (“ IARI ”)
New Delhi in the same capacity, effective immediately. This was stated therein
to be as per his request. On 01.04.2002, the CAT dismissed OA No.1276/2001,
and also recorded that the modified order went unchallenged. The appellant
submitted his joining report on the same day (01.04.2002), though he denied
making any request for transfer.
8. Shortly after, aggrieved by the order of the CAT, the appellant on
28.05.2002 approached the High Court by way of WP (C) No. 3792/2002. The
same was dismissed by the Division Bench on 02.02.2012. The appellant
thereupon filed RP (C) No. 239/2012, seeking review of the earlier judgment. The
said review petition was again dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated
02.11.2012, thereby affirming the original judgment and order in WP (C) No.
3792/2002. The appellant now prefers the instant Appeals before this Court.
ANALYSIS
9. At the very outset, we observe that the appellant has claimed the
protection of Article 311 of the Constitution; specifically, that under Article
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 4 of 12
311(2), he could not have been “ dismissed or removed or reduced in rank ” without
an enquiry as contemplated therein. Such a submission is totally unsustainable.
Article 311 applies only to civil servants or those who otherwise hold a ‘civil post’
under the Union or the State. ICAR, the respondent no.2 herein, functions as an
autonomous Society which reports to the Department of Agricultural Research
and Education, Ministry of Agriculture. Its recruitment, conditions of service,
and any matters arising therefrom are governed by the rules and bye-laws of
ICAR, including the dispute at hand. Thus, Article 311 is not attracted at all.
10. On the merits of the dispute, the CAT, at the first instance, had correctly
observed that the appellant had no “ enforceable right ” to complete the full five-
year term. The instant case is not one of the respondents-Authorities cutting
short a prescribed minimum tenure having basis in some statute and/or binding
judicial direction. Rather, at the time of appointment, the concerned Authority
had expressly reserved the power to curtail the tenure at any point before five
years by issuing further orders. Of course, this power is not absolute, but the
judicial review of its exercise is subject to the well-settled standards governing
administrative discretion i.e., review must be narrowly confined to assessing
whether the action was arbitrary or irrational, tainted by mala fides , or
colourable in nature, particularly vis-à-vis whether it imposes penal or stigmatic
consequences without following the required disciplinary or natural-justice
procedures. Our assessment must proceed within this limited framework, and
cannot serve as an evaluation of the substance of the action. As a three-Judge
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 5 of 12
Bench of this Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
1
Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava had expounded:
“25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making
process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure
fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held
against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached or where the conclusions
upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could
be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be
extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness
of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. Now, the Office Order dated 31.01.2001 is not punitive per se and only
reverts the appellant to the post held by him prior to his appointment as ADG-
ARIS. Needless to say, transfer (especially mere reversion or repatriation) is
ordinarily an incidence of service and cannot be said to amount to punishment
in and of itself. Here, we note that the appellant has vehemently contended that
post of ADG-ARIS was a ‘Research Management Position’, meaning that under
Rules 5, 6, 11(6), and 21 of the Agricultural Research Scientists Rules, 1985
(“ ARS Rules ”), he was entitled to be placed in an equivalent position on the same
1
[2021] 1 SCR 51.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 6 of 12
scale and grade. Hence, he contends that his reversion to Senior Scientist at
CIAE, Bhopal (two ranks below ADG-ARIS) was punitive in effect, if not in form.
12. This contention has been duly examined and negatived by the Courts
below, which had perused and found that the various provisions of the ARS
Rules relied upon contemplate only a transfer to a “ matching” or “suitable ”
position “ ” upon completion of the tenure (as opposed to
in research work
curtailment, as in the instant case), and that too “ depending on the [ICAR’s]
needs ”. As the CAT had rightly observed,
“ 12. …on completion of the tenure, the officer is to return to a
matching position in research work. This does not necessarily
mean that it has to be a matching position with regard to the post
and scale of pay as contended by the learned senior counsel. The
applicant’s tenure has also been curtailed in the present case and
he has not completed the tenure of 5 years. Thereafter, this
contention fails.
13. …The applicant has nowhere contended or roved that the
post on which he has been transferred either earlier by the
impugned order dated 31.1.2001 or thereafter by the
modification order dated 4.1.2002 as Senior Scientist is not a
matching position in research work. The later order has not been
challenged. …Thereafter, even if, as contended by the learned
senior counsel for the applicant the post of ADG, ARIS is a
Research Management position outside the ARS it cannot be held
that he has not been given a matching position in research work
on his transfer.”
(sic) (emphasis supplied)
13. We shall now examine whether the Office Order dated 31.01.2001 casts
stigma on the appellant. To reiterate, the instant case is not one of termination;
yet, the appellant contends that the curtailment of his tenure on the basis of the
AARs for the years 1998-1999 & 1999-2000, characterizing his performance as
‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘below average’ respectively, was inherently stigmatic. In this
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 7 of 12
regard, we may profitably refer to the following observations of this Court in
Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sciences
2
and Anr. on the point of what amounts to ‘stigmatic’ language in an order:
“Before considering the facts of the case before us one
further, seemingly intractable, area relating to. the first test
needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order
would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a
probationer's appointment is terminated it means that the
probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of
misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the
termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the
stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not
stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is
implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's
appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the
parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order
to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which
imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the
job.
As was noted in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra
Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences (supra):
“At the outset, we may state that in several cases
and in particular in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan
Das, AIR (1961) SC 177 it has been held that use of
the word “unsatisfactory work and conduct” in the
termination order will not amount to a stigma.”
Returning now to the facts of the case before us. The
language used in the order of termination is that the
appellant's work and conduct has not been found to be
satisfactory. These words are almost exactly those which have
been quoted in Dipti Prakash Banerjee’s case as clearly falling
within the class of non-stigmatic orders of termination. It is,
therefore safe to conclude that the impugned Order is not ex
facie stigmatic.”
(emphasis supplied)
2
[2001] SUPP. 5 SCR 41 at Pg. 52.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 8 of 12
14. We do note that the appellant contends that the AARs relied upon did not
reflect his actual performance in those years or his overall service record, and
also that he highlights the fact that they were communicated to him belatedly.
Yet, as the Courts below have appreciated, the appellant has not been able to
demonstrate any real consequential prejudice. The fact remains that the AARs
were duly recorded and communicated to him, he was afforded a reasonable
opportunity to make representations against them, and these were considered
and rejected by the competent authority. It was only thereafter that he was
reverted on the basis of these AARs in the following terms:
“Whereas performance of Dr. Tomar during the period he
worked as ADG (ARIS) at ICAR Headquarters had been
adjudged unsatisfactory and below average as reflected in his
Annual Assessment Reports for the period 1998-99 and 1999-
2000.
…
Now, therefore, the Competent Authority after taking into
consideration the performance of Dr. Tomar as ADG (ARIS) has
found that there is sufficient justification to terminate his
tenure as ADG (ARIS) with immediate effect.”
On the standard described in Pavanendra Narayan Verma ( supra ), we do not
feel such the above order casts any stigma beyond an unexceptional assessment
of unsuitability.
15. The CAT had further noted that the AARs, pertaining to the two
immediately preceding years, were relevant and were not drawn from the “ remote
past. ”
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 9 of 12
16. What is borne out of the record, therefore, is a routine exercise of
administrative assessment: the concerned respondent-Authority assessed the
performance of the appellant, afforded him the required opportunity to respond,
and subsequently curtailed his tenure on the basis of its assessment in neutral,
non-stigmatic terms. Though the appellant has sought to place considerable
reliance on the allegations of large-scale financial irregularities, as made by him,
in order to demonstrate that the concerned respondent-Authority’s actions
culminating in the order dated 31.01.2001 were retaliatory in nature, we
reiterate that our remit is limited to examining the legality of the administrative
action impugned. Allegations of colourability and/or mala fides must be
supported by clear, cogent and specific material, and cannot be inferred merely
from the sequence of events or surrounding circumstances. Here, we find it
highly apposite to quote a seminal decision of this Court on this point viz . State
3
of U.P. and Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal :
“A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be
eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or
Tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such
orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative
needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the
reason that Courts or Tribunals cannot substitute their own
decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent
authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when
made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are
based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on
the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures
or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no
”
interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer.
3
[2004] 3 SCR 337 at Pg. 344.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 10 of 12
17. In fact, having gone through the record, including the AARs for the relevant
period, it cannot be said that the concerned respondent-Authority’s assessment
of the appellant’s performance and its concomitant actions were totally without
basis, let alone meeting the abovementioned threshold of irrationality or
perversity warranting interference. We cannot sit in appeal over this process.
18. Finally, adverting to the appellant’s remaining contention that the
concerned respondent-Authority ought to have awaited and considered the
Enquiry Report dated 21.05.2001 before issuing the transfer order, we find that
the same is misplaced. The enquiry expressly pertained to specific charges of
misconduct against the appellant, and could not stand in the way of the
curtailment of his tenure on the basis of the concerned respondent-Authority’s
assessment of his overall performance.
19. We also acknowledge certain ensuing developments. As discussed above,
the appellant was transferred to IARI, Delhi on 04.01.2002. The CAT in its order
had recorded that appellant had personally approached the competent authority
and had requested and secured this posting; however, despite being advised to
join, he neither challenged the order nor complied with it, “... for reasons best
known to him .” Although he subsequently joined and submitted his joining report
the same day, he denied having made the request therein. Moreover, the
appellant himself has drawn our attention to the fact that he approached the
High Court and obtained interim orders dated 22.07.2002, 30.09.2002, and
07.01.2003 in various writ and contempt proceedings initiated by him against
Civil Appeal Nos. 9330-9331/2013 Page 11 of 12
the concerned respondent-Authority. Eventually, however, by Office Order F.No.
2(3)/2002-AU dated 31.03.2004, ICAR accepted the recommendation of ASRB
and promoted the appellant to the post of Principal Scientist with retrospective
effect from 22.07.1998. This was done in suppression of an earlier order dated
16.04.2003, wherein ICAR had rejected the recommendation for appellant’s
promotion on the basis of his AARs for 1998-1999 and 1999-2000.
20. The appellant has since superannuated in July 2013. This Court on
17.10.2013 had directed that his retiral benefits be released to him and the
concerned respondent-Authority has submitted that the same has been done.
21. We are satisfied that there is no merit in these Appeals, as also
concurrently found by the Courts below. The Appeals are, accordingly,
dismissed.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
………………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
………………………………………J.
(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 28, 2026.
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