NAZIM vs. THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on 11.08.2017
Judgment pronounced on: 14.09.2017

+ CRL.A. 207/2016
RAFIQUE ..... Appellant
Through Mr.Aditya Guar, Adv. with
Mr.Chandan Kumar, Adv.


versus

THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through Mr.Tarang Srivastava, APP for
State with SI Alok Bajpai, P.S. Kashmere
Gate.

+ CRL.A. 208/2016
NAZIM ..... Appellant
Through Mr.Ritesh Bahri, Adv. with
Mr.Vipin Bansal and Mr.Pradeep Prajapati,
Advs.
versus

THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through Ms.Aashaa Tiwari, APP for
State with SI Alok Bajpai, P.S. Kashmere
Gate.



Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 1 of 20





+ CRL.A. 345/2016
RAHIS ..... Appellant
Through Mr.Gaurav Vashistha, Adv.
with Mr.Jagdish Chandra, Adv.

versus

STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through Mr.Tarang Srivastava, APP for
State with SI Alok Bajpai, P.S. Kashmere
Gate.
+ CRL.A. 467/2016
AZMAL @ ASLAM ..... Appellant
Through Mr.Aditya Guar, Adv. with
Mr.Chandan Kumar, Adv.

versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through Mr.Tarang Srivastava, APP for
State with SI Alok Bajpai, P.S. Kashmere
Gate.

+ CRL.A. 530/2016
MAKSUD AHMED ..... Appellant
Through Mr.Aditya Guar, Adv. with
Mr.Chandan Kumar, Adv.

versus


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 2 of 20





THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through Mr.Tarang Srivastava, APP for
State with SI Alok Bajpai, P.S. Kashmere
Gate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD GOEL
VINOD GOEL, J.
1. Every accused unrepresented by a lawyer has to be provided a
lawyer at the commencement of the trial, engaged to represent
him during the entire course of the trial. Even if the accused does
not ask for a lawyer or he remains silent, it is the Constitutional
duty of the court to provide him with a lawyer before
commencing the trial. Unless the accused voluntarily makes an
informed decision and tells the court, in clear and unambiguous
words, that he does not want the assistance of any lawyer and
would rather defend himself personally, the obligation to provide
him with a lawyer at the commencement of the trial is absolute,
and failure to do so would vitiate the trial and the resultant
conviction and sentence, if any, given to the accused. This is so
held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of Mohammed
Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 .
2. A constitutional amendment was carried out by inserting Article
39-A in the Constitution by the Constitution 42nd Amendment
rd
Act, 1976 with effect from 3 January, 1977 as part of the


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 3 of 20





„Directive Principles of the State Policy‟. The Article reads as
under:-
“Article 39-A. Equal justice and free legal aid: The
State shall secure that the operation of the legal
system promotes justice, on a basis of equal
opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal
aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other
way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice
are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or
other disabilities.”

3. In order to achieve the object of the amendment of the
Constitution by 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, the Parliament
enacted the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which came
th
into force from 9 November, 1995. The Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Act, insofar as relevant for the present, reads
as under:

4. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad
Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid (supra), noted that this
development by way of insertion of Article 39-A in the
Constitution and enactment of Legal Services Authorities Act,
th
1987 and its enforcement from 9 November, 1995 indicates the


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 4 of 20





direction in which the law relating to access to lawyers/legal aid
has developed and continues to develop. Access to a lawyer is,
therefore, imperative to ensure compliance with statutory
provisions, which are of high standards in themselves and which,
if duly complied with, will leave no room for any violation of
Constitutional provisions or human rights abuses.
5. While upholding the right of the accused to be represented
through a lawyer, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Mohammed
Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid (supra),
observed as under:
“474. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding
that the right to access to legal aid, to consult and
to be defended by a legal practitioner, arises when
a person arrested in connection with a cognizable
offence is first produced before a magistrate. We,
accordingly, hold that it is the duty and obligation
of the magistrate before whom a person accused of
committing a cognizable offence is first produced
to make him fully aware that it is his right to
consult and be defended by a legal practitioner
and, in case he has no means to engage a lawyer of
his choice, that one would be provided to him from
legal aid at the expense of the State. The right
flows from Articles 21 and 22(1) of the
Constitution and needs to be strictly enforced. We,
accordingly, direct all the magistrates in the country
to faithfully discharge the aforesaid duty and
obligation and further make it clear that any failure
to fully discharge the duty would amount to
dereliction in duty and would make the concerned
magistrate liable to departmental proceedings.


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 5 of 20





475. It needs to be clarified here that the right to
consult and be defended by a legal practitioner is not
to be construed as sanctioning or permitting the
presence of a lawyer during police interrogation.
According to our system of law, the role of a lawyer
is mainly focused on court proceedings. The accused
would need a lawyer to resist remand to police or
judicial custody and for granting of bail; to clearly
explain to him the legal consequences in case he
intended to make a confessional statement in terms
of Section 164 CrPC; to represent him when the
court examines the chargesheet submitted by the
police and decides upon the future course of
proceedings and at the stage of the framing of
charges; and beyond that, of course, for the trial . It
is thus to be seen that the right to access to a lawyer in
this country is not based on the Miranda principles, as
protection against self-incrimination, for which there
are more than adequate safeguards in Indian laws. The
right to access to a lawyer is for very Indian reasons;
it flows from the provisions of the Constitution and
the statutes, and is only intended to ensure that those
provisions are faithfully adhered to in practice.”
6. It is trite that a failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused
or the prosecution violates even minimum standards of due
process of law. It is inherent in the concept of due process of law
that condemnation should be rendered only after the trial in
which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a mere farce and
pretence.
7. Since the fair hearing requires an opportunity to preserve the
process, it may be vitiated and violated by an overhasty, stage-
managed, tailored and partisan trial. The fair trial for a criminal
offence consists not only in technical observance of the frame


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 6 of 20





and forms of law, but also in recognition and just application of
its principles in substance, to find out the truth and prevent
miscarriage of justice. This was observed by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Zahira Habibulla Sheikh (5) and Anr. v.
State of Gujarat and Ors., ( commonly known as Best Bakery
Case ) (2004) 4 SCC 158 . This was reiterated by the larger
Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Hussain Alias
Julfikar Ali v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 9
SCC 408 .

8. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 7 SCC 104 , has held that an accused has
not only a valuable right to represent himself, he has also the
right to be informed thereabout . The Apex Court further held
that Section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides for
examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination.
Section 138 of the Act confers a right on the adverse party to
cross-examine a witness who had been examined in chief, subject
of course to expression of his desire to the said effect. But
indisputably such an opportunity is to be granted.
9. While holding right of the accused to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses, the Apex Court has held in P. Sanjeeva
Rao v. State of A.P., (2012) 7 SCC 56 as under:
“18. Denial of an opportunity to recall the
witnesses for cross-examination would amount to


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 7 of 20





condemning the appellant without giving him the
opportunity to challenge the correctness of the
version and the credibility of the witnesses. It is
trite that the credibility of witnesses whether in a
civil or criminal case can be tested only when the
testimony is put through the fire of cross-
examination. Denial of an opportunity to do so will
result in a serious miscarriage of justice in the
present case keeping in view the serious consequences
that will follow any such denial.”

10. These are the questions which are involved in adjudication of
these five criminal appeals. The appellants were convicted by
rd
the impugned judgment dated 23 January, 2016 under section
120-B r/w 394/397 IPC passed by the learned ASJ-03 (Central),
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in Session Case No.158/2011 vide FIR
No.253/2008, Police Station Kashmere Gate, under Section
394/397/120-B/411/34 IPC.
th
11. The order on sentence was passed by the trial court on 29
January, 2016.
12. Even during the course of arguments, learned counsels for the
appellants brought to the notice of this Court that out of 15
witnesses examined by the prosecution, there are at least six
witnesses who were not cross-examined by the respective
counsels for the appellants.
13. It is submitted that when these witnesses were examined, the
counsels for the appellants were not present in the Court and the
trial court after recording the examination-in-chief of these six


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 8 of 20





witnesses had written “cross-examination by accused persons,
Nil, opportunity given” and thus the trial court has denied fair
trial to the appellants. Learned counsel for appellants submitted
that the star witness/victim who was examined as PW-1
Sh.Naveen Kumar and another important witness PW-11 HC
Pramod, who apprehended the accused Rafiq and in whose
presence some of the robbed money was recovered, were not
cross-examined.
14. They submitted that similarly PW-2 SI Ms.Upkar Kaur, PW-13
Dr.Priya Ranjan and PW-14 Sh.Dharmender Rana and PW-15
Ms.Suman were not allowed to be cross-examined by the trial
court as the counsels for the appellants were not present in the
court at the relevant time.
15. They further pointed out that the appellants even moved an
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. before the trial court to
allow them to cross-examine the star witness PW-1 Sh.Naveen
th
Kumar which was dismissed by an order dated 12 February,
2015 without any justifiable reason.
16. The record revealed that examination-in-chief of PW-1
Sh.Naveen Kumar and PW-2 SI Ms.Upkar Kaur were recorded
th th
on 20 April, 2013. The order of the trial court dated 20 April,
2013 reads as under:
“FIR No.253/08
PS: Kashmere Gate


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 9 of 20





20.04.2013
Present: Shri G.S. Guraya, ld. Addl. PP for State.
All the accused persons on bail.
Three PWs are present out of them two have been
examined, cross examined and discharged. One PW
SI Mam Chand is present but the said witness has
been dropped by the ld. Addl. PP as unnecessarily
witness of the case.
Let this matter is listed for entire PE on
24.5.2013.
Sd/- (……….)
ASJ-03 (Central)/20.04.2013”

17. In the statement of PW-1 Naveen Kumar, the trial court had
mentioned regarding the cross-examination as
“xxxxx by Shri Sushil Kumar, ld. Counsel for the
accused Maqsood.

Nil. Opportunity given.

xxxx by all the remaining accused persons.
Nil. Opportunity given. The Court had although
waited upto 1.25 p.m.”

18. Regarding PW-2 SI Ms.Upkar Kaur, the trial court had
mentioned regarding the cross-examination as
“xxxxx by Shri Sushil Kumar, ld. Counsel for the
accused Maqsood.
Nil. Opportunity given.
xxxx by all the remaining accused persons.
Nil. Opportunity given.”


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 10 of 20





th
19. Similarly statement of PW-11 HC Pramod was recorded on 4
March, 2015 and the trial court had mentioned in the statement
regarding the cross-examination as
“xxxxx by accused persons.
Deferred as the ld. Counsel is not available.”

20. The statements of PW-13, PW-14 and PW-15 were recorded on
th
4 March, 2015 and they were also not cross-examined. Order of
th
the trial court dated 4 March, 2015 reads as under:
“State vs. Maksood Ahmed etc.
FIR No.253/08
PS: Kashmere Gate
04.03.2015
Present: Shri Alok Saxena, Ld. Addl. PP for the
State.
All the accused persons on bail.
Three PWs are present.
HC Pramod, SI Rajesh have been examined in
chief and their cross-examination is deferred as the
Ld. Counsel is not available.
Dr.Priya Ranjan has been examined, cross-
examined and discharged.
Put up for PE on 04.04.2015.

Sd/- (……..)
ASJ-03 (Central), Delhi.”

21. Admittedly, the trial court in its impugned judgment had referred
to the statements and relied upon the testimonies of all these six
witnesses i.e. PW-1, PW-2, PW-11, PW-13, PW-14 and PW-15
to convict the appellants. Such a trial unknown to law has been
conducted by the trial court. The appellants were convicted by


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 11 of 20





the trial court without providing an opportunity to be represented
by their counsels or by providing legal aid counsel if their
counsels were not available at the relevant time and without these
said six witnesses being cross-examined.
22. The principle laid down in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur (supra)
was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Hussain Alias
Julfikar Ali (supra) that every person has a right to a fair trial by
a competent court in the spirit of the right to life and personal
liberty. The object and purpose of providing competent legal aid
to undefended and unrepresented accused persons are to see that
the accused gets free and fair, just and reasonable trial of the
charge in a criminal case.
23. Even application of the appellants under section 311 of Cr.P.C.
was dismissed by the trial court by a perverse and whimsical
th
order dated 12 February, 2015 without realizing that the
appellants were denied fair trial by not giving them an
opportunity to cross-examine the said six prosecution witnesses.
The Trial Court concluded that the accused had not moved an
application for re-examination of PW-1 under Section 311 of the
Cr.P.C. till PW-9 was not examined as PW-9 did not support the
prosecution‟s case because the accused Nazim, Rahis and their
counsel along with two or three persons had visited the house of
the complainant/PW-1 and threatened him not to depose.


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 12 of 20





24. The record revealed that on informing the trial court by PW-1
regarding the visit by one of the accused and his counsel, he was
taken into the custody and later on he was released on bail. Even
if there were attempts on behalf of any of the appellants to win
over or overawe the witness, the trial court could have taken
other stringent measures including providing protection to the
witness and taking into custody the concerned accused/appellant.
Be that as it may, certainly the trial court could not have denied
their right to be represented by a counsel and cross-examine the
witnesses.
25. At the time of final arguments, the learned counsel representing
the appellants requested the trial court that the appellants were
not given an opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses and
their testimonies should not be considered.
26. The powers of the appellate court are enumerated in Section 386
of Cr.P.C. which is reproduced as under:
“386. Power of the Appellate Court.
After perusing such record and hearing the appellant
or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor
if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section
377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the
Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no
sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal,
or may-

(a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse
such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or
that the accused be re- tried or committed for trial, as


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 13 of 20





the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence
on him according to law;

(b) in an appeal from a conviction -

(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or
discharge the accused, or order him to be re- tried by
a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such
Appellate Court or committed for trial, or

(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or

(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the
nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the
sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;

In in an appeal for enhancement of sentence-

(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or
discharge the accused or order him to be re- tried
by a Court competent to try the offence, or

(ii) …………………….”
27. In the present case, it is beyond doubt that the trial court has not
followed the due process of law while denying the appellants
their valuable rights to be represented through counsel and to
cross-examine PW-1, PW-2, PW-11, PW-13, PW-14 and PW-15
which has caused them serious prejudice and the trial was
rd
vitiated. Therefore, the impugned judgment dated 23 January,
2016 thereby convicting the appellants and the consequential
th
order on sentence dated 29 January, 2016 against the appellants
are hereby set aside.


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 14 of 20





28. In such a situation where the conviction and consequential
sentence have been set aside, this Court has power to order the
re-trial of the appellants/accused under Section 386(b) of the
Cr.P.C.
29. In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) and Anr. (supra) , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that whether a re-
trial under section 386 of the Cr.P.C. or taking up of the
additional evidence under section 391 of the Cr.P.c. in a given
case is the proper procedure will depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case for which no straight jacket formula
of universal and invariable application can be formulated.
30. While dealing with the issue of the re-trial, the Apex Court in
Mohd. Hussain Alias Julfikar Ali (supra) has held as under:
“41. „Speedy trial‟ and „fair trial‟ to a person accused
of a crime are integral part of Article 21. There is,
however, qualitative difference between the right to
speedy trial and the accused‟s right of fair trial.
Unlike the accused‟s right of fair trial, deprivation of
the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the
accused in defending himself. The right to speedy
trial is in its very nature relative. It depends upon
diverse circumstances. Each case of delay in
conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen in the
facts and circumstances of such case. Mere lapse of
several years since the commencement of prosecution
by itself may not justify the discontinuance of
prosecution or dismissal of indictment. The factors
concerning the accused‟s right to speedy trial have to
be weighed vis-a-vis the impact of the crime on
society and the confidence of the people in judicial


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 15 of 20





system. Speedy trial secures rights to an accused but it
does not preclude the rights of public justice. The
nature and gravity of crime, persons involved, social
impact and societal needs must be weighed along with
the right of the accused to speedy trial and if the
balance tilts in favour of the former the long delay in
conclusion of criminal trial should not operate against
the continuation of prosecution and if the right of
accused in the facts and circumstances of the case and
exigencies of situation tilts the balance in his favour,
the prosecution may be brought to an end. These
principles must apply as well when the appeal court is
confronted with the question whether or not retrial of
an accused should be ordered.
42. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from
a judgment of conviction has power to order the
retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code.
That is clear from the bare language of Section
386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be
exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or
retrial of the accused should be ordered by the
appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and
only when in the opinion of the appellate court
such course becomes indispensable to avert failure
of justice. Surely this power cannot be used to allow
the prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up the
lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is
continuation of the same trial and same
prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial must
always be demand of justice . Obviously, the
exercise of power of retrial under Section 386(b) of
the Code, will depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case for which no straitjacket formula can be
formulated but the appeal court must closely keep in
view that while protecting the right of an accused to
fair trial and due process, the people who seek
protection of law do not lose hope in legal system and
the interests of the society are not altogether
overlooked.


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 16 of 20





43………… Gravity of the offences and the
criminality with which the appellant is charged are
important factors that need to be kept in mind,
though it is a fact that in the first instance the
accused has been denied due process. While having
due consideration to the appellant’s right, the
nature of the offence and its gravity, the impact of
crime on the society, more particularly the crime
that has shaken the public and resulted in death of
four persons in a public transport bus cannot be
ignored and overlooked. It is desirable that
punishment should follow offence as closely as
possible. In an extremely serious criminal case of
the exceptional nature like the present one, it
would occasion in failure of justice if the
prosecution is not taken to the logical conclusion.
Justice is supreme. The retrial of the appellant, in
our opinion, in the facts and circumstances, is
indispensable. It is imperative that justice is
secured after providing the appellant with the legal
practitioner if he does not engage a lawyer of his
choice .
xxxxxxxx
46. In what we have discussed above we answer the
reference by holding that the matter requires to be
remanded for a de novo trial. The Additional Sessions
Judge shall proceed with the trial of the appellant in
Sessions Case No. 122 of 1998 from the stage of
prosecution evidence and shall further ensure that the
trial is concluded as expeditiously as may be possible
and in no case later than three months from the date of
communication of this order.”
31. In the present case, the appellants had faced the trial under
section 120-B read with section 394 and 397 IPC which are
serious offences. Once an accused is convicted under section
394 IPC, he can be incarcerated for life in jail while the minimum


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 17 of 20





punishment under section 397 shall not be less than seven years.
Re-trial in the present case can result in the conviction either
being confirmed or set aside but such a decision must be the
outcome of the due process of law. The question of re-trial was
earlier considered by a Constitution Bench of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR
1959 SC 609 , wherein plea of the validity of the trial and of the
orders of conviction and sentence was raised by the appellant.
That was a case where the appellant was charged for three
offences which were required to be tried as a warrant case by
following the procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1860 but he was tried under the procedure prescribed for
the trial of a summons case. The procedure for summons case
and warrants case was materially different. The Constitution
Bench held that having regard to the nature of the charges framed
and the character and volume of evidence led, the appellant was
prejudiced; the trial of the three cases against the appellant was
vitiated and the orders of conviction and sentence were rendered
invalid. The Court, accordingly, set aside the orders of conviction
and sentence. While dealing with the question as to what final
order should be passed in the appeals, the Constitution Bench
held as under:
“29. ….….The offences with which the appellant
stands charged are of a very serious nature; and
though it is true that he has had to undergo the ordeal
of a trial and has suffered rigorous imprisonment for


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 18 of 20





some time that would not justify his prayer that we
should not order his retrial. In our opinion, having
regard to the gravity of the offences charged
against the appellant, the ends of justice require
that we should direct that he should be tried for
the said offences de novo according to law . We also
direct that the proceedings to be taken against the
appellant hereafter should be commenced without
delay and should be disposed as expeditiously as
possible.”
32. In view of the above discussion, the learned ASJ or the successor
ASJ shall proceed with the trial of the appellants in Session Case
No.158/2011 vide FIR No.253/2008, Police Station Kashmere
Gate, under Section 394/397/120-B/411/34 IPC, from the stage
of the prosecution evidence and shall ensure that the trial is
concluded as expeditiously as may be possible and in no case
later than three months from the date of communication of this
order.
33. Since the accused/appellants were on bail at the time of
rd
announcement of the impugned order dated 23 January, 2016 of
conviction, they be set free from the custody provided they are
not required in any other case. The appellants are directed to
appear before the trial court on 25.09.2017 at 10:00 AM to face
the re-trial. The trial court shall direct the appellants to furnish
fresh bail and surety bonds with such terms and conditions as it
deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 19 of 20





34. This court expects that the ld. defence counsels engaged by the
appellants shall cooperate with the learned Addition Sessions
Judge and they shall remain available to cross-examine
witnesses. In case, the appellants are not able to engage the
counsels the Ld.ASJ shall provide them Amicus Curiae or Legal
Aid counsel.
35. Copy of this order be circulated to all the Judicial Officers for
their guidance.



(VINOD GOEL)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 14 , 2017/ jitender


Crl. Appeals 207/2016, 208/2016, 345/2016, 467/2016 &530/2016 Page 20 of 20