MANOHAR LAL SHARMA vs. NARENDRA DAMODARDAS MODI

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL/CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION [CRIMINAL] NO.225 OF 2018 MANOHAR LAL SHARMA …. PETITIONER(S) VERSUS NARENDRA DAMODARDAS MODI  & ORS. … RESPONDENTS(S) WITH W.P.(C) NO.1205/2018 W.P. (CRL) NO.297/2018 W.P. (CRL) NO.298/2018 J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI, CJI 1. The issues arising in this group of writ petitions, filed as Public Interest Litigations, relate to procurement of 36 Rafale Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR Date: 2018.12.14 15:05:01 IST Reason: Fighter   Jets   for   the   Indian   Airforce.     The   procurement   in question, which has been sought to be challenged, has its origins 2 in   the   post­Kargil   experience   that   saw   a   renewed   attempt   to advance the strategic needs of the armed forces of the country.   2. As far back as in the month of June of the year 2001, an   in­principle   approval   was   granted   for   procurement   of   126 fighter­jets   to   augment   the   strength   of   the   Indian   Airforce. Simultaneously,   a   more   transparent   Defence   Procurement Procedure (“DPP”) was formulated for the first time in the year 2002.   A robust ‘offset clause’ was included in the DPP in the year  2005  so   as  to   promote  Indigenisation  and   to   that  effect Services   Qualitative   Requirements   (“SQRs”)   were   prepared   in th June 2006.  On 29  June 2007 the Defence Acquisition Council (“DAC”)   granted   the   “Acceptance   of   Necessity”   for   the procurement  of  126  Medium  Multi Role   Combat  Aircrafts  (for short   “MMRCA”)     including   18   direct   fly­away   aircrafts (equivalent to a single squadron) to be procured from the Original Equipment   Manufacturer   (“OEM”)   with   the   remaining   108 aircrafts to be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (for short “HAL”) under licence, to be delivered over a period of 11 years from the date of signing.  The bidding process commenced in August 2007.  Six (06) vendors submitted proposals in April, 3 2008.     The   proposals   were   followed   by   technical   and   field evaluations; a Staff Evaluation Report and a Technical Oversight Committee Report.   All these were completed in the year 2011. The commercial bids were opened in November, 2011 and M/s Dassault   Aviation   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “Dassault”)   was placed   as   the   L­I   sometime   in   January   2012.     Negotiations commenced   thereafter   and   continued   but   without   any   final result.     In   the   meantime,   there   was   a   change   of   political dispensation at the centre sometime in the middle of the year 2014.  3. According   to   the   official   respondents   negotiation continued .   A process of withdrawal of the Request for Proposal in relation to the 126 MMRCA was initiated in March 2015.  On th 10  April, 2015 an Indo­French joint statement, for acquisition of 36   Rafale   Jets   in   fly­away   condition   through   an   Inter­ Governmental Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “IGA”), was issued  and   the   same   was   duly   approved   by   the   DAC.       The Request for Proposal for the 126 MMRCA was finally withdrawn in June 2015.  Negotiations were carried out and the process was completed after Inter­Ministerial Consultations with the approval 4 of the Cabinet Committee on Security (for short “CCS”).   The contract along with Aircraft Package Supply Protocol; Weapons Package   Supply   Protocol;   Technical   Arrangements   and   Offset rd contracts   was   signed   in   respect   of   36   Rafale   Jets   on   23 September, 2016.  The aircrafts were scheduled to be delivered in phased manner commencing from October 2019. 4. Things remained quiet until sometime in the month of September, 2018 when certain newspapers reported a statement claimed to have been made by the former President of France, Francois Hollande, to the effect that the French Government were left with no choice in the matter of selection of Indian Offset Partners and the Reliance Group was the name suggested by the Government of India.   This seems to have triggered of the writ petitions under consideration.   The first writ petition i.e. Writ Petition (Criminal) No.225 of 2018   has   been   filed   by   one   Shri   Manohar   Lal   Sharma,   a practicing lawyer of this Court.   What is sought for in the said writ petition is registration of an FIR under relevant provisions of the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   and   a   Court   Monitored Investigation.     The   further   relief   of   quashing   the   Inter­ 5 Governmental Agreement of 2016 for purchase of 36 Rafale Jets has also been prayed for.  Writ Petition (Civil) No.1205 of 2018 has been filed by one Shri Vineet Dhanda claiming to be a public spirited Indian. The petitioner states that he was inspired to file the writ petition being agitated over the matter on the basis of the newspaper articles/reports. The third writ petition bearing Writ Petition (Criminal) No.297   of   2018   has   been   filed   by   one   Shri   Sanjay   Singh,   a Member of Parliament alleging illegality and non­transparency in the   procurement   process.     The   said   writ   petition   seeks investigation into the reasons for “cancellation of earlier deal” and seeks a scrutiny of the Court into the alteration of pricing and, above all, how a ‘novice’ company i.e. Reliance Defence came to replace the HAL as the Offset partner.   Cancellation of Inter­ Governmental   Agreement   and   registration   of   an   FIR   has   also been prayed for.   The   fourth   and   the   last   writ   petition   bearing   Writ Petition   (Criminal)   No.298   of   2018   has   been   filed   by   Shri 6 Yashwant Sinha, Shri Arun Shourie and Shri Prashant Bhushan claiming to be public spirited Indians. They are aggrieved by non­ registration of FIR by the CBI pursuant to a complaint made by th them on 4   October, 2018 which complaint, according to the petitioners, disclose a prima facie evidence of commission of a cognizable   offence   under   the   provisions   of   the   Prevention   of Corruption Act, 1988. The prayer,  inter alia , made is for direction for   registration   of   an   FIR   and   investigation   of   the   same   and submitting periodic status reports to the Court.  5. Adequate   Military   strength   and   capability   to discourage and withstand external aggression and to protect the sovereignty and integrity of India, undoubtedly, is a matter of utmost concern for the Nation.   The empowerment of defence forces   with   adequate   technology   and   material   support   is, therefore, a matter of vital importance. 6. Keeping in view the above, it would be appropriate, at the   outset,   to   set   out   the   parameters   of   judicial   scrutiny   of governmental decisions relating to defence procurement and to indicate   whether   such   parameters   are   more   constricted   than what the jurisprudence of judicial scrutiny of award of tenders 7 and   contracts,   that   has   emerged   till   date,   would   legitimately permit. 7. Parameters   of   judicial   review   of   administrative decisions   with   regard   to   award   of   tenders   and   contracts   has really developed from the increased participation of the State in commercial   and   economic   activity.     In     vs.   Jagdish   Mandal   1   State   of   Orissa   and   Ors.      this   Court,   conscious   of   the limitations in commercial transactions, confined its scrutiny to the   decision   making   process   and   on   the   parameters   of unreasonableness and mala fides.  In fact, the Court held that it was   not   to   exercise   the   power   of   judicial   review   even   if   a procedural error is committed to the prejudice of the tenderer since private interests cannot be protected while exercising such judicial   review.     The   award   of   contract,   being   essentially   a commercial transaction, has to be determined on the basis of considerations that are relevant to such commercial decisions, and this implies that terms subject to which tenders are invited are not open to judicial scrutiny unless it is found that the same have been tailor­made to benefit any particular tenderer or a 1 (2007) 14 SCC 517 8 class of tenderers. [See  Maa Binda Express Carrier & Anr.  Vs. 2 ]   North­East Frontier Railway & Ors.   8. Various   Judicial   pronouncements   commencing   from 3 vs.  , all emphasise the aspect that Tata Cellular    Union of India   scrutiny   should   be   limited   to   the   Wednesbury   Principle   of Reasonableness and absence of mala fides or favouritism.  9. We also cannot lose sight of the tender in issue.  The tender  is   not  for   construction  of   roads,   bridges,   etc.     It  is  a defence tender for procurement of aircrafts.   The parameter of scrutiny would give far more leeway to the Government, keeping in mind the nature of the procurement itself.   This aspect was even emphasized in  Siemens Public Communication Networks 4 Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.  Vs.    Union of India & Ors.   .  The triple ground on   which   such   judicial   scrutiny   is   permissible   has   been consistently held to be “illegality”, “irrationality” and “procedural impropriety”. 2 (2014) 3 SCC 760 3 (1994) 6 SCC 651 4 (2008) 16 SCC 215 9 10. In  Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd.  vs.  Airports 5  the policy of privatization of strategic   Authority of India & Ors.   national   assets   qua   two   airports   came   under   scrutiny.     A reference   was   made   in   the   said   case   to   the   commentary   by Grahame Aldous and John Alder in their book ‘Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice’:

5 (2006) 10 SCC 1 6 To be read as ‘Roskill’ 10

[emphasis supplied] 11. It is our considered opinion/view that the extent of permissible judicial review in matters of contracts, procurement, etc. would vary with the subject matter of the contract and there cannot be any uniform standard or depth of judicial review which could be understood as an across the board principle to apply to all cases of award of work or procurement of goods/material. The scrutiny of the challenges before us, therefore, will have to be made   keeping   in   mind   the   confines   of   national   security,   the subject   of   the   procurement   being   crucial   to   the   nation’s sovereignty.   th 12. Adopting   such   an   approach,   on   10   October,   2018 when the first two writ petitions were initially listed before the Court, the Court had specifically observed in its order that it is proceeding in the matter by requiring the Government of India to apprise the Court of the details of the steps taken in the decision­ making process notwithstanding the fact that the averments in 11 the writ petitions were inadequate and deficient.  The Court had also indicated that it was so proceeding in the matter in order to satisfy itself of the correctness of the decision­making process.  It was also made clear that the issue of pricing or matters relating to technical suitability of the equipment would not be gone into by   the   Court.     The   requisite   information   was   required   to   be placed before the Court by the Government of India in sealed st cover.   Before the next date of hearing fixed i.e. 31   October, 2018, the other two writ petitions came to be filed.  st 13. On   31   October,   2018,   the   Court   in   its   order   had recorded that in none of the writ petitions the suitability of the fighter jets and its utility to the Indian Airforce had been called into question.  Rather what was doubted by the petitioners is the bona fides of the decision­making process and the price/cost of the equipment at which it was proposed to be acquired.   th 14. Pursuant to the order dated 10  October 2018, a note in   sealed   cover   delineating   the   steps   in   the   decision­making st process   was   submitted   to   the   Court   and   by   order   dated   31 October   2018   this   Court   had   directed   that   such   of   the information which has been laid before the Court, which can 12 legitimately be brought into the public domain, be also made available to the petitioners or their counsels.  Details with regard to the induction of the Indian Offset Partner (IOP), if any, was also required to be disclosed.   The Court also directed that the details with  regard   to  pricing;   the   advantages   thereof,   if   any, should also be submitted to the Court in a sealed cover.  15. It   is   in   the   backdrop   of   the   above   facts   and   the somewhat constricted power of judicial review that, we have held, would be available in the present matter that we now proceed to scrutinise the controversy raised in the writ petitions which raise three broad areas of concern, namely, (i) the decision­making process; (ii) difference in pricing; and (iii) the choice of IOP. Decision Making Process  16. The details of the steps in the decision­making process leading to the award of the 36 Rafale fighter aircrafts’ order have th been set out in response to the order dated 10  October, 2018. The Government states that the DPP 2002 has been succeeded by periodical reviews in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013 and 2016. 13 The preamble to DPP has been referred to capture its essence, which emphasises that – “Defence   acquisition   is   not   a   standard   open market commercial form of procurement and has certain unique features such as supplier constraints,   technological   complexity,   foreign suppliers,   high   cost,   foreign   exchange implications   and   geo­political   ramifications. As   a   result,   decision   making   pertaining   to defence   procurement   remains   unique   and complex.” It also states that –  “Defence procurement involves long gestation periods and delay in procurement will impact the preparedness of our forces.  The needs of the armed forces being a non­negotiable and an   uncompromising   aspect,   flexibility   in   the procurement   process   is   required,   which   has also been provisioned for.” It is DPP   2013  which is   stated  to  have  been  followed  in  the procurement in question. It is no doubt true that paragraph 77 of the DPP 2013 reads as follows: “77. This procedure would be in supersession of Defence Procurement Procedure 2011 and will come into effect from 01 June 2013.  There are,   however,   cases   which   would   be   under various   stages   of   processing   in   accordance with provision of earlier versions of DPP at the 14 time   of   commencement   of   DPP­2013.     The processing of these cases done so far under the earlier procedure will be deemed to be valid. Only those cases in which RFP is issued after 01 June, 2013, will be processed as per DPP­ 2013.” In other words when it is stated that only those cases in which st RFP is issued after 1  June 2013 will be processed as per DPP st 2013, in this case where the RFP was issued much prior to 1 April  2013   and   it  was   withdrawn,   as   already   noted,   in   June 2015, a question may arise as to how it could be claimed that DPP 2013 was followed.   We, however, also notice clause 75 of DPP 2013 which reads as follows: “75.   Any   deviation   from   the   prescribed procedure will be put up to DAC through DPB for approval.” 17. Also,   we   notice   that   the   official   respondents   have sought support from paragraph 71 of the DPP 2013.     Para 71 of DPP 2013, in respect of the IGA has been referred to, which postulates   possibilities   of   procurement   from   friendly   foreign countries, necessitated due to geo­strategic advantages that are likely to accrue to the country.   Such procurement would not classically   follow   the   Standard   Procurement   Procedure   or   the 15 Standard Contract Document, but would be based on mutually agreed   provisions   by   the   Governments   of   both   the   countries based on an IGA, after clearance from the Competent Financial Authority   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “CFA”).     Of   the   total procurement of about Rs.7.45 lakh crores since 2002 under DPP, different   kinds   of   IGAs,   including   Foreign   Military   Sales   and Standard Clauses of Contract account for nearly 40%.  With the object of promoting indigenization, a robust offset clause is said to have been included since 2005.   As per the Defence Offset Guidelines   of   2013,   the   vendor/Original   Equipment Manufacturer (hereinafter referred to as “OEM”) is free to select its IOPs for implementing the offset obligation. 18. As far as the endeavour to procure 126 fighter aircrafts is concerned, it has been stated that the contract negotiations could   not   be   concluded,   inter   alia,   on   account   of   unresolved issues between the OEM and HAL.  These have been set out as under: “i) Man­Hours   that   would   be   required   to produce the aircraft in India: HAL required 2.7 times   higher   Man­Hours   compared   to   the French   side   for   the   manufacture   of   Rafale aircraft in India. 16 ii) Dassault   Aviation   as   the   seller   was required   to   undertake   necessary   contractual obligation for 126 aircraft (18 direct fly­away and 108 aircraft manufactured in India) as per RFP   requirements.     Issues   related   to contractual   obligation   and   responsibility   for 108 aircraft manufactured in India could not be resolved.” 19. The   aforesaid   issues   are   stated   to   have   been unresolved for more than three years.  Such delay is said to have impacted the cost of acquisition, as the offer was with ‘in­built escalation’   and   was   influenced   by   Euro­Rupee   exchange   rate variations.     The   stalemate   resulted   in   the   process   of   RFP withdrawal being initiated in March 2015.   In this interregnum period, adversaries of the country, qua defence issues, inducted modern   aircrafts   and   upgraded   their   older   versions.     This th included   induction   of   even   5   Generation   Stealth   Fighter Aircrafts of almost 20 squadrons, effectively reducing the combat potential of our defence forces.  In such a situation, government­ to­government negotiations resulted in conclusion of the IGA for the supply of 36 Rafale Aircrafts, as part of a separate process. The requisite steps are stated to have been followed, as per DPP 7 2013.     An   INT   was   constituted   to   negotiate   the   terms   and 7 Indian Negotiating Team 17 conditions, which commenced in May 2015 and continued till April 2016.   In this period of time, a total of 74 meetings were held, including 48 internal INT meetings and 26 external INT meetings   with   the   French   side.     It   is   the   case   of   the   official respondents that the   INT completed its negotiations and arrived at better terms relating to price, delivery and maintenance, as compared to the MMRCA offer of Dassault.   This was further processed for inter­ministerial consultations and the approval of the CCS was also obtained, finally, resulting in signing of the agreement.  This was in conformity with the process, as per para 72 of DPP 2013. 20. The petitioners, on the other hand, seek to question the very fulfilment of the prerequisites for entering into an IGA. The Government of France, giving only a ‘Letter of Comfort’ and not a ‘Sovereign Guarantee’ has been questioned.  21. It is a say of the petitioners that para 71 envisages three eventualities, where the question of entering into an IGA would arise, which have not arisen in the present case: 18 (a) Proven   technology   and   capabilities   belonging   to   a friendly foreign country is identified by our Armed Forces while participating in joint international exercises; (b) Large value weapon system/platform in service in a friendly foreign country is available for transfer or sale normally at a much lesser cost; or (c) Requirement   of   procuring   a   specific   state­of­the­art equipment/platform where the Government of the OEM’s country might   have   imposed   restriction   on   its   sale   and   thus   the equipment   cannot   be   evaluated   on   ‘No   Cost   No  Commitment’ basis. 22. We have studied the material carefully.  We have also had the benefit of interacting with senior Air Force Officers who answered Court queries in respect of different aspects, including that of the acquisition process and pricing. We are satisfied that there is no occasion to really doubt the process, and even if minor deviations have occurred, that would not result in either setting aside the contract or requiring a detailed scrutiny by the Court. We have been informed that joint exercises have taken 19 place, and that there is a financial advantage to our nation.   It cannot   be   lost   sight   of,   that   these   are   contracts   of   defence procurement which should be subject to a different degree and depth   of   judicial   review.     Broadly,   the   processes   have   been followed.  The need for the aircrafts is not in doubt. The quality of the aircraft is not in question.   It is also a fact that the long negotiations for procurement of 126 MMRCAs have not produced any result, and merely conjecturing that the initial RFP could have resulted in a contract is of no use.  The hard fact is that not only was the contract not coming forth but the negotiations had come practically to an end, resulting in a recall of the RFP.    We cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of deciding to go in for purchase of 36 aircrafts in place of 126.   We cannot possibly compel the Government to go in for purchase of 126 aircraft. This is despite the fact that even before the withdrawal of RFP, an announcement came to be made in April 2015 about the decision to go in only for 36 aircrafts. Our country cannot afford to be unprepared/underprepared in a situation where our adversaries th th are stated to have acquired not only 4  Generation, but even 5 Generation Aircrafts,  of  which,  we  have  none.    It will not be 20 correct for the Court to sit as an appellate authority to scrutinize each aspect of the process of acquisition.   23. We may also note that the process was concluded for rd 36 Rafale fighter jet aircrafts on 23  September, 2016.  Nothing was called into question, then.  It is only taking advantage of the statement by the ex­President of France, Francois Hollande that these set of petitions have been filed, not only qua the aspect which formed the statement, that is, the issue of IOPs but also with respect to the entire decision­making process and pricing. We do not consider it necessary to dwell further into this issue or to seek clause­by­clause compliances.  Pricing 24. The challenge to the pricing of the aircrafts, by the petitioners, is sought to be made on the ground that there are huge escalations in costs, as per the material in public domain, as found in magazines and newspapers. We did initially express our disinclination to even go into the issue of pricing.  However, by a subsequent order, to satisfy the conscience of the Court, it was   directed   that   details   regarding   the   costs   of   the   aircrafts should also be placed in sealed covers before the Court. 21 25. The   material   placed   before   us   shows   that   the Government   has   not   disclosed   pricing   details,   other   than   the basic price of the aircraft, even to the Parliament, on the ground that sensitivity of pricing details could affect national security, apart from breaching the agreement between the two countries. The   pricing   details   have,   however,   been   shared   with   the Comptroller   and   Auditor   General   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “CAG”), and the report of the CAG has been examined by the Public Accounts Committee (hereafter referred to as “PAC”).  Only a redacted portion of the report was placed before the Parliament, and is in public domain.   The Chief of the Air Staff is stated to have communicated his reservation regarding the disclosure of the pricing details, including regarding the weaponry which could adversely affect national security.  The pricing details are stated to be covered by Article 10 of the IGA between the Government of India   and   the   Government   of   France,   on   purchase   of   Rafale Aircrafts, which provides that protection of classified information and material exchanged under the IGA would be governed by the provisions of the Security Agreement signed between both the th Governments on 25  January, 2008.  Despite this reluctance, the 22 material   has   still   been   placed   before   the   Court   to   satisfy   its conscience.  26. We   have   examined   closely   the   price   details   and comparison   of   the   prices   of   the   basic   aircraft   along   with escalation costs as under the original RFP as well as under the IGA.   We have also gone through the explanatory note on the costing, item wise.   Suffice   it   to   say   that   as   per   the   price   details,   the   official respondents   claim   there   is   a   commercial   advantage   in   the purchase of 36 Rafale aircrafts. The official respondents  have claimed   that   there   are   certain   better   terms   in   IGA   qua   the maintenance and weapon package.     It is certainly not the job of this Court to carry out a comparison of the pricing details in matters like the present.    We say no more as the material has to be kept in a confidential domain.    Offsets 27. The issue of IOP is what has triggered this litigation. The   offset   contract   is   stated   to   have   been   governed   by   the Defence Offset Guidelines of DPP 2013.  Two of the said contracts 23 were   signed   with   Dassault   and   M/s   MBDA   Missile   Systems rd Limited on 23  September, 2016, the same day on which the IGA was   signed   between   the   Government   of   India   and   the Government of France.  These are the French industrial suppliers of the Aircraft package and Weapon Package respectively.  There are stated to be no offset obligations in the first three years, but the   offset   obligations   are   to   commence   from   October   2019 onwards.  28. The   complaint   of   the   petitioners   is   that   the   offset guidelines contemplate that the vendor will disclose details about the Indian Offset partner however, in order to help the business group in India in question, an amendment was carried out in paragraph 8 of the Offset Guidelines that too with retrospective effect.   By virtue of the said amendment it is contended that cloak of secrecy is cast about the Offset partner and the vendor is enabled to give the details at a much later point of time.   It is contended,   however,   that   other   provisions   of   the   Offset Guidelines   remain   unamended,   and,   therefore,   Government cannot pretend ignorance about the Indian Offset partner as has been done in the affidavit filed.  It is complained that favouring 24 the   Indian   business   group   has   resulted   in   offence   being committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act.   29. As   per   clause   8   of   DPP   2013,   dealing   with   the processing of offset proposals, it has been stated in clause 8.2 as under: “8. Processing of Offset Proposals 8 8.2 The   TOEC   will  scrutinize   the   technical offset   proposals   (excluding   proposals   for Technology Acquisition by DRDO as per para 8.3)   to   ensure   conformity   with   the   offset guidelines.  For this purpose, the vendor may be advised to undertake changes to bring his offset proposals in conformity with the offset guidelines.     The   TOEC   will   be   expected   to submit   its   report   within   4­8   weeks   of   its constitution.” 30. It has been categorically stated that the vendor/OEM is yet to submit a formal proposal, in the prescribed manner, indicating the details of IOPs and products for offset discharge.  A press   release   in   the   form   of   a  ‘Clarification   on   Offset   Policy’, nd posted on 22  September, 2018 has also been placed before us. Inter alia,  it states that the Government reiterates that it has no role to play in the selection of the IOP.  As per the Defence Offset 8 Technical Offset Evaluation Committee 25 Guidelines, the OEM is free to select any Indian company as its IOP.  A joint venture is stated to have come into being between Reliance Defence and Dassault in February 2017, which is stated to be a ‘purely commercial arrangement’ between the two private companies.  Media reports of February 2012 are stated to suggest that Dassault,  within two  weeks  of  being  declared  the   lowest bidder   for   procurement   of   126   aircrafts   by   the   previous Government,   had   entered   into   a   pact   for   partnership   with Reliance   Industries   (Another   business   group)   in   the   Defence sector.  Dassault has also issued a press release stating that it has signed partnership agreements with several companies and is negotiating with over hundred other companies.   As per the guidelines, the vendor is to provide details of the IOPs, either at the time of seeking offset credit or one year prior to discharge of offset obligation, which would be due from 2020 onwards.  The aforesaid press release is in conformity with the clause dealing with IOPs which reads as under: “4. Indian Offset Partner 4.3  The   OEM/vendor/Tier­I   sub­vendor   will be free to select the Indian offset partner for implementing the offset obligation provided the IOP has not been barred from doing business by the Ministry of Defence.” 26 31. Despite the aforesaid illustration, the petitioners kept on emphasising that the French Government has no say in the matter, as per media reports. It is also stated that there was no reason  for   Dassault   to   have   engaged   the   services   of   Reliance Aerostructure Ltd., through a joint venture, when the company th itself   had   come   into   being   only   on   24   April,   2015.     The allegation, thus, is that the Indian Government gave a benefit to Reliance Aerostructure Ltd., by compelling Dassault to enter into a contract  with  them, and  that too at the  cost of  the  public enterprise, HAL. 32 .   It   is   no   doubt   true   that   the   company,   Reliance Aerostructure Ltd., has come into being in the recent past, but the   press   release   suggests   that   there   was   possibly   an arrangement between the parent Reliance company and Dassault starting from the year 2012.  As to what transpired between the two corporates would be a matter best left to them, being matters of their commercial interests, as perceived by them.  There has been a categorical denial, from every side, of the interview given by the former French President seeking to suggest that it is the Indian Government which had  given no  option  to the  French 27 Government in the matter.   On the basis of materials available before   us,   this   appears   contrary   to   the   clause   in   DPP   2013 dealing with IOPs which has been extracted above. Thus, the commercial arrangement, in our view, itself does not assign any role to the Indian Government, at this stage, with respect to the engagement   of   the   IOP.   Such   matter   is   seemingly   left   to   the commercial decision of Dassault. That is the reason why it has been stated that the role of the Indian Government would start only when the vendor/OEM submits a formal proposal, in the prescribed manner, indicating details of IOPs and products for offset   discharge.     As   far   as   the   role   of   HAL,   insofar   as   the procurement of 36 aircrafts is concerned, there is no specific role envisaged. In fact, the suggestion of the Government seems to be that there were some contractual problems and Dassault was circumspect about HAL carrying out the contractual obligation, which is also stated to be responsible for the non­conclusion of the earlier contract.   33. Once again, it is neither appropriate nor within the experience   of   this   Court   to   step   into   this   arena   of   what   is technically feasible or not.   The point remains that DPP 2013 28 envisages that the vendor/OEM will choose its own IOPs.  In this process, the role of the Government is not envisaged and, thus, mere press interviews or suggestions cannot form the basis for judicial review by this Court, especially when there is categorical denial of the statements made in the Press, by both the sides. We do not find any substantial material on record to show that this is a  case   of  commercial favouritism  to  any   party  by  the Indian Government, as the option to choose the IOP does not rest with the Indian Government. Conclusion: 34. In view of our findings on all the three aspects, and having heard the matter in detail, we find no reason for any intervention by this Court on the sensitive issue of purchase of 36 defence aircrafts by the Indian Government.   Perception of individuals cannot be the basis of a fishing and roving enquiry by this Court, especially in such matters.  We, thus, dismiss all the writ petitions, leaving it to the parties to bear their own costs. We, however, make it clear that our views as above are primarily from   the   standpoint   of   the   exercise   of   the   jurisdiction   under 29 Article 32 of the Constitution of India which has been invoked in the present group of cases.  ………….....................,,CJI [RANJAN GOGOI] ………….....................,,J. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL] ………….....................,,J. [K.M. JOSEPH] NEW DELHI DECEMBER 14, 2018