Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
WORKMEN OF M/S FIRESTONE TYRE & RUBBER CO.OF INDIA (P) LIMIT
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
FIRESTONE TYRE & RUBBER COMPANY
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1976
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION:
1976 AIR 1775 1976 SCR (3) 369
1976 SCC (3) 819
ACT:
Lay-off-Meaning of-Section 2(kkk) of the Industrial
Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), 1947.
Lay-off-Right of the management of an Iudsustrial
Establishment under the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XlV of
1947), 1947, to lay-off workmen-Section 2(kkk) 25A 25B(2)(i)
and 25C of the Act Scope of-Effect of s. 25.j.
Compensation-Lay-off compensation-Whether laid-of
workmen who do not come under Chapter VA of the Industrial
Disputes Act 1947 by virtue of s. 25A are entitled to any
compensation.
Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), 1947-Section
10(1), 33(c)(2), powers of the tribunal court to award
layoff compensation.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent-company manufacturing tyres in Bombay,
due to the general strike in its factory between the period
3rd March 1967 and 16th May 1967 and again from 4th October
1967 and due to the consequent short supply of tyres had to
lay-off 17 out of its 30 workmen in the Delhi distribution
office and also some out of its 33 workmen in its Madras
distribution office. The workmen in the Delhi and Madras
offices were called back to duty on 22nd April 1968 and 29th
April 1968 respectively. The workmen were not given their
wages or compensation for the period of lay-off. An
industrial dispute was raised and referred to the tribunal
by the Delhi Administration even when the lay-off was in
operation. The Presiding officer of the Additional
Industrial Tribunal, Delhi held that the workmen were not
entitled to any layoff compensation. The workmen in Madras
filed petitions under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act for computation of their wages for the period of their
lay-off. The Presiding officer of the Additional Labour
Court, Madras, holding that the lay-off was justified,
dismissed their applications.
on appeal to this Court by special leave,
^
HELD: (I) The simple dictionary meaning according to
the concise oxford Dictionary of the term "lay-ofF’ is
"period during which a workman is temporarily discharged".
Lay-off means the failure, refusal or inability of employer
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on account of contingencies mentioned in cl. (kkk) of s. 2
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to give employment to
a workman whose name is borne on the Muster Rolls of his
Industrial Establishment. It has been called a temporary
discharge of the workmen or a temporary suspension of his
contract of service. Strictly speaking, it is not so. It is
merely a fact of temporary unemployment of the workman in
the work of the lndustrial Establihment. Mere refusal or
inability to give employment to the workman when he reports
for duty on one or more grounds mentioned in cl. (kkk) of s.
2 is not a temporary discharge of the workman. [372A, 374A,
B, G]
Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Ltd. v. Gaya Cotton & lute
Mills Labour Union [1952] II Labour Law Journal 37, referred
to.
(2)(i) That the power to lay-off a workman is inherent
in the definition in cl. (kkk) of s. 2 is not correct, since
no words in the definition clause to indicate the conferment
of any power on the employer to lay-off a workman can be
found. His failure or inability to give employment, by
itself militates against the theory of conferment of power.
No section in Chapter VA in express language or by necessary
implication confers any power, even on the management of the
Industrial Establishment to which the relevant provisions
are applicable, to lay-off a workman. There is no provision
in the Act specifically providing that an employer would be
entitled to lay-off his workmen
370
for the reasons prescribed by s. 2 (kkk). Such a power,
therefore, must be found out from the terms of contract of
service or the Standing orders governing the Establishment.
[374 B-G]
(ii) In the instant case, the number of workmen being
only 3, there being no Standing orders certified under the
Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act (Act 20 of
1946), 1946, and there being no contract of service
conferring any such right of lay-off, the inescapable
conclusion is that the workmen were laid-off without any
authority of law or the power in the management under the
contract of service. [374 G-H]
The Management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi & others v. Hotel
Workers Union [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476 and V. P. Gindroniya v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & ors. [1970] 3 S.C.R. 448, referred
to.
Veiyra (MA ) Fernandez (CP.) and another [1956] 1
Labour Law Journal. 547, reversed.
Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate and ors. v. The Management
[19641 S S.C.R. 548, applied.
Sanghi Jeevaraj Ghewar Chand & ors v. Secretary Madras
Challies Grains Kirana Merchants Workers Union and Anr.
[1969] 1 S.C.C. 366, distinguished.
(3) If the terms of a contract of service or the
statutory terms engrafted in the Standing orders do not give
the power to lay-off to the employer, the employer would be
bound to pay compensation for the period of lay-off which
ordinarily and general would be equal to the full wages of
the concerned V workman. If, however, the terms of
employment confer a right of lay-off on the management then
in the case of an Industrial Establishment which is governed
by Chapter VA, compensation will be payable in accordance
with the provisions contained therein. But compensation or
no compensation will be payable in the case of an Industrial
Establishment to which the provisions of Chapter VA do not
apply and it will be so as per the terms of employment.
[377-B-D]
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Kanhaiya Lal Gupta v. Ajeet Kumar Dey and others [1967]
II Labour Law Journal. 761 and Steel and General Mills Co.
Ltd v Additional District judge Rohtak and others [1972] 1
Labour Law Journal, 2847 approved.
K. T Rolling Mills Private Ltd. and another v. M R
Meher and others A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 146. reversed.
(4) In a reference under s. 10(l) of the Act. it is
open to the tribunal or court to award compensation which
may not be equal to the full amount of basic wages and
dearness allowance. But no such power exists in the Labour
Court under s. 33C(2) of the Act. Only the money due has to
be quantified. If the lay-off could be held to be in
accordance with the terms of contract of service. no
compensation at all could be allowed under s. 33C(2) of the
Act, while in the reference some compensation could be
allowed. [378-B-Cl
[In the instant case as regards the workmen in the
Delhi case. the court held 75% of the basic wages and
dearness allowance would be the adequate compensation for
the lay-off period.]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2307 of
1969
(Appeal by Special leave from the Award dated the 1st April
1969 of the Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in I. D.- No.
83 of 1968) and Civil Appeals Nos. 1857-1859/70. (Appeals by
Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 17th
November 1969 of the Addl. Labour Court, Madras in claim
Petition Nos. 627 and 629 of 1968).
M. K. Ramamurthi and Jitendra Sharma and Janardan
Sharma, for the appellants in both the appeals.
371
S. N. Andley, (Rameshwar Nath and B. R. Mehta in CAs
1857- A 59/70) for respondents in both the appeals.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, J.-As the main question for determination in
these appeals by special leave is common, they have been
heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.
Civil Appeal No. 2307 of 1969
The respondent company in this appeal has its Head
office at Bombay. It manufactures tyres at its Bombay
factory and sells the tyres and other accessories in the
markets throughout the country. The company has a
Distribution office at Nicholson Road, Delhi. There was a
strike in the Bombay factory from 3rd March, 1967 to 16th
May, 1967 and again from 4th October, 1967. As a result of
the strike there was a short supply of tyres etc. to the
Distribution office. In the Delhi office, there were 30
employees at the relevant time. 17 workmen out of 30 were
laid-off by the management as per their notice dated the 3rd
February, 1968, which was to the following effect:
"Management is unable to give employment to the
following workmen due to much reduced production in the
company’s factory resulting from strike in one of the
factory departments.
These workmen are, therefore, laid-off in accordance
with law with effect from 5th February, 1968."
The lay-off of the 17 workmen whose names were
mentioned in the notice was recalled by the management on
the 22nd April, 1968. The workmen were not given their wages
or compensation for the period of lay-off. An industrial
dispute was raised and referred by the Delhi Administration
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on the 17th April, 1968 even when the layoff was in
operation. The reference was in the following terms:
"Whether the action of the management to ’lay-off’ 17
workmen with effect from 5th Feb. 1968 is illegal
and/or unjustified, and if so, to what relief are these
workmen entitled?
The Presiding officer of the Additional Industrial
Tribunal, Delhi has held that the workmen are not entitled
to any lay-off compensation. Hence this is an appeal by
their Union.
We were informed at- the Bar that some of the workmen
out of the batch of 17 have settled their disputes with the
management and their cases were not represented by the Union
in this appeal. Hence this judgment will not affect the
compromise or the settlement arrived at between the
management and some of the workmen.
The question which for our determination is whether the
management had a right to lay-off their workmen and whether
the workmen are entitled to claim wages or compensation.
372
The simple dictionary meaning according to the Concise
oxford Dictionary of the term ’lay-off’ is "period during
which a workman is temporarily discharged." The term ’lay-
off’ has been well known in the industrial arena. Disputes
were often raised in relation to the ’lay-off’ of the
workmen in various industries. Sometime compensation was
awarded for the period of lay-off but many a time when the
lay-off was found to be justified workmen were not found
entitled to any wages or compensation. In Gaya Cotton & Jute
Mills Ltd. v. Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Labour Union(l) the
standing order of the company provided that the company
could under certain circumstances "stop any machine or
machines or department or departments, wholly or partially
for any period or periods without notice or without
compensation in lieu of notice." In such a situation for the
closure of the factory for a certain period, no claim for
compensation was allowed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of
India. We are aware of the distinction betwen a lay-off and
a closure. But just to point out the history of the law we
have referred to this case.
Then came an amendment in the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 -hereinafter referred to as the Act-by Act 43 of 1953.
In section 2 clause (kkk) was added to say:
"lay-off" (with its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions) means the failure, refusal or inability of
an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or
raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the
break-down of machinery or for any other reason to give
employment to a workman whose name is borne on the
muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who
has not been retrenched
Explanation-Every workman whose name is borne on the
muster rolls of the industrial establishment and who
presents himself for work at the establishment at the
time appointed for the purpose during normal working
hours on any day and is not given employment by the
employer within two hours of his so presenting himself
shall be deemed to have been laid-off for that day
within the meaning of this clause:
Provided that if the workman, instead of being
given employment at the commencement of any shift for
any day is asked to present himself for the purpose
during the second half of the shift for the day and is
given employment then, he shall be deemed to have been
laid-off only for one-half of that day:
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Provided further that if he is not given any such
employment even after so presenting himself, he shall
not be deemed to have been laid-off for the second half
of the shift for the day and shall be entitled to full
basic wages and dearness allowance for that part of the
day.’"
(1) [1952] II Labour Law Journal, 37.
373
By the same Amending Act, Chapter VA was introduced in the
Act to provide for lay-off and retrenchment compensation.
Section 25A excluded the Industrial Establishment in which
less than 50 workmen on an average per working day had been
employed in the preceding calendar month from the
application of Sections 25C to 25E. Section 25-C provides
for the right of laid-off workmen for compensation and
broadly speaking compensation allowable is 50% of the total
of the basic wages and dearness allowance that would have
been payable 13 to the workman had he not been laid-off. It
would be noticed that the sections dealing with the matters
of lay-off in Chapter VA are not applicable to certain types
of Industrial Establishments. The respondent is one such
Establishment because it employed only 30 workmen at its
Delhi office at the relevant time. In such a situation the
question beset with difficulty of solution is whether the
laid-off workmen were entitled to any compensation, if so,
what’?
We shall now read section 25-J. It says:
"(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect
not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law including standing orders
made under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders)
Act, 1946:
Provided that where under the provisions of any other
Act or Rules, orders or notifications issued thereunder or
under any standing orders or under any award, contract of
service or otherwise, a workman is entitled to benefits in
respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than
those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the
workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable
benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he
receives benefits in respect of other matters under this
Act.
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that
nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to affect
the provisions of any other law for the time being in force
in any State in so far as that law provides for the
settlement of industrial disputes, but the rights and
liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they
relate to layoff and retrenchment shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter."
The effect of the provisions aforesaid is that for the
period of lay-off in an Industrial Establishment to which
the said provisions apply, compensation will have to be paid
in accordance with section 25C. But if a workman is entitled
to benefits which are more favourable to him than those
provided in the Act, he shall continue to be entitled to the
more favourable benefits. The rights and liabilities of
employers and workmen in so far as it relate to lay-off and
retrenchment, except as provided in section 25J, have got to
be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter
VA.
The ticklish question which does not admit of an easy
answer is as to the source of the power of management to
lay-off a workman. The employer has a right to terminate the
services of a workman. Therefore, his power to retrench
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presents no difficulty as retrenchment means the termination
by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever as mentioned in clause (oo) of section 2 of the
374
Act. But lay-off means the failure, refusal or inability of
employer on account of contingencies mentioned in clause
(kkk) to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on
the Muster Rolls of his Industrial Establishment. It has
been called a temporary discharge of the workman or a
temporary suspension of his contract of service. Strictly
speaking, it is not so. It is merely a fact of temporary
unemployment of the workman in the work of the Industrial
Establishment. Mr. S. N. Andley submitted with reference to
the explanation and the provisions appended to clause (kkk)
that the power to lay-off a workman is inherent in the
definition. We do not find any words in the definition
clause to indicate the conferment of any power on the
employer to lay-off a workman. His failure or inability to
give employment by itself militates against the theory of
conferment of power. The power to lay-off for the failure or
inability to give employment has to be searched somewhere
else. No section in the Act confers this power.
There are two small matters which present some
difficulty in the solution of the problem. In explanation
(1) appended to sub-section ( 2) of section 25B the words
used are:
"he has been laid-off under an agreement or as
permitted by standing order made under the Industrial
Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, or under this
Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial
establishment."
indicating that a workman can be laid-off under the
Industrial Disputes Act also. But it is strange to find that
no section in Chapter VA in express language or by necessary
implication confers any power, even on the management of the
Industrial Establishment to which the relevant provisions
are applicable, to lay-off a workman. Clause (ii) of section
25E says:
"No compensation shall be paid to a workman who has
been laid-off-
If he does not present himself for work at the
establishment at the appointed time during normal
working hours at least once a day."
This indicates that there is neither a temporary discharge
of the work man nor a temporary suspension of his contract
of service. Under the general law of Master and Servants an
employer may discharge an employee either temporarily or
permanently but that cannot be without adequate notice. Mere
refusal or inability to give employment to the workman when
he reports for duty on one or more grounds mentioned in
clause (kkk) of section 2 is not a temporary discharge of
the work man. Such a power, therefore, must be found out
from the terms of contract of service or the Standing orders
governing the establishment. In the instant case the number
of workmen being only 30, there were no Standing orders
certified under the Industrial employment (Standing orders)
Act, 1946. Nor was there any term of contract of service
conferring any such right of lay-off. In such a situation
the conclusion seems to be inescapable that the workmen were
laid-off without any authority of law or the power in the
management under the contract of service. In Industrial
Establishments where there is a power in the management to
lay-off a workman and to which the
375
provisions of Chapter VA apply, the question of payment of
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compensation will be governed and determined by the said
provisions. Otherwise Chapter VA is not a complete Code as
was argued on behalf of the respondent company in the matter
of payment of lay-off compensation. This case, therefore,
goes out of Chapter VA. Ordinarily and generally the workmen
would be entitled to their full wages but in a reference
made under section 10(l) of the Act, it is open to the
Tribunal or the Court to award a lesser sum finding the
justifiability of the lay-off. ‘-
In The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & others
v. Hotel Workers’ Union(l) in a case of suspension of a
workman it was said by Wanchoo, J. as he then was,
delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court at page 482:
"Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power
either as an express term in the contract or in the
rules framed under some statute would mean that the
master would have no power to suspend a workman and
even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the
employee to work. he will have to pay wages during the
so-called period of suspension. Where, however. there
is power to suspend either in the contract of
employment or in the statute or the rules framed
thereunder, the suspension has the effect of
temporarily suspending the relation of master and
servant with the consequence that ‘ the servant is not
bound to render service and the master is not bound to
pay."
The same principle was reiterated in V. P. Gindroniya v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.(2)
We have referred to the suspension cases because in our
opinion the principles governing the case of lay-off are
very akin to those applicable to a suspension case.
In Veiyra (M. A.) v. Fernandez (C. P.) and another(3) a
Bench of the Bombay High Court opined that under the general
law the employer was free to dispense with the services of a
workman but under the Industrial Disputes Act he was under
an obligation to lay him off; that being so, the action of
lay-off by the employer could not . be questioned as being
ultra vires. We do not think that the view expressed by the
Bomby High Court is correct.
There is an important decision of this Court in Workmen
of Dewan Tea Estate and ors. v. The Management(4) on which
reliance was placed heavily by Mr. M. K. Ramamurti appearing
for the appellant and also by Mr. Andley for the respondent.
One of the question for consideration was whether section
25C of the Act recognises the common law right of the
management to declare a lay-off for reasons other than those
specified in the relevant clause of the Standing order.
While considering this question, Gajendragadkar, J. as he
then was. said at page 554:
"The question which we are concerned with at this stage
is whether it can be said that s.25C recognises a
common law
(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476. (2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 448.
(3) [1956] I Labour Law Journal, 547. (4) []964] S
S.C.R. 548.
376
right of the industrial employer to lay off his
workmen. This question must, in our opinion, be
answered in the negative. When the laying off of the
workmen is referred to in s. 25C, it is the laying off
as defined by s. 2 (kkk) and so, workmen who can claim
the benefit of s. 25C must be workmen who are laid off
and laid off for reasons contemplated by s. 2 (kkk);
that is all that s. 25C means.
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Then follows a sentence which was pressed into service by
the respondent. It says:
"If any case is not covered by the Standing orders, it
will necessarily be governed by the provisions of the
Act, and layoff would be permissible only where one or
the other of the factors mentioned by s. 2 (kkk) is
present, and for such lay off compensation would be
awarded under s. 25C."
In our opinion, in the context, the sentence aforesaid means
that if the power of lay-off is there in the Standing orders
but the grounds of lay-off are not covered by them, rather,
are governed by the provisions of the Act, then lay-off
would be permissible only on one or the other of the factors
mentioned in clause (kkk). Subsequent discussions at pages
558 and 559 lend ample support to the appellant’s argument
that there is no provision in the Act specifically providing
that an employer would be entitled to lay-off his workmen
for the reasons prescribed by section 2 (kkk).
Mr. Andley placed strong reliance upon the decision of
this Court in Sanjhi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand & Ors. v.
Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains Kirana Merchants Workers’
Union & Anr.(l) The statute under consideration in this case
was the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and it was held that the
Act was intended to be a comprehensive and exhaustive law
dealing with the entire subject of bonus of the persons to
whom it should apply. The Bonus Act was not to apply to
certain Establishments. Argument before the Court was that
bonus was payable de hors the Act in such establishment
also. This argument was repe11ed and in that connection it
was observed at page 381:
"It will be noticed that though the Industrial Disputes
Act confers substantive rights on workmen with regard
to lay off, retrenchment compensation, etc., it does
not create or confer any such statutory right as to
payment to bonus. Bonus was so far the creature of
industrial adjudication and was made payable by the
employers under the machinery provided under that Act
and other corresponding Acts enacted for ,.
investigation and settlement of disputes raised
thereunder. There was, therefore, no question of
Parliament having to delete or modify item S in the
Third Schedule to Industrial Disputes Act or any such
provision in any corresponding Act or its having to
exclude any right to bonus thereunder by any
categorical exclusion in the present case."
And finally it was held at page 385:
"Considering the history of the legislation, the
background and the circumstances in which the Act was
enacted, the
(1) [1969] I S.C.C. 366.
377
object of the Act and its scheme, it is not possible to
accept A the construction suggested on behalf of the
respondents that the Act is not an exhaustive Act
dealing comprehensively with the subject-matter of
bonus in all its aspects or that Parliament still left
it open to those to whom the Act does not apply by
reason of its provisions either as to exclusion or
exemption to raise a dispute with regard to bonus
through Industrial adjudication under the Industrial
Disputes Act or other corresponding law."
In a case of compensation for lay-off the position is quite
distinct and different. If the term of contract of service
or the statutory terms engrafted in the Standing orders do
not give the power of lay off to the employer, the employer
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will be bound to pay compensation for the period of lay-off
which ordinarily and generally would be equal to the full
wages of the concerned workmen. If, however, the terms of r
employment confer a right of lay-off on the management,
then, in the case of an industrial establishment which is
governed by Chapter VA, compensation will be payable in
accordance with the provisions contained therein. But
compensation or no compensation will be payable in the case
of an industrial establishment to which the provisions of
Chapter VA do not apply, and it will be so as per the terms
of the employment.
In Kanhaiya Lal Gupta v. Ajeet Kumar Dey and others(l)
a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court seem to
have rightly held that in the absence of any term in the
contract of service or in the statute or in the statutory
rules or standing orders an employer has no right to lay-off
a workman without paying him wages. A learned single Judge
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court took an identical view
in the case of Steel and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Additional District Judge, Rohtak and others. (2) The
majority view of the Bombay High Court in K. T. Rolling
Mills Private Ltd. and another v. M. R. Meher and other(8)
that it is not open to the Industrial Tribunal under the Act
to award lay-off compensation to workmen employed in an
’Industrial Establishment’ to which S. 25-C does not apply,
is not correct. The source of the power of the employer to
lay-off workmen does not seem to have been canvassed or
discussed by the Bombay High Court in the said judgment.
In the case of the Delhi office of the respondent the
Tribunal has held that the lay-off was justified. It was
open to the Tribunal to award a lesser amount of
compensation than the full wages. Instead of sending back
the case to the Tribunal, we direct that 75% the basic wages
and dearness allowance would be paid to the workmen
concerned for the period of lay-off. As we have said above
this will not cover the case of those workmen who have
settled or compromised their disputes with the management.
Civil Appeals 1857-1859 (NL) of 1970
In these appeals the facts are identical to those in
the other appeal. There were only 33 employees in the Madras
office of the respondent company. Certain workmen were laid-
off for identical reasons from the
(1) [1967] II Labour Law Journal, 761. (2) [1972] 1
Labour Law Journal, 284.
(3) A.I.R. 1963 Bombay, 146.
378
5th February, 1968. The lay-off was lifted on the 29th
April, 1968. The concerned workmen filed petitions under
section 33C (2) of the Act for computation of their wages
for the period of lay-off. Holding that the lay-off was
justified and valid the Presiding officer of the Additional
Labour Court, Madras has dismissed their applications for
salary and allowances for the period of lay-off. Hence these
appeals.
In a reference under section 10 (1) of the Act it is
open to the Tribunal or the Court to award compensation
which may not be equal to the full amount of basic wages and
dearness allowance. But no such power exists in the Labour
Court under section 33C (2) of the Act. only the money due
has got to be quantified. If the lay-off could be held to be
in accordance with the terms of the contract of service, no
compensation at all could be allowed under section 33C (2)
of the Act, while, in the reference some compensation could
be allowed. Similarly on the view expressed above that the
respondent company had no power to lay-off any workmen,
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there is no escape from the position that the entire sum
payable to the laid-off workmen except the workmen who have
settled or compromised, has got to be computed and
quantified under section 33C(2) of the Act for the period of
lay-off.
For the reasons stated above all the appeals are
allowed. In Civil Appeal No. 2307/1969 in place of the order
of the Tribunal, an order is made on the lines indicated
above. And in Civil Appeals 1857 to 1859/1970 the orders of
the Labour Court are set aside and the cases of the
appellants are remitted back to that Court for computation
and quantification of the sums payable to the concerned
workmen for the period of lay-off. There will be no order as
to costs in any of the appeals.
S.R Appeals allowed:-
Orders in CA 2307/69
modified : CAs 1857-1859/70 remitted hock to the
Tribunal.
379