Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7
PETITIONER:
HARBILAS RAI BANSAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT05/12/1995
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 857 1996 SCC (1) 1
JT 1995 (8) 458 1995 SCALE (6)717
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Kuldip Singh, J.
The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (the
Act) - prior to 1956 - permitted a landlord to evict his
tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of bona
fide requirement for his own use, however, the said right of
the landlord was taken away by the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Punjab Act 29 of 1956)
(the Amendment) which came into force on September 24,1956.
Before us the constitutional validity of the Amendment has
been challenged. A writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India challenging the Amendment was
dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in limine.
This appeal, by way of special leave, is against the order
of the High Court.
The non-residential premises in dispute was given on
rent by the appellant’s father to the predecessor-in-
interest of respondent 2. After the death of appellant’s
father in the year 1953 the appellant, who was in Government
service, became owner of the shop. The appellant retired
from service in 1986. According to the appellant he is a
Registered Medicines. While he was in service his employer
granted him permission in 1976 to practice as Homeopath
Physician after office hours. It is the case of the
appellant that he intends to start practice as Homeopath
Physician and for that purpose he bona fide requires the
shop in dispute for his personal use and occupation.
The relevant provisions of the Act prior to the amendment
were as under :
"Section 13 - Eviction of Tenants. (3)
(a). A landlord may apply to Controller
for an order directing the tenant to put
the landlord in possession :
(ii) in case of a non-residential
building or rented land, if
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
(a) he requires it for his own use:
(b) he is not occupying in the Urban
Area concerned for the purpose of his
business any other such building or
rented land as the case may be ;
and
(c) has not vacated such a building or
rented land without sufficient cause
after the commencement of this Act, in
the Urban Area concerned."
The amendment was enforced by the notification dated
September 24, 1956. The impugned provisions of the amendment
are as under :
"1. Short title -This Act may be called
the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 1956.
2. Amendment of section 13 of East
Punjab Act III of 1949. - In clause (a)
of sub section (3) of section 13 of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949, hereinafter referred to as the
principal Act -
(i) (a)
(b)
(ii) (a) In sub-clause (iii) the words
"a non-residential building or" shall be
omitted.
(b) In sub-paragraph (b), the words
"building or" and the words "as the case
may be" shall be omitted.
(c) In sub-paragraph (c), the words "a
building or" shall be omitted.
(iii)
(iv) In sub clause (iv), for the words
"any building", where they first occur,
the words ("any residential building")
shall be substituted.
In the second proviso, for the
words "a residential, a scheduled or
non-residential building or rented
land", the words ("a residential
building or rented land") shall be
substituted.
After the enforcement of the amendment the provisions of the
Act are as under :
"(3) (a) A landlord may apply to
Controller for an order directing the
tenant to put the landlord in
possessions.
(ii) in case of (X X X) rented land, if.
(a) he requires it for his own use;
(b) he is not occupying in the urban
area concerned for the purpose of his
business any other such 2(X X X ) rented
land 3 (X X X), and
(c) has not vacated such 4 (X X X)
rented land without sufficient cause
after the commencement of this Act, in
the urban area concerned."
It is thus obvious that prior to the coming into force of
the amendment a landlord could seek eviction of his tenant
from a non-residential premises for his bona fide
requirement but the amendment has taken away the said right
of the landlord.
Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
contended that the above quoted provisions of the amendment
are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The precise argument is that the classification of the
buildings into residential and non-residential - created by
the amendment - has no reasonable nexus with the object
sought to be achieved by the Act. It is further contended by
the learned counsel that the taking away of the landlord’s
right to seek eviction of his tenant, from a non-residential
premises, on the ground of his bona fide requirement, is
wholly arbitrary and as such is hit by Article 14 of the
Constitution.
The scope of Article 14 has been authoritatively laid
down by this Court in innumerable decisions including,
Budhan Choudhary Vs State of Bihar (1956)1 SCR 1045, Ram
Krishan Dalmia Vs Justice S.R.Tendolkar (1959 SCR 279), U.P.
Electric Power and Supply Company Limited Vs State of U.P.
(1969) 1 SCC 817, Mohd. Hanif Quareshi Vs State of Bihar
(1959 SCR 629). To be permissible under Article 14 of the
Constitution a classification must satisfy two conditions
namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from others left out the
group and (ii) that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute
in question. The classification may be founded on different
basis, but what is necessary is that there must be a nexus
between the basis of classification and the object of the
Act under consideration.
The statement of objects and reasons of the Act is as
under:-
"Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 (Act 3 of 1949).- Under Article 6
of the India (Provisional Constitution)
Order 1947, any law made by the Governor
of the Punjab by virtue of section 93 of
the Government of India Act, 1995, which
was in force immediately before the 15th
August, 1947, is to remain in force for
two years from the date on which the
Proclamation ceased to have effect,
viz., the 14th August, 1947. A
Governor’s Act will, therefore, cease to
have effect on the 14th August, 1947. It
is desired that the Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1947 (Punjab Act No. VI
of 1947), being a Governor’s Act, be re-
enacted as a permanent measure, as the
need for restricting the increase of
rents of certain premises situated
within the limits of urban areas and the
protection of tenants against mala fide
attempts by their landlords to procure
their eviction would be there even after
the 14th August, 1949.
In order to achieve the above
object, a new Act incorporating the
provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1947 with necessary
modification is being enacted."
It is obvious from the objects and reasons quoted above that
the primary purpose for legislating the Act was to protect
the tenants against the mala fide attempts by their
landlords to procure their eviction. Bona fide requirement
of a landlord was, therefore, provided in the Act - as
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
originally enacted - a ground to evict the tenant from the
premises whether residential or non-residential.
The statement of objects and reasons of the amendment
was in the following words:
"Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act (Act 29 of 1956).- Under
the Ajmer Marwar Rent Control Act, 1947,
tenants of urban property cannot be
ejected except from residential
buildings and that too for bona fide
personal use. This Act applies to Delhi
city also where tenants of commercial or
industrial premises cannot be ejected on
the ground of personal use. In the
Punjab, however, such tenants can be
ejected on various grounds including
that of personal use. This entails a
great hardship on such tenants. The
provision allowing eviction on the
ground of personal use has been misused
by certain landlords and there have been
many complaints and representations on
behalf of the tenants to amend the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947.
It is, therefore, considered necessary
that the tenants of non-residential
property in the Punjab should at least
be placed at par with tenants of such
property in Delhi and other urban areas
covered by the Delhi Ajmer Act."
Two reasons have been given for bringing the amendment. It
is stated that eviction from non-residential building on the
ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord entails a
great hardship on such tenants. The second reason giving is
that the provision regarding eviction on the ground of
personal use has been misused by certain landlords. Support
is sought from the fact that in the State of Delhi and other
urban areas covered by the Delhi Ajmer Act, there were
similar provisions.
It would be useful to have a look at the provisions of
the Act. Section 2(a) defines "building" as any building or
part of a building let for any purpose whether being
actually used for that purpose or not, including any land,
godowns, out-houses, or furniture let therewith, but does
not include a room in a hotel, hostel or boarding house.
Section 2(d) defines "non-residential building" as a
building being used solely for the purpose of business or
trade. "Residential building" under Section 2(g) means any
building which is not a non-residential building.Section 3
permits the State Government to exempt any particular
building or rented land or any class of buildings or rented
lands from the provisions of the Act. Sections 4, 5 and 6
provide for fixation, increase etc, of fair rent. Section 11
provides that no person shall convert the residential
building into a non-residential building except with the
permission in writing of the Controller. Then comes the
crucial Section 13 regarding the eviction of tenants.
Section 13(2)(i) enables the landlord to evict the tenant
for non-payment of rent. Section 13(2)(ii)(a) and (ii)(b)
provide for the eviction of a tenant on the grounds of sub-
letting and misuse of the premises. Clause (iii) of Section
13 (2) makes the tenant liable to eviction when he continues
such acts as are likely to impair materially the valuer and
utility of the building or rented land. Clauses (iv) and (v)
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
of Section 13(2) permit the eviction of the tenant on the
grounds of nuisance and when he ceases to occupy the
building for a period of four months without reasonable
cause. Sub-Section 3 of Section 13 provides for eviction of
the tenant from the residential premises on the ground of
bona fide requirement of the landlord. It is not necessary
to refer to other provisions of the Act.
The Scheme of the Act, unmistakably aims at regulating
the conditions of tenancy, controlling the rents and
preventing unreasonable and mala fide eviction of tenants of
the residential and non-residential buildings. For the
advancement of these objects, tenants are invested with
certain right and landlords are subjected to certain
obligations. These rights and obligations are attached to
the tenants and the landlords of all buildings, residential
or non-residential. None of the main provisions of the Act,
to which we have referred, make any serious distinction
between residential and non-residential buildings.
The provisions of the Act, prior to the amendment, were
uniformly applicable to the residential and non-residential
buildings. The amendment, in the year 1956, created the
impugned classification. The objects and reasons of the Act
indicate that it was enacted with a view to restrict the
increase of rents and to safeguard against the mala fide
eviction of tenants. The Act, therefore, initially provided
- conforming to its objects and reasons - bona fide
requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether
residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of
the tenant. The classification created by the amendment has
no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the
landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant.
Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such
an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the
tenant for the rest of his life even we he bona fide
requires the premises for his personal use and occupation.
It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering
great hardships because of the amendment. A landlord may
genuinely like to let out a shop till the time he bona fide
needs the same. Visualise a case of a shopkeeper (owner)
dying young. There may not be a member in the family to
continue the business and the widow may not need the shop
for quite some time. She may like to let out the shop till
the time her children grow-up and need the premises for
their personal use. It would be wholly arbitrary - in a
situation like this - to deny her the right to evict the
tenant. The amendment has created a situation where a tenant
can continue in possession of a non-residential premises for
life and even after the tenant’s death his heirs may
continue the tenancy. We have no doubt in our mind that the
objects, reasons and the scheme of the Act could not have
envisaged the type of situation created by the amendment
which is patently harsh and grossly unjust for the landlord
of a non-residential premises.
Learned counsel for the respondents contended that a
tenant occupying non-residential premises and the one
occupying residential premises belong to two different
classes under the Act and as such no fault can be found with
the amendment. Assuming that the classification exists, it
has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the
Act. Tenants of both kinds of buildings need equal and same
protection of the beneficial provisions of the Act. Neither
from the objects and reasons of the Act nor from the
provisions of the Act it is possible to discern any basis
for the classification created by the amendment.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
This Court in Rattan Arya etc. vs. State of Tamil Nadu
and another 1986(2) SCR 596 struck down Section 13(ii) of
the Tamil Nadu buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on
the ground that the distinction made by it between the
tenant of a residential building and the tenant of a non-
residential building based on the rent paid by the
respective tenants had no reasonable nexus to the object
sought to be achieved by the Act.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in Gian Devi Anand
vs. Jeevan Kumar & Ors. [1985(2) SCC 683] observed as
under:-
"39. Before concluding, there is one
aspect on which we consider it desirable
to make certain observations. The owner
of any premises, whether residential or
commercial, let out to any tenant, is
permitted by the Rent Control Acts to
seek eviction of the tenant only on the
grounds specified in the Act, entitling
the landlord to evict the tenant from
the premises. The restrictions on the
power of the landlords in the matter of
recovery of possession of the premises
let out by him to a lenant have been
imposed for the benefit of the tenants.
In spite of various restrictions put on
the landlord’s right to recover
possession of the premises from the
tenant for the bona fide need of the
premises by the landlord is recognised
by the Act, in case of residential
premises. A landlord may let out the
premises under various circumstances.
Usually a landlord lets out the premises
when he does not need it for own use.
Circumstances may change and a situation
may arise when the landlord may require
the premises let out by him for his own
use. It is just and proper that when the
landlord requires the premises bona fide
for his own use and occupation, the
landlord should be entitled to recover
the possession of the premises which
continues to be his property in spite of
his letting out the same to a tenant.
The Legislature in its wisdom did
recognise this fact and the Legislature
has provided that bona fide requirement
of the landlord for his own use will be
a legitimate ground under the Act for
the eviction of his tenant from any
residential premises. This ground is,
however, confined to residential
premises of commercial premises. A
landlord who lets out commercial
premises to a tenant under certain
circumstances may need bona fide the
premises for his own use under changed
condition’s on some future date should
not in fairness be deprived of his right
to recover the commercial premises. Bona
fide need of the landlord will stand
very much on the same footing in regard
to either class of premises, residential
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
or commercial. We, therefore, suggest
that Legislature may consider the
advisability of making the bona fide
requirement of the landlord a ground of
eviction in respect of commercial
premises as well."
In Gian Devi’s case the question for consideration before
the Constitution Bench was whether under the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, the statutory tenancy in respect of
commercial premises was heritable or not. The Bench answered
the question in the affirmative. The above quoted
observations were made by the Bench keeping in view that
hardship being caused to the landlords of commercial
premises who connote evict their tenants even on the ground
of bona fide requirement for personal use. The observations
of the Constitution Bench that "bona fide need of the
landlord will stand very much on the same footing in regard
to either class of premises, residential or commercial"
fully support the view, we have taken, that the
classification created by the amendment has no reasonable
nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. We,
therefore, hold that the provisions of the amendment, quoted
in earlier part of the judgment, are violative of Article 14
of the Constitution of India and are liable to be struck-
down.
We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of
the High Court, declare the above said provisions of the
amendment as constitutionally invalid and as a consequence
restore the original provisions of the Act which were
operating before coming into force of the amendment. The net
result is that a landlord - under the Act - can seek
eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the
ground that he requires it for his own use. The parties to
bear their own costs.