Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1161
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11269 OF 2016
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY … APPELLANT
Versus
CORPORATION BANK & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ALOK ARADHE, J.
1. This appeal emanates from an order dated 11.08.2014
passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 5005 of 2014 by which High
Court of Delhi has dismissed the writ petition preferred by
the appellant.
The present appeal brings before this Court a contest
not merely of rights but of duties - the duty of the lessee to
honour the covenants of the lease, the duty of a bank to
exercise due diligence before advancing public money and
the duty of an instrumentality of the state, as trustee of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2025.09.25
16:52:50 IST
Reason:
public property, to guard against encroachment upon its
title. It also brings before us the plight of an Auction
1
Purchaser who entered the field in good faith only to find
the ground beneath its feet unstable.
2. The relevant facts leading to filing of this appeal are as
under:-
(i) FACTS: -
3. The Delhi Development Authority-the Appellant
(hereinafter referred to as “DDA”) on 01.10.2001 allotted
Plot No. 25, Facility Centre-33 Kalindi Kunj Road, Jasola,
New Delhi admeasuring 877.50 square metres (hereinafter
referred to as “subject plot”) to Respondent No. 2 namely,
Sarita Vihar Club (hereinafter referred to as “the club”) on
leasehold basis. The subject plot was allotted to the club on
a premium of Rs.62,96,664/- for construction of a
recreational and sports club. The club was required to pay
a provisional premium, in respect of subject plot, at the rate
of Rs.2,90,40,000/- per acre with annual ground rent at
the rate of Rs. 2.5 % per annum of the total premium. As
per the letter of allotment dated 01.10.2001, the club, with
previous consent in writing of the Lieutenant Governor of
Delhi, could mortgage or charge the subject plot to such
2
person as may be approved by the Lieutenant Governor in
his absolute discretion.
4. The club on 28.11.2001 deposited a sum of Rs.29,50,000/-
to the DDA. It appears that the club applied for sanction of
loan for a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- to Respondent No. 1
namely, the Corporation Bank (hereinafter referred to as
the “Bank”). The Bank thereafter by a communication dated
07.02.2002 informed the club that the proposal of sanction
of loan is being forwarded to the higher authorities for
consideration and requested the club to seek a permission
for mortgaging the subject plot from the DDA. The club vide
communication dated 11.02.2002, sought the permission
of the DDA for mortgaging the subject plot for arranging the
balance payment. The DDA, by a communication dated
22.02.2002, granted NOC to the club for applying loan to
the Bank for making payment to the DDA, on account of
the premium of the plot subject to the condition that
permission for mortgage of the plot shall be issued only
after execution/registration of the lease deed. The Bank
thereafter by a communication dated 22.03.2002 sought
the permission of the DDA for mortgage of the subject plot
3
and to note lien of the Bank on the subject plot. The club
on 12.04.2002 deposited an additional amount of
Rs.2,05,000/- to the DDA which included the interest on
the delayed payment as well. Thereupon DDA on
29.04.2002 issued a modified letter of allotment in favour
of the club and the amount of initial premium of
Rs.64,53,107/- was modified to Rs.64,54,126/-.
5. A perpetual lease deed in respect of subject plot was
executed on 28.01.2005 between the DDA and the club.
Clause 5(b) of the lease deed provided that previous consent
in writing of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi for mortgage or
charge of the subject plot was necessary. Clause (6) deals
with DDA’s right to recover an unearned increase and pre-
emptive right to purchase the subject plot. The club was
under an obligation to complete the construction within a
period of two years.
6. It appears that the subject plot was mortgaged with the
Bank and original registered perpetual lease deed was
deposited with the Bank. The Bank thereupon by a
communication dated 09.03.2005 informed the DDA that
the club has mortgaged the subject plot with it and the DDA
4
was requested to take a note of mortgage of the subject plot
with the Bank.
7. The club defaulted in payment of the loan taken by it from
the Bank. Thereupon the Bank filed an original application
under Section 19 of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [now known as Recovery of
Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (for short “1993 Act”]
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as “DRT”) for recovery of sum of
Rs.86,46,790.37. The aforesaid application was allowed on
27.08.2010 by the DRT. The Recovery Officer, DRT on
02.02.2011 issued a notice, for drawing up the
proclamation of sale and settling the terms thereof and
informed the Bank to bring to its notice the encumbrances,
charges, and claims of liabilities attached to the subject plot
or any portion thereof. The DDA by a communication dated
24.02.2011 informed the Recovery Officer, DRT that the
club has not sought the permission of the DDA to create a
mortgage in favour of the Bank and therefore the mortgage
of the subject plot in favour of the Bank is illegal and void.
The DDA in the aforesaid communication stated that the
5
sale of the property be set aside and the proceeding to draw
the proclamation of sale and settling the terms thereof be
immediately stopped.
8. The DDA thereafter on 30.06.2011 filed an affidavit before
the Recovery Officer, DRT objecting to the sale of the
subject plot on the ground that the permission to mortgage
the subject plot was never granted by the DDA and
therefore the mortgage in favour of the Bank is illegal. The
Bank thereupon by a communication dated 22.07.2011
requested the DDA to inform about the amount of unearned
increase which is due and payable to it after the sale of the
subject plot is effected.
9. The DDA thereupon again filed an affidavit before the
Recovery Officer, DRT objecting to the sale inter alia on the
grounds that under the lease deed it has the right to recover
the unearned increase and has the pre-emptive right to
purchase the subject plot. The Recovery Officer by an order
dated 27.02.2012 rejected the objections raised by the DDA
as contained in the affidavits dated 16.02.2012 and
30.06.2011.
6
10. The DDA filed an appeal before the DRT against the order
of the Recovery Officer dated 27.02.2012. The aforesaid
appeal was dismissed by an order dated 25.06.2012, by the
DRT. The Recovery Officer of DRT by an order dated
21.09.2012 held that the subject plot shall be sold by an e-
auction sale on 09.11.2012. Thereafter on 27.09.2012 e-
auction sale notice and proclamation of sale published by
DRT which recorded the terms and conditions of the e-
auction notice.
11. The DDA sometime in October, 2012 filed an appeal under
Section 18 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 against orders dated 27.02.2012 and 25.06.2012
passed by DRT.
12. The DDA on 03.11.2012 filed a Writ Petition (C) No. 6972
of 2012 before Delhi High Court seeking to quash and set
aside the order dated 25.06.2012 passed by the DRT and
to quash and set aside e-auction notice dated 27.09.2012
issued by Recovery Officer, DRT. In the said Writ Petition,
the counsel for Bank on 05.11.2012 made a statement that
auction will be subject to terms and conditions of the lease.
7
In view of the aforesaid statement made by the Bank, which
was also recorded by the High Court in its order, the
counsel for the DDA did not press the writ petition. The
High Court thereupon by an order dated 05.11.2012
dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. The DDA by a
communication dated 06.11.2012 informed the Manager of
the Bank and the Recovery Officer, DRT about the
undertaking by the Bank recorded by the High Court in its
order dated 05.11.2012.
13. The auction of the subject plot was held on 09.11.2012
wherein Respondent No. 6 -M/s Jay Bharat Commercial
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Auction
Purchaser”) was declared the highest bidder in respect of
subject plot. The bid price of the Auction Purchaser of
Rs.13.15 crores as against the reserve price Rs.8.85 crores
was accepted. The Auction Purchaser deposited sale
proceeds through various demand drafts in favour of
Recovery Officer, DRT. The Recovery Officer, DRT by an
order dated 08.07.2013 confirmed the sale in favour of the
Auction Purchaser. A sale certificate dated 12.07.2013 was
issued in favour of the Auction Purchaser, and on
8
17.07.2013, the possession of the subject plot was handed
over to auction purchaser.
14. The auction purchaser on 29.07.2013 filed an application
before the Recovery Officer DRT for exonerating itself from
paying the liabilities and claims over the subject plot which
was sold in a public auction. The notice of the said
application was issued to the DDA to disclose the amount
of unearned increase. The DDA however, sought an
adjournment in the aforesaid proceedings. The Recovery
Officer, DRT, on 18.09.2013 directed the DDA to file an
affidavit, in respect of rules of calculation of unearned
increase as well as details of institutional
land/sold/allotted/leases in recent time by the DDA so as
to enable it to know the present rates for institutional lease
hold property.
15. The DDA filed a Special Leave Petition against the order
dated 05.11.2012 passed by the High Court. The aforesaid
Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 25.10.2013 on the
ground of delay. The DDA on 07.11.2013 informed the
Recovery Officer of DRT about the dismissal of SLP
preferred by it and therefore sought time for compliance
9
with the directions issued by DRT. The DDA on 10.12.2013
filed an affidavit of compliance before the Recovery Officer
with regard to calculation of the amount of unearned
increase. The Recovery Officer vide order dated 22.01.2014
recorded that DDA is not ready to redeem the property at
the cost of Rs.27.73 crores which was being demanded
approximately. The DDA filed an application under Section
22 of the 1993 Act before the Recovery Officer stating that
even if the sale is considered to be valid, the Auction
Purchaser would only have the status of a lessee.
16. The DDA filed another writ petition namely, Writ Petition
(C) No. 5005 of 2014 before the High Court seeking to set
aside the e-auction conducted by the Recovery Officer on
09.11.2012 in pursuance of e-auction notice dated
27.09.2012 and to set aside the acts and omissions of the
Bank and the club with respect to the subject plot. The High
Court by an order dated 11.08.2014 held that it is open to
the DDA to challenge the order dated 12.03.2014 passed by
the DRAT in accordance with law. The High Court further
inter alia held that issues raised in the instant petition by
the DDA and in the Writ Petition (C) No. 6972 of 2012,
10
which was dismissed as withdrawn on 05.11.2012 and the
subsequent writ petition are same. It was further held that
aforesaid order dated 05.11.2012 in Writ Petition (C) No.
6972 of 2012 has attained finality and the same issues
cannot be raised once again. It was further held that
principles analogous to Section 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 would apply. Accordingly, the petition was
dismissed. In the aforesaid background this appeal arises
for consideration.
17. During the pendency of this appeal the DRT on an
application filed by the Auction Purchaser, by an order
dated 01.12.2014, has released the amount of
Rs.12,26,42,478/- in favour of the Auction Purchaser inter
alia on the ground that at this stage the sale cannot be set
aside/cancelled and at the most amount lying in FDRs can
be returned to the Auction Purchaser till the Special Leave
Petition preferred by DDA pending before this Court is
decided.
(ii) SUBMISSIONS BY DDA: -
18. Learned Senior counsel for the DDA submitted that the
terms of the lease deed, specifically stipulated that a
11
mortgage or charge has to be created in respect of subject
plot only with prior consent in writing, of the Lieutenant
Governor. It is further submitted that no consent in writing
of the Lieutenant Governor before creation of mortgage in
favour of the Bank was taken and the DDA is entitled for
its statutory dues. It is pointed out that DDA by a
communication dated 22.07.2011 informed the Bank about
the amount of unearned increase, which was to be
deposited. It is further pointed out that the DDA had filed
a detailed affidavit before the Recovery Officer regarding its
statutory claims including the ground rent due and the
amount due and payable to it on account of unearned
increase. It is contended that the subject plot was sold in
contravention of the statement made before the High Court
in Writ Petition (C) No. 6972 of 2012, which was recorded
in the order dated 05.11.2012 passed by the High Court.
19. It is argued that the Bank has committed multiple
illegalities, from the stage of application for grant of loan till
sale of land. It is urged that the Bank has disbursed the
loan to the club without intimating the DDA and ought to
have appreciated that DDA had granted, no objection only,
12
to apply for a loan to the extent of 35 lakhs only. However,
the bank sanctioned a loan of Rs.60 lakhs. It is contended
that the Bank had the knowledge that the property was not
a freehold property and DDA is entitled for statutory dues.
It is further contended that the sale is therefore liable to be
set aside and the subject plot be restored to the DDA
permitting it to claim its statutory dues from the Bank.
(iii) SUBMISSIONS BY BANK: -
20. Learned counsel for the Bank submitted that the Bank
vide communication dated 09.03.2005 had informed the
DDA that the club had mortgaged, the subject plot with the
Bank and had deposited perpetual lease deed dated
28.01.2005, however, the DDA maintained a stoic silence
till 25.02.2011 i.e. the first appearance before the Recovery
Officer, DRT. It is contended that by an auction notice dated
27.09.2012, the subject plot was sold on “as is where is
basis” and therefore the DDA could have exercised its pre-
emptive right to purchase the subject plot through auction
and recover its dues. It is further contended that for the
reasons, best known to the DDA, the said option to
13
purchase the subject plot, was not exercised. It is urged
that, in principle, NOC was granted by the DDA vide letter
dated 22.02.2002 and DDA was aware of the lien of the
bank on the subject plot. It is submitted that this appeal
amounts to an abuse of process of law. It is further
submitted that principle of estoppel applies to facts of the
case and appeal is liable to be dismissed.
(iv) SUBMISSIONS OF AUCTION PURCHASER: -
21. Learned Senior counsel for Auction Purchaser submits
that Section 29 of the 1993 Act makes the provision of
Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as “1961 Act”) and Income Tax
(Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred
to as “the Rules, 1962”) applicable to sales of immovable
property under the 1993 Act. It is further submitted that
under Rule 16 of the Rules, 1962, it was incumbent on the
Recovery Officer as well as parties before the DRT to have
determined and conclude all issues that materially affect,
the value of the property or fixation of the reserve price
under Rule 18, prior to issue of proclamation of sale. It is
contended that the sale has been held in violation of Second
14
and Third Schedule to the 1961 Act and, therefore, the
auction sale is liable to be set aside. It is further contended
that neither the sale proclamation disclosed any quantified
claim of the DDA nor the reserve price reflected the market
value, that DDA claims. It is submitted that DDA cannot
foist its right to claim an amount of unearned increase over
and above the auction price on the Auction Purchaser. It is
therefore submitted that e-auction conducted on
09.11.2012 by the Recovery Officer, DRT be set aside and
the Bank be directed to refund the Auction Purchaser an
amount of Rs.1,68,28,488/- retained by it along with
interest at the rate of 15% being the rate charged by it
which is evident from the sale proclamation.
(v) CONSIDERATION : -
22. We have considered the rival submissions made on both
sides and have perused the records, as well as the written
submissions filed on behalf of DDA, Bank and the Auction
Purchaser. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take
note of relevant statutory provisions.
23. Section 29 of the 1993 Act deals with application of certain
provisions of Income-tax Act. It provides that provisions of
15
Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961
and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962,
as in force from time to time, shall as far as possible, apply
with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and
the Rules referred to the amount of debt due under this
Act instead of to the Income-tax. The Second Schedule
provides for procedure of recovery of tax, whereas the
Third Schedule deals with procedure for distraint by
Assessing Officer or Tax Recovery Officer. Rule 53 of
Second Schedule to 1961 Act deals with contents of
proclamation. It provides that a proclamation of sale of
immovable property shall be drawn up after notice to the
defaulter, and shall state the time and place of sale, and
shall specify, as fairly and accurately as possible: -
“(a)The property to be sold;
(b)The revenue, if any, assessed upon
the property or any part thereof;
(c)The amount for the recovery of
which the sale is ordered
(d)Any other thing which the Tax
Recovery Officer considers it material
for a purchaser to know, in order to
judge the nature and value of the
property.”
16
24. Thus, Rule 53 mandates the Recovery Officer to mention
in the proclamation of sale any other thing which he
considers material for purchaser to know in order to judge
the nature and value of the property.
25. In exercise of powers under Section 295(1) of the 1961 Act
and Rules 91 and 92 of the Second Schedule of the 1961
Act, the Central Board of Revenue has made the Rules
namely, the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings), Rules
1962. Rule 16 of the Rules empowers the Recovery Officer
to summon any person whom he thinks necessary to
summon and may examine him in respect of any matters
relevant to the proclamation and require him to produce
any document in his possession or power relating thereto.
26. In the backdrop of aforesaid relevant statutory provisions,
we advert to the facts of the case in hand. Sometimes in
the year 2008, the Bank filed an application under Section
19 of 1993 Act for recovery of the dues against the club. It
is pertinent to note that under Clause 5(a) and 5(b) of the
lease deed, executed between the lessee and the Club, the
DDA had the right of pre-emption. The fact that the
subject plot had been allotted on lease to the Club by the
17
DDA was within the knowledge of the Bank. However, DDA
was not impleaded as a party in the said proceedings
under Section 19 of the 1993 Act. In pursuance of
Recovery Certificate dated 27.08.2010 issued by DRT, for
recovery of sum of Rs.86,46,790.37, the Recovery Officer
on 02.02.2011 issued notice for drawing up the
proclamation of sale and settling the terms thereof and
informed, the Bank to bring to its notice, the
encumbrances, charges, claims of liabilities attached to
the said property. The DDA filed an objection before the
Recovery Officer on the ground that no permission was
granted by it to mortgage subject plot to the Bank.
However, the aforesaid objection was rejected on
27.02.2012 by the Recovery Officer. The Recovery Officer
without directing the DDA to quantify its claim on account
of unearned increase in relation to the subject plot and
without ascertaining the same, directed, that sale
proclamation be issued.
27. An e-auction notice was issued on 27.09.2012. In the said
e-auction notice, sale price was fixed at Rs.8.85 crores.
However, the fact that DDA has an encumbrance i.e. the
18
claim for an amount of unearned increase in respect of
subject plot was not disclosed in the e-auction. The Bank
also failed to disclose the terms and conditions of the lease
executed between the DDA and the Club, to the Recovery
Officer which, it was under an obligation to do so in view
of the statement made by it before the High Court, as
recorded in the order dated 05.11.2012 pass in W.P. (C)
No. 6972 of 2012. Thus, it is evident that e-auction notice
was issued in violation of Rule 53 of the Second Schedule
to the 1961 Act as well as Rule 16 of the Rules, 1962.
Therefore, no sanctity can be attached to the e-auction
sale notice and proclamation of sale dated 27.09.2012 as
well as confirmation of sale and sale certificate dated
08.07.2013 and 12.07.2013 respectively issued in favour
of the Auction Purchaser.
28. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao & Ors. v.
1
State of U.P. and Ors. dealt with the question of
applicability of principle of Res Judicata in writ
proceedings, and has summarised its conclusion in para
26 of its judgement. The aforesaid paragraph was
1
1961 SCC OnLine SC 21 : (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457
19
extracted by another Constitution Bench of this Court in
2
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat in
para 53 as follows :-
“53. In Daryao Case this Court had again
dealt with the question of the applicability
of the principle of res judicata in writ
proceedings. The matter was going through
very exhaustively and the final conclusions
are to be found at p. 592. We may
summarise them thus :
1. If a petition under Article
226 is considered on the merits
as a contested matter and is
dismissed, the decision would
continue to bind the parties
unless it is otherwise modified or
reversed by appeal or other
appropriate proceedings
permissible under the
Constitution.
2. It would not be open to a party
to ignore the said judgment and
move this Court under Article
32 by an original petition made
on the same facts and for
obtaining the same or similar
orders or writs.
3. If the petition under Article
226 in a High Court is dismissed
not on the merits but because of
the laches of the party applying
for the writ or because it is held
that the party had an alternative
2
1964 SCC OnLineSC 99 : (1965) 2 SCR 547 : AIR 1965 SC 1153
20
remedy available to it, the
dismissal of the writ petition
would not constitute a bar to a
subsequent petition under Article
32.
4. Such a dismissal may however
constitute a bar to a subsequent
application under Article
32 where and if the facts thus
found by the High Court be
themselves relevant even
under Article 32.”
29. Thus, the doctrine of Res Judicata , salutary as it is, rests
upon foundation that a matter once heard and finally
decided between the parties cannot be reopened. In light
of the aforesaid well settled legal propositions, the facts of
the case in hand may be noticed. The earlier writ petition
i.e. Writ Petition (C) No. 6972 of 2012 filed by the DDA was
withdrawn in view of the undertaking furnished by the
bank that the auction shall take place in accordance with
terms and conditions of the lease. The earlier writ petition
was not decided on merits. In view of undertaking
furnished by the bank, as recorded by that High Court in
its order dated 05.11.2012, the DDA had a right to insist
that auction is held in accordance with terms and
conditions of the lease. The auction was held in violation
21
of terms of the lease on 09.11.2012. Therefore, the DDA
had a fresh cause of action to approach the Court. Thus,
principles analogous to Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code,
1908 did not apply to obtaining factual matrix of the case.
The High Court without adverting to the validity of the
auction which was per se illegal as the same was
conducted in violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease deed and the provisions of the 1961 Act and 1962
Rules, erred in dismissing the Writ Petition on the ground
that the same was barred by the principles analogous to
Section 11 of the CPC.
30. We now address the position of the Auction Purchaser. In
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe
3
Barbour Ltd. , it was held that any civilized system of law
is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been
called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to
prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit
derived from another which it is against conscience that
he should keep. Such remedies in English law are
generally different from remedies in contract or in tort, and
3
1943 AC 32 : (1942) 2 All ER 122 (HL)
22
are now recognized to fall within a third category of the
common law which has been called quasi-contract or
restitution. The aforesaid legal proposition was referred to
with approval by a Two Judge Bench of this Court in
Nagpur Golden Transport Company v. Nath Traders &
4
Ors. The restitution therefore becomes not merely a legal
device but a moral imperative. The principle of restitution
flows from the very heart of justice that no one shall
unjustly enrich himself at the instance of another and that
those who suffered without fault should, so far as money
can achieve, be restored to the position they once
occupied. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent
in every court and will be exercised wherever the justice of
the case demands.
31. In the facts of the present case, the Auction Purchaser
has been caught in the undertow of circumstances, not of
its making. Among all the actors in this legal drama, it
alone stands innocent. The Auction Purchaser entered the
auction in good faith, placed its bid and deposited its hard-
earned money in the belief that the law clothed the auction
4
(2012) 1 SCC 555
23
with legitimacy. The Auction Purchaser neither breached
the covenant nor failed in diligence and did not seek to
profit from the illegality. The restitution therefore becomes
not merely a legal device but a moral imperative. It is this
principle which in the facts of the case must guide the
relief to the Auction Purchaser. The Bank having advanced
the money of an illegal mortgage and having chosen to
auction what it never lawfully possessed, bears the
responsibility for the consequences.
(vi) CONCLUSION : -
32. In the result, impugned order dated 11.08.2014 passed
by the High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 5005 of 2014,
the e-auction notice dated 27.09.2012 as well as the e-
auction conducted by the Recovery Officer, DRT on
09.11.2012, the confirmation of sale and sale certificate
dated 08.07.2013 and12.07.2013 respectively issued in
favour of the Auction Purchaser are quashed and set
aside. We direct the bank to refund the entire amount lying
in deposit to the Auction Purchaser. The Auction
Purchaser has been deprived of the use of its money for a
considerable time, the money which would have earned
24
value elsewhere. Therefore, the Auction Purchaser is
entitled to interest on the balance amount which is lying
in the deposit of the Bank. We, therefore, direct that the
balance amount deposited by the Auction Purchaser
which is with the bank be returned to the Auction
Purchaser with an interest at the rate of 9% per annum
within a month to be reckoned from the date of deposit till
repayment.
33. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms.
……………….……………J.
[SANJAY KUMAR]
..………………………….J.
[ALOK ARADHE]
NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 25, 2025.
25
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11269 OF 2016
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY … APPELLANT
Versus
CORPORATION BANK & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ALOK ARADHE, J.
1. This appeal emanates from an order dated 11.08.2014
passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 5005 of 2014 by which High
Court of Delhi has dismissed the writ petition preferred by
the appellant.
The present appeal brings before this Court a contest
not merely of rights but of duties - the duty of the lessee to
honour the covenants of the lease, the duty of a bank to
exercise due diligence before advancing public money and
the duty of an instrumentality of the state, as trustee of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2025.09.25
16:52:50 IST
Reason:
public property, to guard against encroachment upon its
title. It also brings before us the plight of an Auction
1
Purchaser who entered the field in good faith only to find
the ground beneath its feet unstable.
2. The relevant facts leading to filing of this appeal are as
under:-
(i) FACTS: -
3. The Delhi Development Authority-the Appellant
(hereinafter referred to as “DDA”) on 01.10.2001 allotted
Plot No. 25, Facility Centre-33 Kalindi Kunj Road, Jasola,
New Delhi admeasuring 877.50 square metres (hereinafter
referred to as “subject plot”) to Respondent No. 2 namely,
Sarita Vihar Club (hereinafter referred to as “the club”) on
leasehold basis. The subject plot was allotted to the club on
a premium of Rs.62,96,664/- for construction of a
recreational and sports club. The club was required to pay
a provisional premium, in respect of subject plot, at the rate
of Rs.2,90,40,000/- per acre with annual ground rent at
the rate of Rs. 2.5 % per annum of the total premium. As
per the letter of allotment dated 01.10.2001, the club, with
previous consent in writing of the Lieutenant Governor of
Delhi, could mortgage or charge the subject plot to such
2
person as may be approved by the Lieutenant Governor in
his absolute discretion.
4. The club on 28.11.2001 deposited a sum of Rs.29,50,000/-
to the DDA. It appears that the club applied for sanction of
loan for a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- to Respondent No. 1
namely, the Corporation Bank (hereinafter referred to as
the “Bank”). The Bank thereafter by a communication dated
07.02.2002 informed the club that the proposal of sanction
of loan is being forwarded to the higher authorities for
consideration and requested the club to seek a permission
for mortgaging the subject plot from the DDA. The club vide
communication dated 11.02.2002, sought the permission
of the DDA for mortgaging the subject plot for arranging the
balance payment. The DDA, by a communication dated
22.02.2002, granted NOC to the club for applying loan to
the Bank for making payment to the DDA, on account of
the premium of the plot subject to the condition that
permission for mortgage of the plot shall be issued only
after execution/registration of the lease deed. The Bank
thereafter by a communication dated 22.03.2002 sought
the permission of the DDA for mortgage of the subject plot
3
and to note lien of the Bank on the subject plot. The club
on 12.04.2002 deposited an additional amount of
Rs.2,05,000/- to the DDA which included the interest on
the delayed payment as well. Thereupon DDA on
29.04.2002 issued a modified letter of allotment in favour
of the club and the amount of initial premium of
Rs.64,53,107/- was modified to Rs.64,54,126/-.
5. A perpetual lease deed in respect of subject plot was
executed on 28.01.2005 between the DDA and the club.
Clause 5(b) of the lease deed provided that previous consent
in writing of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi for mortgage or
charge of the subject plot was necessary. Clause (6) deals
with DDA’s right to recover an unearned increase and pre-
emptive right to purchase the subject plot. The club was
under an obligation to complete the construction within a
period of two years.
6. It appears that the subject plot was mortgaged with the
Bank and original registered perpetual lease deed was
deposited with the Bank. The Bank thereupon by a
communication dated 09.03.2005 informed the DDA that
the club has mortgaged the subject plot with it and the DDA
4
was requested to take a note of mortgage of the subject plot
with the Bank.
7. The club defaulted in payment of the loan taken by it from
the Bank. Thereupon the Bank filed an original application
under Section 19 of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [now known as Recovery of
Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (for short “1993 Act”]
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as “DRT”) for recovery of sum of
Rs.86,46,790.37. The aforesaid application was allowed on
27.08.2010 by the DRT. The Recovery Officer, DRT on
02.02.2011 issued a notice, for drawing up the
proclamation of sale and settling the terms thereof and
informed the Bank to bring to its notice the encumbrances,
charges, and claims of liabilities attached to the subject plot
or any portion thereof. The DDA by a communication dated
24.02.2011 informed the Recovery Officer, DRT that the
club has not sought the permission of the DDA to create a
mortgage in favour of the Bank and therefore the mortgage
of the subject plot in favour of the Bank is illegal and void.
The DDA in the aforesaid communication stated that the
5
sale of the property be set aside and the proceeding to draw
the proclamation of sale and settling the terms thereof be
immediately stopped.
8. The DDA thereafter on 30.06.2011 filed an affidavit before
the Recovery Officer, DRT objecting to the sale of the
subject plot on the ground that the permission to mortgage
the subject plot was never granted by the DDA and
therefore the mortgage in favour of the Bank is illegal. The
Bank thereupon by a communication dated 22.07.2011
requested the DDA to inform about the amount of unearned
increase which is due and payable to it after the sale of the
subject plot is effected.
9. The DDA thereupon again filed an affidavit before the
Recovery Officer, DRT objecting to the sale inter alia on the
grounds that under the lease deed it has the right to recover
the unearned increase and has the pre-emptive right to
purchase the subject plot. The Recovery Officer by an order
dated 27.02.2012 rejected the objections raised by the DDA
as contained in the affidavits dated 16.02.2012 and
30.06.2011.
6
10. The DDA filed an appeal before the DRT against the order
of the Recovery Officer dated 27.02.2012. The aforesaid
appeal was dismissed by an order dated 25.06.2012, by the
DRT. The Recovery Officer of DRT by an order dated
21.09.2012 held that the subject plot shall be sold by an e-
auction sale on 09.11.2012. Thereafter on 27.09.2012 e-
auction sale notice and proclamation of sale published by
DRT which recorded the terms and conditions of the e-
auction notice.
11. The DDA sometime in October, 2012 filed an appeal under
Section 18 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 against orders dated 27.02.2012 and 25.06.2012
passed by DRT.
12. The DDA on 03.11.2012 filed a Writ Petition (C) No. 6972
of 2012 before Delhi High Court seeking to quash and set
aside the order dated 25.06.2012 passed by the DRT and
to quash and set aside e-auction notice dated 27.09.2012
issued by Recovery Officer, DRT. In the said Writ Petition,
the counsel for Bank on 05.11.2012 made a statement that
auction will be subject to terms and conditions of the lease.
7
In view of the aforesaid statement made by the Bank, which
was also recorded by the High Court in its order, the
counsel for the DDA did not press the writ petition. The
High Court thereupon by an order dated 05.11.2012
dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. The DDA by a
communication dated 06.11.2012 informed the Manager of
the Bank and the Recovery Officer, DRT about the
undertaking by the Bank recorded by the High Court in its
order dated 05.11.2012.
13. The auction of the subject plot was held on 09.11.2012
wherein Respondent No. 6 -M/s Jay Bharat Commercial
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Auction
Purchaser”) was declared the highest bidder in respect of
subject plot. The bid price of the Auction Purchaser of
Rs.13.15 crores as against the reserve price Rs.8.85 crores
was accepted. The Auction Purchaser deposited sale
proceeds through various demand drafts in favour of
Recovery Officer, DRT. The Recovery Officer, DRT by an
order dated 08.07.2013 confirmed the sale in favour of the
Auction Purchaser. A sale certificate dated 12.07.2013 was
issued in favour of the Auction Purchaser, and on
8
17.07.2013, the possession of the subject plot was handed
over to auction purchaser.
14. The auction purchaser on 29.07.2013 filed an application
before the Recovery Officer DRT for exonerating itself from
paying the liabilities and claims over the subject plot which
was sold in a public auction. The notice of the said
application was issued to the DDA to disclose the amount
of unearned increase. The DDA however, sought an
adjournment in the aforesaid proceedings. The Recovery
Officer, DRT, on 18.09.2013 directed the DDA to file an
affidavit, in respect of rules of calculation of unearned
increase as well as details of institutional
land/sold/allotted/leases in recent time by the DDA so as
to enable it to know the present rates for institutional lease
hold property.
15. The DDA filed a Special Leave Petition against the order
dated 05.11.2012 passed by the High Court. The aforesaid
Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 25.10.2013 on the
ground of delay. The DDA on 07.11.2013 informed the
Recovery Officer of DRT about the dismissal of SLP
preferred by it and therefore sought time for compliance
9
with the directions issued by DRT. The DDA on 10.12.2013
filed an affidavit of compliance before the Recovery Officer
with regard to calculation of the amount of unearned
increase. The Recovery Officer vide order dated 22.01.2014
recorded that DDA is not ready to redeem the property at
the cost of Rs.27.73 crores which was being demanded
approximately. The DDA filed an application under Section
22 of the 1993 Act before the Recovery Officer stating that
even if the sale is considered to be valid, the Auction
Purchaser would only have the status of a lessee.
16. The DDA filed another writ petition namely, Writ Petition
(C) No. 5005 of 2014 before the High Court seeking to set
aside the e-auction conducted by the Recovery Officer on
09.11.2012 in pursuance of e-auction notice dated
27.09.2012 and to set aside the acts and omissions of the
Bank and the club with respect to the subject plot. The High
Court by an order dated 11.08.2014 held that it is open to
the DDA to challenge the order dated 12.03.2014 passed by
the DRAT in accordance with law. The High Court further
inter alia held that issues raised in the instant petition by
the DDA and in the Writ Petition (C) No. 6972 of 2012,
10
which was dismissed as withdrawn on 05.11.2012 and the
subsequent writ petition are same. It was further held that
aforesaid order dated 05.11.2012 in Writ Petition (C) No.
6972 of 2012 has attained finality and the same issues
cannot be raised once again. It was further held that
principles analogous to Section 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 would apply. Accordingly, the petition was
dismissed. In the aforesaid background this appeal arises
for consideration.
17. During the pendency of this appeal the DRT on an
application filed by the Auction Purchaser, by an order
dated 01.12.2014, has released the amount of
Rs.12,26,42,478/- in favour of the Auction Purchaser inter
alia on the ground that at this stage the sale cannot be set
aside/cancelled and at the most amount lying in FDRs can
be returned to the Auction Purchaser till the Special Leave
Petition preferred by DDA pending before this Court is
decided.
(ii) SUBMISSIONS BY DDA: -
18. Learned Senior counsel for the DDA submitted that the
terms of the lease deed, specifically stipulated that a
11
mortgage or charge has to be created in respect of subject
plot only with prior consent in writing, of the Lieutenant
Governor. It is further submitted that no consent in writing
of the Lieutenant Governor before creation of mortgage in
favour of the Bank was taken and the DDA is entitled for
its statutory dues. It is pointed out that DDA by a
communication dated 22.07.2011 informed the Bank about
the amount of unearned increase, which was to be
deposited. It is further pointed out that the DDA had filed
a detailed affidavit before the Recovery Officer regarding its
statutory claims including the ground rent due and the
amount due and payable to it on account of unearned
increase. It is contended that the subject plot was sold in
contravention of the statement made before the High Court
in Writ Petition (C) No. 6972 of 2012, which was recorded
in the order dated 05.11.2012 passed by the High Court.
19. It is argued that the Bank has committed multiple
illegalities, from the stage of application for grant of loan till
sale of land. It is urged that the Bank has disbursed the
loan to the club without intimating the DDA and ought to
have appreciated that DDA had granted, no objection only,
12
to apply for a loan to the extent of 35 lakhs only. However,
the bank sanctioned a loan of Rs.60 lakhs. It is contended
that the Bank had the knowledge that the property was not
a freehold property and DDA is entitled for statutory dues.
It is further contended that the sale is therefore liable to be
set aside and the subject plot be restored to the DDA
permitting it to claim its statutory dues from the Bank.
(iii) SUBMISSIONS BY BANK: -
20. Learned counsel for the Bank submitted that the Bank
vide communication dated 09.03.2005 had informed the
DDA that the club had mortgaged, the subject plot with the
Bank and had deposited perpetual lease deed dated
28.01.2005, however, the DDA maintained a stoic silence
till 25.02.2011 i.e. the first appearance before the Recovery
Officer, DRT. It is contended that by an auction notice dated
27.09.2012, the subject plot was sold on “as is where is
basis” and therefore the DDA could have exercised its pre-
emptive right to purchase the subject plot through auction
and recover its dues. It is further contended that for the
reasons, best known to the DDA, the said option to
13
purchase the subject plot, was not exercised. It is urged
that, in principle, NOC was granted by the DDA vide letter
dated 22.02.2002 and DDA was aware of the lien of the
bank on the subject plot. It is submitted that this appeal
amounts to an abuse of process of law. It is further
submitted that principle of estoppel applies to facts of the
case and appeal is liable to be dismissed.
(iv) SUBMISSIONS OF AUCTION PURCHASER: -
21. Learned Senior counsel for Auction Purchaser submits
that Section 29 of the 1993 Act makes the provision of
Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as “1961 Act”) and Income Tax
(Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred
to as “the Rules, 1962”) applicable to sales of immovable
property under the 1993 Act. It is further submitted that
under Rule 16 of the Rules, 1962, it was incumbent on the
Recovery Officer as well as parties before the DRT to have
determined and conclude all issues that materially affect,
the value of the property or fixation of the reserve price
under Rule 18, prior to issue of proclamation of sale. It is
contended that the sale has been held in violation of Second
14
and Third Schedule to the 1961 Act and, therefore, the
auction sale is liable to be set aside. It is further contended
that neither the sale proclamation disclosed any quantified
claim of the DDA nor the reserve price reflected the market
value, that DDA claims. It is submitted that DDA cannot
foist its right to claim an amount of unearned increase over
and above the auction price on the Auction Purchaser. It is
therefore submitted that e-auction conducted on
09.11.2012 by the Recovery Officer, DRT be set aside and
the Bank be directed to refund the Auction Purchaser an
amount of Rs.1,68,28,488/- retained by it along with
interest at the rate of 15% being the rate charged by it
which is evident from the sale proclamation.
(v) CONSIDERATION : -
22. We have considered the rival submissions made on both
sides and have perused the records, as well as the written
submissions filed on behalf of DDA, Bank and the Auction
Purchaser. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take
note of relevant statutory provisions.
23. Section 29 of the 1993 Act deals with application of certain
provisions of Income-tax Act. It provides that provisions of
15
Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961
and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962,
as in force from time to time, shall as far as possible, apply
with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and
the Rules referred to the amount of debt due under this
Act instead of to the Income-tax. The Second Schedule
provides for procedure of recovery of tax, whereas the
Third Schedule deals with procedure for distraint by
Assessing Officer or Tax Recovery Officer. Rule 53 of
Second Schedule to 1961 Act deals with contents of
proclamation. It provides that a proclamation of sale of
immovable property shall be drawn up after notice to the
defaulter, and shall state the time and place of sale, and
shall specify, as fairly and accurately as possible: -
“(a)The property to be sold;
(b)The revenue, if any, assessed upon
the property or any part thereof;
(c)The amount for the recovery of
which the sale is ordered
(d)Any other thing which the Tax
Recovery Officer considers it material
for a purchaser to know, in order to
judge the nature and value of the
property.”
16
24. Thus, Rule 53 mandates the Recovery Officer to mention
in the proclamation of sale any other thing which he
considers material for purchaser to know in order to judge
the nature and value of the property.
25. In exercise of powers under Section 295(1) of the 1961 Act
and Rules 91 and 92 of the Second Schedule of the 1961
Act, the Central Board of Revenue has made the Rules
namely, the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings), Rules
1962. Rule 16 of the Rules empowers the Recovery Officer
to summon any person whom he thinks necessary to
summon and may examine him in respect of any matters
relevant to the proclamation and require him to produce
any document in his possession or power relating thereto.
26. In the backdrop of aforesaid relevant statutory provisions,
we advert to the facts of the case in hand. Sometimes in
the year 2008, the Bank filed an application under Section
19 of 1993 Act for recovery of the dues against the club. It
is pertinent to note that under Clause 5(a) and 5(b) of the
lease deed, executed between the lessee and the Club, the
DDA had the right of pre-emption. The fact that the
subject plot had been allotted on lease to the Club by the
17
DDA was within the knowledge of the Bank. However, DDA
was not impleaded as a party in the said proceedings
under Section 19 of the 1993 Act. In pursuance of
Recovery Certificate dated 27.08.2010 issued by DRT, for
recovery of sum of Rs.86,46,790.37, the Recovery Officer
on 02.02.2011 issued notice for drawing up the
proclamation of sale and settling the terms thereof and
informed, the Bank to bring to its notice, the
encumbrances, charges, claims of liabilities attached to
the said property. The DDA filed an objection before the
Recovery Officer on the ground that no permission was
granted by it to mortgage subject plot to the Bank.
However, the aforesaid objection was rejected on
27.02.2012 by the Recovery Officer. The Recovery Officer
without directing the DDA to quantify its claim on account
of unearned increase in relation to the subject plot and
without ascertaining the same, directed, that sale
proclamation be issued.
27. An e-auction notice was issued on 27.09.2012. In the said
e-auction notice, sale price was fixed at Rs.8.85 crores.
However, the fact that DDA has an encumbrance i.e. the
18
claim for an amount of unearned increase in respect of
subject plot was not disclosed in the e-auction. The Bank
also failed to disclose the terms and conditions of the lease
executed between the DDA and the Club, to the Recovery
Officer which, it was under an obligation to do so in view
of the statement made by it before the High Court, as
recorded in the order dated 05.11.2012 pass in W.P. (C)
No. 6972 of 2012. Thus, it is evident that e-auction notice
was issued in violation of Rule 53 of the Second Schedule
to the 1961 Act as well as Rule 16 of the Rules, 1962.
Therefore, no sanctity can be attached to the e-auction
sale notice and proclamation of sale dated 27.09.2012 as
well as confirmation of sale and sale certificate dated
08.07.2013 and 12.07.2013 respectively issued in favour
of the Auction Purchaser.
28. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao & Ors. v.
1
State of U.P. and Ors. dealt with the question of
applicability of principle of Res Judicata in writ
proceedings, and has summarised its conclusion in para
26 of its judgement. The aforesaid paragraph was
1
1961 SCC OnLine SC 21 : (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457
19
extracted by another Constitution Bench of this Court in
2
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat in
para 53 as follows :-
“53. In Daryao Case this Court had again
dealt with the question of the applicability
of the principle of res judicata in writ
proceedings. The matter was going through
very exhaustively and the final conclusions
are to be found at p. 592. We may
summarise them thus :
1. If a petition under Article
226 is considered on the merits
as a contested matter and is
dismissed, the decision would
continue to bind the parties
unless it is otherwise modified or
reversed by appeal or other
appropriate proceedings
permissible under the
Constitution.
2. It would not be open to a party
to ignore the said judgment and
move this Court under Article
32 by an original petition made
on the same facts and for
obtaining the same or similar
orders or writs.
3. If the petition under Article
226 in a High Court is dismissed
not on the merits but because of
the laches of the party applying
for the writ or because it is held
that the party had an alternative
2
1964 SCC OnLineSC 99 : (1965) 2 SCR 547 : AIR 1965 SC 1153
20
remedy available to it, the
dismissal of the writ petition
would not constitute a bar to a
subsequent petition under Article
32.
4. Such a dismissal may however
constitute a bar to a subsequent
application under Article
32 where and if the facts thus
found by the High Court be
themselves relevant even
under Article 32.”
29. Thus, the doctrine of Res Judicata , salutary as it is, rests
upon foundation that a matter once heard and finally
decided between the parties cannot be reopened. In light
of the aforesaid well settled legal propositions, the facts of
the case in hand may be noticed. The earlier writ petition
i.e. Writ Petition (C) No. 6972 of 2012 filed by the DDA was
withdrawn in view of the undertaking furnished by the
bank that the auction shall take place in accordance with
terms and conditions of the lease. The earlier writ petition
was not decided on merits. In view of undertaking
furnished by the bank, as recorded by that High Court in
its order dated 05.11.2012, the DDA had a right to insist
that auction is held in accordance with terms and
conditions of the lease. The auction was held in violation
21
of terms of the lease on 09.11.2012. Therefore, the DDA
had a fresh cause of action to approach the Court. Thus,
principles analogous to Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code,
1908 did not apply to obtaining factual matrix of the case.
The High Court without adverting to the validity of the
auction which was per se illegal as the same was
conducted in violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease deed and the provisions of the 1961 Act and 1962
Rules, erred in dismissing the Writ Petition on the ground
that the same was barred by the principles analogous to
Section 11 of the CPC.
30. We now address the position of the Auction Purchaser. In
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe
3
Barbour Ltd. , it was held that any civilized system of law
is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been
called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to
prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit
derived from another which it is against conscience that
he should keep. Such remedies in English law are
generally different from remedies in contract or in tort, and
3
1943 AC 32 : (1942) 2 All ER 122 (HL)
22
are now recognized to fall within a third category of the
common law which has been called quasi-contract or
restitution. The aforesaid legal proposition was referred to
with approval by a Two Judge Bench of this Court in
Nagpur Golden Transport Company v. Nath Traders &
4
Ors. The restitution therefore becomes not merely a legal
device but a moral imperative. The principle of restitution
flows from the very heart of justice that no one shall
unjustly enrich himself at the instance of another and that
those who suffered without fault should, so far as money
can achieve, be restored to the position they once
occupied. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent
in every court and will be exercised wherever the justice of
the case demands.
31. In the facts of the present case, the Auction Purchaser
has been caught in the undertow of circumstances, not of
its making. Among all the actors in this legal drama, it
alone stands innocent. The Auction Purchaser entered the
auction in good faith, placed its bid and deposited its hard-
earned money in the belief that the law clothed the auction
4
(2012) 1 SCC 555
23
with legitimacy. The Auction Purchaser neither breached
the covenant nor failed in diligence and did not seek to
profit from the illegality. The restitution therefore becomes
not merely a legal device but a moral imperative. It is this
principle which in the facts of the case must guide the
relief to the Auction Purchaser. The Bank having advanced
the money of an illegal mortgage and having chosen to
auction what it never lawfully possessed, bears the
responsibility for the consequences.
(vi) CONCLUSION : -
32. In the result, impugned order dated 11.08.2014 passed
by the High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 5005 of 2014,
the e-auction notice dated 27.09.2012 as well as the e-
auction conducted by the Recovery Officer, DRT on
09.11.2012, the confirmation of sale and sale certificate
dated 08.07.2013 and12.07.2013 respectively issued in
favour of the Auction Purchaser are quashed and set
aside. We direct the bank to refund the entire amount lying
in deposit to the Auction Purchaser. The Auction
Purchaser has been deprived of the use of its money for a
considerable time, the money which would have earned
24
value elsewhere. Therefore, the Auction Purchaser is
entitled to interest on the balance amount which is lying
in the deposit of the Bank. We, therefore, direct that the
balance amount deposited by the Auction Purchaser
which is with the bank be returned to the Auction
Purchaser with an interest at the rate of 9% per annum
within a month to be reckoned from the date of deposit till
repayment.
33. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms.
……………….……………J.
[SANJAY KUMAR]
..………………………….J.
[ALOK ARADHE]
NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 25, 2025.
25