COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE vs. THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS (TASA)

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 14-02-2022

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1320 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP(C)NO.24702 of 2019) COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE                      ... APPELLANT (S) VERSUS THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF  ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS.                           ... RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T V. Ramasubramanian, J. Leave granted. st 2. The 1   respondent herein which is a society registered under  the Tamil  Nadu Societies  Registration Act,  1975 and which has as its members, professional architects who claim to be   teaching   faculty   in   institutions   imparting   education   in Architecture, filed a writ petition on the file of the High Court of Judicature   at   Madras,   praying   for   quashing   the   “Minimum Signature Not Verified Standards   of   Architectural   Education   Regulations,   2017” Digitally signed by Jayant Kumar Arora Date: 2022.02.15 10:27:32 IST Reason: circulated by the appellant herein  vide  communications dated 1 31.10.2018 and 03.12.2018. The main and perhaps the only ground   of   challenge   to   the   Regulations   was   that   the Regulations   required   the   prior   approval   of   the   Central Government under Section 45 of The Architects Act, 1972, (in short referred to as ‘the Act’) before they are implemented and that no such prior approval was obtained before issuing the impugned communications. 3. The appellant herein took umbrage under Section 21 of the Act. The appellant also questioned the  locus standi  of the st 1   respondent   to   challenge   the   impugned   communications, since   the   communications   were   addressed   to   institutions teaching   Architecture,   none   of   which   had   come   forward   to challenge the same. 4. Taking a view that Section 21 cannot be read in isolation and that the provisions of Section 45 are mandatory, the High Court   allowed   the   writ   petition   and   quashed   the   impugned communications.  Hence, the appellant is before us. 2 5. We   have   heard   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the respective parties. 6. Before we consider the issue that arises for consideration, we must take note of one important subsequent development. After this Court ordered notice in the Special Leave Petition, a Notification   bearing   F.No.CA/193/2020/MSAER   dated 11.08.2020   was   published   in   the   Government   Gazette, notifying the “Council of Architecture (Minimum Standards of Architectural Education) Regulations, 2020”. These Regulations st were directed to come into force with effect from the 1  day of November, 2020. These Regulations have been issued, as seen from the Notification, in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (e), (g), (h) and (j) of sub­section (2) of Section 45 read with   Section   21   of   the   Act.   They   have   been   issued   in supersession of the 1983 Regulations. 7. Due to the above subsequent development, the question relating to the inter­play between Section 21 and Section 45 of 3 the   Act   has   become   one   of   mere   academic   importance. However, Mr. Naveen R. Nath, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the question of law is of importance and advanced arguments. 8. Admittedly, the communication dated 31.10.2018 issued by the appellant herein drew the attention of the educational institutions to the revised eligibility criteria for admission to 5 year B.Arch. degree course and also to the Minimum Standards for Architectural Education prescribed by the Council to be followed   for   the   academic   session   2019­20.   The   second impugned  communication  was  dated  03.12.2018  which  was the “Approval Process” for 2019­20. 9. Both   the   communications   dated   31.10.2018   and 03.12.2018, impugned before the High Court, were not part of any   Regulations   framed   by   the   appellant   in   exercise   of   the power conferred by Section 45(1) of the Act. The requirements of prior approval and the notification in the official gazette in 4 terms of Section 45(1) of the Act, are in respect of Regulations and   not   in   respect   of   communications   such   as   the   ones impugned in the writ petition. This is why an argument is advanced on the inter­play between Sections 21 and 45 of the Act. Section 21 reads as follows:­
“21. Minimum standard of architectural
education.­ The Council may prescribe the minimum
standards of architectural education required for
granting recognised qualifications by colleges or
institutions in India.”
Section 45 reads as follows:­ “45 Power of Council to make regulations. ­ (1) The . Council   may,   with   the   approval   of   the   Central Government, [by   notification   in   the   Official   Gazette], make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, or the rules made thereunder, to carry out the purposes of this Act. (2)   In   particular   and   without   prejudice   to   the generalityof the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for— (a)   the   management   of   the   property   of   the   Council; (b) the powers and duties of the President and   the Vice­President of the Council; (c) the summoning and holding of meetings of   the  Council and the Executive Committee or   any  other   committee   constituted   under   section 10,  the times and places at  which such   meetings  shall be held, the  conductof   business thereat  and the number  of   persons   necessary to  constitute a  quorum; 5 (d)   the   functions   of   the   Executive   Committee   or of  any   other   committee   constituted   under   section 10; (e)   the   courses   and   periods   of   study   and   of   practical   training,   if   any,   to   be   undertaken,   the  subjects  of  examinations and  standards   of  proficiency therein to be obtained in any   college  or   institution   for   grant   of   recognised qualifications; (f)   the   appointment,   powers   and   duties   of   inspector; (g)   the   standards   of   staff,   equipment,   accommodation,   training   and   other   facilities   for  architectural education; (h)   the   conduct   of   professional   examinations,   qualifications of examiners and the conditions   of  admission to such examinations; (i)   the   standards   of   professional   conduct   and   etiquette and code of ethics to be observed by   architects; (j) any other matter which is to be or may be   provided by regulations under this Act and in   respect of which no rules have been made. (3) Every regulation made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses   agree   in   making   any   modification   in   the regulation   or   both   Houses   agree   that   the   regulation should   not   be   made,   the   regulation   shall   thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as   the   case   may   be;   so,   however,   that   any   such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the   validity   of   anything   previously   done   under   that regulation. 10. It may be seen from sub­section (2) of Section 45 that it gives a list of matters for which provision may be made in the Regulations, 6 in clauses (a) to (j). Clause (a) to (d) concern the management and administration of the Council of Architecture and its property. It is only clauses (e), (g) and (h) of sub­section(2) of Section 45 which have a bearing on the Minimum Standards of Education. Clause (f) relates   to   appointment   of   Inspectors   and   clause   (i)   relates   to standards   of   professional   conduct   and   etiquette.   Clause   (j)   is   a residuary clause. 11. Interestingly,   the   1983   Regulations   as   well   as   the   2020 Regulations (now issued after the judgment of the Madras High Court), are issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (e), (g), (h) and (j) of sub­section (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21. If the stipulation contained in Section 21 is subsumed in one of the clauses of Section 45(2), there was no necessity for invoking the power under Section 45(2)  read with Section 21  while issuing the Regulations.   In   other   words,   if   the   minimum   standards   of architectural education are covered by clauses (e), (g) and (h), or at least by the residuary clause (j) of sub­section (2) of Section 45, it would have been enough for the appellant to issue the regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 45(2) alone without 7 invoking Section 21 along with it. The reason why Section 21 is also invoked along with Section 45(2) is not far to seek. 12. Clause (i) of sub­section (2) of Section 45 relates to standards of   professional   conduct   and   code   of   ethics   to   be   observed   by architects.   The   substantive   power   to   prescribe   the   code   of professional conduct for architects, flows out of Section 22. It reads as follows:­
“22. Professional conduct.­(1 )
(2 ) Regulations made by the Council under sub­section<br>(1) may specify which violations thereof shall<br>constitute infamous conduct in any professional<br>respect, that is to say, professional misconduct, and<br>such provision shall have effect notwithstanding<br>anything contained in any law for the time being in<br>force.”
13. Apparently, Section 22 confers substantive power upon the<br>Council to prescribe standards of professional conduct and Section<br>45(2)(i) deals with the procedural power. But Section 22 itself<br>makes it clear that the prescription of standards of professional<br>conduct and code of ethics for architects could be done only by way<br>of regulations. This is in contrast to Section 21.
8 14. To put it differently, Section 22(1) confers power upon the Council   of   Architecture   to   prescribe   standards   of   professional conduct and a code of ethics, only by way of regulations, though Section   45(2)(i)   takes   care   of   the   procedural   requirement.   But Section 21 which confers substantive power upon the Council to prescribe   minimum   standards   of   architectural   education,   is   not couched in the same language as Section 22(1). In other words, Section 21 does not contain a stipulation that, “the Council may by regulation   prescribe   minimum   standards   of   architectural education”. The words “may by regulation”, found in Section 22, are conspicuous   by   their   absence   in   Section   21.   This   is   a   clear indication of the fact,   that the Council is empowered to prescribe (i) minimum standards of architectural education, not necessarily by taking   recourse   to   Section   45(2);   and   (ii)   that   if   at   all,   such minimum   standards   are   issued   otherwise   than   through Regulations, they should not be in conflict with those found in the Regulations. 9
15. It is thus clear from the scheme of the Act that the Council of<br>Architecture may prescribe minimum standards of architectural<br>education, either by way of regulations issued under Section 45(2)<br>or even otherwise. It is only in cases where the Council chooses to<br>prescribe standards in the form of regulations that the requirement<br>of approval of the Central Government under Section 45(1) would<br>become necessary.
16. It is interesting to see that the communications dated<br>31.10.2018 and 03.12.2018 issued by the appellant which were put<br>to challenge before the High Court, were primarily aimed at<br>streamlining the institutions imparting architectural education.<br>The 1st respondent herein who challenged the communications, was<br>admittedly a society, which has as its members, the teaching<br>faculty. This can be seen from paragraph 2 of the writ petition filed<br>by the 1st respondent herein before the High Court, the relevant<br>portion of which reads as follows:­
“The members of the Society are professionalArchitects<br>who have engaged themselves as teaching faculty and<br>the society recognises four kinds of members, namely<br>(1) Life Member– Professor registered with COA and<br>being heads of institutions with Ten years of teaching<br>experience, (2) Associate /Affiliate Member–Teachers
10 registered   with   COA   having   less   than   Ten   years   of teaching   experience,   (3)   Patron/Donor   Member   – Accomplished   Academicians   and   Renowned   Teachers registered   with   COA   involved   in   Architectural Education   with   Twenty   years   of   experience   and   (4) Institutional Member –representing a college or school or institute of Architecture”. 17. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant before the High Court, a specific objection was taken to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the communications impugned in the   writ   petition   were   addressed   to   the   institutions   imparting architectural   education   and   that   individuals   who   claim   to   be teaching faculty cannot challenge the same. It was also contended st in the counter affidavit that the 1  respondent (writ petitioner) was attempting to espouse the cause of some defaulting  educational institutions which did not meet the minimum standards. Another important issue raised in the counter affidavit filed by the appellant st herein before the High Court was that one of the members of the 1 respondent Society was a member of the appellant Council which st approved the 2015 norms and that some of the members of the 1 respondent   Society   even   acted   as   Inspectors   and   inspected   the 11 educational institutions to find out whether minimum standards are put in place. 18. But the above objections were not even considered by the High Court. The High Court addressed itself merely to the question of the requirement of approval of the Central Government under Section st 45(1) and did not go into the question of   locus standi   of the 1 respondent. The High Court even overlooked the fact that none of the educational institutions imparting architectural education ever chose to challenge the communications impugned before the High Court. In fact, the appellant has furnished a chart extracting the provisions   of   the   1983   Regulations   in   Column   No.1,   the   2017 Prescriptions in Column No.2, and the area of difference between the two, in Column No.3. It is seen from the said chart that many of the   changes   brought   forthwith   in   2018   were   in   relation   to,   (i) duration   of   the   architecture   programme;   (ii)   admission   to architecture   course;     intake   and   migration;     courses   and (iii) (iv) periods   of   study;   (v)   professional   examination,   standards   of proficiency   and   conditions   of   admissions   and   qualifications   of 12 examiners; and  (vi)  standards of staff, equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities. st 19. If at all, the 1  respondent­society (writ petitioner), due to the nature of its membership, could have been aggrieved only by the st prescriptions   affecting   the   teaching   faculty.   The   1   respondent could not have challenged the prescriptions with which they are not in   any   way   concerned.   Unfortunately,   the   High   Court   did   not address itself to these important issues. 20. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be allowed and the impugned order is bound to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the writ st petition filed by the 1  respondent before the High Court shall stand dismissed. No costs. ……………………………..J. (Hemant Gupta) ………………………………J. (V. Ramasubramanian) New Delhi February 14, 2022 13