Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1320 of 2022
(Arising out of SLP(C)NO.24702 of 2019)
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE ... APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF
ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
Leave granted.
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2. The 1 respondent herein which is a society registered
under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 and
which has as its members, professional architects who claim to
be teaching faculty in institutions imparting education in
Architecture, filed a writ petition on the file of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras, praying for quashing the “Minimum
Signature Not Verified
Standards of Architectural Education Regulations, 2017”
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2022.02.15
10:27:32 IST
Reason:
circulated by the appellant herein vide communications dated
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31.10.2018 and 03.12.2018. The main and perhaps the only
ground of challenge to the Regulations was that the
Regulations required the prior approval of the Central
Government under Section 45 of The Architects Act, 1972, (in
short referred to as ‘the Act’) before they are implemented and
that no such prior approval was obtained before issuing the
impugned communications.
3. The appellant herein took umbrage under Section 21 of
the Act. The appellant also questioned the locus standi of the
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1 respondent to challenge the impugned communications,
since the communications were addressed to institutions
teaching Architecture, none of which had come forward to
challenge the same.
4. Taking a view that Section 21 cannot be read in isolation
and that the provisions of Section 45 are mandatory, the High
Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned
communications. Hence, the appellant is before us.
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5. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties.
6. Before we consider the issue that arises for consideration,
we must take note of one important subsequent development.
After this Court ordered notice in the Special Leave Petition, a
Notification bearing F.No.CA/193/2020/MSAER dated
11.08.2020 was published in the Government Gazette,
notifying the “Council of Architecture (Minimum Standards of
Architectural Education) Regulations, 2020”. These Regulations
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were directed to come into force with effect from the 1 day of
November, 2020. These Regulations have been issued, as seen
from the Notification, in exercise of the powers conferred by
clauses (e), (g), (h) and (j) of subsection (2) of Section 45 read
with Section 21 of the Act. They have been issued in
supersession of the 1983 Regulations.
7. Due to the above subsequent development, the question
relating to the interplay between Section 21 and Section 45 of
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the Act has become one of mere academic importance.
However, Mr. Naveen R. Nath, learned senior counsel for the
appellant contended that the question of law is of importance
and advanced arguments.
8. Admittedly, the communication dated 31.10.2018 issued
by the appellant herein drew the attention of the educational
institutions to the revised eligibility criteria for admission to 5
year B.Arch. degree course and also to the Minimum Standards
for Architectural Education prescribed by the Council to be
followed for the academic session 201920. The second
impugned communication was dated 03.12.2018 which was
the “Approval Process” for 201920.
9. Both the communications dated 31.10.2018 and
03.12.2018, impugned before the High Court, were not part of
any Regulations framed by the appellant in exercise of the
power conferred by Section 45(1) of the Act. The requirements
of prior approval and the notification in the official gazette in
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terms of Section 45(1) of the Act, are in respect of Regulations
and not in respect of communications such as the ones
impugned in the writ petition. This is why an argument is
advanced on the interplay between Sections 21 and 45 of the
Act. Section 21 reads as follows:
| “21. Minimum standard of architectural | ||
|---|---|---|
| education | . The Council may prescribe the minimum | |
| standards of architectural education required for | ||
| granting recognised qualifications by colleges or | ||
| institutions in India.” |
Section 45 reads as follows:
“45 Power of Council to make regulations. (1) The
.
Council may, with the approval of the Central
Government, [by notification in the Official Gazette],
make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act, or the rules made thereunder, to carry out
the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the
generalityof the foregoing power, such regulations may
provide for—
(a) the management of the property of the
Council;
(b) the powers and duties of the President and
the VicePresident of the Council;
(c) the summoning and holding of meetings of
the Council and the Executive Committee or
any other committee constituted under
section 10, the times and places at which such
meetings shall be held, the conductof
business thereat and the number of persons
necessary to constitute a quorum;
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(d) the functions of the Executive Committee
or of any other committee constituted under
section 10;
(e) the courses and periods of study and of
practical training, if any, to be undertaken,
the subjects of examinations and standards
of proficiency therein to be obtained in any
college or institution for grant of
recognised qualifications;
(f) the appointment, powers and duties of
inspector;
(g) the standards of staff, equipment,
accommodation, training and other facilities
for architectural education;
(h) the conduct of professional examinations,
qualifications of examiners and the conditions
of admission to such examinations;
(i) the standards of professional conduct and
etiquette and code of ethics to be observed by
architects;
(j) any other matter which is to be or may be
provided by regulations under this Act and in
respect of which no rules have been made.
(3) Every regulation made under this section shall be
laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each
House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total
period of thirty days which may be comprised in one
session or in two or more successive sessions, and if,
before the expiry of the session immediately following
the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both
Houses agree in making any modification in the
regulation or both Houses agree that the regulation
should not be made, the regulation shall thereafter
have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect,
as the case may be; so, however, that any such
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to
the validity of anything previously done under that
regulation.
10. It may be seen from subsection (2) of Section 45 that it gives a
list of matters for which provision may be made in the Regulations,
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in clauses (a) to (j). Clause (a) to (d) concern the management and
administration of the Council of Architecture and its property. It is
only clauses (e), (g) and (h) of subsection(2) of Section 45 which
have a bearing on the Minimum Standards of Education. Clause (f)
relates to appointment of Inspectors and clause (i) relates to
standards of professional conduct and etiquette. Clause (j) is a
residuary clause.
11. Interestingly, the 1983 Regulations as well as the 2020
Regulations (now issued after the judgment of the Madras High
Court), are issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (e),
(g), (h) and (j) of subsection (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21.
If the stipulation contained in Section 21 is subsumed in one of the
clauses of Section 45(2), there was no necessity for invoking the
power under Section 45(2) read with Section 21 while issuing the
Regulations. In other words, if the minimum standards of
architectural education are covered by clauses (e), (g) and (h), or at
least by the residuary clause (j) of subsection (2) of Section 45, it
would have been enough for the appellant to issue the regulations
in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 45(2) alone without
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invoking Section 21 along with it. The reason why Section 21 is also
invoked along with Section 45(2) is not far to seek.
12. Clause (i) of subsection (2) of Section 45 relates to standards
of professional conduct and code of ethics to be observed by
architects. The substantive power to prescribe the code of
professional conduct for architects, flows out of Section 22. It reads
as follows:
| “22. Professional conduct. | (1 ) |
|---|
| (2 ) Regulations made by the Council under subsection<br>(1) may specify which violations thereof shall<br>constitute infamous conduct in any professional<br>respect, that is to say, professional misconduct, and<br>such provision shall have effect notwithstanding<br>anything contained in any law for the time being in<br>force.” | ||
| 13. Apparently, Section 22 confers substantive power upon the<br>Council to prescribe standards of professional conduct and Section<br>45(2)(i) deals with the procedural power. But Section 22 itself<br>makes it clear that the prescription of standards of professional<br>conduct and code of ethics for architects could be done only by way<br>of regulations. This is in contrast to Section 21. |
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14. To put it differently, Section 22(1) confers power upon the
Council of Architecture to prescribe standards of professional
conduct and a code of ethics, only by way of regulations, though
Section 45(2)(i) takes care of the procedural requirement. But
Section 21 which confers substantive power upon the Council to
prescribe minimum standards of architectural education, is not
couched in the same language as Section 22(1). In other words,
Section 21 does not contain a stipulation that, “the Council may by
regulation prescribe minimum standards of architectural
education”. The words “may by regulation”, found in Section 22, are
conspicuous by their absence in Section 21. This is a clear
indication of the fact, that the Council is empowered to prescribe
(i)
minimum standards of architectural education, not necessarily by
taking recourse to Section 45(2); and (ii) that if at all, such
minimum standards are issued otherwise than through
Regulations, they should not be in conflict with those found in the
Regulations.
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| 15. It is thus clear from the scheme of the Act that the Council of<br>Architecture may prescribe minimum standards of architectural<br>education, either by way of regulations issued under Section 45(2)<br>or even otherwise. It is only in cases where the Council chooses to<br>prescribe standards in the form of regulations that the requirement<br>of approval of the Central Government under Section 45(1) would<br>become necessary. | ||
|---|---|---|
| 16. It is interesting to see that the communications dated<br>31.10.2018 and 03.12.2018 issued by the appellant which were put<br>to challenge before the High Court, were primarily aimed at<br>streamlining the institutions imparting architectural education.<br>The 1st respondent herein who challenged the communications, was<br>admittedly a society, which has as its members, the teaching<br>faculty. This can be seen from paragraph 2 of the writ petition filed<br>by the 1st respondent herein before the High Court, the relevant<br>portion of which reads as follows: | ||
| “The members of the Society are professionalArchitects<br>who have engaged themselves as teaching faculty and<br>the society recognises four kinds of members, namely<br>(1) Life Member– Professor registered with COA and<br>being heads of institutions with Ten years of teaching<br>experience, (2) Associate /Affiliate Member–Teachers |
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registered with COA having less than Ten years of
teaching experience, (3) Patron/Donor Member –
Accomplished Academicians and Renowned Teachers
registered with COA involved in Architectural
Education with Twenty years of experience and (4)
Institutional Member –representing a college or school
or institute of Architecture”.
17. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant before the High
Court, a specific objection was taken to the maintainability of the
writ petition on the ground that the communications impugned in
the writ petition were addressed to the institutions imparting
architectural education and that individuals who claim to be
teaching faculty cannot challenge the same. It was also contended
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in the counter affidavit that the 1 respondent (writ petitioner) was
attempting to espouse the cause of some defaulting educational
institutions which did not meet the minimum standards. Another
important issue raised in the counter affidavit filed by the appellant
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herein before the High Court was that one of the members of the 1
respondent Society was a member of the appellant Council which
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approved the 2015 norms and that some of the members of the 1
respondent Society even acted as Inspectors and inspected the
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educational institutions to find out whether minimum standards
are put in place.
18. But the above objections were not even considered by the High
Court. The High Court addressed itself merely to the question of the
requirement of approval of the Central Government under Section
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45(1) and did not go into the question of locus standi of the 1
respondent. The High Court even overlooked the fact that none of
the educational institutions imparting architectural education ever
chose to challenge the communications impugned before the High
Court. In fact, the appellant has furnished a chart extracting the
provisions of the 1983 Regulations in Column No.1, the 2017
Prescriptions in Column No.2, and the area of difference between
the two, in Column No.3. It is seen from the said chart that many of
the changes brought forthwith in 2018 were in relation to,
(i)
duration of the architecture programme; (ii) admission to
architecture course; intake and migration; courses and
(iii) (iv)
periods of study; (v) professional examination, standards of
proficiency and conditions of admissions and qualifications of
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examiners; and (vi) standards of staff, equipment, accommodation,
training and other facilities.
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19. If at all, the 1 respondentsociety (writ petitioner), due to the
nature of its membership, could have been aggrieved only by the
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prescriptions affecting the teaching faculty. The 1 respondent
could not have challenged the prescriptions with which they are not
in any way concerned. Unfortunately, the High Court did not
address itself to these important issues.
20. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be allowed and the impugned
order is bound to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed,
the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the writ
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petition filed by the 1 respondent before the High Court shall stand
dismissed. No costs.
……………………………..J.
(Hemant Gupta)
………………………………J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
February 14, 2022
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