Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.2393-2394 OF 2008
INDIA YAMAHA MOTOR PVT LTD. .......APPELLANT
VERSUS
DHARAM SINGH & ANR. ......RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.
The appellant before this Court is the
management/industry. It has approached this Court, to assail the
competence of the respondents (who are the workmen) to be
represented before the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut (hereafter
referred to as `the Tribunal'), through five of the
respondents/workmen (Dharam Singh, Sanjay Nagar, Ranveer Nagar,
Pratap Singh and Dhanpat Singh) out of the 113 workmen who were
agitating the industrial dispute before the said Tribunal.
Originally, the cause of the respondents-workmen was
espoused by the Noida Engineering Mazdoor Sangh. However,
consequent upon the de-recognition of the aforesaid Union in 2003,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Satish Kumar Yadav
Date: 2014.10.10
17:24:01 IST
Reason:
the Management i.e. the appellant before us, raised an objection
that the cause of respondent-workmen could no longer be presented
through the Noida Engineering Mazdoor Sangh. The appellant
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management accordingly prayed that the Industrial Tribunal, should
not proceed with the adjudication of the matter. On account of the
submission, that the representation of the respondents-workmen
before the Industrial Tribunal, could only be in consonance with
Section 6-I of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as the `Industrial Disputes Act') read
with Rule 40 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957
(hereinafter referred to as the `Industrial Disputes Rules'), it
was suggested that the respondent-workmen should be permitted to
make their choice in consonance therewith. This is the crux of the
dispute that has been projected before us for our consideration.
Despite, the limited scope of the dispute which arises
for our consideration, it is essential for us, to notice the
factual background to the controversy. In the first instance,
prolonged conciliation proceedings were conducted before the
Conciliation Board. Consequent upon the failure of the
conciliation proceedings, the State Government on 28.05.1998
referred the following disputes for adjudication to the Labour
Court, Ghaziabad:-
“Whether non-declaration of the 113 workmen,
mentioned in the schedule enclosed, as permanent
from the date of their employment and not paying
them equal salary and other benefits by the
Management is illegal and unjustified? If yes,
to what relief and other consequential benefits
the workmen are entitled to and from which date?”
At the instant juncture, the respondents-workmen made a
representation to the State Government requiring it to transfer the
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matter for adjudication from the Labour Court, Ghaziabad to the
Industrial Tribunal, Meerut. The request of the respondents-workmen
was acceded to, whereupon, the State Government passed an order
dated 06.03.1999. The Management i.e. the appellant before this
Court, assailed the above order dated 06.03.1999 by filing Civil
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.16666 of 1999. The aforesaid Writ
Petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as `the High
Court') by an order dated 26.09.2002. The order dated 06.03.1999 by
which the State Government had transferred the referred disputes
from the Labour Court, Ghaziabad, to the Industrial Tribunal,
Meerut, was set aside, on the ground that the appellant-management
had not been afforded an opportunity of hearing. The State
Government was accordingly directed to pass an appropriate order,
in accordance with law, within a period of six months.
In compliance of the directions issued by the High Court
(in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.16666 of 1999), the State
Government by its order dated 11.02.2003, re-transferred the
dispute from the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut, to the Labour Court,
Ghaziabad. The instant order was sought to be assailed by the
Union representing the respondents-workmen, through Civil
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.13986 of 2003, before the High
Court. The above writ petition came to be dismissed by a learned
Single Judge on 02.04.2003. It would however be relevant to mention
that the following observations were recorded by the High Court in
its order dated 02.04.2003 while dismissing the writ petition:
“I am not able to share the apprehension. The
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employers had challenged the transfer of
reference to Industrial Tribunal, Meerut and now
after the matter has been decided by State
Government, maintaining the reference to Labour
Court (II) at Ghaziabad, the employers cannot be
permitted to challenge the same on the ground
that the matter should have been referred to
Industrial Tribunal, Meerut. The reference, does
not fall in either First or Second Schedules and
can be taken to fall in residuary item No.6 of
First Schedule, and thus the Labour Court, is
competent to adjudicate the matter.”
It seems that the above observations were not palatable to the
appellant-management. It is therefore that the appellant-management
preferred Special Appeal No.410 of 2003 before a Division Bench of
the High Court. Before the Division Bench, the submission of the
appellant-management was, that the order dated 02.04.2003 had been
passed by the learned Single Judge, without giving an opportunity
to the appellant to project its case. The High Court did not
entertain the above submission and disposed of the Special Appeal
by an order dated 13.08.2003. Liberty was however granted to the
appellant-management, to apply for recall of the order passed by
the learned Single Judge. It is in the aforesaid circumstances,
that the appellant-management filed a recall application, before
the learned Single Judge. The above application came to be
dismissed on 04.09.2003. Yet again, the appellant-management
preferred Special Appeal No.1027 of 2003, to assail order dated
04.09.2003, whereby, the recall application preferred by the
appellant-management was dismissed. On this occasion with the
consent of the rival parties, the Special Appeal came to be
disposed of, by recording the following observations:
“Considering the facts and circumstances of the
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present case and considering the case of both the
parties to the extent that the reference case
should be decided by the Industrial Tribunal, we
transfer the reference case from the Labour
Court-II, Ghaziabad to the concerned Industrial
Tribunal for its decision and direct the
proceedings of the reference case shall commence
from the stage it was before the Labour Court, as
we find from the records that the written
statement and other paraphernalia have already
been completed before the Labour Court. The
Industrial Tribunal shall, therefore, dispose of
the reference case in accordance with law, within
a period of three months from the date of
production of a certified copy of this order
without granting any unnecessary adjournment to
either of the parties.”
The dispute between the rival parties therefore came to be settled
by consent inasmuch as, the matter came to be finally transferred
to the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut i.e. the place suggested by the
workmen.
It is thereafter that the matter was taken up for
consideration on merits, by the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut.
Before the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant-management filed an
application dated 08.02.2006, asserting that the case could not be
proceeded further, because the Noida Engineering Mazdoor Sangh,
had ceased to be a recognised Union. It was pointed out, that the
above Union came to be de-recognised on 11.03.2003, and as such,
the officers of the Union could no longer represent the
respondents-workmen.
On 01.05.2006, a meeting of the workmen (involved in the
present controversy) was convened. 71 of the 113 workmen
participated in the same. They resolved that, they would henceforth
be represented by 5 of the workmen. It needs to be expressly
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noticed that these 5 workmen selected vide Resolution dated
01.05.2006 were amongst the 113 respondents-workmen involved in the
controversy. Representation on behalf of the respondents-workmen
in terms of the Resolution dated 01.05.2006 was not accepted by the
Industrial Tribunal. Accordingly, vide its order dated 07.08.2006,
the Industrial Tribunal directed the respondents-workmen to adopt
the procedure laid down in Rule 40 (1)(i)(c) of the Industrial
Disputes Rules, for finalising their representation before the
Industrial Tribunal. The instant order passed by the Industrial
Tribunal on 07.08.2006 came to be assailed by one of the
respondents-workmen by filing Writ Petition No.58121 of 2006. The
High Court accepted the claim of the respondent-workmen vide its
order dated 30.04.2007 by holding as under:-
“9. The writ petition is allowed. The order of the
Industrial Tribunal dated 7.8.2006 in Adjudication
Case No.157 of 2003 is quashed. It will be open to
the remaining workmen, who are interested in the
case to be represented by their authorized
representatives to pursue the reference to its
logical conclusion. The Industrial Tribunal will
do well to decide the old matter of the year 1989
on priority as expeditiously as possible.”
The order passed by the High Court on 30.04.2007 is the subject
matter of challenge at the hands of the appellant-management
through the instant civil appeals.
During the course of hearing, the solitary contention
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the
appellant-management, was premised on Section 6-I of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act. The same is being extracted hereunder:
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“6-I. Representation of the parties.- (1) Subject to the
provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), the parties to
an industrial dispute may be represented before a Board,
Labour Court, or Tribunal in the manner prescribed.
(2) No party to any proceeding before a Board shall be
represented by a legal practitioner, and no party to any
proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal shall be
represented by a legal practitioner, unless the consent
of the other party or parties to the proceeding and the
leave of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court or
Tribunal, as the case may be, has been obtained.
(3) No officer of a Union shall be entitled to represent
any party unless a period of two years has elapsed since
its registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act,
1926, and the Union has been registered for the one
trade only :
Provided that an officer of a federation of
unions may subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed represent any party.”
It was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant,
that Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 6-I of the U.P.Industrial
Disputes Act were inapplicable to the present controversy, because
the respondents-workmen had not sought representation through a
legal practitioner, and also because, they had not filed a
representation through an officer of the Union in terms of
Sub-section (3) thereof. It was accordingly the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant, that the representation on
behalf of the respondents-workmen before the Industrial Tribunal,
Meerut, could have only been in terms of the mandate contained in
Sub-section (1) of Section 6-I of the U.P.Industrial Disputes Act,
which postulates, that representation on behalf of the
respondents-workmen before the Industrial Tribunal could have only
been “in the manner prescribed”. Insofar as the instant aspect of
the matter is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant invited
our attention to Rule 40 of the U.P.Industrial Disputes Rules,
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which prescribes the representation of parties. Rule 40 is being
extracted hereunder:
“40. Representation of parties.-(1) The parties may,
in their discretion, be represented before a Board,
Labour Court or Tribunal,-
(i) in the case of a workman subject to the
provision of sub-section (3) of Section
6-I, by-
(a) an officer of a Union of which he is
member, or
(b) an officer of a Federation of Unions
to which the union referred to in
clause (a) above, is affiliated, and
(c) where there is no union of workmen,
any representative, duly nominated by
the workman who are entitled to make
an application before a Conciliation
Board under any orders issued by
Government, or any members of the
executive, or other officer;
(ii) in the case of an employer, by
(a) an officer of a union or Association
of employers of which the employer is
a member, or
(b) an officer of a federation of unions
or associations of employers to which
the union or association referred to
in clause (a) above, is affiliated, or
(c) by an officer of the concern, if so
authorized in writing by the
employer :
Provided that no officer of a federation of unions
shall be entitled to represent the parties unless
the federation has been approved by the Labour
Commissioner for this purpose.
(2) A party appearing through a representative
shall be bound by the acts of that representative.
(3) An application for approval of a federation
of unions for representing the parties before a
Board, Labour Court and Tribunal shall be made in
Form XX to the Labour Commissioner :
Provided that no federation of unions shall
be entitled to apply for approval unless a period
of two years has elapsed since its formation.
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-rule
(3) above, the Labour Commissioner may, after
making such enquiries, as he deems fit, approve
the federation or reject the application. In case
a federation is approved its name shall be
notified in the Official Gazette otherwise the
applicant shall be informed of the position in
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writing by the Labour Commissioner.
(5) The Labour Commissioner or the Registrar of
the Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh, may, at any time
before or after a federation has been approved,
call for such information from the federation as
he considers necessary and the federations shall
furnish the information so called for.
(6) Every approved federation shall,-
(a) intimate to the Labour Commissioner
and to the registrar of Trade Unions, Uttar
Pradesh, in Form XXI every change in the
address of its head office and in the
members of the executive (including its
office bearers) within seven days thereof;
and
(b) submit to the Labour Commissioner and
to the Registrar of Trade Unions, Uttar
Pradesh by December 31 every year a list of
unions affiliated to its in Form XXII.
(7) The Labour Commissioner may, at any time and
for reasons to be recorded in writing, withdraw
the approval granted to a federation under
sub-rule (4) above.
(8) A party aggrieved by the order of the Labour
Commissioner under sub-rule (4) or (7) may within
one month from the date of the receipt of such
order prefer an appeal before the State
Government, whose decision in the matter shall be
final and binding.”
It is the submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant, that in the absence of any Union, of which the
respondents-workmen were members, Sub-clause (a) and (b) of Rule
40(1)(i) of the U.P.Industrial Disputes Rules, would be
inapplicable. It was his submission, that the representation on
behalf of the respondents-workmen could have been only in terms of
Rule 40(1)(i)(c). This, according to the learned counsel for the
appellant, was because of the admitted position between the rival
parties, that the respondents-workmen were not members of any Union
of workmen. In the above view of the matter, placing reliance on
Rule 40(1)(i)(c), it was the submission of the learned counsel for
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the appellant, that the representation on behalf of the
respondents-workmen could have been, only out of those workmen who
were entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board,
under the orders issued by the Government. In this behalf, reliance
was placed on Notification No.7248 dated 31.12.1958 (published in
U.P.Gazette Extraordinary of 31.12.1958). A relevant extract of
the aforesaid Notification dated 31.12.1958 is being reproduced
hereunder:
“Reference of disputes to Conciliation Board – (1)
An application for the settlement of an industrial
dispute may be made before the Conciliation Officer
of the area concerned in Form I with five spare
copies thereof-
(i) in the case of a workman
(a) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of
S.6-1, by an officer of a union of which he is a
member, or by an officer of a Federation of Unions
to which such union is affiliated; or
(b) where no union of workmen exists by five
representatives of the workmen employed in a
concern or industry, duly elected in this behalf by
a majority of the workmen employed in that concern
or industry at a meeting held for the purpose, or
by all workmen, employed in the concern if their
number is not more than five;
Provided that where no union of workmen exists and
the application is made by representatives of the
workmen duly elected as aforesaid, a copy of the
resolution adopted at a meeting held for the
purpose shall be attached to the application in
form I, and
(ii)....... …... …...”
Having placed reliance on the Notification dated 31.12.1958,
learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment
rendered by the Allahabad High Court in M/s Mahabir Sizing and
Processing Co. and others vs. The Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad
(1979 LAB I.C.674).
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
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submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the
appellant-management. Section 6-I of the U.P.Industrial Disputes
Act has already been extracted hereinabove. Having examined the
same minutely, we are of the considered view that Section 6(1)
would be applicable only in a situation where, the workmen seek to
be represented by others, and choose not to represent themselves in
the proceedings. In such an exigency, it is imperative to make a
choice in terms of the mandate contained in Section 6-I of the
U.P.Industrial Disputes Act. It is not open for the workmen to be
represented even through a legal practitioner, without the consent
of the opposite party. Representation through a legal practitioner
other than by consent of the opposite party, is precluded by
Section 6-I(2). In case the workmen desire to be represented by
an officer of the Union, the choice can only be of such officer who
has held the position in the Union, which had subsisted for a
period of more than two years. We have already extracted
hereinabove Rule 40 of the U.P.Industrial Disputes Rules. Under the
above rule also, representation is contemplated through an officer
of the Union, through an officer of the Federation of Unions, and
in case of the absence of any Union, in the manner stipulated under
Rule 40(1)(i)(c). We find no difficulty whatsoever in concurring
with the learned counsel for the appellant-management insofar as
his submissions, on the issue of representation are concerned.
In the adjudication of the present controversy, the
primary issue to be determined is, whether Section 6-I of the
U.P.Industrial Disputes Act, and Rule 40 of the U.P.Industrial
Disputes Rules, would be applicable in a situation where the
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workmen choose to present their case before the Industrial
Tribunal, by themselves or by choosing a few amongst themselves on
behalf of themselves. In our considered view, the choice of an
individual to represent himself in a dispute before a Court or a
Tribunal, is a vested inherent right. It is only the privilege of
being represented through someone else, that needs the sanction of
law. Section 6-I, as also, Rule 40 de-alienate the extent to which
the above privilege can extend. In case, workmen before an
Industrial Tribunal choose to be represented through a concerned
authority, that choice must be in conformity with Section 6-I, as
also, Rule 40 aforementioned.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the
appellant very fairly acceded to the inherent right of an
individual to represent himself before a Tribunal or a Court.
Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, reference
may be made to the observations of this Court in Goa Antibiotics
and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. R.K.Chawla and another, (2011) 15 SCC
449, wherein it was held as under:
“1. Mr. Vishnu Kerikar, Deputy Manager, Finance & MS
claims to be the power-of-attorney holder of the
petitioner, Goa Antibiotics & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. in this
case. He wishes to argue the case personally on behalf of
the petitioner.
2. Section 33 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) states as follows:
“33. Advocates alone entitled to practise .—Except
as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other
law for the time being in force, no person shall,
on or after the appointed day, be entitled to
practise in any court or before any authority or
person unless he is enrolled as an advocate under
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this Act.”
3. A perusal of the above provision shows that only a
person who is enrolled as an advocate can practise in a
court, except where otherwise provided by law. This is
also evident from Section 29 of the Act. A natural person
can, of course, appear in person and argue his own case
personally but he cannot give a power of attorney to
anyone other than a person who is enrolled as an advocate
to appear on his behalf. To hold otherwise would be to
defeat the provisions of the Advocates Act.
4. Section 32 of the Act, however, vests discretion in
the court, authority or person to permit any person who is
not enrolled as an advocate to appear before the court and
argue a particular case. Section 32 of the Act is not the
right of a person (other than an enrolled advocate) to
appear and argue before the court but it is the discretion
conferred by the Act on the court to permit anyone to
appear in a particular case even though he is not enrolled
as an advocate.”
It is however the pointed contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant-management, that in case the respondents-workmen
had made a choice to project their case by themselves, it was
imperative for all of them, to participate in the proceedings being
conducted by the Industrial Tribunal. In sum and substance, it is
the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that in
case the respondents-workmen choose to appear by themselves, all
113 of them had to participate in the proceedings before the
Industrial Tribunal. It was therefore his submission, that it was
not open for 5 of them to represent all the 113.
Insofar as the above contention is concerned, learned
counsel for the respondents has invited our attention to Section
5-C of the Industrial Disputes Act which is reproduced hereunder:
“5-C. Procedure and powers of Boards, Labour Courts
and Tribunals.- (1) Subject to any rules that may be
made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Labour Court or
a Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the
arbitrator, the Labour Court or the Tribunal
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concerned may think fit.
(2) A Presiding Officer of a Labour Court or a
Tribunal may for the purpose of enquiry into any
existing or apprehended industrial disputes, after
giving reasonable notice, enter the premises occupied
by any establishment to which the disputes relates.
(3) Every Board, Labour Court and Tribunal shall have
the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit
in respect of the following matters, namely,-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath or affirmation or otherwise;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of
documents and material objects;
(c) issuing commissions for the examination
of witnesses;
(d) inspection of any property or thing
including machinery concerning any such dispute; and
(e) in respect of such other matters as may
be prescribed;
and every enquiry or investigation by a Labour Court
or Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228
of the Indian Penal Code.”
A perusal of Section 5-C leaves no room of any doubt, that in the
absence of any particular rule, it is open to an Industrial
Tribunal, to follow such procedure as it may think fit. We are of
the view, that it is well recognised in law, that in case where
more than one persons are involved collectively on the same side,
it is open to them to choose one of more amongst themselves, to
represent all of them. Such provision is also found incorporated
under Order 1 Rule VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure which is
being extracted hereunder:
“8. One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in
same interest.- (1) Where there are numerous persons
having the same interest in one suit,—
(a) one or more of such persons may, with the
permission of the court, sue or be sued, or may
defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit
of, all persons so interested;
(b) the Court may direct that one or more of such
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persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit,
on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so
interested.
(2) The court shall, in every case where a
permission or direction is given under sub-rule (1),
at the plaintiff’s expense, give notice of the
institution of the suit to all persons so
interested, either by personal service, or, where,
by reason of the number of persons or any other
cause, such service is not reasonably practicable,
by public advertisement, as the court in each case
may direct.
(3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose
benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, under
sub-rule (1), may apply to the court to be made a
party to such suit.
(4) No part of the claim in any such suit shall be
abandoned under sub-rule (1), and no such suit shall
be withdrawn under sub-rule (3), of rule 1 of Order
XXIII, and no agreement, compromise or satisfaction
shall be recorded in any such suit under rule 3 of
that Order, unless the court has given, at the
plaintiff’s expense, notice to all persons so
interested in the manner specified in sub-rule (2).
(5) Where any person suing or defending in any such
suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit
or defence, the court may substitute in his place
any other person having the same interest in the
suit.
(6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall
be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for
whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended,
as the case may be.”
In such view of the matter, we are satisfied, that it was open to
the respondents-workmen to choose one or more amongst themselves,
to represent all of them before the Industrial Tribunal. In view
of the aforesaid finding, we find no infirmity in the impugned
order passed by the High Court.
While disposing of the present controversy, it is
necessary for us to clarify that the instant conclusion has been
drawn by categorically arriving at the conclusion that Section 6-I
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of the U.P.Industrial Disputes Act and Rule 40 of the
U.P.Industrial Disputes Rules, would be applicable, only in a
situation where the workmen choose to be represented through a
third party before the Industrial Tribunal. The above provisions
would be inapplicable, when the workmen choose to present their own
case by themselves. In the instant situation, none of the above
provisions would be invoked. Accordingly, it is also imperative
for us to hold, that the judgment relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellant, would not be applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case, since the aforesaid judgment was
on the interpretation and the applicability of Rule 40(1)(i)(c) of
the U.P.Industrial Disputes Rules.
The narration of above-mentioned facts reveals, that the
respondents-workmen were inducted into the employment of the
appellant-management before 1989. Conciliation proceedings were
initiated on their behalf by the employees Union in 1989. The
workmen were seeking regularisation from the date of their
employment, and wages (and other allied benefits connected to the
wages) being paid to permanent employees. The process of
conciliation continued for about a decade, whereupon, the State
Government made a reference of the industrial dispute raised by the
respondents-workmen on 28.05.1998. Eversince the above reference,
the appellant-management has initiated one or the other proceedings
before the High Court, which has stalled the very initiation of
consideration, of the claim of the respondents-workmen. The
appellant-management was also dissatisfied with the determination
of the State Government in transferring the adjudication of the
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dispute from the Labour Court, Ghaziabad to the Industrial
Tribunal, Meerut vide its order dated 06.03.1999. A challenge to
the same was raised before the High Court repeatedly. Eventually,
by an order dated 28.10.2003, the appellant-management by consent
accepted the adjudication of the dispute by the Industrial
Tribunal, Meerut. This was where the matter was ordered to be
determined by the State Government vide its order dated 06.03.1999,
at the asking of the workmen. What is important is, that large
number of years came to be wasted in something which was eventually
acceded to voluntarily by the appellant-management. Even in so far
as the present controversy is concerned, it is not understandable
why the appellant-management was dissatisfied with the
representation of 5 of the workmen before the Industrial Tribunal.
It is not possible for us to understand what prejudice could have
been caused to the appellant-management if 5 workmen had
represented the respondents-workmen before the Industrial Tribunal,
Meerut. All the same, the matter was brought to this Court in 2008
and is now being adjudicated finally after a lapse of 6 years. The
sequence of facts noted hereinabove reveals that the claim which
commenced in 1989 and was referred for adjudication by the State
Government in 1998, has still not been taken up for consideration.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the
appellant-management invited our attention to the fact, that out of
113 original workmen, on whose behalf the Union had initiated
proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, 89 had entered
into an out of Court settlement with the appellant-management and
24 of them have remained. Insofar as the remaining 24 are
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concerned, their services have been terminated during the pendency
of the adjudicatory process. While the services of Hari Niwas, one
of the respondents-workmen, were terminated in the year 2000, the
services of all the remaining workmen were terminated in the year
2005. We are of the view, that the appellant-management has abused
the judicial process, and thereby, tired out the workmen, in the
legitimate pursuit of their alleged rights. This is not the purpose
for which these adjudicatory processes have been awarded for. It is
for expeditious relief to workmen employed in industries, that
these beneficial legislations have been enacted. We are of the
view that some compensation should be awarded to the
respondents-workmen for having remained involved in this
assiduously long process of litigation. We therefore while
dismissing the instant appeals, direct the appellant-management to
pay as cost a sum of Rs.1 lakh to each of the remaining contesting
workmen.
In view of the inordinate delay in the adjudicatory
process, on account of litigation at the higher levels, we would
direct the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut to make all efforts to
dispose of the controversy within nine months from the date the
parties appear before the Industrial Tribunal.
...........................J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
..........................J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2014.
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ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.7 SECTION XV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 2393-2394/2008
INDIA YAMAHA MOTOR PVT LTD. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
DHARAM SINGH & ANR. Respondent(s)
(With appln. (s) for stay and early hearing)
Date : 20/08/2014 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
For Appellant(s) Mr.Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr.Adv.
Mr. Subramonium Prasad, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr.Colin Gonsalves, Sr.Adv.
Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Adv.
Upon hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed
judgment.
(SATISH KUMAR YADAV) (PHOOLAN WATI ARORA)
COURT MASTER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)