Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
TMT. NOORJAHAN.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
TMT. SULTAN RAJIA ALIAS THAJU & OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/11/1996
BENCH:
S.C. SEN
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Ahmadi, CJI
Special leave granted.
Syed Abu Thakir on 3.8.1982 suffered injuries while
alighting from the bus belonging to the appellant and died
on the way to the hospital. The respondent No.1 is the widow
and the respondent No.2, the minor son of the deceased while
the respondents 3 & 4 are his father & mother respectively.
The respondent No.5 was the insurer of the vehicle while the
respondent No.6 was the driver of the bus at the relevant
time. The respondents 1 to 4 filed a claim for compensation
against the appellant and the respondents 5 and 6. The
District Judge, Madurai, acting as a Tribunal under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter called ’the Act’,
awarded compensation of Rs.92,000/- and held that since the
deceased was a "passenger" at the time of the accident the
liability of the Insurance Company was limited to
Rs.10,000/- only. The appellant filed an appeal contending
that the Insurance Company was liable to pay the entire
compensation. The respondents 1 to 4 also filed an appeal.
The High Court dismissed both the a also Hence this appeal
by special leave.
The sole question that arises for consideration is
whether the victim was a "passenger" within the meaning of
Section 95(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. The findings of the
District Judge, Madurai and that of the High Court are that
the victim fell down from the bus while alighting therefrom
due to the rash and negligent act of the driver in starting
the bus before he had got down. Both the Courts rejected the
plea of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.
The quantum of compensation, i.e., Rs.92,000/-, is not
chalIenged before us.
The plea of the Insurance Company is that the deceased
was a passenger in the bus and therefore its liability was
limited to Rs.10,000/- as per the provisions of Section 95
of the Act. The plea of the appellant on the other hand is
that the victim/deceased was a ’third party’ and hence the
Insurance Company was liable to meet the entire claim.
The High Court, after examining the provisions and case
law on the subject, observed that there was a divergence of
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opinion on the question whether in a situation as the
present one, the deceased could be said to be a ’passenger’
in the bus. Examining the provisions of Section 95(1) of the
Act, the High Court observed that the liability arising out
of an event leading to injury or death of a person
alighting from a bus, as in the present case, was
necessarily to be covered by the insurance policy, the
victims of such accidents were passengers for whom the
liability of the Insurance Company at the relevant time was
limited to only Rs.10,000/-.
It will be proper here to extract the relevant part of
Section 95(1) of the Act :
"95. Requirements of policies and
limits of liability. -- (1) In
order to comply with the
requirements of this Chapter, a
policy of insurance must he a
policy which -
(a) ... ... ...
(b) insures the person or classes
of persons specified in the
policy to the extent specified
in sub-section (2) -
(i) against any liability which may
be incurred by him in respect of
the death of or bodily injury to
any person or damage to any
property of a third party caused
by or arising out of the use of
the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily
injury toany passenger of a public
service vehicle caused by or
arising out of the use of the
vehicle in a public place,
Provided that a policy shall not be
required
(i) ... ... ...
(ii) except where the vehicle is a
vehicle in which passengers are
carried for hire or reward or by
reason of or in pursuance of a
contract of employment, to cover
liability in respect of the death
of or bodily injury to persons
being carried in or upon or
entering or mounting or alighting
from the vehicle at the time of the
occurrence of the event out of
which a claim arises, or
(iii) ... ... ..."..
The High Court rightly interpreted the proviso (ii)
extracted above to mean that the liability in respect of
death or injury to persons alighting from the vehicle at the
time of the accident need not be covered except where the
vehicle is a vehicle in which the passengers are carried for
hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract
of employment. In other words, where the vehicle is a
vehicle in which the passengers are carried for hire or
reward or by reason of or pursuant to a contract of
employment, giving rise to the above liability arising out
of an accident, the vehicle has necessarily to be covered.
It can be seen that the proviso is an exception to Section
95(1). As per sub-section (b) the insurance policy must
insure the persons specified in the policy against (i) any
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liability to person or property of a third party, and (ii)
against death or personal injury to any passenger of a
public service vehicle. The liability in respect of those
suffering personal injury while getting into or alighting
from the vehicle need not be covered if the vehicle is not
one in which the passengers are carried for hire reward. But
as in the present case, the vehicle is one that carries
passengers for hire or reward, the liability for personal
injury or death caused while getting into or alighting from
the vehicle would be required to be covered by the policy.
In other words, such people who suffer injury or die while
alighting from the vehicle are to be covered by the general
rule that the insurance policy for a public service vehicle
should cover the liability against the death of or bodily
injury to any passenger of such a vehicle.
It is clear that the legislature intended that
such persons, viz., passengers who are in the process of
alighting from a public service vehicle, should be
covered by the policy of insurance, which requirement is
mandatory under Section 95(1)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Further, once such persons, viz., those who are entering
or alighting from the vehicle are treated as passengers,
the limit of liability of the insurance company has to
be located in clause (ii) of Section 95(2)(b) of the
Act. The limit at the relevant time was Rs.1O,OOO/-.
The High Court has referred to a few decisions of
the very same court wherein contradictory views have
been expressed. We do not consider it necessary to restate
those cases because in our view the language of the statute
is clear. Section 95(1)(b) makes it clear that a policy of
insurance shall not be required to cover liability in
respect of death or bodily injury to persons boarding or
alighting from a motor vehicle but clause (ii) of the
proviso thereto engrafts an exception and says that where
the vehicle is one in which passengers are carried for hire
or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of
employment, it shall be necessary to cover liability in
relation to persons carried in or upon such vehicle which
would include cases of death or bodily injury caused while
entering or mounting or alighting from such vehicle. The
words ’alighting from the vehicle’ are plain and simple and
clearly mean ’while getting down from the vehicle’.
Therefore, if a person is still in the process of boarding
or alighting from the vehicle, such person would be
entitled to the coverage, no doubt within the limit of
liability fixed under the statute at the relevant point of
time. It must be remembered that this was a beneficial
provision engrafted by way of an exception to provide an
insurance cover to passengers.
It is interesting to observe that in the new Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, the proviso on which our interpretation
rests has been omitted. For our purpose, since the accident
took place in 1982, the old Act has to be applied. The
appellant, being the owner of the bus is vicariously liable
for the acts of the driver, the respondent No.6 and is
liable for the compensation for the death of Syed Abu
Thakir. The insurer, the respondent No.5, is liable only to
the extent of Rs.10,000/-. The appeals are accordingly
dismissed. No costs.