NARESH vs. HEMANT

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).8859 OF 2019 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s). 16697 of 2018) NARESH AND OTHERS ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS HEMANT AND OTHERS          ...RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The appellants who were the original defendants in the Suit are   aggrieved   by   the   order   of   the   High   Court   allowing   the respondents­plaintiffs’   Second   Appeal,   upsetting   the   concurrent findings of facts by two courts.  The parties shall be referred to by their respective positions in the Suit for better appreciation and convenience.  Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ARJUN BISHT Date: 2019.11.19 18:05:10 IST Reason: 3. The   predecessors   of   the   plaintiffs   and   the   defendants  were brothers   namely,   Ramchandrarao   Ingole   and   Trimbakrao   Ingole. 1 They   partitioned   among   themselves   in   1952.   The   suit   property consists of 7011 sq. ft. of lands, with a house constructed in 1974­ 75   thereupon   leaving   substantial   vacant   lands,   was   purchased jointly   in   the   name   of   the   two   brothers   by   sale   deed   dated 29.03.1957. Trimbakrao Ingole expired in 1980 and Ramchandrarao Ingole also passed away on 22.03.1995.  The plaintiffs as legal heirs of Ramchandrarao Ingole, relying on the sale deed filed Special Civil Suit No.268 of 1995 seeking partition and possession of their half share in the suit property. 4. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. The first appeal preferred   by   the   plaintiffs   was   also   dismissed.   Both   the   courts arrived at concurrent findings of facts that the plaintiffs had failed to   prove   that   Ramchandrarao   Ingole   had   contributed   to   the purchase of the suit property or that at any time he had been a beneficiary of the purchase by residence or possession. The house had been constructed exclusively by Trimbakrao Ingole from his own funds and who remained in exclusive possession of the same relying on the admissions of PW­1 in his evidence.  Ramchandrarao Ingole was held not to be a vendee of the suit property. 2 5. Shri   V.C.   Daga,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the appellants, submitted that the High Court in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code should not have interfered with   the   concurrent   findings   of   facts   by   two   courts   that Ramchandrarao Ingole was not and was never intended to be a beneficiary of the purchase.  The presumption under Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), by reason of his name being mentioned in the sale deed as a vendee also was rebuttable and not absolute. Two courts on appreciation of the   oral   evidence,   were   satisfied   for   reasons   recorded   that Ramchandrarao Ingole was never a beneficiary or in joint ownership of the suit property.   Trimbakrao Ingole alone was present at the time of registration and the stamp papers were also purchased by him.  The construction was also raised by him alone from his own funds,   acknowledged   by   PW­1   in   his   evidence.   Ramchandrarao Ingole never raised any claim for share in the property either during the life time of Trimbakrao Ingole or for fifteen years thereafter till his own death.  It is only after the passing away of Ramchandrarao Ingole that his legal heirs staked claim for partition based merely on 3 the recitals in the sale deed.  Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act has no application in the facts of the case as it is applicable only in case of a bilateral document relying on  Bai Hira Devi and others  AIR 1958 SC 448.  The present vs. Official Assignee of Bombay, sale deed was a unilateral document executed by the vendor alone. It was lastly submitted that the house was built in ‘L’ shape and by design was incapable of being divided. The plaintiffs, as evident from their own pleadings were indulging in speculative litigation, eyeing the vacant area of the suit property. 6. Shri Pallav Sisodiya, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the suit property was purchased by both the brothers together in view of their cordial relations. The cordiality ended with the death of Ramchandrarao Ingole. Thus, the suit came to be filed after his death.  Relying on the recitals in the sale deed, reading the same in conjunction with Section 45 of the Act, it was submitted that Ramchandrarao Ingole was co­owner by operation of law.  The fact that he may not have been in possession does not raise any estoppel precluding him or his legal heirs from asserting   their   rights,   relying   upon   Suraj   Rattan   Thirani   and 4 (1964) 6 SCR 192. others vs. Azamabad Tea Co. Ltd. And others,  Signature of the vendee on the sale deed was not mandatory, as held in  Aloka Bose vs. Parmatma Devi and others,  (2009) 2 SCC 582.  The fact that Trimbakrao Ingole may have signed at the time of registration on the reverse of the deed or that his name may have been mentioned as the purchaser of the stamp papers does not make him and his legal heirs the exclusive owners of the property. The  oral  evidence   by   both   sides   was   insufficient   to   exclude the rights   of   the   plaintiffs.   The   appellants   were   unable   to   lead   any evidence   under   the   second   and   third   proviso   to   Section   92   for rebutting   the   presumption   in   the   law  in   favour   of   the   plaintiffs under Section 45 of the Act.   The fact that the original sale deed may   have   been   produced   by   the   defendants   cannot   be   proof   of exclusive ownership.   The findings in favour of the defendants by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are only in the realm of probabilities.     The   High   Court  rightly  held  in   the   nature   of the evidence, that the conclusions arrived at by the two courts below were, therefore, perverse.  5 7. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties, perused the respective pleadings and the evidence on record.  The plaintiffs   acknowledged   the   construction   of   a  house   on   the  suit property, seeking a share in the vacant lands fully aware of the nature   of   the   construction   which   could   not   be   partitioned.   The defendants in their additional written statement had stated that originally   both   the   brothers   proposed   to   purchase   the   property together.   Subsequently Ramchandrarao Ingole retracted and was not  interested   in  purchasing   the   property   due  to  funds   crunch. Trimbakrao   Ingole   therefore   alone   paid   the   entire   consideration. Since the stamp papers had already been purchased and the sale deed drafted in name of both the brothers, registration followed without any change.  It is very important to notice that no rejoinder or replication was filed by the plaintiffs to this additional written statement.   8. The evidence was in the nature of oath versus oath by the legal heirs of the two brothers. No documentary evidence except for the sale deed was led. The Trial Court correctly noticed the gap of 36 days between the preparation of the sale deed on 29.03.1957 and its 6 subsequent registration on 03.05.1957 as a circumstance to accept the   contention   of   the   defendants   that   Ramchandrarao   Ingole retracted   from   any   contribution   and   his   status   as   a   vendee   or beneficiary of the purchase. Since registration on 03.05.1957 till the institution of the suit by the legal heirs of Ramchandrarao Ingole, 38 years later, he did not prefer any claim since 03.05.1957 till his brothers death in 1980, including for 15 long years till his own death on 23.03.1995. Thereafter, PW­1 in his evidence admitted that the construction of the house had been made by Trimbakrao Ingole alone.  There is no evidence that this construction was made from joint family funds.  It is an undisputed fact that the plaintiffs at no point of time ever since purchase resided   in the house or upon the suit lands or enjoyed the same in any manner let alone incurred any expenditure on the same.     9. The claim for a presumption under Section 45 of the Act in favour of the plaintiffs was raised for the first time before the First Appellate Court but was negated in light of the factual findings. Importantly,   it   was   held   that   mere   failure   of   the   defendants   to adduce satisfactory evidence that Trimbakrao Ingole had paid the 7 entire consideration did not absolve the plaintiffs of their duty to establish their own claim in accordance with law by satisfactory evidence to substantiate the presumption sought to be relied upon. In other words, the appellate court correctly held that the weakness of   the   defence   could   not   become   the   strength   of   the   plaintiff, especially when the defendants were disputing their claims.   10. Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act read as follows:

8 11. The   High   Court   invoked   the   presumption   without   proper consideration and appreciation of the facts considered and dealt with   by   two   courts   holding   by   reasoned   conclusions   why   the presumption  stood   rebutted   on  the   facts.     The   High  Court  also committed an error of record by holding that there was no evidence that Trimbakrao Ingole alone had constructed the house, a finding patently contrary to the admission of PW­1 in his evidence.  The fact that mutation also was done in the name of Trimbakrao Ingole alone which remain unchallenged at any time was also not noticed. The conclusion of the High Court that improper appreciation of evidence amounted to perversity is completely unsustainable.  No finding has been arrived at that any evidence had been admitted contrary to the law   or   that   a   finding   was   based   on   no   evidence   only   in   which circumstance the High Court could have interfered in the second appeal. 12.  The High Court therefore manifestly erred by interfering with the concurrent findings on facts by two courts below in exercise of powers   under   Section   100,   Civil   Procedure   Code,   a   jurisdiction 9 confined to substantial questions of law only. Merely because the High Court may have been of the opinion that the inferences and conclusions   on   the   evidence   were   erroneous,   and   that   another conclusion to its satisfaction could be drawn, cannot be justification for the High Court to have interfered.     13. In  (1964) 2 Madamanchi Ramappa vs. Muthaluru Bojappa,  SCR 673, this court with regard to the scope for interference in a second appeal with facts under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code observed as follows: “12.  ….The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which courts of fact have acted was admissible and   relevant,   it   is   not   open   to   a   party   feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the courts of fact to contend before the High Court in second appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the court of facts and cannot be agitated   in   a   second   appeal.   Sometimes,   this position   is   expressed   by   saying   that   like   all questions   of   fact,   sufficiency   or   adequacy   of evidence in support of a case is also left to the jury for   its   verdict.   This   position   has   always   been accepted   without   dissent   and   it   can   be   stated without any doubt that it enunciates what can be 10 properly   characterised   as   an   elementary proposition.   Therefore,   whenever   this   Court   is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner,   or   deliberately   as   in   this   case, contravened   the   limits   prescribed   by   s.   100,   it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions.  It may be that in some   cases,   the   High   Court   dealing   with   the second   appeal   is   inclined   to   take   the   view   that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by   courts   of   fact;   but   on   such   occasions   it   is necessary to remember that what is administered in   courts   is   justice   according   to   law   and considerations   of   fair   play   and   equity   however important they may be, must yield to clear  and express   provisions   of   the   law.   If   in   reaching   its decisions   in   second   appeals,   the   High   Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually   associated   with   gambling;   and   that   is   a reproach   which   judicial  process   must   constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” 14. Though precedents abound on this settled principle   of law, we do not consider it necessary to burden our discussion unnecessarily except to rely further on  Gurdev Kaur and others vs. Kaki and , (2007) 1 SCC 546, holding as follows: others   “71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was   compelled   to   interfere   was   because   the   true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 CPC 11 have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought   before   them   evidence   has   been   grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or   by   both   the   courts   below,   it   is   their   duty   to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves   injustice   and   it   is   the   duty   of   the   High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law. xxxx 73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous   finding   of   fact,   however   gross   or inexcusable   the   error   may   seem   to   be,   and   they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. xxxx 81.   Despite   repeated   declarations   of   law   by   the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with   the   pure   findings   of   fact   even   after   the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 12 82.   In   view   of   the   clear   legislative   mandate crystallised by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.” 15. The   order   of   the   High   Court   interfering   with   concurrent findings   of   facts   by   two   courts   is,   therefore,   held   to   be unsustainable in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The order of the High Court is consequently set aside. The orders dated 06.03.1998 and 13.06.2002 of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are restored.   The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed.  The present appeal is allowed.  .……………………….J.   (Ashok Bhushan) ………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)   New Delhi, November 19, 2019. 13