Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
B. H. ASWATHANARAYAN SINGH AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
23/04/1965
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
SHAH, J.C.
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
SIKRI, S.M.
CITATION:
1965 AIR 1848 1966 SCR (1) 87
CITATOR INFO :
F 1968 SC1095 (5)
RF 1973 SC 534 (9)
RF 1974 SC1905 (20)
D 1977 SC1170 (5)
R 1980 SC 129 (9)
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), vs. 68C and 68E-
Specification of maximum and minimum number of vehicles and
trips in approved scheme-Validity-Inter-State route, what
is-Hearing objections on behalf of State Government Who
should.
HEADNOTE:
The State Transport Undertaking published a scheme in the
Gazette for taking over the routes mentioned therein to the
entire exclusion of the existing operators., Objections to
the scheme were heard by the Chief Minister and the approved
scheme with modifications was published. The draft scheme
was published when the Rules of 1960 were in force and the
approved scheme after the Rules of 1963 had come into force.
Writ petitions were filed by various bus-operators
challenging the validity of the approved scheme but they
were dismissed.
In their appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that
: (i) It was not open, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
and the Rules there Linder, to the State Government, when
approving the scheme to specify minimum and maximum number
of motor vehicles to be put on each route and the minimum
and maximum number of trips to be made on each route and in
so far as the approved scheme made such a provision it was
ultra vires- (ii) As the draft scheme only specified the
maximum number of vehicles and trips as required by the 1960
Rules, but the approved scheme provided both for minimum and
maximum number of vehicles and trips on each route as
required by the 1963 Rules, there was no opportunity to the
objectors to put forward their objections to that feature of
the scheme; (iii) Rule 3 cls. (e) and (f) and rule 12, of
the 1963 Rules, which provided for the specification of the
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maximum and minimum number of vehicles and trips in the
scheme and for variation of the frequency of services on a
notified route without exceeding the maximum number, were
ultra vires; (iv) The scheme could not be deemed to have
been approved as it related to inter-State routes and the
approval the Central Government had not been obtained; and
(v) The Chief Minister was not competent to hear objections
on behalf of the State Government, but that it should have
been done by the Minister in charge of Transport.,
HELD : (i) The specifying of both minimum and maximum number
of vehicles and trips in the scheme was in accordance with
the provisions of s. 68C and was not hit by s. 68E and was
valid. [98 F-G]
Section 68C itself provides that "particulars of the nature
of the services to be rendered" should be given in the
scheme and the intention is that such details should be
given as are necessary to enable the objectors to make their
objections. When the section speaks of the nature of
services to be rendered, it refers to the classes of motor
vehicles for carrying passengers or goods or both, and the
scheme has to indicate which class of service is to be taken
over. Also, the word "particulars" should be given its
ordinary meaning of "details". There may be some
88
difficulty in working out a scheme containing minimum and
maximum number of vehicles and trips, where exclusion is
partial as compared to a case where exclusion is complete,
but the task of making a proper adjustment by the Regional
Transport Authority is not insuperabla and therefore, such a
difficulty would not change the meaning of the word "
particulars." Such details of the nature of services
proposed to be rendered include not only the precise number
of vehicles and trips but also the minimum and maximum
number of vehicles and trips on each route; and such
indication of the maximum and minimum number gives the
necessary information to enable objectors to oppose the
scheme even with reference to the adequacy of the service
proposed to be rendered. .’Further, s. 46(c) and s. 48(3)
(ii) indicate that specification of the minimum and maximum
number of trips and vehicles is envisaged by the Act, and it
is permissible and legitimate to refer to those sections,
Besides, such a specification would subserve the purpose of
Chap. IV-A of the Act inasmuch as it will provide for a
certain amount of flexibility in the service to be rendered.
Such a. provision for flexibility in the approved scheme
itself, cannot be said to override s. 68-E or be a device to
get round the section; and since the gap between the maximum
and minimum, in the present case, was not wide, their
fixation did not operate as a fraud on ss. 68C and 68E.
[93A, 1), E-G: 94 G-H; 95A C-G; 97F; 98 B-GE]
Dosa Satyanarayanan v. Andhra Predesh Stae Road Transport
Corporation, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 642. distinguished.
C.P.C. Motor Service v. State of Mysore, [1962] Supp. I
S.C.R, 717 and C. S. Rowjee v. Stale of Andhra Pradesh,
[1964] 6 S.C.R. 330. explained.
(ii)The fact that there was some defect in the draft
scheme, would not be fatal, if the approved scheme, as it
finally emerged after the objections had been heard and
decided under s. 68-D was in accordance with what was
required by s. 68-C. [99E]
There was no violation of principles of natural justice,
because, objection was taken to the impropriety of only
indicating a maximum in the draft scheme and that objection
was met by the State Government by modifying the scheme and
including a minimum also. [99 G-H]
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Dosa Satyanarayanana Murty v. Andhra Pradesh State Road
Corporation, [1961] I S.C.R. 642. followed.
(iii)Since it was permissible to specify the maximum
and minimum ’number of vehicles and trips under s. 68-C, and
since r. 12 should be read as giving power to the
undertaking to vary the frequency between the maximum and
minimum prescribed in the scheme, the rule are all valid.
[100 F-G]
(iv)The two termini of the route being within the State.
the scheme ,did not deal with inter-State route-,. A road
is different from ’I route and the criterion for determining
if a route is intrastate or inter-State is to see whether
the 2 termini are in the same State or not. [101 B-C]
(v)The authority under s. 68-D to hear objections is the
State Government. Therefore, some living person must hear
objections on its behalf. Since the rule framed by the
Government nominates the Chief Minister as the authority, he
was competent to hear the objections. [101 D.E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIl. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 250 and
286 of 1965.
89
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated February 2, 1965
of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1435 to 1438,
1445 to 1451, 1453 to 1461, 1496 to 1498, 1524, 1526 to
1528, 1541 to 1543 and 1721 of 1964.
N. C. Chatterjee, N. S. Narayana Rao, B. P. Singh, D.
Gundu Rao, A. G. Meshwarappa, A. T. Sundaravardan and R. B.
Datar. for the appellant (in C. A. No. 250 to 269 and 276 to
286 of 1965).
G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta, M. Rangaswami, J. B. Dadachanji,
O. C. Mathur and Ravinder- Narain, for the appellants (in
C. As. Nos. 270-275 of 1965).
A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for respon-
dent No. 2 (in all the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, J. These 37 appeals on certificates from the
judgment of the Mysore High Court raise common questions and
be dealt with together. The appellants are motor bus
operators in the district of Bellamy in the State of Mysore.
It appears that two draft schemes for taking over passenger
bus routes were published by the State Transport Undertaking
(hereinafter referred to as the Undertaking) in May 1962.
Objections to those schemes were heard by the State
Government and the schemes were approved after some
modifications and published in the Mysore gazette in August
1962. The approved schemes were however challenged by the
motor bus operators who were operating in the district
before the High Court by writ petitions and the two schemes
were quashed by the High Court on September 24, 1962, for
reasons into which it is unnecessary to go.
Then the Under-taking published another scheme on November
1, 1962 in the Mysore gazette for taking over the routes
mentioned therein to the entire exclusion of the existing
motor bus operators. This scheme was published under the
State Transport Undertakings (Mysore) Rules 1960.
Objections to the scheme were heard by the State Government
on various dates in April and May 1963. In the meantime,
the State Transport Undertakings Rules were under
modification and the revised rules were published on April
25, 1963. The last date for hearing of objections by the
State Government was May 23, .1963. On. July 25, 1963, the
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Rules of 1963 came into force. The order of the State
Government approving the scheme was made on April 18, 1964
and thereafter the approved scheme with such modifications
90
as the State Government had made was published in the
gazette on May 7, 1964. Then followed applications by tile
Undertaking to the Regional Transport Authority for issue of
permits in accordance with the scheme. Soon thereafter writ
petitions were filed by various motor bus operators
challenging the validity of the approved scheme in the first
week of August 1964, and the implementation of the scheme
was stayed by the High Court. On February 23, 1965, the
High Court dismissed the writ petitions. Thereafter the
High Court granted certificates to the appellants to appeal;
and that is how the matter has come up before us.
A large number of contentions have been urged on behalf of
the appellants to which we shall refer in due course. But
the two main contentions that have been urged are : (i) it
was not open, under the Motor Vehicles Act, No. 4 of 1939,
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rule;
thereunder, to the State Government when approving the
scheme to specify minimum and maximum number of motor
vehicles to be put on each route and minimum and maximum
number of trips to be made on each route and insofar as the
approved scheme makes such a provision it is ultra vires,
and (ii) when the draft scheme was published in the Rules of
1960 were in force and the draft scheme only specified the
maximum number of vehicle and trips on each route, but by
the time the State Government disposed of the objections,
Rules of 1963 had come into force and the approved scheme
provided both for minimum and maximum number of vehicles and
trips on each route. As, however, the minimum number was
not specified in the draft scheme, there was no opportunity
to the objectors to put forward their objections to this
feature of the scheme and therefore principles of natural
justice had been violated by the State Government, which has
been held to be a quasi-judicial authority for this purpose,
when approving the scheme.
We shall deal with these two main objections first and then
consider other points raised on behalf of the appellants.
It is not in dispute that one fixed number of vehicles as-,
well as of trips can be provided in the scheme. The
question that arises is whether the fixing of a minimum and
maximum number of vehicles and trips, as has been done in
the approved scheme, is also permissible under the Act.
This takes us to s. 68-C of the Act which may be reproduced
here :
"Where any State transport undertaking is of
opinion that for the purpose of providing an
efficient, adequate, economical and properly
coordinated road transport service, it is
necessary in the public interest that road
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transport services in general or any
particular class of such service in relation
to any area or route or portion thereof should
be run and operated by the State transport
undertaking, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of other persons or
otherwise, the State transport undertaking may
prepare scheme giving particulars of the
nature of the services proposed to be
rendered, the " area or route proposed to be
covered and such other particulars respecting
thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause
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every such scheme to be published in the
Official Gazette and also in such other manner
as the State Government may direct."
It will be seen that if the Undertaking is of opinion, for
reasons indicated in the section, to take over road
transport services to the exclusion, complete or partial, of
other persons, it has to frame a scheme, which has to be
published in the official gazette and in such other manner
as the State Government may direct. "Road transport
service" means a service of motor vehicles carrying
passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward.
Under the section the Undertaking may take over road
transport services in general or any particular class of
such service in relation to any area or route or portion
thereof. In the present case the Undertaking decided to
take over passenger services over various routes in the
district of Bellary to the exclusion of all other persons.
There is no dispute that the Undertaking in publishing the
scheme acted in the manner required by s. 68-C. The dispute
arises as to the contents of the scheme published by the
Undertaking and the contention on behalf of the appellants
is that under the relevant words of s. 68-C, the scheme must
only contain a precise number of vehicles and trips on each
route and that if the scheme provides minimum and maximum
number of vehicles and trips it will not be in accordance
with s. 68-C. Stress is laid on behalf of ’he appellants on
the following words in s. 68-C which provide for the
publication of the scheme thereunder
"........ the State transport undertaking may
prepare a scheme giving particulars of the
nature of the services proposed to be
rendered, the area or route proposed to be
covered, and such other particulars respecting
thereto as may be prescribed ....
It will be seen that this provision is in two parts. By the
first part the section itself provides what should be there
in the scheme. namely--(i) particulars of the nature of the
services to be rendered, and (ii) the area or route proposed
to be covered. The
Sup.CI/65-7
92
second part provides for such other particulars respecting
hereto as may be prescribed by the rules. We have already
indicated that rules have been framed for this purpose and
it is not in dispute that Rules of 1960 which were in force
at the relevant time were complied with. In the Rules only
the maximum number of vehicles and trips was required to be
mentioned and that was done in the draft scheme, which was
published. But the contention on behalf of the appellants
is that the first part of the section to which we have
referred requires two things, namely-(i) particulars of the
nature of the services proposed to be rendered, and (ii) the
area or route proposed to be covered. ’there is no
difficulty as to the meaning of the words "area or route
proposed to be covered" and the draft scheme did provide for
the area or routes to be covered. It is however contended
that. when s. 68-C requires that the scheme should give
particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be
rendered, it was necessary that the scheme should provide
only the precise number of vehicles and trips for each
route-if not, in the draft, at anyrate in the scheme
finally approved by the State Government after hearing,
objections. It is said that when the section requiresthat
the scheme should give the "particulars of the nature of the
services proposed to be rendered", the word "particulars"
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used in the section necessarily imports that the scheme
should specify the precise number of vehicles and trips for
each route. Now the words "nature of the services
proposed to be rendered"clearly refer to the class of
service to be taken over. It is arguedthat the words
"nature of the services proposed to be rend-red" are
different from the words "class of services proposed to be
rendered" and have a wider meaning. It is further submitted
that there was no reason for the word "nature" being used in
this part of the section when the word "clays" was used in
the earlier part of the section if the two meant the same.
We are however of opinion that there is no substantial
difference between the class of services which has been
referred earlier in the section and the nature of services
proposed to be rendered which is referred in the latter part
of the section. Road transport service as defined in s. 68-
A can be of three kinds, namely-(i) passenger service, (ii)
goods services, and (iii) mixed goods and passenger service.
Further passenger and goods services themselves could be of
different types as , for example, stage carriages [see s. 2
(29) ] goods vehicles [see s. 2(8)], contract carriages [see
s. 2(3)], invalid carriages [see s. 2(10)], and motor cabs
[see s. 2(15]. Therefore, when s. 69-C speaks of nature of
services to be rendered it
93
refers to these classes of motor vehicles. for carrying
passengers or goods and the scheme has to indicate which
class of service is to be taken over. It may be added that
one of the meanings of the word "nature" given in the
Concise Oxford Dictionary is "kind, sort, class", and it is
this meaning which is intended by the use of this word in
this part of the section.
Besides indicating the class of services to be taken
over, the section requires that the particulars with
reference to the class of service to be taken over should
also be indicated in the scheme. It is contended on behalf
of the appellants that where, (for example) stage carriage
services are being taken over, particulars must indicate the
exact number of motor vehicles that will be used on a
particular route and the exact number of trips that they
will perform in the course of a day and that this is
essential to be given in the scheme to enable objectors to
object to it particularly with respect to the adequacy of
services to be rendered which is one of the conditions
precedent for taking over the services under that section.
We ate of opinion that the word "particulars" in the
section has been used in its ordinary meaning. In its
ordinary meaning, the word "particulars" means details or
items: (see the Concise Oxford Dictionary). In the
Dictionary of English Law by Jowitt, "particulars" with
reference to a claim means the details of the claim which
are necessary in order to enable the other side to know what
case he has to meet. They are intended to. make quite clear
the case of the party who furnishes them. Thus when s. 68-C
provides for giving particulars of the nature of the
services proposed to be rendered, the intention is that such
details should be given as are necessary to enable the
objectors to make their objections. We do not think that
these details would necessarily consist of the precise
number of vehicles and trips to be used on each route. We
see no difficulty in holding that the details of the nature
of services proposed to be rendered may not only be in the
form of a precise number of vehicles and trips but also in
the form of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips
on each route. Furnishing of minimum and maximum number of
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vehicles and trips for each route would also in our opinion
satisfy the requirement that particulars should be furnished
of the services proposed to be rendered. Further the
indication of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and
trips for each route would give the necessary information to
enable the objectors to oppose the scheme even with
reference to the adequacy of the services proposed to be
rendered.. We do not think that the appellants are right
in submitting that when the word "particulars" is used in
this Dart of the section, it can only be satisfied if the
exact number of
94
vehicles and trips for each route is specified and that
there is no other way of satisfying the requirement implicit
in the use of the word "particulars". As we have already
said the word "particulars’ has been used in its ordinary
sense and means details and the, indication of the minimum
and maximum number of trips and vehicles would also in our
opinion be sufficient to give the objectors the necessary
information to enable them to object with reference to the
conditions precedent provided in the section for framing a
scheme. It is obvious that the section itself has provided
the absolute minimum information which must be given in the
scheme to enable the objectors to object and that minimum
consists of details with respect to the class of service
proposed to be rendered and the area or route proposed to be
covered. Other particulars are left to be prescribed by the
rules as they are not of the same importance as the details
with respect to class of service to be rendered and the area
or route to be covered. We are therefore of opinion that if
the scheme in leaves both minimum and maximum number of
vehicles and trips on each route it will be in accordance
with the requirements of s. 68-C.
We may in this connection refer to S. 46 (c) and S. 48 (3 )
(ii) which also indicate that it is permissible to have
minimum and maximum number of daily services in case of
stage carriages in particular. Section 46 provides for
application for stage carriage permits of two kinds-(i) in
respect of a service of stage carriages, and (ii) in respect
of a particular motor vehicle used as a stage carriage.
Where a service of stage carriages has to be provided, cl.
(c) of s. 46 provides for indicating the minimum and maximum
number of daily services proposed to be provided in relation
to each route or area and the time-table of the normal
services. Section 48 which provides for grant of stage
carriage permits by the Regional Transport Authority also
provides in sub-s. (3) in the case of a service of state
carriages for attaching to the permit any condition relating
to the minimum and maximum daily services to be maintained
in relation to any route generally or on specified days and
occasions. Number of vehicles would naturally depend upon
the number of daily services, for the larger the number of
daily services, the larger would be the number of vehicles
required. These two sections therefore indicate that
specification of minimum and maximum number of trips and
vehicles is envisaged by the Act. It is true that these
sections are in Chapter IV while s. 68-C is in Chap. IV-A,
S. 68-B whereof provides that Chap. IV-A would have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in Chap.
IV. But in order to find out what particulars of the nature
95
of the services proposed to be rendered have to be given
under S. 68-C it would be permissible and legitimate to
refer to these provisions in ss. 46 and 48. They indicate
that a provision in the scheme of minimum and maximum number
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of trips per day would be sufficient in order that necessary
information may be available to objectors to make their
objections with respect to the adequacy etc. of the services
proposed to be rendered. But quite apart from this
consideration we see no reason to hold that the word "parti-
culars" as used in S. 68-C necessarily refers only to the
precise number of vehicles and trips for each route and
cannot take in the minimum and maximum number of vehicles
and trips for each route.
Besides we are of opinion that a provision for a minimum and
maximum number of vehicles and trips would subserve the
purpose of Chap. IV-A inasmuch it will provide for a
certain amount of flexibility in the service to be rendered,
for it cannot be disputed that transport needs may vary from
season to season. This flexibility provided by specifying
the minimum and maximum would obviate the necessity of
taking action under s. 68-E of the Act every time the
Undertaking decided to make a minor change in the number of
trips with the necessary changed in the number of vehicles
employed. We: cannot accept the argument that provision of
a minimum and maximum number in the scheme would be hit by
s. 68-E, of the Act which provides for cancellation or
modification of an approved scheme, for S. 68-E comes into
play after the scheme has been approved under S. 68-D. Nor
can the provision of flexibility by indicating the minimum
and maximum number of vehicles and trips, be said to be a
device to get round S. 68-E, which deals with a situation
after the scheme has been approved. But where a scheme
itself provides for minimum and maximum number of trips and
vehicles and has been approved, it cannot be said that such
approval is meant to over-ride s. 68-E, for even such an
approved scheme may require radical alteration after some
years when transport needs may have radically changed and in
such cases action under S. 68-E would be necessary. But
this provision of flexibility providing minimum and maximum
number in a scheme cannot per se be said to be an attempt to
get round S. 68-E.
In this connection our attention is drawn to a decision of
this Court in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty v. Andhra Pradesh
State Road Transport Corporation(1). In that case r. 5 of
the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules was struck down on
the ground that it violated S. 68-E. In that case the
scheme provided for an
(1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 642.
96
exact number of trips and an exact number of vehicles. Rule
5 however permitted frequency of services to be varied. It
was in these circumstances that the rule was held to be
ultra vires s. 68-E. But where the scheme itself provides
for a minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips there
is no question of its being violative of S. 68-E. We, Loire
therefore of opinion that the provision of minimum and
maximum number of vehicle-, and trips in the scheme as
approved is not against the provision of s. 68-C as the
section does not require that only an exact number of
vehicles and trips for each route must be notified in the
scheme.
Our attention is also drawn to C.P.C. Motor Service v. The
State of In that case at p. 727, following observations
"The earlier Rules retired a statement as to
the minimum and maximum number of vehicles to
be put on a route, as also the minimum and
maximum trips. It was however held by this
Court that a departure, from the minimum
number would mean the alternation of the
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scheme, necessitating the observance of
allformalities for framing a Scheme."
These observation are presad into Service to show that a
minimum number cannot be prescribed in a scheme prepared
under s. 68-C. It is true that there is an observation in
that case that it had been held by this Court that a
departure from the minimum number would mean an alteration
of the scheme, necessitating the observance of all the
formalities for framing a scheme. But learned counsel was
unable to point out any case of this Court. where it was
held that a departure from the minimum in the case of a
scheme which mentions both the minimum and maximum would
require action under s. 68-E. The only case to which our
attention was invited in this connection is that of Dosa
Satyanarayanamurty (2); but in that case it was held that a
departure from an exact number would require action under s.
68-E. However, that was Pot a case where the scheme itself
fixed minimum and maximum. The scheme in that case fixed an
exact number and it was held that a departure from such a
number would mean modification of the scheme within the
meaning of s. 68-F,. The observation in C.P.C. Motor
Service’s case(1) that this Court had held that a departure
from the minimum would mean alteration of the scheme
therefore appears to have crept in per incuriam.
Lastly our attention is drawn to a judgment of this Court in
C. S. Roiviec v. The State of Andhra Pradesh(1). In that
case
(1) [1962] SLipp. I S.C.R. 717.
(2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 642.
(3) (1964 6 S.C.R. 331).
97
the question of indicating minimum and maximum in the scheme
had come up for consideration. But the scheme in that case
was quashed on the ground of bias and this Court had
therefore no occasion to consider the question whether the
indication of minimum and maximum in the scheme would make
it ultra vires s. 68-C. Even so some observations were
made in that connection at the end of the judgment. But the
learned Judges made it clear that they had not thought it
necessary to decide the larger question viz., whether the
mere prescription of the maxima and minima constituted a
violation of s. 6S-E, as to require ,he scheme to be struck
down. Therefore the observations in that case with respect
to the fixing of minima and maxima must be treated as
obiter. Further in that case it was argued on behalf of the
State that indication of minima and maxima by itself would
not be bad; but it was conceded that the gap between the
minumum and maximum should not be very wide. The Court
assumed this position and then observed that in some of the
cases gap between the minimum and maximum was very wide and
if the scheme had not already been vitiated on the ground of
bias, this Court might have struck it down on the ground
that there was a wide gap between the minimum and maximum.
There is no doubt that though fixing of minimum and maximum
number of vehicles and trips with respect to each route is
permissible under s. 68-C and would not be hit by s. 68-E,
the proportion between the minimum and maximum should not be
so great as to make the fixing of minimum and maximum a
fraud on ss. 68-C and 68-E of the Act. It is not possible
to lay down specifically at what stage the fixing of minimum
and maximum. would turn into fraud; but it is only when the
gap between the minimum and maximum is so great that it
amounts to fraud on the Act that it will be open to a court
to hold that the scheme is not in compliance with s. 68-C
and is hit by s. 68-E. The gap between the minimum and
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maximum would depend upon a number of factors, particularly
on the variation in the demand for transport at different
seasons of the year. Even so if the approved scheme were to
fix minimum and maximum with very wide disparity between the
two. it may be possible for the court to hold after
examining the facts of the case that such fixation is not in
accordance with s. 68-C an<] is a fraud on s. 68-E. But,
with respect, it seems to us that a variation in minimum and
maximum from 6 to 12 or 5 to 9 can hardly be of such an
order as to amount to fraud on the Act. The observations
with respect to fixing of minimum and maximum number of
vehicles and trips in the scheme made in Rowjee’s case(1)
must therefore
(1) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 339.
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be treated as obiter as in that case they did not require
determination. In the present case the gap is not of such a
wide nature.
Then it is urged that whatever may be the position in a case
of complete exclusion, fixing of maximum and maximum in
relation to vehicles and trips could not be contemplated by
s. 68-C where there is partial exclusion. Therefore if it
could not be contemplated in the case of partial exclusion
it could not be contemplated in the case of complete
exclusion also. It may be assumed that there may be some
difficulty in working out a scheme containing minimum and
maximum number of vehicles and trips where exclusion is
partial as compared to a case where exclusion is complete.
Even so we do not think that would ,change the meaning of
the word "particulars" used in s. 68-C and necessarily imply
that the particulars given must consist only of an exact
number of vehicles and an exact number of trips. Further we
are of opinion that though it may be assumed that certain
difficulties may conceivably arise in carrying out a scheme
which includes minimum and maximum in the case of partial
exclusion the difficulties are clearly not insuperable, and
the Regional Transport Authority is there to work out the
details where the scheme provides for a minimum and maximum
number of vehicles and trips after taking into account the
private operators who are allowed to ply their buses along
with the Undertaking. The task of making a proper
adjustment by the Regional TransPort Authority is not
insuperable and therefore we are not prepared to hold that
because exclusion can be partial, particulars required by s.
68-C with respect to number of vehicles and trips must be
precise.
We are therefore of opinion that specifying of both minimum
and maximum number of vehicles and trips in the scheme under
challenge is also in accordance with the provisions of s.
68-C and is not hit by s. 68-E. The contention of the
appellants under this head is therefore rejected.
Then we come to the second main point raised in the case.
It is urged that the draft scheme was framed when rules only
required maximum number to be mentioned and the draft scheme
mentioned the maximum. But in the approved scheme, this was
modified and both the minimum and maximum were mentioned.
So it is urged that as the minimum was not mentioned in the
draft scheme which was in accordance with the Rules of 1960
as they then stood, it was not possible for the objectors to
object with
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respect to the minimum which was introduced by the State
Government by modification under S. 68-D of the Act.
Therefore there was breach of principles of natural justice
as the objectors had no opportunity to show that the
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condition precedent, namely, that the service was adequate,
had been complied with. It may be accepted that there was a
defect in the draft scheme inasmuch as it only indicated the
maximum number of services and not the minimum. But we are
here concerned with the approved scheme after it was
modified by the State Government in accordance with s. 68-D
of the Act. It is also not quite correct on the part of the
appellants to say that they could not object to the adequacy
of service because the minimum was not mentioned. We find
that quite a few of the objectors appear to have objected
that it was not enough to mention the maximum only in the
scheme and that in the absence of the minimum the
Undertaking might not run even one bus on a particular
route. It was because of this objection that the State
Government provided for the minimum in the scheme. The fact
that there was some defect in the draft scheme would in our
opinion be not fatal if the approved scheme as it finally
emerges after the objections have been heard and decided
under s. 68-D is in accordance with what is required by s.
68-C. Nor do we think that it was not possible for
objectors to raise the question of adequacy of services
where only the maximum is Spector. The approved scheme
cannot in our opinion be struck (Town if it is in accordance
with s. 68-C merely because there was some defect in the
particulars supplied in the draft scheme. We may in this
connection refer to the case of Dosa Satyanarayanamurty(1)
where also there was a defect in the draft scheme inasmuch
as in certain cases the number of vehicles to be operated on
each route was not specified and one number was mentioned
against many routes which were bracketted. An objection was
taken with regard to this matter and the scheme was modified
accordingly. This Court upheld the modified scheme and the
same principle in our opinion applies to the present case
where only the maximum was mentioned in the draft scheme and
not the minimum. We do not think that there was any
violation of principles of natural justice because objection
was taken to the impropriety of only indicating a maximum in
the scheme and that objection has been met by the State
Government by modifying the scheme and including a minimum
also. The contention therefore on this head must fail.
We shallnow consider the other points raised on behalf of
the appellants. It is urged that cls. (e) and (f) of r.
3 of the 1960-
(1)[1961] I S.C.R. 642.
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Rules are bad as they provide only for a maximum number of
vehicles and trips. It is further urged that r. 12 of the
1960Rules is bad inasmuch as it allows an Undertaking to
vary the frequency of services operated on any of the
notified routes or within the notified area without
exceeding the maximum number of vehicles or services having,
regard to the traffic needs during any period. We are of
opinion that it is unnecessary to consider the validity of
these rules in view of the fact that they no longer exist.
We should however guard ourselves by saying that we should
not be understood as accepting the view of the High Court
which has upheld the validity of these rules.
Then it is urged that cls. (e) and (f) of r. 3 of the
1963-Rules as well as r. 12 thereof are bad. Clauses (e)
and (f) of r. 3 provide for the specification of maximum
and minimum number of vehicles and trips in the scheme. We
have already considered this question and have held that it
is permissible to specify the maximum and minimum number of
vehicles and trips under s. 68-C. Rules 3 (e) and (f) is in
accordance with what we have held above and is therefore
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valid. Rule 12 lays down that where the services are run and
operated to the complete exclusion of other persons by the
Undertaking, it may, in the interest of the public having
regard to the traffic needs during any period vary the
frequency of services operated on any of the notified routes
or within .any notified area without exceeding the maximum
number of vehicles or services as enumerated in the approved
scheme. This rule is ancillary to r. 3 (e) and (f) and
comes into operation only where services are run to the
total exclusion of other persons. In such a case this rule
gives power to the Undertaking to vary the frequency of
services upto the maximum limit. We are of opinion that
this rule should be read as giving power to the Undertaking
to vary the frequency of services within the minimum and
maximum prescribed in the scheme. Read as such, we see no
invalidity in this rule.
Then it is urged that the scheme cannot be deemed to
have been approved as it relates to inter-State routes and
the approval of the Central Government has not been taken as
required under the proviso to s. 68-D (3). We are of
opinion that there is no substance in this contention. An
inter-State route is one in which one of the terminii is in
one State and the other in another State. In the present
case both the terminii are in one State. So it does not deal
with inter-State routes at all. It is urged that part of
the scheme covers roads which continue beyond the State
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and connect various points in the State of Mysore with other
States. Even if that is so that does not make the scheme
one connected with interstate routes, for a road is
different from a route. For example, the Grand Trunk Road
runs from Calcutta to Amritsar and passes through many
States. But any portion of it within a State or even within
a District or a subdivision can be a route for purposes of
stage carriage$ or goods vehicles. That would not make such
a route a part of an inter-State route even though it lies
on a road which runs through many States. The criterion is
to see whether the two terming of the route are in the same
State or not. If they are in the same State, the route is
not an inter-State route and the proviso to s. 68-D (3)
would not be applicable. The termini in the present case
being within the State of Mysore the scheme does not deal
with interState routes it all, and the contention on this
head must be rejected.
Lastly it is urged that the Chief Minister was not competent
to hear the objections under s. 68-D and that this should
have been done by the minister of transport. The
authority under s. 68-D tohear objections is the State
Government. As the StateGovernment is not a living
person, some living person must hear the objection.Rule
8 provides treat the Chief minister shall be theauthority
to hear the decide the sections. We fail to see why, if
according to the appellants the Minister incharge of
transport can hear the objections, the Chief Minister cannot
do so when the rule framed by the government under the Act
nominates the Chief Minister as the authority to hear the
objections on behalf of the State Government. There is no
force in this objection and it is hereby rejected.
The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed with
costs-one set of hearing fee.
Appeal dismissed.
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