Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NACHHATFAR SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT30/04/1990
BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
PUNCHHI, M.M.
CITATION:
1990 SCR (2) 822 1990 SCC (3) 585
JT 1990 (2) 431 1990 SCALE (1)110
ACT:
Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Section 100--Second
Appeal-Serious question of law involved--High Court not to
dismiss the appeal in limine.
Punjab Police Rules, 1934: Rule 16.2(2)--Police
Officer--Conviction of--Dismissal from service--Suit chal-
lenging dismissal--Period of limitation--What is.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent, a constable, convicted under sections
325/34 of the Indian Penal Code along with another co-ac-
cused constable and dismissed from service, filed a suit
challenging his dismissal, which was dismissed by the trial
court holding that it was barred by limitation. On appeal
the First Appellate Court decreed his suit by holding that
the respondent-plaintiff was discriminated because his co-
accused was re-instated in service pursuant to the decision
in the suit filed by the co-accused; his dismissal was void
on the ground of arbitrariness, and the bar of limitation
was not applicable.
The defendant-appellant filed a regular second appeal
against the aforesaid decree before the High Court which was
dismissed in limine.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf
of the appellant that the High Court erred in dismissing the
second appeal in limine.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1. Serious questions of law are involved in this
case and they should not have been lightly brushed aside by
the High Court in the manner it has been done. Therefore the
High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal in limine.
[824F; 825D]
2. Rule 16.2 (2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 manda-
torily directs that a police officer judicially sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment exceeding one month shall be dis-
missed, and this mandate of law
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cannot be ignored on the ground that in the case of another
member of the police force a mistake was committed. [824F]
3. The appellant’s assertion that the respondent’s co-
accused who was .reinstated in service pursuant to the
Court’s decision was subsequently dismissed has not been
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denied by the respondent. The case is, therefore, remitted
to the High Court for fresh disposal. [824G; 825D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4055 of
1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.1987 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 2092 of 1987.
C.M. Nayar for the Appellants.
R.P. Agarwal and U.S. Prasad for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHARMA, J. This appeal of the State of Punjab by special
leave arises out of a suit filed by the respondent, Nachhat-
tar Singh. The plaintiff-respondent was serving the State
Police as a constable when an incident took place on
17.2.1971, which led to the prosecution of the plaintiff
along with the Head Constable Kahan Singh and the Sub
Inspector Baldev Singh. The charge made against the
plaintiff was that he physically assaulted and detained one
Gurdial Singh. The accused were tried and Baldev Singh was
acquitted. So far the plaintiff and Kahan Singh were
concerned, they were found guilty under s. 325 read with s.
34 of the Indian Penal Code and several other sections, and
were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months each.
The conviction was maintained up to the Supreme Court stage.
The Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala, thereafter
dismissed the plaintiff on 20.4.1976. This order of dismiss-
al was challenged as illegal in the present suit which was
instituted on 6.11.1982.
2. Besides taking several technical objections, the suit
was defended on merits, as well as on the ground of limita-
tion. From the judgment of the trial court it appears that
only two questions were pressed by the parties, namely,
whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the
order of dismissal was illegal on the ground that the plain-
tiff was not served with a show cause notice before the
impugned order was passed. Both the issues were decided by
the learned
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Subordinate Judge against the plaintiff and the suit was
accordingly dismissed.
3. The plaintiff appealed against the decision. It
appears that before the Additional District Judge, who heard
the appeal, it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that
the other accused constable Kahan Singh, who was also con-
victed with the plaintiff, had also filed a separate suit
against his dismissal from service, which was decreed with
an observation that it was open to the competent authorities
to pass fresh order of punishment in accordance with law,
but while no further punishment was awarded to Kahan Singh,
the respondent’s service stands terminated.A plea of dis-
crimination was taken on this basis which was accepted by
the first appellate court and the suit was decreed. On the
question of limitation the court after a very brief discus-
sion in the judgment held that the impugned order of dis-
missal was void on the ground of arbitrariness and, there-
fore, the bar of limitation would not apply. It was further
observed that this decision would not preclude the authority
to award a minor punishment, provided such a punishment has
been awarded to the other police officials tried and con-
victed along with him. The authority was also permitted to
take a decision in regard to the pay and allowance for the
period the plaintiff remained out of service because of his
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being in jail.
4. The defendant-appellants filed a regular second
appeal before the High Court against the decree of the first
appellate court which was dismissed at the admission stage
by merely saving:--
"HEARD. DISMISSED"
It has been contended on behalf of the appellants, and in
our view correctly, that serious questions of law are in-
volved in this case and the High Court erred in dismissing
the second appeal in limine. It has been argued that Rule
16.2(2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 mandatorily directs
that a police officer judicially sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment exceeding one month shall be dismissed, and
this mandate of law cannot be ignored on the ground that in
the case of another member of the police force a mistake was
committed. Besides, it has been asserted on oath before this
Court and not denied by the respondent that the aforesaid
Kahan Singh had to be re-instated in service for a short
time in pursuance of the decision in the suit as the order
of his dismissal had been passed by an authority not compe-
tent in this regard, and that later he was again dismissed.
It has also been pointed out that another convicted consta-
ble Surinder Singh was given the
825
benefit of probation by the criminal court and his case,
therefore, is distinguishable. Even in the concluding por-
tion of the last paragraph of the judgment of the Additional
District Judge, the possibility that "the other police
officials convicted with him" (that is, the plaintiff) might
have been later punished, is recognised.
5. It has been further urged on behalf of the appellants
that the finding of the Additional District Judge on the
question of limitation is patently illegal inasmuch as the
judgment assumes that no law of limitation is applicable to
suits where an order is impugned as being void. The High
Court should have examined the plaint for finding out the
cause of action for the suit and then in that light deter-
mined the correct article of the Limitation Act applicable
to the case. Serious objection has been taken against the
observations of the first appellate court permitting the
competent authority to inflict only minor punishment on the
plaintiff in certain conditions, and the direction about the
payment of the salary and the other emoluments. After heat-
ing the learned counsel for the parties, we agree with the
appellants that the question involved in this suit should
not have been lightly brushed aside by the High Court in the
manner it has been done. We, therefore, set aside the judg-
ment of the High Court and remit the case to it for fresh
disposal in accordance with law. It will be open to the
appellants to file an application for admitting additional
evidence in regard to the further orders passed against
Kahan Singh subsequent to the civil court’s decree in his
favour, and to argue before the High Court that the case of
the present plaintiff is distinguishable. The High Court
should call for the records and decide the case finally at
the motion stage itself as the case is an old one. In the
event of admission of fresh evidence, the High Court shall
permit the plaintiff to file relevant rebutting evidence.
The operation of the decree of the first appellate court
shall remain stayed till the final disposal of the second
appeal by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
There will be no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeal
allowed.
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