Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 51
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8465-8466 OF 2024
ANSAL CROWN HEIGHTS FLAT
BUYERS ASSOCIATION (REGD.) … APPELLANT
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8539 OF 2024
KAMAL GIROTRA & ANR. … APPELLANTS
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 10874-10877 OF 2024
SANGEETA DEWAN ETC. ETC. … APPELLANTS
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
Signature Not Verified
AND
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.01.12
19:13:19 IST
Reason:
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10878 OF 2024
1
NIDHI CHAWLA … APPELLANT
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.8465-8466 OF 2024
th
1. The lead appeals call in question the judgment and order dated 20
1
June, 2024 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
2
Commission dismissing Execution Application Nos. 27/2023 and
28/2023 filed by the appellant against the respondents 2 to 9
3
(directors/promoters of M/s. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. ). Such
applications arose from two final orders rendered by the NCDRC while
deciding complaints lodged by the appellant bearing nos.
CC/2600/2018 and CC/86/2018 respectively.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Appellant is an association of flat buyers which entered into Flat Buyer
Agreements with ACIPL for units in Ansal Crown Heights. Vide
1
impugned order
2
NCDRC
3
ACIPL
2
individual builder buyer agreements, ACIPL promised to handover
possession of the apartments within a period of 36 months from the
date of execution of the agreements, which expired for all the buyers
in the time period from December, 2013 - December, 2015. Possession
of the flats not having been delivered, the appellant instituted two
th
consumer complaints – the first on 10 , January 2018 (on behalf of
th
45 flat buyers), and the second on 26 November, 2018 (on behalf of
20 flat buyers). The respondents were ACIPL and its
directors/promoters being the respondents 2 to 9.
th
3. While admitting CC/86/2018, the NCDRC vide order dated 25
January, 2018 directed that the proceedings would continue only
against ACIPL and not the respondents 2 to 9. Accordingly, the
appellant was directed to file amended memo of party impleading
ACIPL as the sole respondent.
4. Subsequently, CC/2600/2018 came to be lodged wherein ACIPL was
arrayed as the sole respondent, in conformity with the earlier
admission order.
th
5. On 28 February, 2022, the complaints were allowed and directions
were issued to ACIPL to complete the project; obtain the occupancy
certificate; and hand over possession of the flats to the buyers, i.e.,
the allottees, with interest @ 9% per annum on the amounts deposited
by them from the committed date of possession until the offer of
possession or, alternatively, if the allottees were unwilling to wait for
possession, ACIPL was directed to refund the entire amount deposited
3
with interest @ 9% per annum, to be paid within six weeks, failing
which interest @ 12% per annum would apply for the period of default.
6. Owing to ACIPL not complying with the said order, the appellant
initiated proceedings for execution. During this time, corporate
insolvency resolution process having been initiated under
4
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against ACPIL, a
moratorium had come into force. NCDRC, accordingly, vide order dated
th
18 May, 2023, adjourned proceedings sine die , including against the
directors of ACPIL with the following observations:
" ... So far opposite party Nos.2 to 9 are concerned, they were not
party in the main complaint. If the decree cannot be executed against
opposite party No.1 due to moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC,
it would not be appropriate to proceed in same execution against
opposite party Nos.2 to 9. In the light of order of National Company
Law Tribunal, this Matter is adjourned sine die with liberty to the
Parties to file an Application for listing of the Case in the event the
National Company Law Tribunal alter, modify or vacates of the Order
or decides the proceedings finally."
7. Appellant then challenged the sine die adjournment granted by the
NCDRC by filing Civil Appeal Nos. 4247, 4480 and 4481 of 2023 before
th
this Court. The said appeals were allowed vide order dated 17
January 2024, whereby the abovementioned order of the NCDRC was
set aside. This Court directed that the execution proceedings may
continue against the respondents 2 to 9, while granting them liberty
to raise all available objections, including the plea that they were not
liable to satisfy or implement the order sought to be executed. This
4
IBC
4
Court held that the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC shields
only the corporate debtor and does not extend to directors/promoters.
8. Upon revival, the appellant pressed the execution applications against
the respondents 2 to 9. As noted, the NCDRC dismissed the execution
applications insofar as they sought to proceed against the respondents
2 to 9, holding that the order is executable only against ACIPL, the
sole respondent in the original complaints.
ISSUE
9. The core controversy lies within a narrow compass. Question that
arises is, can persons who were arrayed as respondents in the
consumer complaints but ultimately against whom no notice was
issued and the complaints did not proceed, could be brought within the
net of execution, on the premise that they were directors/promoters
of the judgment-debtor company. NCDRC has answered this question
in the negative. We are called upon to decide whether such view
warrants interference.
ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS
10. It is not in dispute that at the stage of admitting CC/86/2018, the
th
NCDRC consciously admitted the complaint on 25 January, 2018 only
qua the respondent no. 1, namely ACIPL, while declining to issue
notice to the directors and promoters. A specific direction was issued
to amend the memo of parties accordingly, whereafter notice was
issued only to ACIPL. The said order was never assailed and, therefore,
attained finality.
5
11. Proceedings in the complaints thereafter continued on that basis
alone. No pleadings were directed to be filed against, nor issues
framed in relation to the directors or promoters, and no findings came
to be recorded against them at any stage of the adjudicatory process.
Once the lis stood consciously and finally confined to ACIPL, the
adjudication culminated in an order binding exclusively ACIPL and
none else. The order neither records any determination of liability
against the respondents 2 to 9 nor contains any direction requiring
them to perform or refrain from performing any act. In the absence of
pleadings, adjudication, or findings against them, the essential
foundation for fastening liability upon the respondents 2 to 9 is plainly
lacking.
12. Since, the judgment and order in CC/86/2018 and CC/2600/2018 had
not been passed against the respondents 2 to 9, at the stage of
execution, the order passed against ACIPL could not be enforced
against them. It is settled law that execution must strictly conform to
the decree. This principle has been reiterated in a catena of
precedents. For the purpose of this discussion, we may profitably refer
5
to Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan where this Court held that:
“ 14. It is well settled that the executing court cannot go beyond the
decree. The decree must be executed as it is. Though, it is indeed
open to the executing court to construe the decree; it cannot go
beyond the decree …”
5
(2022) 14 SCC 609
6
13. It is trite that a decree cannot, by process of execution, be employed
to shift or enlarge liability so as to bind persons who were neither
parties to the decree nor otherwise legally liable thereunder. Where
the judgment debtor is a company, the liability of its shareholders or
joint venture partners remains confined to the extent of their
shareholding or to such guarantees or undertakings as may have been
expressly furnished by them.
14. In the present case, the appellant has neither pleaded nor established
that the respondents 2 to 9 had furnished any guarantee or surety in
respect of the investment made in the project, nor has any material
been placed on record to attract the application of Section 14(3) of the
IBC.
15. Once a moratorium has been declared against the judgment debtor
company, i.e., ACIPL, the modes of execution contemplated under
6
Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 including
attachment and sale of movable or immovable property, attachment
of bank accounts, or withdrawal of decretal amounts from the accounts
of the judgment debtor, stand interdicted. Execution proceedings
cannot, therefore, be permitted to continue indirectly against the
respondents 2 to 9, who are neither judgment debtors nor guarantors,
and against whom no independent liability under the order allowing
the complaints has been established.
6
CP Act
7
16. This Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue
7
Deptt., Govt. of A.P. underscored that a clear distinction must be
maintained between a company and its shareholders by observing as
follows:
“ 15. A clear distinction must be drawn between a company and its
shareholder, even though that shareholder may be only one and that
the Central or a State Government. In the eye of the law, a company
registered under the Companies Act is a distinct legal entity other
than the legal entity or entities that hold its shares.”
17. We are in complete agreement with the approach adopted by the
NCDRC that the CP Act envisages a complete adjudicatory process
founded on service of notice, pleadings, opportunity to contest, leading
of evidence, and recorded findings of fact and law. These are not mere
procedural formalities but substantive safeguards that precede the
fastening of liability. In the present case, no such adjudicatory exercise
was undertaken qua the respondents 2 to 9. There are no pleadings
attributing any personal role to them, no evidence led to establish
individual culpability, and no findings returned fixing personal liability.
In the absence of these foundational elements, execution proceedings
cannot be utilised as a surrogate forum to impose liability where none
has been adjudicated.
18. It is apposite to note that the invocation of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil is wholly unwarranted in the present factual matrix. The
lifting of the corporate veil is an exceptional measure, to be resorted
7
(1999) 4 SCC 458
8
to only upon a clear finding that the corporate personality was abused
for fraudulent or dishonest purposes. Such a finding must be preceded
by specific pleadings and a determination on merits. No such allegation
of fraud or misuse of the corporate form was either pleaded or
established before the adjudicatory forum. In the absence of a prior
and reasoned determination justifying disregard of the corporate
personality, the directors/promoters cannot be exposed to personal
liability through execution.
th
19. Appellant placed reliance on the order of this Court dated 17 January,
2024. The order reads as follows:
“11. Therefore, we are of the view that only because there is a
moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC against the company, it
cannot be said that no proceedings can be initiated against the
opposite party Nos. 2 to 9(the respondent Nos. 2 .to 9) for execution,
provided that they ·are otherwise liable to abide by and comply with
the order, which is passed against the company. The protection of
the moratorium will not be available to the directors/officers of the
company.
12. Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgments and orders and
remit the execution application to the National Commission. The
execution will continue against the opposite party Nos. 2 to 9(the
respondent Nos. 2 to 9) in the execution application.
13. It is open for the opposite party Nos. 2 to 9 (the respondent Nos.
2 to 9) to raise a contention that they are not bound to implement
the order sought to be executed. They are entitled to file additional
objections along with documents raising the issue of executability as
against them.
14. We clarify that the issue whether opposite party Nos. 2 to 9 (the
respondent Nos. 2 to 9) to the execution are otherwise liable, will
have to be decided by the National Commission in accordance with
law."
(emphasis ours)
20. A plain reading of the said order shows that it addressed a limited
issue, namely, whether the existence of a moratorium under Section
9
14 of the IBC, against ACIPL, operated as a bar to the continuation of
execution proceedings against its directors/promoters. This Court held
that the moratorium, by itself, does not preclude execution
proceedings against directors or officers, provided they are otherwise
liable.
21. Importantly, the order did not determine or declare any personal
liability of the respondents 2 to 9. On the contrary, this Court expressly
left it open to them to raise all objections as to executability and
clarified that the question whether they are otherwise liable to comply
with the order was required to be decided by the NCDRC in accordance
th
with law. The order dated 17 January, 2024, therefore, merely
removed the moratorium-related impediment and did not expand the
scope of the order or fasten liability upon the directors.
22. Viewed in this light, the impugned order of the NCDRC, which
examines the issue of executability against the respondents 2 to 9 on
its own merits and declines to proceed against them in the absence of
any legal or factual basis for personal liability, cannot be said to be
inconsistent with the order of this Court.
23. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the
record, we are of the considered view that the NCDRC committed no
error of law or jurisdiction in declining to execute the order against
persons who were admittedly not parties to the complaints. The order
th
binds only ACIPL. Appellant did not challenge the order dated 25
January, 2018 of the NCDRC declining to issue notice to the
10
respondents 2 to 9 and directing it to file amended memo of party with
ACIPL as the sole respondent, and cannot now enlarge the order
through execution. Hence, in our opinion, the appeals must fail.
24. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed.
25. However, this dismissal will not preclude the appellant from pursuing
any remedy available in law against the promoters/directors, including
proceedings under the Companies Act, IBC, or civil law, should the
statutory requirements therefor be satisfied.
26. There shall be no order as to costs.
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.8539, 10874-10877 & 10878 OF 2024
27. These appeals involve similar questions of fact and law as raised in the
lead appeals and for the reasons aforementioned, the same too stand
dismissed.
……………..…………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
……………..…………………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
New Delhi;
January 12, 2026.
11
2026 INSC 51
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8465-8466 OF 2024
ANSAL CROWN HEIGHTS FLAT
BUYERS ASSOCIATION (REGD.) … APPELLANT
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8539 OF 2024
KAMAL GIROTRA & ANR. … APPELLANTS
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 10874-10877 OF 2024
SANGEETA DEWAN ETC. ETC. … APPELLANTS
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
Signature Not Verified
AND
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.01.12
19:13:19 IST
Reason:
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10878 OF 2024
1
NIDHI CHAWLA … APPELLANT
VS.
M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD
PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.8465-8466 OF 2024
th
1. The lead appeals call in question the judgment and order dated 20
1
June, 2024 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
2
Commission dismissing Execution Application Nos. 27/2023 and
28/2023 filed by the appellant against the respondents 2 to 9
3
(directors/promoters of M/s. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. ). Such
applications arose from two final orders rendered by the NCDRC while
deciding complaints lodged by the appellant bearing nos.
CC/2600/2018 and CC/86/2018 respectively.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Appellant is an association of flat buyers which entered into Flat Buyer
Agreements with ACIPL for units in Ansal Crown Heights. Vide
1
impugned order
2
NCDRC
3
ACIPL
2
individual builder buyer agreements, ACIPL promised to handover
possession of the apartments within a period of 36 months from the
date of execution of the agreements, which expired for all the buyers
in the time period from December, 2013 - December, 2015. Possession
of the flats not having been delivered, the appellant instituted two
th
consumer complaints – the first on 10 , January 2018 (on behalf of
th
45 flat buyers), and the second on 26 November, 2018 (on behalf of
20 flat buyers). The respondents were ACIPL and its
directors/promoters being the respondents 2 to 9.
th
3. While admitting CC/86/2018, the NCDRC vide order dated 25
January, 2018 directed that the proceedings would continue only
against ACIPL and not the respondents 2 to 9. Accordingly, the
appellant was directed to file amended memo of party impleading
ACIPL as the sole respondent.
4. Subsequently, CC/2600/2018 came to be lodged wherein ACIPL was
arrayed as the sole respondent, in conformity with the earlier
admission order.
th
5. On 28 February, 2022, the complaints were allowed and directions
were issued to ACIPL to complete the project; obtain the occupancy
certificate; and hand over possession of the flats to the buyers, i.e.,
the allottees, with interest @ 9% per annum on the amounts deposited
by them from the committed date of possession until the offer of
possession or, alternatively, if the allottees were unwilling to wait for
possession, ACIPL was directed to refund the entire amount deposited
3
with interest @ 9% per annum, to be paid within six weeks, failing
which interest @ 12% per annum would apply for the period of default.
6. Owing to ACIPL not complying with the said order, the appellant
initiated proceedings for execution. During this time, corporate
insolvency resolution process having been initiated under
4
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against ACPIL, a
moratorium had come into force. NCDRC, accordingly, vide order dated
th
18 May, 2023, adjourned proceedings sine die , including against the
directors of ACPIL with the following observations:
" ... So far opposite party Nos.2 to 9 are concerned, they were not
party in the main complaint. If the decree cannot be executed against
opposite party No.1 due to moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC,
it would not be appropriate to proceed in same execution against
opposite party Nos.2 to 9. In the light of order of National Company
Law Tribunal, this Matter is adjourned sine die with liberty to the
Parties to file an Application for listing of the Case in the event the
National Company Law Tribunal alter, modify or vacates of the Order
or decides the proceedings finally."
7. Appellant then challenged the sine die adjournment granted by the
NCDRC by filing Civil Appeal Nos. 4247, 4480 and 4481 of 2023 before
th
this Court. The said appeals were allowed vide order dated 17
January 2024, whereby the abovementioned order of the NCDRC was
set aside. This Court directed that the execution proceedings may
continue against the respondents 2 to 9, while granting them liberty
to raise all available objections, including the plea that they were not
liable to satisfy or implement the order sought to be executed. This
4
IBC
4
Court held that the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC shields
only the corporate debtor and does not extend to directors/promoters.
8. Upon revival, the appellant pressed the execution applications against
the respondents 2 to 9. As noted, the NCDRC dismissed the execution
applications insofar as they sought to proceed against the respondents
2 to 9, holding that the order is executable only against ACIPL, the
sole respondent in the original complaints.
ISSUE
9. The core controversy lies within a narrow compass. Question that
arises is, can persons who were arrayed as respondents in the
consumer complaints but ultimately against whom no notice was
issued and the complaints did not proceed, could be brought within the
net of execution, on the premise that they were directors/promoters
of the judgment-debtor company. NCDRC has answered this question
in the negative. We are called upon to decide whether such view
warrants interference.
ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS
10. It is not in dispute that at the stage of admitting CC/86/2018, the
th
NCDRC consciously admitted the complaint on 25 January, 2018 only
qua the respondent no. 1, namely ACIPL, while declining to issue
notice to the directors and promoters. A specific direction was issued
to amend the memo of parties accordingly, whereafter notice was
issued only to ACIPL. The said order was never assailed and, therefore,
attained finality.
5
11. Proceedings in the complaints thereafter continued on that basis
alone. No pleadings were directed to be filed against, nor issues
framed in relation to the directors or promoters, and no findings came
to be recorded against them at any stage of the adjudicatory process.
Once the lis stood consciously and finally confined to ACIPL, the
adjudication culminated in an order binding exclusively ACIPL and
none else. The order neither records any determination of liability
against the respondents 2 to 9 nor contains any direction requiring
them to perform or refrain from performing any act. In the absence of
pleadings, adjudication, or findings against them, the essential
foundation for fastening liability upon the respondents 2 to 9 is plainly
lacking.
12. Since, the judgment and order in CC/86/2018 and CC/2600/2018 had
not been passed against the respondents 2 to 9, at the stage of
execution, the order passed against ACIPL could not be enforced
against them. It is settled law that execution must strictly conform to
the decree. This principle has been reiterated in a catena of
precedents. For the purpose of this discussion, we may profitably refer
5
to Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan where this Court held that:
“ 14. It is well settled that the executing court cannot go beyond the
decree. The decree must be executed as it is. Though, it is indeed
open to the executing court to construe the decree; it cannot go
beyond the decree …”
5
(2022) 14 SCC 609
6
13. It is trite that a decree cannot, by process of execution, be employed
to shift or enlarge liability so as to bind persons who were neither
parties to the decree nor otherwise legally liable thereunder. Where
the judgment debtor is a company, the liability of its shareholders or
joint venture partners remains confined to the extent of their
shareholding or to such guarantees or undertakings as may have been
expressly furnished by them.
14. In the present case, the appellant has neither pleaded nor established
that the respondents 2 to 9 had furnished any guarantee or surety in
respect of the investment made in the project, nor has any material
been placed on record to attract the application of Section 14(3) of the
IBC.
15. Once a moratorium has been declared against the judgment debtor
company, i.e., ACIPL, the modes of execution contemplated under
6
Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 including
attachment and sale of movable or immovable property, attachment
of bank accounts, or withdrawal of decretal amounts from the accounts
of the judgment debtor, stand interdicted. Execution proceedings
cannot, therefore, be permitted to continue indirectly against the
respondents 2 to 9, who are neither judgment debtors nor guarantors,
and against whom no independent liability under the order allowing
the complaints has been established.
6
CP Act
7
16. This Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue
7
Deptt., Govt. of A.P. underscored that a clear distinction must be
maintained between a company and its shareholders by observing as
follows:
“ 15. A clear distinction must be drawn between a company and its
shareholder, even though that shareholder may be only one and that
the Central or a State Government. In the eye of the law, a company
registered under the Companies Act is a distinct legal entity other
than the legal entity or entities that hold its shares.”
17. We are in complete agreement with the approach adopted by the
NCDRC that the CP Act envisages a complete adjudicatory process
founded on service of notice, pleadings, opportunity to contest, leading
of evidence, and recorded findings of fact and law. These are not mere
procedural formalities but substantive safeguards that precede the
fastening of liability. In the present case, no such adjudicatory exercise
was undertaken qua the respondents 2 to 9. There are no pleadings
attributing any personal role to them, no evidence led to establish
individual culpability, and no findings returned fixing personal liability.
In the absence of these foundational elements, execution proceedings
cannot be utilised as a surrogate forum to impose liability where none
has been adjudicated.
18. It is apposite to note that the invocation of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil is wholly unwarranted in the present factual matrix. The
lifting of the corporate veil is an exceptional measure, to be resorted
7
(1999) 4 SCC 458
8
to only upon a clear finding that the corporate personality was abused
for fraudulent or dishonest purposes. Such a finding must be preceded
by specific pleadings and a determination on merits. No such allegation
of fraud or misuse of the corporate form was either pleaded or
established before the adjudicatory forum. In the absence of a prior
and reasoned determination justifying disregard of the corporate
personality, the directors/promoters cannot be exposed to personal
liability through execution.
th
19. Appellant placed reliance on the order of this Court dated 17 January,
2024. The order reads as follows:
“11. Therefore, we are of the view that only because there is a
moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC against the company, it
cannot be said that no proceedings can be initiated against the
opposite party Nos. 2 to 9(the respondent Nos. 2 .to 9) for execution,
provided that they ·are otherwise liable to abide by and comply with
the order, which is passed against the company. The protection of
the moratorium will not be available to the directors/officers of the
company.
12. Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgments and orders and
remit the execution application to the National Commission. The
execution will continue against the opposite party Nos. 2 to 9(the
respondent Nos. 2 to 9) in the execution application.
13. It is open for the opposite party Nos. 2 to 9 (the respondent Nos.
2 to 9) to raise a contention that they are not bound to implement
the order sought to be executed. They are entitled to file additional
objections along with documents raising the issue of executability as
against them.
14. We clarify that the issue whether opposite party Nos. 2 to 9 (the
respondent Nos. 2 to 9) to the execution are otherwise liable, will
have to be decided by the National Commission in accordance with
law."
(emphasis ours)
20. A plain reading of the said order shows that it addressed a limited
issue, namely, whether the existence of a moratorium under Section
9
14 of the IBC, against ACIPL, operated as a bar to the continuation of
execution proceedings against its directors/promoters. This Court held
that the moratorium, by itself, does not preclude execution
proceedings against directors or officers, provided they are otherwise
liable.
21. Importantly, the order did not determine or declare any personal
liability of the respondents 2 to 9. On the contrary, this Court expressly
left it open to them to raise all objections as to executability and
clarified that the question whether they are otherwise liable to comply
with the order was required to be decided by the NCDRC in accordance
th
with law. The order dated 17 January, 2024, therefore, merely
removed the moratorium-related impediment and did not expand the
scope of the order or fasten liability upon the directors.
22. Viewed in this light, the impugned order of the NCDRC, which
examines the issue of executability against the respondents 2 to 9 on
its own merits and declines to proceed against them in the absence of
any legal or factual basis for personal liability, cannot be said to be
inconsistent with the order of this Court.
23. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the
record, we are of the considered view that the NCDRC committed no
error of law or jurisdiction in declining to execute the order against
persons who were admittedly not parties to the complaints. The order
th
binds only ACIPL. Appellant did not challenge the order dated 25
January, 2018 of the NCDRC declining to issue notice to the
10
respondents 2 to 9 and directing it to file amended memo of party with
ACIPL as the sole respondent, and cannot now enlarge the order
through execution. Hence, in our opinion, the appeals must fail.
24. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed.
25. However, this dismissal will not preclude the appellant from pursuing
any remedy available in law against the promoters/directors, including
proceedings under the Companies Act, IBC, or civil law, should the
statutory requirements therefor be satisfied.
26. There shall be no order as to costs.
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.8539, 10874-10877 & 10878 OF 2024
27. These appeals involve similar questions of fact and law as raised in the
lead appeals and for the reasons aforementioned, the same too stand
dismissed.
……………..…………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
……………..…………………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
New Delhi;
January 12, 2026.
11