ILANGOVAN vs. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU

R EPORTABLE 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1285 OF 2010 ILANGOVAN             … APPELLANT V ERSUS STATE OF TAMIL NADU                           … RESPONDENT REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE J U D G M E N T   N.V. R AMANA ,  J.   1.   The   present   appeal   is   directed   against   the   Judgment   dated 06.01.2010 passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court whereby the appellant­accused’s appeal was partly allowed and his conviction   under   Section   302,   IPC   was   modified   into   one   under Section 304 Part II, IPC and sentence was reduced to 5 years’ rigorous imprisonment along with fine. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant under Section 324, IPC was confirmed by the High Court and both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Vishal Anand Date: 2020.09.18 17:03:46 IST Reason: the brother of the complainant allegedly had an illicit relationship with the daughter of accused no. 4, which resulted in enmity between the 2 two families. On 26.01.2002, the accused persons allegedly came in front of the house of the complainant and a fight took place between the two groups. The present appellant attacked the complainant with an   iron   rod,   while   the   other   3   accused   allegedly   attacked   other members of the family with sticks. The deceased, on hearing the noise, attempted to intervene, and was attacked by the present appellant on the head with the iron rod, which ultimately resulted in her death.  3. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 324 and 302, IPC and sentenced him to 2 years rigorous imprisonment and imprisonment for life, respectively. The other accused were acquitted as   the   charges   against   them   were   not   proved   beyond   reasonable doubt. On appeal, as mentioned above, the High Court modified the conviction under Section 302, IPC, and sentence imposed thereunder, to one under Section 304 Part II, IPC, on the ground that the case of the appellant fell under Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC, that is, there was a free fight between the two parties.  4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant – accused and the learned counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu at length today. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that 5. the High Court erred in convicting the appellant by solely relying upon 3 the testimonies of the relatives of the deceased. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellant should have been acquitted by giving him the  benefit of  doubt,  particularly when the  Trial  Court disbelieved the prosecution’s case and acquitted the co­accused. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State submitted 6. that the High Court has considered all the evidence on record and rendered   a   well­reasoned   judgment   which   does   not   merit   any interference by this Court. 7. With   respect   to   the   first   submission   of   the   counsel   for   the appellant, regarding the testimonies of related witnesses, it is settled law that the testimony of a related or an interested witness can be taken into consideration, with the additional burden on the Court in such cases to carefully scrutinize such evidence [See   Sudhakar v. ,   ].   As   such,   the   mere   submission   of  the State (2018)   5   SCC   435 counsel for the appellant, that the testimonies of the witnesses in the case   should   be   disregarded   because   they   were   related,   without bringing to the attention of the Court any reason to disbelieve the same, cannot be countenanced. 8. The counsel for the appellant next submitted that the benefit of doubt extended to his co­accused should also have been extended to him.   According   to   him,   once   the   co­accused   were   acquitted,   the 4 appellant should also have been acquitted. However, there is no such principle   of   law,   that   requires   automatic   acquittal   of   an   accused because of   the   acquittal   of   the   co­accused.  The   same   is   a  settled position of law, which has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments, including the case of   Yanob Sheikh v. State of West , wherein it was held Bengal , (2013) 6 SCC 428 ­

the   co­accused   that   were   acquitted   was,   in   comparison   with   the evidence against the present appellant. A bare perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court indicates that the nature and quality of evidence against   the   appellant­accused   was   distinct   from   that   which   was adduced against his co­accused. The Trial Court noted that the other co­accused were the aunt (accused no. 2), mother (accused no. 3) and grandfather (accused no. 4) of the present appellant. The Court noted that   accused   no.   4   was   70   years   old,   and   could   not   even   stand 5 straight, let alone presumed to have caused any injury to one of the witnesses.   Further,   with   respect   to   the   actions   attributed   to   the accused no. 2 and 3, the Trial Court held that they appear to be exaggerations and an afterthought, as they were not even included in the complaint. The Court ultimately held that apart from the fact that the accused no. 2 to 4 were present at the scene of the occurrence, there was no concrete evidence in the depositions of the eyewitnesses to indicate that they caused injuries to the witnesses. 10. On the other hand, when it comes to the appellant, the evidence against him is consistent, with the depositions in Court being in line with   the   complaint   and   statements   made   before   the   police.   The appellant is the main accused, who is stated to have attacked the complainant and caused him injuries as well as hit the deceased on her head with an iron rod, resulting in her death. The allegations against the appellant are in line with the chargesheet, the wound certificate regarding the complainant and the post mortem report of the   deceased.   It   is   for   the   above   reasons   that   the   Trial   Court distinguished between the prosecution’s case against the appellant and the co­accused and we see no reason to interfere with the same. 11. The   counsel   for   the   appellant   lastly   argued   that   once   the witnesses had been disbelieved with respect to the co­accused, their testimonies   with   respect   to   the   present   accused   must   also   be 6 discarded. The counsel is, in effect, relying on the legal maxim “ falsus in uno ,   falsus in omnibus ”, which Indian Courts have always been reluctant to apply. A three Judge Bench of this Court, as far back as in 1957, in  Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh , AIR 1957 SC 366  held on this point as follows: “   It  was   next  contended   that  the   witnesses   had 9. falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah and because of that the court should have rejected the testimony of these witnesses   as   against   the   appellant   also.   The   well­ known maxim   falsus in une falsus in omnibus   was relied upon by the appellant. The argument raised was   that   because   the   witnesses   who   had   also deposed against Qudrat Ullah by saying that he had handed over the knife to the appellant had not been believed by the courts below as against him, the High Court should not have accepted the evidence of these witnesses to convict the appellant.  This maxim has not   received   general   acceptance   in   different jurisdictions in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not   that   it   must   be   disregarded .   One   American author has stated: “…the  maxim is  in  itself  worthless; first  in point of validity … and secondly, in point of utility because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do   or   must   not   do,   and   therefore,   it   is   a superfluous   form   of   words.   It   is   also   in practice pernicious….” [Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. III, para 1008]  7  The   10. doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence ”.” ( emphasis supplied ) This   principle   has   been   consistently   followed   by   this   Court,   most recently in   , (2019) 10 SCC 554   and Rohtas v. State of Haryana needs no reiteration. The Trial Court, as mentioned above, has given specific reasons 12. for disbelieving the testimony of the witnesses with respect to the co­ accused, and extending the benefit of doubt to them, while convicting the appellant on the strength of the evidence against him. We find no infirmity in the approach of the Trial Court.  13. We also find that the High Court, in the impugned judgment, has taken into account the submissions of the counsel for the appellant, and considered the entire evidence, in order to come to the finding that there was a free fight as the appellant also sustained injuries and had even attempted to make a complaint. On the basis of the above, the High Court modified the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant.  14. The counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any infirmity in the findings of the High Court. We therefore see no reason to interfere with the impugned Judgment passed by the High Court. 8 We   find   no   merit   in   the   appeal   and   the   same   is,   accordingly, dismissed. 15. Consequent upon the dismissal of the appeal, the bail granted to the appellant by this Court on 19­7­2010 stands cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the concerned Trial Court to serve out the remaining   period   of   sentence,   failing   which   the   concerned   Police Authority shall take him into custody for the purpose. .....................................J. (N.V. RAMANA) .....................................J.      (S. ABDUL NAZEER) .....................................J.      (SURYA KANT) NEW DELHI; nd 02  SEPTEMBER, 2020.