CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE vs. UNION OF INDIA

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL/ APPELLATE JURISDICTION TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.98 OF 2012 CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION         … PETITIONER(S) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS         … RESPONDENT(S) WITH  TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 102 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 104 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 105 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 107 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 108 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 99 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 119 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 120 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 125­127 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 110 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 111 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 112 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 113­114 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 115­116 OF 2012 Signature Not Verified TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 117­118 OF 2012 Digitally signed by JAYANT KUMAR ARORA Date: 2020.04.29 14:01:59 IST Reason: TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 123­124 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 128­130 OF 2012 2 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 131 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 132­134 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 138­139 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 144 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 145 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 142 OF 2012 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 23­24 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 5 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 7 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 1 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 2 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 3 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 4 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 11 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 37­38 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 59 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 8 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 9 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 10 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 12­13 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 16 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 17 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 18 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 14­15 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 19 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 20 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 21­22 OF 2013 3 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 25 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 28­29 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 30 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 48 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 49 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 31­32 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 33­36 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 39 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 40 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 42 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 41 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 43 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 44 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 46 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 45 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 47 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 60 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 61 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 62 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 63­65 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 66­69 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NOS. 70­71 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 72 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 73 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 75 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 76 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 108 OF 2013 4 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 443 OF 2016 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 750 OF 2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2383 OF 2020 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 28223 OF 2016) AND TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 25 OF 2019 J U D G M E N T ARUN MISHRA, J. Most of the cases have a chequered history.  Initially, petitioners 1. have questioned four notifications ­ two notifications dated 21.12.2010 issued by Medical Council of India (for short, ‘the MCI’) and other two notifications dated 31.5.2012, issued by Dental Council of India (for short,   ‘the   DCI’).     The   MCI   by   virtue   of   Regulations   on   Graduate Medical   Education   (Amendment)   2010,   (Part   II)   notified   by   the Government of India, amended the Regulations on Graduate Medical Education,   1997.     Similarly,   the   other   notification   issued   by   MCI called   “Post­Graduate   Medical   Education   (Amendment)   Regulation, 2010   (Part­II)”   to   amend   the   Post   Graduate   Medical   Education Regulations,   2000.     The   regulations   came   into   force   on   their publication in the Official Gazette.  The other two notifications dated 31.5.2012 issued by DCI were relating to admission in the BDS and MDS courses. 5 2. The MCI issued notifications in exercise of power conferred by Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act of 1956’).  The amendments were made in the Regulation on Graduate Medical   Education,   1997.     The   change   was   made   in Clause   5   in   Chapter II of the Regulations.   Clause 5 provided for procedure for selection thus: "6. In Chapter II, Clause 5 under the heading “Procedure for selection   to   MBBS   Course   shall   be   as   follows”   shall   be substituted as under:  ( i ) There shall be a single eligibility­cum­entrance examination, namely,  ‘National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test for admission to   MBBS   course’  in   each   academic   year.   The   overall superintendence,   direction,   and   control   of   the   National Eligibility­cum­Entrance   Test   shall   vest   with   the   Medical Council of India. However, the Medical Council of India, with the previous approval of the Central Government, shall select organisation(s)   to   conduct   'National   Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test for admission to MBBS course.  ( ii ) In order to be eligible for admission to MBBS course for a particular academic year, it shall be necessary for a candidate to obtain minimum of 50% (fifty percent) marks in each paper of   National   Eligibility­cum­Entrance   Test   held   for   the   said academic year. However, in respect of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and the Other Backward   Classes,   the   minimum   percentage   shall   be   40% (forty percent) in each paper, and in respect of candidates with locomotory disability of lower limbs, the minimum percentage marks   shall   be   45%   (forty­five   percent)   in   each   paper   of National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test: Provided when sufficient number of candidates belonging to respective   categories   fail   to   secure   minimum   marks   as prescribed   in   National   Eligibility­cum­Entrance   Test   in   any academic   year   for   admission   to   MBBS   course,   the   Central Government in consultation with the Medical Council of India may at its discretion lower the minimum marks required for admission   to   MBBS   course   for   candidates   belonging   to respective   categories   and   marks   so   lowered   by   the   Central Government shall be applicable for the said year only. 6 ( iii ) The reservation of seats in medical colleges for respective categories   shall   be   as   per   applicable   laws   prevailing   in States/Union   Territories.   An   all   India   merit   list   as   well   as State­wise   merit   list   of   the   eligible   candidates   shall   be prepared   on   the   basis   of   the   marks   obtained   in   National Eligibility­cum­Entrance   Test   and   candidates   shall   be admitted to MBBS course from the said lists only. ( iv )   No   candidate   who   has   failed   to   obtain   the   minimum eligibility marks as prescribed in sub­clause ( ) above shall be ii admitted to MBBS course in the said academic year. ( v )   All   admissions   to   MBBS   course   within   the   respective categories   shall   be   based   solely   on   marks   obtained   in   the National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test.” (emphasis supplied) 3. Similarly, amendments to the Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations,   2000   were   made.     The   relevant   portion   of   the amendments made are extracted hereunder:   “No.   MCI.   18(1)/2010­Med./49070.   —   In   exercise   of   the powers conferred by Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956), the Medical Council of India with the previous approval of the Central Government hereby makes the following regulations to further amend the ‘Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000’, namely: 1.   ( i ).   These   Regulations   may   be   called   'the   Postgraduate Medical Education (Amendment) Regulations, 2010 (Part II)'. ( ii ) They shall come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. 2. In the ‘Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000’, the   following   additions/   modifications/   deletions/ substitutions, shall be as indicated therein: 3.   Clause   9   under   the   heading   ‘SELECTION   OF POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS’ shall be substituted as under: “9.  Procedure  for selection of candidate for Postgraduate courses shall be as follows: ( i )   There   shall   be   a   single   eligibility­cum­entrance examination,   namely,   National   Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test for admission to Postgraduate Medical Courses in each 7 academic year. The overall superintendence, direction and control of National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test shall vest with Medical Council of India. However, the Medical Council of   India,   with   the   previous   approval   of   the   Central Government shall select organisation(s) to conduct National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test for admission to Postgraduate courses"'." 4. Similar notifications were issued by DCI providing for procedure for selection of candidates for MBBS Course and Post­graduate Course and also for BDS and MDS.  Thus, National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test (for short, ‘the NEET’) for admission to the MBBS course and the Post­graduate course and similarly  for BDS and MDS came to be introduced.   Now the statutory provisions under Section 10D of the Act   of   1956   providing   for   uniform   entrance   examination   for undergraduate   and   post­graduate   level   which   came   into   force   on 24.5.2016.  Section 10D is extracted hereunder: “ 10D.   Uniform   entrance   examination   for   undergraduate —  There   shall   be   conducted   a and   post­graduate   level. uniform   entrance   examination   to   all   medical   educational institutions at the undergraduate level and post­graduate level through such designated authority in Hindi, English and such other languages and in such manner as may be prescribed and   the   designated   authority   shall   ensure   the   conduct   of uniform entrance examination in the aforesaid manner: Provided that notwithstanding any judgment or order of any court, the provisions of this section shall not apply, in relation to   the   uniform   entrance   examination   at   the   undergraduate level for the academic year 2016­17 conducted in accordance with any regulations made under this Act, in respect of the State   Government   seats   (whether   in   Government   Medical College or in a private Medical College) where such State has not opted for such examination.” (emphasis supplied) 8 Section   10D   of   the   Dentists   Act,   1948,   containing   similar provisions with respect of uniform entrance examination has also been inserted, same is extracted hereunder: “ 10D.   Uniform   entrance   examination   for   undergraduate and post­graduate level .—There shall be conducted a uniform entrance examination to all dental educational institutions at the undergraduate level and post­graduate level through such designated   authority   in   Hindi,   English   and   such   other languages and in such manner as may be prescribed and the designated   authority   shall   ensure   the   conduct   of   uniform entrance examination in the aforesaid manner: Provided that notwithstanding any judgment or order of any court, the provisions of this section shall not apply, in relation to   the   uniform   entrance   examination   at   the   undergraduate level for the academic year 2016­17 conducted in accordance with any regulations made under this Act, in respect of the State   Government   seats   (whether   in   Government   Dental College or in a private Dental College) where such State has not opted for such examination.” 5. The Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997 have also been   amended   by   Regulations   on   Graduate   Medical   Education (Amendment) 2017.   The admission to the medical course eligibility criteria has been prescribed by amended Clause 4    Following has . been substituted: “3. In Clause 4, under the heading Admission to the Medical Course­eligibility criteria, and in sub­clause 4 (1) & (1A), the following shall be substituted: 4.  Admission to the Medical Course­Eligibility Criteria : No candidate   shall   be   allowed   to   be   admitted   to   the   Medical Curriculum proper of first Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of  Surgery  course   until  he  /she  has  qualified  the  National Eligibility Entrance Test, and he/she shall not be allowed to appear for the National Eligibility­Cum­Entrance Test until: st (1) He/she shall complete the age of 17 years on or before 31 December of the year of admission to the MBBS. 9 (1A) He/She has obtained a minimum of marks in National Eligibility­Cum­Entrance   Test   as   prescribed   in   Clause   5   of Chapter II.” (emphasis supplied) In   Chapter   II,   Clause   5   under   the   heading   “Procedure   for selection to MBBS” has been substituted by MCI in 2017 as under:  “7. In Chapter­II, Clause 5 under the heading “Procedure for selection   to   MBBS   course   shall   be   as   follows”   shall   be substituted as under:­ “Procedure   for   selection   to   MBBS   course   shall   be   as follows:” (1) There shall be a uniform entrance examination to all medical educational institutions at the under graduate level namely  ‘National   Eligibility­cum­Entrance   Test  for admission to MBBS course in each academic year and shall be conducted under overall supervision of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India. (2)   The   “designated   authority”   to   conduct   the   ‘National Eligibility­Cum­ Entrance Test’ shall be the Central Board of Secondary Education or any other body/organization so designated   by   the   Ministry   of   Health   &   Family   Welfare, Government   of   India,   in   consultation   with   the   Medical Council of India. (3) The language and manner of conducting the ‘National Eligibility­Cum­Entrance Test’ shall be determined by the “designated   authority”   in   consultation   with   the   Medical Council  of   India  and   the   Ministry  of   Health   and   Family Welfare, Government of India. (4) In order to be eligible for admission to MBBS Course for a academic year, it shall be necessary for a candidate to th obtain minimum of marks at 50   percentile in ‘National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test to MBBS course’ held for the said   academic   year.   However,   in   respect   of   candidates belonging   to   Scheduled   Castes,   Scheduled   Tribes,   Other th Backward  Classes,   the  minimum  marks  shall  be  at 40 percentile.   In   respect   of   candidates   with   benchmark disabilities   specified   under   the   Rights   of   Persons   with Disabilities Act, 2016, in terms of Clause 4(3) above, the minimum  marks   shall  be  at   45th  percentile  for  General Category candidates and 40th percentile for SC/ST/OBC candidates. The percentile shall be determined on the basis of highest marks secured in the All­India common merit list for admission in ‘National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test for admission to MBBS course. 10 Provided   when   sufficient   number   of   candidates   in   the respective   categories   fail   to   secure   minimum   marks   as prescribed   in   National   Eligibility­cum­Entrance   Test   held for any academic year for admission to MBBS Course, the Central Government in consultation with Medical Council of India   may   at   its   discretion   lower   the   minimum   marks required   for   admission   to   MBBS   Course   for   candidates belonging to respective categories and marks so lowered by the  Central  Government   shall  be   applicable   for  the  said academic year only. (5)   The   reservation   of   seats   in   Medical   Colleges   for respective   categories   shall   be   as   per   applicable   laws prevailing in States/Union Territories. An All India merit list as   well   as   State/Union   Territory­wise   merit   list   of   the eligible candidates shall be prepared on the basis of marks obtained   in   ‘National   Eligibility­cum­Entrance   Test   and candidates shall be admitted to MBBS course from the said lists only. (6) No candidate who has failed to obtain the minimum eligibility marks as prescribed in Sub­clause (4) above shall be admitted to MBBS course in the said academic year.  (7) No authority/institution shall admit any candidate to the MBBS course in contravention of the criteria/procedure as laid down by these Regulations and/or in violation of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of   admissions.   Any   candidate   admitted   in contravention/violation of aforesaid shall be discharged by the   Council   forthwith.   The   authority/institution   which grants admission to any student in contravention /violation of   the   Regulations   and/or  the   judgments   passed   by  the Hon'ble Supreme Court, shall also be liable to face such action   as   may   be   prescribed   by   the   Council,   including surrender   of   seats   equivalent   to   the   extent   of   such admission made from its sanctioned intake capacity for the succeeding academic year/years. (8)   All   admission   to   MBBS   course   within   the   respective categories shall be based solely on the marks obtained in the ‘National Eligibility­Cum­Entrance Test.” (emphasis supplied) Initially, the matters filed in 2012­2013 were heard by a Bench 6. of three Judges, and the matters were decided vide judgment and order dated 18.7.2013.  As per the majority opinion, the petitions were 11 allowed.  The notifications issued by MCI and DCI providing for NEET were quashed.  However, the admissions, which were made, were not interfered with.   Review petitions were filed, which were entertained and   were   ultimately   allowed   on   11.4.2016,   and   judgment   dated 18.7.2013 was recalled.   In Writ Petition (C) No.443 of 2016, prayer has been made to 7. protect   the   rights   of   the   petitioner­institutions   guaranteed   under Articles 14, 15, 25, 26 and 30 of the Constitution of India.   In Writ Petition (C) No.750 of 2016, prayer is made to direct the respondents to   conduct   centralized   counselling   for   admission   to   all   Graduate Medical and Dental Courses throughout the country.  In Transferred Case (C) No.25 of 2019, it is stated that vires of the provisions of Maharasthra   Unaided   Private   Professional   Educational   Institution (Regulation   of   Admissions   &   Fees)   Act,   2015,   applying   them   to Unaided Private Minority Professional Educational Institutions are bad in   law.     In   S.L.P.   (C)   No.28223   of   2016,   provisions   have   been questioned   on   the   ground   that   they   cannot   take   away   the   rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of India. 8. Initially, the questions were raised that MCI and DCI could not have introduced NEET as the same offends the fundamental rights 12 guaranteed under Article19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and the rights of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice as guaranteed under Article 30 Constitution of India.   Thus, subordinate legislation could not have overriding   effect   over   the   fundamental   rights   guaranteed   under Articles 25, 26, 29(1), and 30 of the Constitution of India.  Now the amendment made could not take away or abridge the aforesaid rights of minorities.  The right to admit students is one of the fundamental rights, thus, rider of clearing NEET examination could not have been imposed. 9. It   was   urged   on   behalf   of   petitioners   that   the   impugned notifications violate the fundamental rights of an unaided minority institution   to   “establish   and   administer   educational   institutions   of their choice” protected under Article 30 read with Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to admit students of their own choice.  The doctrine of limited Government provides that a   citizen's   liberty   and   autonomy   is   the   central   notion   of   the Constitution of India and there is an inherent limitation on the State's involvement   in   matters   of   admissions   of   students.     The   NEET prescribes   no   alternative   to   the   institution,   impinges   upon   the fundamental rights of an unaided minority institution to establish and administer educational institution of their choice. 13 10. It was further urged on behalf of petitioners that State has no power to compel an unaided minority institution to admit students through a single centralized national examination such as NEET.  The unaided minority professional colleges have the fundamental rights to choose   the   method   and   manner   in   which   to   admit   its   students, subject to satisfying the triple test of having a fair, transparent, and non­exploitative process.    11. It was also argued on behalf of petitioners that they have a time­ tested admission procedure without any complaints.  Their process is fair and transparent, and they have a fundamental right to protect autonomy and reputation by continuing to admit students using their admission   process.     The   NEET   cannot   be   the   only   parameter   to determine   the   merit   of   a   student.     Some   of   the   institutions   are providing   best   medical   professional   by   having   their   procedure   for admission.  They have fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30(1) of the Constitution to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution.  The State, while imposing reasonable restrictions, can fix the threshold criterion of merit, but cannot restrict the petitioners from   having   any   additional   criteria   of   merit   over   and   above   the threshold   fixed   by   the   State.     The   restriction   violates   the   test   of proportionality.   14 12. The   petitioners   have   also   referred   to   the   existing   position concerning centralised examination for professional courses in India and   internationally,   to   hold   entrance   examination   cannot   be compulsion, it has to be voluntarily.  They have relied upon Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) ­ a system of examination for admission in the Law Colleges.   Reference has also been made to the admission process   followed   in   Indian   Institute   of   Technology   (IITs),   National Institute  of  Technology  (NITs)  and  Indian   Institute   of  Management (IIMs).  NEET is the first of its kind, both in India and globally, where all institutions are compelled by the State to follow a single admission procedure.   Some of the institutions are having an excellent record. They follow   the gurukul   tradition.   With the introduction of NEET in 2016­17, institutions have been compelled to admit students through NEET  instead  of  their method.     Some  of  them  have the  All  India Entrance Test.   They have their unique procedure of admission for MBBS as well as Post Graduation.  The system of examination of some of the institutions is wider on All India Basis, and they test general ability also, whereas, in NEET, evaluation is based on three subjects, namely, Physics, Biology, and Chemistry.   They have an elaborate procedure of the assessment, and they do not admit students only based on their theoretical knowledge.   Some of them are the best 15 medical educational institutions in the country.  There is not even a single allegation of maladministration  against some of the reputed institutions.  The principles, which govern the selection, are eligibility, suitability, and distributive justice.  The selection of candidates is an important factor to the medical colleges to suit their requirements in a particular field. 13. There are various issues which have arisen according to  the admission given for post­graduate examination after the introduction of NEET.   Now, in some of the specialised institutions, they are not getting   good   doctors   to   take   care   of   patients,   for   example,   in   the Oncology Department.   Some of the candidates are not able to bear the burden of the procedure and have expressed their inability to go with very sick patients.   Some of them were not able to undertake procedures in a sterile manner to avoid infections.   Similar is the position in other super­speciality departments.  There are complaints of lack of clinical competence among students admitted to speciality courses like general medicine. 14. The petitioners further submitted that they have a fundamental right to admit students of their own choice under Article 30 of the Constitution.  It is submitted that the admission procedure adopted by them   passes   the   triple   test,   i.e.,   fair,   transparent,   and   non­ 16 exploitative.    Various orders were passed by this Court recognising fair   method   adopted   in   individual   institutions   while   admitting students through their admission procedure as apparent from interim orders passed in the years 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1998. 15. This Court on 28.4.2016 passed an order in  Sankalp Charitable Trust and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.,  (Writ Petition (C) No.261 of 2016), in which it was clarified that order passed in the said matter shall   not   affect   the   hearing   of   the   petitions.     Most   of   petitions remained pending after recall of the order earlier passed by this Court. As per appellants, the ratio laid down in   Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.,  (2016) 7 SCC 353, is not applicable.  While deciding the said case, this Court did   not   deal   with   the   rights   of   unaided   minority   institutions.     A Division   Bench   of   Madras   High   Court   held   that   the   procedure   of admission of some of the institutions is fair, transparent and non­ exploitative.   Reliance has been placed on   the T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,  (2002) 8 SCC 481 to contend that State have minimal interference and if possible, to be made only to maintain academic standards.  The right to admit students is one of the fundamental rights recognized by this Court.   The challenge in Modern Dental College and Research Centre   (supra) was to the State level examination, i.e., the Common Entrance Test (CET).  The holding 17 of NEET would not be in the interest of the academic standard of premier medical institutions in the country.  The change in admission procedure of students would result in a sharp decline in the current standards of excellence in education maintained at the institution, that   would   not   be   in   public   interest.     The   admission   procedure followed by petitioners is head and shoulders above the NEET.  The concept of limited government has also been relied upon by referring to the decisions in  Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.,  (1975) 2 SCC 148 and  K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India,  (2017) 10 SCC 1. Reliance has also been placed on   the Islamic Academy of Education and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,  (2003) 6 SCC 697 and  P.A. Inamdar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.,  (2005) 6 SCC 537. 16. It was argued that provisions  of  the  MCI  and  DCI  Acts and regulations which have been amended during the pendency of the petitions cannot take away the right of the institutions to admit their students under Article 30 of the Constitution of India.   Thus, the prescription   of   NEET   cannot   be   said   to   be   permissible   for   the institutions in question. 17. On behalf of respondents, reliance has been placed on  Sankalp Charitable Trust and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.,  (2016) 7 SCC 487, (supra) and  Modern Dental College and Research Centre  P.A. Inamdar 18 (supra).  It was also argued that Section 10D has been inserted in the Act of 1956 it provides that there shall be a uniform common entrance conducted by the designated authority.   The main reasoning of this Court in   Christian Medical College Vellore v. Union of India,   (2014) 2 SCC 305, which decision has been recalled, was that uniform common entrance examination could not be introduced by way of subordinate legislation   and   under   the   Act   of   1956   and   MCI   had   no   power   to conduct the said examination.  After the introduction of Section 10D, both the said lacunas have been plugged.  The introduction of NEET is constitutionally valid.  In  Modern Dental College and Research Centre (supra), the Court considered the question of conduct of examination by   private   medical   colleges   in   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   for admitting students in their colleges.  In   State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jainarayan Chouksey and Ors. , (2016) 9 SCC 412, while deciding the contempt   petition   it   was   observed   that   judgment   dated   2.5.2016 passed in the case of   Modern Dental  College  and Research Centre (supra), held that admission should be made through a centralised procedure to be conducted by the State Government.  The Court again in the   (2016) 9 State of Maharashtra v. D.Y. Patil Vidyapeeth and Ors., SCC 401, decided on 28.9.2016 reiterated that the decision in  Modern Dental College and Research Centre   (supra) makes it unequivocally clear   that   centralised   counselling   is   an   adjunct   and   part   of   the 19 uniform common entrance test.  The notifications were also challenged by   minority   institutions,   deemed   Universities,   and   other   private institutions by filing writ petitions in this Court.   The Court in the judgment dated 9.5.2017 in  Dar­us­Salam Educational Trust and Ors. v. Medical Council of India and Ors.,  (Writ Petition (C) No.267 of 2017), observed that common counselling did not in any manner affect the right   of   minority   institutions   to   admit   students   of   their   minority community. As such, their right to admit students of their community was fully protected.  The institutions were entitled to fill students of minority   quota   in   their   respective   medical   colleges.     NEET   is   a qualifying   examination   to   determine   merit   and   also   ensure   fair procedure   and   equality   of   opportunity   that   most   meritorious candidates get admitted in the medicine and dental courses.   Reliance has been placed on   Yatinkumar Jasubhai Patel and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.,  (2019) 10 SCC 1, in which the Court considered the question of institutional preference/reservation after introduction of NEET, and observed that introduction of NEET did not affect 50% State quota seats in PG medicine course.   It may be filled based on institutional reservation.  The   primary   issue   is   whether   by   providing   centralised 18. examination system – NEET for admission to MBBS, PG, BDS and MDS by virtue of the provisions made in the Act and regulations, there 20 is violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29(1) and 30 of the Constitution of India.   We first advert to take note that various decisions rendered by 19. this Court in respect of the right of minority as stated under Article 30 of the Constitution of India.   ,   AIR   1958   SC   956, 20. In   Re   The   Kerala   Education   Bill,   1957 question   arose   concerning   right   of   the   Government   to   prescribe qualification to be possessed by the incumbents for appointment as teachers in aided or recognized schools.   The State Public Service Commission was empowered to select candidates for appointment as teachers in Government and aided schools.   The Court opined that minority   cannot   ask   for   the   aid   or   recognition   for   an   educational institution without competent teachers and fair standards.  The choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist on reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided or even recognized.  The Court held thus: “(29) Their grievances are thus stated: The gist of the right of administration   of   a   school   is   the   power   of   appointment, control, and dismissal of teachers and other staff. But under the said Bill such power of management is practically taken away. Thus the manager must submit annual statements (Cl. 5). The fixed assets of the aided schools are frozen and cannot be dealt with except with the permission of the authorised officer (Cl. 6). No educational agency of an aided school can appoint a manager of its choice and the manager is completely under the control of the authorised officer, for he must keep accounts in the manner he is told to do and to give periodical 21 inspection   of   them   and   on   the   closure   of   the   school   the accounts must be made over to the authorised officer (Cl. 7). All   fees   etc.   collected   will   have   to   be   made   over   to   the Government (Cl. 8(3)). Government will take up the task of paying   the   teachers   and   the   non­teaching   staff   (Cl.   9). Government will prescribe the qualification of teachers (Cl. 10). The school authorities cannot appoint a single teacher of their choice, but must appoint persons out of the panel settled by the Public Service Commission (Cl. 11). The school authorities must   provide   amenities   to   teachers   and   cannot   dismiss, remove,   reduce,   or   even   suspend   a   teacher   without   the previous sanction of the authorised officer (Cl. 12). …… (31)   We   are   thus   faced   with   a   problem   of   considerable complexity apparently difficult of solution. There is, on the one hand the minority rights under Art. 30(1) to establish and administer   educational   institutions   of   their   choice   and   the duty of the Government to promote education, there is, on the other   side   the   obligation   of   the   State   under   Art.   45   to endeavour to introduce free and compulsory  education.  We have to reconcile between these two conflicting interests and to give   effect   to   both   if   that   is   possible   and   bring   about   a synthesis   between   the   two.   The   directive   principles   cannot ignore or override the fundamental rights but must, as we have said, subserve the fundamental rights. We have already observed that Art. 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities, (1) to establish and (2) to administer educational institutions of their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to                                maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any   competent   teachers,   possessing   any   semblance   of qualification,   and   which   does   not   maintain   even   a   fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the   institutions   to   be   aided.   Learned   Attorney­General concedes   that   reasonable   regulations   may   certainly   be imposed   by   the   State   as   a   condition   for   aid   or   even   for recognition...   ...Clauses 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 20 relate   to   the   management   of   aided   schools.   Some   of   these provisions, e.g., 7, 10, 11(1), 12(1)(2)(3) and (5) may easily be regarded as reasonable regulations or conditions for the grant of aid. Clauses 9, 11(2) and 12(4) are, however, objected to as going much beyond the permissible limit. It is said that by taking over the collections of fees etc., and by undertaking to pay   the   salaries   of   the   teachers   and   other   staff   the Government   is   in   reality   confiscating   the   school   fund   and taking away the prestige of the school, for none will care for 22 the school authority. Likewise Cl. 11 takes away an obvious item   of   management,   for   the   manager   cannot   appoint   any teacher at all except out of the panel to be prepared by the Public Service Commission which, apart from the question of its power of taking up such duties, may not be qualified at all to   select   teachers   who   will   be   acceptable   to   religious denominations and in particular sub­cl. (2) of that clause is objectionable for it thrusts upon educational institutions of religious   minorities   teachers   of   Scheduled   Castes   who   may have no knowledge of the tenets of their religion and may be otherwise   weak   educationally.   Power   of   dismissal,   removal, reduction in rank, or suspension is an index of the right of management, and that is taken away by Cl. 12(4). These are, no doubt, serious inroads on the right of administration and appear  perilously  near  violating  that  right.  But  considering that   those   provisions   are   applicable   to   all   educational institutions and that the impugned parts of Cls. 9, 11 and 12 are designed to give protection and security to the ill paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and   protect   the   backward   classes,   we   are   prepared,   as   at present advised, to treat these clauses 9, 11(2) and 12(4) as permissible regulations which the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their educational institutions. We, however, find it impossible to support Cls. 14 and 15 of the said Bill as mere Regulations. The provisions of those clauses may be totally destructive of the rights under Art. 30(1). It is true that the right to aid is not implicit in Art. 30(1) but the provisions of those clauses, if submitted to on account of their factual compulsion as condition of aid, may easily be violative of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the State of Kerala recognizes that Cls. 14 and 15 of the Bill may annihilate the minority communities' right to manage educational institutions of their choice but submits that the validity of those clauses is not the subject matter of question 2. But, as already explained, all newly established schools   seeking   aid   or   recognition   are,   by   Cl.   3(5),   made subject   to   all   the   provisions   of   the   Act.   Therefore,   in   a discussion   as   to   the   constitutional   validity   of   Cl.   3(5)   a discussion   of   the   validity   of   the   other   clauses   of   the   Bill becomes relevant, not as and by way of a separate item but in determining the validity of the provisions of Cl. 3(5). In our opinion, sub­cl. 3 of Cl. 8 and Cls. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 being merely regulatory do not offend Art. 30(1), but the provisions of   sub­cl.   (5)   of   cl.   3   by   making   the   aided   educational institutions subject to Cls. 14 and 15 as conditions for the grant of aid do offend against Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) 23 21. In  Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Anr., (1963)   3   SCR   837,   the   Court   again   considered   the   matter   and observed   that   educational   institutions   cater   to   the   needs   of   the citizens or section thereof.   Regulation made in the real interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order, and the like may undoubtedly be imposed.   Such regulations are not restrictive on the substance of the right, which is guaranteed, they secure the proper functioning of the institution in the matter of education.   It was also observed that regulation must satisfy a dual test   ­   the   test   of   reasonableness   and   that   it   is   regulative   of   the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the   institution   a   capable   vehicle   of   education   for   the   minority community or other persons who resort to it.  In  Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors.,   AIR 1969 SC 465, the Court observed thus: “   In our opinion, the width of Article 30(1) cannot be cut 8. down by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29(1) is based. The latter article is a general protection which is given   to   minorities   to   conserve   their   language,   script,   or culture. The former is a special right to minorities to establish educational   institutions   of   their   choice.   This   choice   is   not limited to institution seeking to conserve language, script, or culture,   and   the   choice   is   not   taken   away   if   the   minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstance   irrelevant   for   the   application   of   Article   30(1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied. The   two   articles   create   two   separate   rights,   although   it   is possible that they may meet in a given case.” 24 22. In   Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr.,  (1974) 1 SCC 717, a college was run by the minority. A Bench of 9­Judges of this Court considered the question whether Sections   40   and   41   of   the   Gujarat   University   Act,   1949   violated Section   30,   which   provided   all   colleges   within   the   University   area would be governed by the statutes of the University which may provide for minimum educational qualifications for teachers and tutorial staff. The   University   may   approve   the   appointments   of   teachers   to coordinate   and   regulate   the   facilities   provided   and   expenditure incurred.  The Court opined that regulation which serves the interests of the teachers are of paramount importance in good administration, education should be a great cohesive force in developing integrity of the nation, thus: “19 . The entire controversy centres round the extent of the right of the religious and linguistic minorities to administer their educational institutions. The right to administer is said to consist of four principal matters. First is the right to choose its managing or governing body. It is said that the founders of the minority institution have faith and confidence in their own committee   or   body   consisting   of   persons   elected   by   them. Second   is   the   right   to   choose   its   teachers.   It   is   said   that minority institutions want teachers to have compatibility with the ideals, aims, and aspirations of the institution. Third is the right not to be compelled to refuse admission to students. In other words, the minority institutions want to have the right to admit   students   of   their   choice   subject   to  reasonable regulations about academic qualifications. Fourth is the right to   use  its   properties   and   assets   for  the   benefit   of   its   own institution. .   The   right   conferred   on   the   religious   and   linguistic 20 minorities   to   administer   educational   institutions   of   their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation.   Just   as   regulatory   measures   are   necessary   for 25 maintaining the educational character and content of minority institutions, similarly, regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring   orderly,   efficient,   and   sound   administration.   Das, C.J., in the  Kerala Education Bill case  (supra) 1959 SCR 995: AIR   1958   SC   956,   summed   up   in   one   sentence   the   true meaning of the right to administer by saying that the right to administer is not the right to mal­administer. 30 .   Educational   institutions   are   temples   of   learning.   The virtues of human intelligence are mastered and harmonised by education.   Where   there   is   complete   harmony   between   the teacher and the taught, where the teacher imparts and the student  receives, where  there is complete dedication  of the teacher and the taught in learning, where there is discipline between   the   teacher   and   the   taught,   where   both   are worshippers of learning, no discord or challenge will arise. An educational institution runs smoothly when the teacher and the  taught   are  engaged   in  the   common  ideal   of  pursuit  of knowledge. It is, therefore, manifest that the appointment of teachers is an important part in educational institutions. The qualifications   and   the   character   of   the   teachers   are   really important.   The   minority   institutions   have   the   right   to administer institutions. This right implies the obligation and duty of the minority institutions to render the very best to the students. In the right of administration, checks, and balances in the shape of regulatory measures are required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service. The   right   to   administer   is   to   be   tempered   with   regulatory measures   to   facilitate   smooth   administration.   The   best administration will reveal no trace or colour of minority. A minority institution should shine in exemplary eclectism in the administration of  the institution. The  best  compliment  that can be paid to a minority institution is that it does not rest on or proclaim its minority character. 31 . Regulations which will serve the interests of the students, regulations which will serve the interests of the teachers are of paramount importance in good administration. Regulations in the interest of efficiency of teachers, discipline, and fairness in administration are necessary for preserving harmony among affiliated institutions. 46 . The ultimate goal of a minority institution too imparting general  secular  education  is  advancement   of  learning.   This Court has consistently held that it is not only permissible but also   desirable   to   regulate   everything   in   educational   and academic matters for achieving excellence and uniformity in standards of education. 26 47 . In the field of administration it is not reasonable to claim that   minority   institutions   will   have   complete   autonomy. Checks on the administration may be necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound and will serve the academic needs of the institution.  The right of a minority to administer its educational institution involves, as part of it, a correlative duty of good administration. 90 . We may now deal with the scope and ambit of the right guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 30. The clause confers a right on all minorities, whether they are based on religion or language, to establish and administer educational instructions of their choice. The right conferred by the clause is in absolute terms and is not subject to restrictions, as in the case of rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution. The right of the minorities   to   administer   educational   institutions   does   not, however,   prevent   the   making   of   reasonable   regulations   in respect of those institutions. The regulations have necessarily to be made in the interest of the institution as a minority educational   institution.   They  have   to   be   so   designed   as   to make it an effective vehicle for imparting education. The right to administer educational institutions can plainly not include the   right   to   maladminister.   Regulations   can   be   made   to prevent the housing of an educational institution in unhealthy surroundings as also to prevent the setting up or continuation of an educational institution without qualified teachers.  The State can prescribe regulations to ensure the excellence of the institution.  Prescription   of   standards   for   educational institutions does not militate against the right of the minority to administer the institutions. Regulations made in the true interests   of   efficiency   of   instruction,   discipline,   health, sanitation,   morality,   public   order,   and   the   like   may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions on   the   substance   of   the   right,   which   is   guaranteed:   they secure the proper functioning of the institution, in matters educational  [see observations of Shah, J. in   Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai   (supra),   [(1963   3   SCR   837]   p.   850].   Further,   as observed by Hidyatullah, C.J. in the case of  Very Rev. Mother Provincial   (supra) [(1971) 1 SCR 734], the standards concern the   body   politic   and   are   dictated   by   considerations   of   the advancement   of   the   country   and   its   people.   Therefore,   if universities establish syllabi for examinations, they must be followed,   subject,   however,   to   special   subjects   which   the institutions may seek to teach, and to a certain extent, the State   may   also   regulate   the   conditions   of   employment   of teachers   and   the   health   and   hygiene   of   students.   Such regulations do not bear directly upon management as such, although they may indirectly affect it. Yet the right of the State to   regulate   education,   educational   standards,   and   allied matters cannot be denied. The minority institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of 27 educational institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow the general pattern. While the management must be left to them, they may be compelled to keep in step with others. 92 .   A   regulation   which   is   designed   to   prevent maladministration of an educational institution cannot be said to offend Clause (1) of Article 30. At the same time, it has to be ensured that under the power of making regulations, nothing is done as would detract from the character of the institution as a minority educational institution or which would impinge upon the rights of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The right conferred by Article 30(1) is intended to be real and effective and not a mere pious and abstract sentiment; it is a promise of reality and not a   teasing   illusion.   Such   a   right   cannot   be   allowed   to   be whittled down by any measure masquerading as a regulation. As   observed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Rev.   Sidhajbhai Sabhai   (supra)   [(1963   3   SCR   837],   regulations   which   may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a   condition   of   receiving   grant   or   of   recognition   must   be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such   regulation   must   satisfy   a   dual   test   —   the   test   of reasonableness,   and   the   test   that   it   is   regulative   of   the educational character of the institution  and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. 94 . If a request is made for the affiliation or recognition of an educational institution, it is implicit in the request that the educational institution would abide by the regulations which are made by the authority granting affiliation or recognition. The said authority can always prescribe regulations and insist that   they   should   be   complied   with   before   it   would   grant affiliation or recognition to an educational institution. To deny the power of making regulations to the authority concerned would result in robbing the concept of affiliation or recognition of   its   real   essence.   No   institution   can   claim   affiliation   or recognition until it conforms to a certain standard. The fact that   the   institution   is   of   the   prescribed   standard   indeed inheres in the very concept of affiliation or recognition. It is, therefore, permissible for the authority concerned to prescribe regulations which must be complied with before an institution can seek and retain affiliation and recognition. Question then arises whether there is any limitation on the prescription of regulations for minority educational institutions. So far as this aspect is concerned, the authority prescribing the regulations must bear in mind that the Constitution has guaranteed a fundamental   right   to   the   minorities   for   establishing   and administering their educational institutions. Regulations made 28 by   the   authority   concerned   should   not   impinge   upon   that right.  Balance   has,   therefore,   to   be   kept   between   the   two objectives, that of ensuring the standard of excellence of the institution and that of preserving the right of the minorities to establish  and   administer   their   educational   institutions. Regulations which embrace and reconcile the two objectives can be considered to be reasonable.”  (emphasis supplied) The Court held that it is permissible for the State to prescribe qualifications for teachers.  It observed: “176 . Recognition or affiliation is granted on the basis of the excellence of an educational institution, namely, that it has reached the educational standard set up by the university. Recognition or affiliation is sought for the purpose of enabling the  students   in   an   educational   institution   to   sit   for   an examination to be conducted by the university and to obtain a degree   conferred   by   the   university.     For   that   purpose,   the students should have to be coached in such a manner so as to attain the standard of education prescribed by the university. Recognition or affiliation creates an interest in the university to ensure that the educational institution is maintained for the purpose intended and any regulation which will subserve or advance that purpose will be reasonable and no educational institution   established   and   administered   by   a   religious   or linguistic minority can claim recognition or affiliation without submitting to those regulations. That is the price of recognition or affiliation: but this does not mean that it should submit to a regulation   stipulating   for   surrender   of   a   right   or   freedom guaranteed   by   the   Constitution,   which   is   unrelated   to   the purpose   of   recognition   or   affiliation.   In   other   words, recognition   or   affiliation   is   a   facility   which   the   university grants   to   an   educational   institution,   for   the   purpose   of enabling the students there to sit for an examination to be conducted by the university in the prescribed subjects and to obtain the degree conferred by the university, and therefore, it stands to reason to hold that no regulation which is unrelated to   the   purpose   can   be   imposed.   If   besides   recognition   or affiliation, an educational institution conducted by a religious minority is granted aid, further regulations for ensuring that the aid is utilized for the purpose for which it is granted will be permissible.  The heart of the matter is that no educational institution established by a religious or linguistic minority can claim total immunity from regulations by the legislature or the university   if   it   wants   affiliation   or   recognition,   but   the character of the permissible regulations must depend upon their purpose. As we said, such regulations will be permissible if they are relevant to the purpose of securing or promoting the 29 object   of   recognition   or   affiliation.   There   will   be   borderline cases where it is difficult to decide whether a regulation really subserves the purpose of recognition or affiliation. But that does not affect the question of principle. In every case, when the reasonableness of a regulation comes up for consideration before the Court, the question to be asked and answered is whether   the   regulation   is   calculated   to   subserve   or  will   in effect   subserve   the   purpose   of   recognition   or   affiliation, namely,   the   excellence   of   the   institution   as   a   vehicle   for general secular education to the minority community and to other   persons   who   resort   to   it.   The   question   whether   a regulation   is   in   the   general   interest   of   the   public   has   no relevance   if   it   does   not   advance   the   excellence   of   the institution   as   a   vehicle   for   general   secular   education   as, ex­hypothesi , the only permissible regulations are those which secure the effectiveness of the purpose of the facility, namely, the excellence of the educational institutions in respect of their educational standards. This is the reason why this Court has time and again said that the question whether a particular regulation is calculated to advance the general public interest is of no consequence if it is not conducive to the interests of the minority community and those persons who resort to it. 197 . On the second question, I have nothing significant to add to what has fallen from My Lord the Chief Justice. I am in entire agreement with the view that, although, Articles 29 and 30   may   supplement   each   other   so   far   as   certain   rights   of minorities are concerned, yet, Article 29 of the Constitution does not, in any way, impose a limit on the kind or character of education which a minority may choose to impart through its Institution to the children of its own members or to those of others who may choose to send their children to its schools. In other   words,   it   has   a   right   to   impart   a   general   secular education. I would, however, like to point out that, as rights and duties are correlative, it follows, from the extent of this wider right of a minority under Article 30(1) to impart even general or non­denominational secular education to those who may not follow  its  culture or subscribe  to its  beliefs,  that, when   a  minority   Institution   decides   to   enter   this   wider educational sphere of national education, it, by reason of this free choice itself, could be deemed to opt to adhere to the needs of the general pattern of such education in the country, at   least  whenever   that   choice   is   made   in   accordance   with statutory   provisions.   Its   choice   to   impart   an   education intended   to   give   a   secular   orientation   or   character   to   its education necessarily entails its assent to the imperative needs of the choice made by the State about the kind of “secular” education which promotes national integration or the elevating objectives set out in the preamble to our Constitution, and the best way of giving it. If it is part of a minority's rights to make such a choice, it should also be part of its obligations, which necessarily follow from the choice to adhere to the general 30 pattern.   The   logical   basis   of   such   a   choice   is   that   the particular minority Institution, which chooses to impart such general secular education, prefers that higher range of freedom where, according to the poet Rabindranath Tagore, "the narrow domestic   walls"   which   constitute   barriers   between   various sections of the nation will crumble and fall. It may refuse to accept the choice made by the State of the kind of secular education the State wants or of the way in which it should be given. But, in that event, should it not be prepared to forego the benefits of recognition by the State? The State is bound to permit   and   protect   the   choice   of   the   minority   Institution, whatever that might be. But, can it be compelled to give it a treatment   different   from   that   given   to   other   Institutions making such a choice? . Evidently, what was meant was that the right to exclusive 221 management of the institution is separable from the right to determine the character of education and its standards. This may explain why "standards" of education were spoken as "not part of management" at all. It meant that the right to manage, having   been   conferred   in   absolute   terms,   could   not   be interfered with at all although the object of that management could be determined by a general pattern to be laid down by the State, which could prescribe the syllabi and standards of education.   Speaking   for   myself,   I   find   it   very   difficult   to separate the objects and standards of teaching from a right to determine   who   should   teach   and   what   their   qualifications should be.  Moreover, if the “standards of education” are not part   of   management,   it   is   difficult   to   see   how   they   are exceptions to the principle of freedom of management from control.   Again,   if   what   is   aimed   at   directly   is   to   be distinguished   from   an   indirect   effect   of   it,   the   security   of tenure of teachers and provisions intended to ensure fair and equitable   treatment   for   them   by   the   management   of   an institution would also not be directly aimed at interference with its management. They could more properly be viewed as designed   to   improve   and   ensure   the   excellence   of   teachers available at the institution, and, therefore, to raise the general standard   of   education.   I   think   that   it   is   enough   for  us   to distinguish this case on the ground that the provisions to be interpreted by us are different, although, speaking for myself, I feel bound to say, with great respect, that I am unable to accept every proposition found stated there as correct. In that case, the provisions of the Kerala University Act 9 of 1969, considered there were inescapable for the minority institutions which claimed the right to be free from their operation. As I have already observed, in the case before us, Section 38­B of the   Act   provides   the   petitioning   College   before   us   with   a practically certain mode of escape from the compulsiveness of provisions other than Sections 5,  40, and 41  of  the Act if claims made on its behalf are correct. 31 232 . Even if Article 30(1) of the Constitution is held to confer absolute and unfettered rights of management upon minority institutions, subject only to absolutely minimal and negative controls in the interests of health and law and order, it could not be meant to exclude a greater degree of regulation and control when a minority institution enters the wider sphere of general   secular   and   non­denominational   education,   largely employs   teachers   who   are   not   members   of   the   particular minority   concerned,   and   when   it   derives   large   parts   of   its income from the fees paid by those who are not members of the  particular  minority  in  question.  Such  greater degree   of control could be justified by the need to secure the interests of those who are affected by the management of the minority institution   and   the   education   it   imparts   but   who   are   not members of the minority in management. In other words, the degree   of   reasonably   permissible   control   must   vary   from situation to situation. For the reasons already given above, I think that, apart from Sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act, which directly   and   unreasonably   impinge   upon   the   rights   of   the petitioning minority managed college, protected by Article 30(1) of the Constitution, I do not think that the other provisions have that effect. On the situation under consideration before us, the minority institution affected  by the enactment has, upon the claims put forward on its behalf, a means of escape from the impugned provisions other than Sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act by resorting to Section 38B of the Act.” (emphasis supplied) 23. In  The Gandhi Faiz­e­am College, Shahjahanpur v. University of Agra   and   Anr.,   (1975)   2   SCC   283,   the   Court   considered   whether statute framed by University of Agra infringed fundamental rights of the minority community and observed thus:   “16.   The  discussion  throws   us  back  to  a  closer  study  of Statute 14­A to see if it cuts into the flesh of the management’s right   or   merely   tones   up   its   health   and   habits.   The   two requirements the University asks for are that the managing body (whatever its name) must take in ( a ) the Principal of the College;   ( b )   its   seniormost   teacher.   Is   this   desideratum dismissible   as   biting  into  the  autonomy  of   management   or tenable as ensuring the excellence of the institution without injuring the essence of the right? On a careful reflection and conscious of the constitutional dilemma, we are inclined to the view that this case falls on the valid side of the delicate line. Regulation   which   restricts   is   bad,   but   regulation   which facilitates is good. Where does this fine distinction lie? No rigid formula is possible, but a flexible test is feasible. Where the 32 object and effect is to improve the tone and temper of the administration   without   forcing   on   it   a   stranger,   however superb his virtues be, where the directive is not to restructure the governing body but to better its performance by a marginal catalytic   induction,   where   no   external   authority's   fiat   or approval or outside nominee is made compulsory to validate the   Management   Board   but   inclusion   of   an   internal   key functionary appointed by the autonomous management alone is asked for, the provision is salutary and saved, being not a diktat eroding the freedom of the freedom." (emphasis supplied) The majority negated the challenge.  It was held that regulation which restricts is bad, but provision which facilitates is good. 24. In  Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v. Union of   India   and   others ,   (1986)   4   SCC   707,   question   arose   whether teachers   and  other   employees   working  in   an  unaided  school   were entitled   to   same   pay­scale,   allowances,   and   benefits.     The   Court allowed the petition and opined thus:   “ 16.   The   excellence   of   the   instruction   provided   by   an institution   would   depend   directly   on   the   excellence   of   the teaching staff, and in turn, that would depend on the quality and the contentment of  the teachers.  Conditions of service pertaining   to   minimum   qualifications   of   teachers,   their salaries,   allowances   and   other   conditions   of   service   which ensure security, contentment and decent living standards to teachers and which will consequently enable them to render better service to the institution and the pupils cannot surely be said to be violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article   30(1)   of   the   Constitution.   The   management   of   a minority Educational Institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more   than   any   other   private   employee.  Oppression   or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is bound to lead, inevitably, to discontent and deterioration of the   standard   of   instruction   imparted   in   the   institution affecting   adversely   the   object   of   making   the   institution   an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. The management of minority institution cannot complain  of invasion  of the  fundamental 33 right to administer the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of Article 30(1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education.” (emphasis supplied) 25. In   Bihar State Madarasa Education Board, Patna v. Madarasa Hanfia Arabic College, Jamalia and others , (1990) 1 SCC 428, the Court held that minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institution of their own choice. Still, they have no right to maladminister,   and   the   State   has   the   power   to   regulate   the management and administration of such institutions in the interest of educational need and discipline of the institution.   The Court held thus:   “ 6.   The question which arises for consideration is whether Section 7(2)( n ) which confers power on the Board to dissolve the Managing Committee of an aided and recognised Madarasa institution   violates   the   minorities   constitutional   right   to administer its educational institution according to their choice. This Court has all along held that though the minorities have right   to   establish   and   administer   educational   institution   of their own choice but they have no right to maladminister and the   State   has   power   to   regulate   management   and administration   of   such   institutions   in   the   interest   of educational   need   and   discipline   of   the   institution.   Such regulation may have indirect effect on the absolute right of minorities   but   that   would   not   violate   Article   30(1)   of   the Constitution as it is the duty of the State to ensure efficiency in educational institutions. The State has, however, no power to   completely   take   over   the   management   of   a   minority institution.   Under   the   guise   of   regulating   the   educational standards to secure efficiency in institution, the State is not entitled   to   frame   rules   or   regulations   compelling   the management to surrender its right of administration. In  State of Kerala   v.   Very Rev. Mother Provincial , (1970) 2 SCC 417, Section   63(1)   of   the   Kerala   University   Act,   1969   which conferred   power   on   the   government   to   take   over   the management of a minority institution on its default in carrying out the directions of the State Government was declared ultra 34 vires on the ground that the provisions interfered with the constitutional right of a minority to administer its institution. Minority   institutions   cannot   be   allowed   to   fall   below   the standard of excellence on the pretext of their exclusive right of management but at the same time their constitutional right to administer their institutions cannot be completely taken away by   superseding   or   dissolving   Managing   Committee   or   by appointing ad hoc committees in place thereof. In the instant case Section 7(2)( n ) is clearly violative of constitutional right of minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution insofar as it provides for dissolution of Managing Committee of a Madarasa. We agree with the view taken by the High Court.” (emphasis supplied) 26. In  St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi,  (1992) 1 SCC 558, concerning admission process adopted by aided minority institutions, various questions were raised thus:   “ 41.  It was contended that St. Stephen’s College after being affiliated   to   the   Delhi   University   has   lost   its   minority character. The argument was based on some of the provisions in   the   Delhi   University   Act   and   the   Ordinances   made thereunder. It was said that the students are admitted to the University and not to the College as such. But we find no substance in the contention. In the first place, it may be stated that   the   State   or   any   instrumentality   of   the   State   cannot deprive the character of the institution, founded by a minority community by compulsory affiliation since Article 30(1) is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. The minority institution has a distinct identity and the right to administer with continuance of such identity cannot be denied by coercive action. Any such coercive action would be void being contrary to the constitutional guarantee. The right to administer is the right to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution. This right is exercised by a body of persons in whom the founders have faith and confidence. Such a management body of the institution cannot be displaced or reorganised if the right is to be recognised and maintained. Reasonable   regulations   however,   are   permissible   but regulations   should   be   of   regulatory   nature   and   not   of abridgment of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1). 60.   The right to select students for admission is a part of administration.   It   is   indeed   an   important   facet   of administration.  This power also could be regulated but the regulation must be reasonable just like any other regulation. It should be conducive to the welfare of the minority institution 35 or for the betterment of those who resort to it. The Bombay Government order which prevented the schools using English as the medium of instruction from admitting students who have   a   mother   tongue   other   than   English   was   held   to   be invalid since it restricted the admission pattern of the schools [ State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society,   (1955) 1 SCR 568]. The Gujarat Government direction to the minority run college to reserve 80 per cent of seats for government selected candidates   with   a   threat   to   withdraw   the   grant­in­aid   and recognition was struck down as infringing the fundamental right   guaranteed   to   minorities   under   Article   30(1)   of   the Constitution [ Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay,   (1963) 3 SCR 837]. In   Rt. Rev. Magr. Mark Netto   v.   State of Kerala , (1979) 1 SCC 23, the denial of permission to the management of a minority school to admit girl students was held to be bad. The   Regional   Deputy   Director   in   that   case   refused   to   give sanction for admission of girl students on two grounds: ( ) that i the school was not opened as a mixed school and that the school has been run purely as a boys school for 25 years; and ( ii )   that   there   was   facility  for   the   education   of   girls   of   the locality in a nearby girls school which was established by the Muslims and was also a minority institution. This Court noted that the Christian community in the locality wanted their girls also to receive education in the school maintained specially by their own community. They did not think it in their interest to send their children to the Muslim girls school run by the other minority   community.   The   withholding   of   permission   for admission of girl students in the boys minority school was violative of Article 30(1). It was also observed that the rule sanctioning such refusal of permission crosses the barrier of regulatory measures and comes in the region of interference with the administration of the  institution, a right  which is guaranteed   to   the   minority   under   Article   30(1).   The   Court restricted the operation of the rule and made it inapplicable to the   minority   educational   institution.   In   Director   of   School Education, Government of T.N.  v.   Rev. Brother G. Arogiasamy , AIR 1971 Mad 440, the Madras High Court had an occasion to consider the validity of an uniform procedure prescribed by the State Government for admission of candidates to the aided training schools. The government directed that the candidates should be selected by the school authorities by interviewing every   candidate   eligible   for   admission   and   assessing   and awarding marks in the interview. The marks awarded to each candidate in the interview will be added to the marks secured by the candidate in the SSLC public examination. On the basis of the aggregate of marks in the SSLC examination and those obtained at the interview the selection was to be made without any further discretion. The High Court held that the method of selection   placed   serious   restrictions   on   the   freedom   of   the minority institution to admit their own students. It was found that   the   students   of   the   minority   community   could   not compete with the students belonging to other communities. 36 The applications of students from other communities could not be restricted under law. The result was that the students of minority   community   for   whose   benefit   the   institution   was founded,   had   little   chance   of   getting   admission.   The   High Court held that the government order prescribing the uniform method   of   selection   could   not   be   applied   to   minority institutions. 78.  Having set the scene, we can deal with the provisions of Articles 29(1) and 30(1) relatively quickly. Under Article 29(1) every section of the citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own has the right to conserve the same. Under Article 29(1), the minorities — religious or linguistic — are entitled to establish and administer educational institutions to conserve their distinct language, script or culture. However, it has  been  consistently  held   by  the  courts   that   the   right   to establish   an   educational   institution   is   not   confined   to purposes of conservation of language, script or culture. The rights in Article 30(1) are of wider amplitude. The width of Article  30(1)   cannot  be  cut down  by the  considerations  on which Article 29(1) is based. The words “of their choice” in Article 30(1) leave vast options to the minorities in selecting the   type   of   educational   institutions   which   they   wish   to establish.   They   can   establish   institutions   to   conserve   their distinct language, script or culture or for imparting general secular education or for both the purposes. (See:   Father W. Proost   v.   State  of  Bihar,   (1969)   2   SCR   73,   Ahmedabad  St. Xavier’s College   v.   State of Gujarat , (1974) 1 SCC 717; and Kerala Education Bill case , 1959 SCR 995.)”  (emphasis supplied) The decision in  St. Stephen's College  (supra) has been analysed by   my   esteemed   brother   Lalit,   J.   in   Sk.   Md.   Rafique   v.   Managing Committee,   Contai   Rahamania   High   Madrasah   and   Ors.,   2020   (1) SCALE 345, thus:

37

38

39

40

(emphasis supplied) 41 The Court held that the choice of institution does not mean that the minorities could establish educational institution for the benefit of their own community people.   In Re The   Kerala Education Bill  (supra), it was considered and observed that the minorities cannot establish educational institution only for the benefit of their community.  Every educational institution, irrespective of community to which it belongs, is a 'melting pot' in our national life and that there should be mixing up of students of different communities in all educational institutions. The   intake   for   the   community   cannot   exceed   50%   of   the   annual admission,   which   is   to   be   provided   to   other   than   the   minority community. The admission should be made purely on the basis of merit. In  T.M.A. Pai Foundation  (supra), decided by Bench of 11 Judges 27. of the Court, on consideration of the rights under Article 30 of the Constitution of India, held thus: “ 3.   The hearing of these cases has had a chequered history. Writ Petition No. 350 of 1993 filed by the Islamic Academy of Education and connected petitions were placed before a Bench of five Judges. As the Bench was prima facie of the opinion that Article 30 did not clothe a minority educational institution with the power to adopt its own method of selection and the correctness   of   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   St.   Stephen's College v. University of Delhi , (1992) 1 SCC 558, was doubted, it   was   directed   that   the   questions   that   arose   should   be authoritatively answered by a larger Bench. These cases were then placed before a Bench of seven Judges. The questions framed were recast and on 6­2­1997, the Court directed that the matter be placed before a Bench of at least eleven Judges, as it was felt that in view of the Forty­second Amendment to the Constitution, whereby "education" had been included in 42 Entry 25 of List III of Seventh Schedule, the question of who would   be   regarded   as   a "minority"   was   required   to   be considered   because   the   earlier  case­law  related   to  the   pre­ amendment era, when education was only in the State List. When the cases came up for hearing before an eleven­Judge Bench,   during   the   course   of   hearing   on   19­3­1997,   the following order was passed: “Since a doubt has arisen during the course of our arguments   as   to   whether   this   Bench   would   feel itself bound by   the ratio propounded   in   —   Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In Re , AIR 1958 SC 956 and Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat ,   (1974)  1 SCC  717   it is clarified that this sized   Bench   would   not   feel   itself   inhibited   by   the views   expressed   in   those   cases   since   the   present endeavour   is   to   discern   the   true   scope   and interpretation   of   Article 30(1) of   the   Constitution, which   being   the   dominant question would   require examination   in   its   pristine   purity.   The   factum   is recorded.”” 38.  The scheme in  Unni Krishnan case , (1993) 1 SCC 645 has the effect of nationalizing education in respect of important features viz. the right of a private unaided institution to give admission and to fix the fee. By framing this scheme, which has led to the State Governments legislating in conformity with the scheme, the private institutions are indistinguishable from the   government   institutions;   curtailing   all   the   essential features of the right of administration of a private unaided educational   institution   can   neither   be   called   fair   nor reasonable. Even in the decision in  Unni Krishnan case  it has been observed by Jeevan Reddy, J., at p. 749, para 194, as follows: “194.   The   hard   reality   that   emerges   is   that   private educational institutions are a necessity in the present­day context. It is not possible to do without them because the governments   are   in   no   position   to   meet   the   demand   — particularly in the sector of medical and technical education which call for substantial outlays. While education is one of the most important functions of the Indian State it has no monopoly   therein.   Private   educational   institutions   — including minority educational institutions — too have a role to play.” 40.  Any system of student selection would be unreasonable if it   deprives   the   private   unaided   institution   of   the   right   of rational selection, which it devised for itself, subject to the minimum qualification that may be prescribed and to some system of computing the equivalence between different kinds of qualifications, like a common entrance test. Such a system 43 of   selection   can   involve   both   written   and   oral   tests   for selection, based on principle of fairness. 45.   In view of the discussion hereinabove, we hold that the decision in  Unni Krishnan case , (1993) 1 SCC 645 insofar as it framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing of the fee, was not correct, and to that extent, the said decision and the consequent directions given to UGC, AICTE, the   Medical   Council   of   India,   the   Central   and   State Governments etc. are overruled.

53.   With regard to the core components of the rights under Articles 19 and 26(a), it must be held that while the State has the right to prescribe qualifications necessary for admission, private unaided colleges have the right to admit students of their choice, subject to an objective and rational procedure of selection and the compliance with conditions, if any, requiring admission   of   a   small   percentage   of   students   belonging   to weaker sections of the society by granting them freeships or scholarships, if not granted by the Government. Furthermore, in   setting   up   a   reasonable   fee   structure,   the   element   of profiteering is not as yet accepted in Indian conditions. The fee structure must take into consideration the need to generate funds   to   be   utilized   for   the   betterment   and   growth   of   the educational institution, the betterment of education in that institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. In any event, a private institution will have the right   to   constitute   its   own   governing   body,   for   which qualifications may be prescribed by the State or the university concerned.   It   will,   however,   be   objectionable   if   the   State retains   the   power   to   nominate   specific   individuals   on governing bodies. Nomination by the State, which could be on a   political   basis,   will   be   an   inhibiting   factor   for   private enterprise to embark upon the occupation of establishing and administering educational institutions. For the same reasons, nomination of teachers either directly by the department or through a service commission will be an unreasonable inroad and   an   unreasonable   restriction   on   the   autonomy   of   the private unaided educational institution. 44 68.  It would be unfair to apply the same rules and regulations regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional institutions.   It   must   be   borne   in   mind   that   unaided professional   institutions   are   entitled   to   autonomy   in   their administration while, at the same time, they do not forego or discard   the   principle   of   merit.   It   would,   therefore,   be permissible for the university or the Government, at the time of granting recognition, to require a private unaided institution to provide for merit­based selection while, at the same time, giving   the   management   sufficient   discretion   in   admitting students.   This   can   be   done   through   various   methods.   For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can be reserved for admission by the management out of those students who have passed   the   common   entrance   test   held   by   itself   or   by   the State/university and have applied to the college concerned for admission, while the rest of the seats may be filled up on the basis of counselling by the State agency. This will incidentally take care of poorer and backward sections of the society. The prescription of percentage for this purpose has to be done by the   Government   according  to   the   local   needs   and   different percentages   can   be   fixed   for   minority   unaided   and   non­ minority   unaided   and   professional   colleges.   The   same principles   may   be   applied   to   other   non­professional   but unaided   educational   institutions   viz.   graduation   and postgraduation non­professional colleges or institutes.   While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be 71. permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by rules or regulations, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation policy of the State. The merit may be   determined   either   through   a   common   entrance   test conducted by the university or the Government followed by counselling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual institutions — the method to be followed is for the university or the Government to decide.  The authority may also devise other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case   of   such   institutions,   it   will   be   permissible   for   the Government   or  the   university  to  provide   that  consideration should be shown to the weaker sections of the society. 90 .   In   the   exercise   of   this   right   to   conserve   the   language, script   or   culture,   that   section   of   the   society   can set up educational   institutions.   The   right to   establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice is a necessary concomitant   to   the   right   conferred   by   Article 30.  The   right   under   Article   30     is   not   absolute.   Article 29(2) provides   that, where any educational institution is maintained by the State or receives aid out of State funds,  no citizen shall be denied 45 admission   on   the   grounds   only   of   religion,   race,   caste, language   or   any   of   them.   The   use   of   the   expression   "any educational institution" in Article 29(2) would (sic not) refer to any educational institution established by anyone, but which is maintained by the State or receives aid out of State funds. In other words, on a plain reading, State­maintained or aided educational   institutions,   whether   established   by   the Government or the majority or a minority community cannot deny admission to a citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste or language. 93 . Can Article 30(1) be so read as to mean that it contains an absolute right of the minorities, whether based on religion or   language, to   establish and   administer   educational institutions   in   any   manner   they   desire,   and   without   being obliged   to   comply   with   the provisions of   any   law?   Does Article 30(1) give the religious or linguistic minorities a right to establish an educational institution that propagates religious or racial bigotry or ill will amongst the people? Can the right under Article 30(1) be so exercised that it is opposed to public morality   or   health?   In   the   exercise   of   its   right,   would   the minority   while   establishing   educational   institutions   not be bound by   town   planning rules and   regulations?  Can   they   construct     and   maintain   buildings   in   any   manner   they   desire without complying with the   provisions     of the building bye­laws or health regulations? . In  Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai  v.  State of Bombay , (1963) 3 105 SCR 837, this Court had to consider the validity of an order issued   by   the   Government   of   Bombay   whereby   from   the academic   year   1955­56,   80%   of   the   seats   in   the   training colleges for teachers in non­government training colleges were to be reserved for the teachers nominated by the Government. The   petitioners,   who   belonged   to   the   minority   community, were,  inter alia , running a training college for teachers, as also primary schools. The said primary schools and college were conducted for the benefit of the religious denomination of the United   Church   of   Northern   India   and   Indian   Christians generally,   though   admission   was   not   denied   to   students belonging to other communities. The petitioners challenged the government order requiring 80% of the seats to be filled by nominees of the Government,  inter alia , on the ground that the petitioners were members of a religious denomination and that they constituted a religious minority, and that the educational institutions had been established primarily for the benefit of the Christian community. It was the case of the petitioners that the decision of the Government violated their fundamental rights   guaranteed   by   Articles 30(1), 26(a),   ( b ),   ( c )   and   ( d ), and 19(1)( f )   and   ( g ).   While   interpreting   Article 30,   it   was observed by this Court at SCR pp. 849­50 as under: 46

47 held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Article 30(1) will be   but   a   'teasing   illusion',   a promise of   unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative   or   executive   action   as   a   condition   of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test ­­ the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative   of   the   educational   character   of   the institution and is conducive to making the institution an   effective   vehicle   of   education   for   the   minority community or other persons who resort to it.” 107 .  The   aforesaid   decision  does   indicate  that  the  right   under   Article   30(1)     is   not   so   absolute   as   to   prevent   the Government   from   making   any   regulation   whatsoever.   As already   noted   hereinabove,   in  Sidhajbhai   Sabhai   case, (1963) 3 SCR 837  it was laid down that regulations made , in the true interests of  efficiency of instruction, discipline, health,   sanitation,   morality   and   public   order   could   be   imposed.   If this is so, it is difficult to appreciate how the Government can be prevented from framing regulations that are in the national interest, as it seems to be indicated in the passage quoted hereinabove.  Any regulation framed in the   national   interest   must   necessarily   apply   to   all educational institutions, whether run by the majority or the minority. Such a limitation must necessarily be read into Article 30. The right under Article 30(1) cannot be such as to   override   the   national   interest   or   to   prevent   the Government from framing regulations in that behalf. It is, of course,   true   that   government   regulations   cannot   destroy the   minority   character   of   the   institution   or   make   the right to establish and administer a mere illusion; but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be above the law. It will further be seen that in  Sidhajbhai Sabhai case, (1963) 3 SCR 837, no reference was made to Article 29(2) of the   Constitution.   This   decision,   therefore,   cannot   be   an authority for the proposition canvassed before us. 119 . In   a concurrent judgment,   while noting (at   SCC   p. 770, para 73) that "clause (2) of Article 29 forbids the denial of   admission   to   citizens   into   any   educational   institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them", Khanna, J. then examined Article 30, and observed at SCR p. 222, as follows: (SCC p. 770, para 74) “74.  Clause   (1)   of   Article 30 gives   right   to   all minorities, whether based on religion or language, to establish and administer educational institutions of 48

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50 should   not   impinge   upon   the   minority   character   of   the institution. Therefore, a balance has to be kept between the two objectives — that of ensuring the standard of excellence of the institution, and that of preserving the right of the minorities to   establish and   administer   their   educational institutions. Regulations that embraced and reconciled the two objectives could be considered to be reasonable. This, in our view, is the correct approach to the problem. 123 . After referring to the earlier cases in relation to the appointment of teachers, it was noted by Khanna, J., that the   conclusion   which   followed   was   that   a   law   which interfered with a minority's choice of qualified teachers, or its disciplinary control over teachers and other members of the staff of the institution, was void, as it was violative of Article 30(1). While it was permissible for the State and its educational   authorities   to   prescribe   the   qualifications   of teachers,   it   was   held   that   once   the   teachers   possessing the requisite qualifications were selected by the minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right   to veto the selection of   those   teachers. The selection and   appointment   of   teachers   for   an educational institution was regarded as one of the essential ingredients under Article 30(1). The Court's attention was drawn to the fact that in  Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case , 1959 SCR 995,  this Court had opined that clauses 11 and 12 made it obligatory for all aided schools to select teachers from   a   panel   selected   from   each   district   by   the Public Service Commission and that no teacher of an aided school could be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without the previous sanction of the authorized officer. At SCR p.245, Khanna,   J.,   observed   that   in   cases   subsequent   to   the opinion in  Kerala Education Bill, 1957  case, (1959) SCR 995 this   Court   had   held   similar provisions as   clause   11   and clause   12   to   be   violative   of   Article 30(1) of   the   minority institutions. He then observed as follows: (SCC p. 792, para 109). “The opinion expressed by this Court in  Re Kerala Education   Bill,   1957 ,  1959   SCR   995, was   of   an advisory character and though great weight should be attached to it because of its persuasive value, the said   opinion   cannot   override   the   opinion subsequently expressed by this Court in contested cases.  It  is the  law declared by this Court in the subsequent   contested   cases   which   would   have   a binding effect. The words 'as at present advised' as well as the preceding sentence indicate that the view expressed by this Court in  Re Kerala Education Bill,  in this respect was hesitant and tentative and 1957 not a final view in the matter.” 51 135.  We agree with the contention of the learned Solicitor­ General that the Constitution in Part III does not contain or give any absolute right. All rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are subject to at least other provisions of the said Part. It is difficult to comprehend that the framers of   the Constitution would have given such an   absolute right     to the religious or linguistic minorities, which would enable   them   to establish     and administer educational institutions in a manner so as to be in conflict with the other Parts of the Constitution.  We   find   it   difficult   to   accept   that   in   the establishment   and   administration   of   educational institutions by the religious and linguistic minorities, no law of the land, even the Constitution, is to apply to them. 136.   Decisions of this Court have held that the right to administer does not include the right to maladminister. It has   also   been   held   that   the   right   to   administer   is   not absolute, but must be subject to reasonable regulations for the benefit of the institutions as the vehicle of education, consistent with national interest. General laws of the land applicable to all persons have been held to be applicable to the minority institutions also — for example, laws relating to taxation, sanitation, social welfare, economic regulation, public order and morality. 137 .   It   follows   from   the   aforesaid   decisions   that   even though the words of Article 30(1) are unqualified, this Court has   held   that   at   least   certain   other   laws   of   the   land pertaining to health, morality and standards of education apply. The right under Article 30(1) has, therefore, not been held to be absolute or above other provisions of the law, and we reiterate the same. By the same analogy,  there is no reason why regulations or conditions concerning, generally, the welfare of students and teachers should not be made   applicable   in   order   to   provide     a   proper   academic atmosphere, as such provisions do not in any way interfere with   the   right   of   administration   or   management   under Article 30(1). 138 . As we look at it, Article 30(1) is a sort of guarantee or assurance   to   the   linguistic   and   religious minority institutions   of   their   right to   establish and   administer educational   institutions   of   their   choice.   Secularism   and equality being two of the basic features of the Constitution, Article 30(1) ensures   protection   to   the   linguistic   and religious minorities, thereby preserving the secularism of the country. Furthermore, the principles of equality must necessarily apply to the enjoyment of such rights. No law can be framed that will discriminate against such minorities with   regard   to   the   establishment   and   administration   of educational   institutions   vis­a­vis   other   educational institutions.  Any law or rule or regulation that would put 52

53 minorities. Article 28(3) is the right of a person studying in a   State­recognized   institution   or   in   an   educational institution receiving aid from State funds, not to take part in any religious instruction, if imparted by such institution, without his/her consent (or his/her guardian's consent if such a person is a minor). Just as Articles 28(1) and (3) become applicable the moment any educational institution takes aid, likewise, Article 29(2) would also be attracted and become applicable to an educational institution maintained by   the   State   or   receiving   aid   out   of   State   funds. It   was strenuously contended that the right to give admission is one   of   the   essential   ingredients   of   the   right to administer conferred on the religious or linguistic minority, and that this right should not be curtailed in any manner. It is difficult to accept this contention. If Articles 28(1) and (3) apply to a minority institution that receives aid out of State   funds,   there   is   nothing   in   the   language   of Article 30 that   would   make   the provisions of Article 29(2) inapplicable.   Like   Article 28(1) and Article 28(3),   Article 29(2) refers   to "any   educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds". A minority institution would fall within the ambit   of   Article 29(2) in   the   same   manner   in   which Article 28(1) and   Article 28(3) would   be   applicable   to   an aided minority institution. It is true that one of the rights to administer an educational institution is to grant admission to   the   students.  As   long   as   an   educational   institution, whether   belonging   to   the   minority   or   the   majority community, does not receive aid, it would, in our opinion, be   its   right   and   discretion   to   grant   admission   to   such   students as it chooses or selects   subject to     what has been clarified before. Out of the various rights that the minority institution   has   in   the   administration   of   the   institution, Article 29(2) curtails   the   right   to   grant   admission   to   a certain extent. By virtue of Article 29(2), no citizen can be denied admission by an aided minority institution on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It is no doubt true that Article 29(2) does curtail one of the powers of the minority institution, but on receiving aid, some of the rights that an unaided minority institution   has,   are   also   curtailed   by   Articles   28(1)     and     28(3).   A minority   educational   institution   has   a   right   to   impart   religious instruction     — this right is taken away by   Article   28(1),   if   that   minority   institution   is   maintained wholly out of State funds. Similarly on receiving aid out of State   funds   or   on   being   recognized   by   the   State, the absolute   right of   a   minority   institution   requiring   a student   to   attend religious   instruction is   curtailed   by Article 28(3). If the curtailment of the right to administer a minority   institution   on   receiving   aid   or   being   wholly maintained out of State funds as provided by Article 28 is valid, there is no reason why Article 29(2) should not be 54

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Answers to eleven questions Q. 1 .  * A.  * .  * Q. 2 A .  * Q. 3 .   ( a )  *  * A. Q.   3 .   ( b )   To   what   extent   can   professional   education   be treated as a matter coming under minorities’ rights under Article 30? A.  Article 30(1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The use of the words “of their choice” indicates that   even   professional   educational   institutions   would   be covered by Article 30. Q.   4 .   Whether   the   admission   of   students   to   minority educational institution, whether aided or unaided, can be regulated by the State Government or by the university to which the institution is affiliated? A.   Admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions viz. schools and undergraduate colleges where the scope for merit­based selection is practically nil, cannot be regulated by the State or university concerned, except for providing   the  qualifications   and   minimum   conditions   of eligibility in the interest of academic standards. The right to admit students being an essential facet of the   right   to   administer   educational   institutions   of   their choice,   as  contemplated   under   Article   30   of   the Constitution, the State Government or the university may not be entitled to interfere with that right, so long as the admission to the unaided educational institutions is on a transparent basis and the merit is adequately taken care of. The right to administer, not being absolute, there could be regulatory   measures   for   ensuring   educational   standards and maintaining excellence thereof, and it is more so in the matter of admissions to professional institutions. …   Whether the minorities’s rights to establish and Q.5 . ( a ) administer   educational   institutions   of   their   choice   will include   the   procedure   and   method   of   admission   and selection of students? 56 A.   A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of admission as well as selection of students, but such a procedure must be fair and transparent, and the selection of students in professional and higher education colleges   should  be  on the  basis  of  merit.  The procedure adopted  or  selection  made   should   not  be  tantamount   to maladministration.   Even   an   unaided   minority   institution ought not to ignore the merit of the students for admission, while exercising its right to admit students to the colleges aforesaid, as in that event, the institution will fail to achieve excellence. Q.5.(b) * A. * Q.5. (c)  Whether the statutory provisions which regulate the facets   of   administration   like   control   over   educational agencies,   control   over   governing   bodies,   conditions   of affiliation   including   recognition/withdrawal   thereof,   and appointment   of   staff,   employees,   teachers   and   principals including their service   conditions   and  regulation  of  fees, etc. would   interfere   with   the   right   of   administration   of minorities?  So far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of A. administration   are   concerned,   in   case   of   an   unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control   should   be   minimal   and   the   conditions of recognition as   well   as   the   conditions   of   affiliation   to a university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of day­to­day management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and non­teaching, and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there   should   not   be   any   external   controlling   agency. However, a rational procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself. For redressing the grievances of employees of aided and   unaided   institutions   who   are   subjected to punishment or  termination   from  service,   a   mechanism will have to be evolved,  and in our  opinion, appropriate tribunals could be constituted, and till then, such tribunals could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge. The State or other controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being   appointed   as   a   teacher   or   a   principal   of   any educational institution. 57 Regulations   can   be   framed   governing   service conditions   for   teaching   and   other   staff   for   whom   aid   is provided by the State, without interfering with the overall administrative control of the management over the staff. Fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be regulated but no institution should charge capitation fee.” (emphasis supplied) In     (supra),   the   Court   held   that   some T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation system   of   computing   equivalence   between   different   kinds   of qualifications like a common entrance test, would not be in violation of the rights conferred. The unaided minority institutions under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India have the right to admit students, but the merit may be determined by common entrance test and the rights under Article 30(1) is not absolute so as to prevent the Government from making any regulations.   The Government cannot be prevented from framing regulations that are in national interest.   However, the safeguard is that the Government cannot discriminate any minority institution and put them in a disadvantageous position vis­à­vis to other   educational   institutions   and   has   to   maintain   the   concept   of equality in real sense.  The minority institutions must be allowed to do what   non­minority   institutions   are   permitted.     It   is   open   to State/concerned bodies to frame regulations with respect to affiliation and  recognition, to  provide  a  proper academic atmosphere.    While answering   question   no.4,   it   was   held   that   the   Government   or   the University can lay down the regulatory measures ensuring educational 58 standards and maintaining excellence and more so, in the matter of admission to the professional institutions.   It may not interfere with the   rights   so   long   as   the   admissions   to   the   unaided   minority institutions are on transparent basis and the merit is adequately taken care of.   In   Brahmo   Samaj   Education   Society   v.   State   of   West   Bengal, 28. (2004)  6  SCC  224,  the  Court   opined   that   State   can  impose   such conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance of standards of education and to check maladministration.  The decision of  T.M.A. Pai Foundation  (supra) was followed in which it was observed that the State   could   regulate   the   method   of   selection   and   appointment   of teachers after prescribing requisite qualifications for the same.   In Brahmo Samaj Education Society   (supra), it was further opined that the State could very well provide the basic qualification for teachers. The equal standard of teachers has been maintained by the NET / SLET. This Court in  (supra) also considered the difference 29. P.A. Inamdar  between  professional  and  non­professional  educational  institutions, thus: “ 104.   Article   30(1)   speaks   of   “educational   institutions” generally and so does Article 29(2). These articles do not draw any distinction between an educational institution dispensing theological   education   or   professional   or   non­professional 59 education. However, the terrain of thought as has developed through   successive   judicial   pronouncements   culminating   in Pai   Foundation ,   (2002)   8   SCC   481,   is   that   looking   at   the concept of education, in the backdrop of the constitutional provisions, professional educational institutions constitute a class   by   themselves   as   distinguished   from   educational institutions   imparting   non­professional   education.   It   is   not necessary for us to go deep into this aspect of the issue posed before us inasmuch as  Pai Foundation,  (2002) 8 SCC 481, has clarified that merit and excellence assume special significance in   the   context   of   professional   studies.   Though   merit   and excellence are not anathema to non­professional education, yet at that level and due to the nature of education which is more general, the need for merit and excellence therein is not of the degree as is called for in the context of professional education.   Dealing with unaided minority educational institutions, 105. Pai Foundation,  (2002) 8 SCC 481, holds that Article 30 does not come in the way of the State stepping in for the purpose of securing transparency and recognition of merit in the matter of admissions.   Regulatory   measures   for   ensuring   educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof are no anathema to   the   protection   conferred   by   Article   30(1).   However,   a distinction   is   to   be   drawn   between   unaided   minority educational   institution   of   the   level   of   schools   and undergraduate   colleges   on   the   one   side   and   institutions   of higher education, in particular, those imparting professional education,   on   the   other   side.   In   the   former,   the   scope   for merit­based selection is practically nil and hence may not call for regulation. But in the case of the latter, transparency and merit have to be unavoidably taken care of and cannot be compromised.   There   could   be   regulatory   measures   for ensuring   educational   standards   and   maintaining   excellence thereof.   (See   para   161,   answer   to   Question   4,   in   Pai (2002) 8 SCC 481.) The source of this distinction Foundation,  between   two   types   of   educational   institutions   referred   to hereinabove   is   to   be   found   in   the   principle   that   right   to administer does not include a right to maladminister. 106.   S.B. Sinha, J. has, in his separate opinion in   Islamic Academy ,   (2003)   6   SCC   697,   described   (in   para   199)   the situation as a pyramid­like situation and suggested the right of minority to be read along with the fundamental duty. Higher the level of education, lesser are the seats and higher weighs the consideration for merit. It will, necessarily, call for more State intervention and lesser say for the minority.   Educational institutions imparting higher education i.e. 107. graduate   level   and   above   and   in   particular   specialised education   such   as   technical   or   professional,   constitute   a separate   class.   While   embarking   upon   resolving   issues   of 60 constitutional significance, where the letter of the Constitution is   not   clear,   we   have   to   keep   in   view   the   spirit   of   the Constitution,   as   spelt   out   by   its   entire   scheme.   Education aimed   at   imparting   professional   or   technical   qualifications stands   on   a   different   footing   from   other   educational instruction. Apart from other provisions, Article 19(6) is a clear indicator   and   so   are   clauses   ( h )   and   ( j )   of   Article   51­A. Education up to the undergraduate level aims at imparting knowledge just to enrich the mind and shape the personality of a student. Graduate­level study is a doorway to admissions in educational institutions imparting professional or technical or  other higher  education  and,  therefore,   at  that  level,  the considerations   akin   to   those   relevant   for   professional   or technical educational institutions step in and become relevant. This is in the national interest and strengthening the national wealth,   education   included.   Education   up   to   the undergraduate level on the one hand and education at the graduate   and   postgraduate   levels   and   in   professional   and technical   institutions   on   the   other   are   to   be   treated   on different   levels   inviting   not   identical   considerations,   is   a proposition not open to any more debate after  Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481. A number of legislations occupying the field of education whose constitutional validity has been tested and accepted suggest that while recognition or affiliation may not be a must for education up to undergraduate level or, even if required, may be granted as a matter of routine, recognition or affiliation is a must and subject to rigorous scrutiny when it comes to educational institutions awarding degrees, graduate or   postgraduate,   postgraduate   diplomas   and   degrees   in technical or professional disciplines. Some such legislations are   found   referred   in   paras   81   and   82   of   S.B.   Sinha,   J.’s opinion in  Islamic Academy , (2003) 6 SCC 697.” Dealing with unaided minority educational institutions in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation   (supra), the court observed that Article 30 does not come in the way of the State stepping in to secure transparency and recognition of merit in the matter of admissions. Regulatory measures for ensuring educational standards can be framed.   In the case of professional   education,   transparency   and   merit   have   to   be unavoidably taken care of and cannot be compromised. 61 30. In   Sindhi   Education   Society   and   Anr.   v.   Chief   Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors.,   (2010) 8 SCC 49, the Court opined that measures to regulate the courses of study, qualifications, and   appointment   of   teachers,   the   conditions   of   employment   are germane to the affiliation of minority institutions.   The Court held thus:   “47.   Still   another   seven­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court,   in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society,  (1974) 1 SCC 717, was primarily concerned with the scope of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution,   relating   to   the   rights   of   minorities   to   impart general education and applicability of the concept of affiliation to such institutions. Of course, the Court held that there was no fundamental right of a minority institution to get affiliation from a university. When a minority institution applies to a university to be affiliated, it expresses its choice to participate in the system of general education and courses of instructions prescribed   by   that   university,   and   it   agrees   to   follow   the uniform   courses   of   study.   Therefore,   measures   which   will regulate   the   courses   of   study,   the   qualifications   and appointment   of   teachers,   the   conditions   of   employment   of teachers,   the   health,   hygiene   of   students   and   the   other facilities are germane to affiliation of minority institutions.  The respondents have placed reliance upon the law stated 55. by   the   Bench   that   any   regulation   framed   in   the   national interest must necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether run by majority or the minority. Such a limitation must   be   read   into   Article   30.   The   rule   under  Article   30(1) cannot   be   such   as   to   override   the   national   interest   or   to prevent   the   Government   from   framing   regulations   in   that behalf.   It   is,   of   course,   true   that   government   regulations cannot   destroy   the   minority   character   of   the   institution   or make a right to establish and administer a mere illusion; but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be above the law. 56.   The appellant also seeks to derive benefit from the view that the courts have also held that the right to administer is not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulations for the benefit   of   the   institutions   as   the   vehicle   of   education consistent with the national interest. Such general laws of the land would also be applicable to the minority institutions as well.   There   is   no   reason   why   regulations   or   conditions 62 concerning generally the welfare of the students and teachers should not be made applicable in order to provide a proper academic atmosphere. As such, the provisions do not, in any way, interfere with the right of administration or management under Article 30(1). Any law, rule or regulation, that would put the   educational   institutions   run   by   the   minorities   at   a disadvantage, when compared to the institutions run by the others, will have to be struck down. At the same time, there may not be any reverse discrimination. 92.  The right under clause (1) of Article 30 is not absolute but subject to reasonable restrictions which, inter alia, may be framed   having   regard   to   the   public   interest   and   national interest   of   the   country.   Regulation   can   also   be   framed   to prevent   maladministration   as   well   as   for   laying   down standards of education, teaching, maintenance of discipline, public order, health, morality, etc. It is also well settled that a minority   institution   does   not   cease   to   be   so,   the   moment grant­in­aid is received by the institution. An aided minority educational institution, therefore, would be entitled to have the right of admission of students belonging to the minority group and,   at   the   same   time,   would   be   required   to   admit   a reasonable extent of non­minority students, to the extent, that the right in Article  30(1) is  not substantially impaired  and further, the citizen’s right under Article 29(2) is not infringed.” In   Chandana Das (Malakar) v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2015) 12 SCC 140, the Court observed that the Government can frame the conditions of eligibility for appointment of such teachers, thus: “21.  It is unnecessary to multiply decisions on the subject for the   legal   position   is   well   settled.   Linguistic   institution   and religious   are   entitled   to   establish   and   administer   their institutions. Such right of administration includes the right of appointing teachers of its choice but does not denude the State of   its   power   to   frame   regulations   that   may   prescribe   the conditions of eligibility for appointment of such teachers. The regulations can also prescribe measures to ensure that the institution is run efficiently for the right to administer does not include the right to maladministration. While grant­in­aid is not included in the guarantee contained in the Constitution to linguistic and religious minorities for establishing and running their educational institutions, such grant cannot be denied to such institutions only because the institutions are established by   linguistic   or   religious   minority.   Grant   of   aid   cannot, however, be made subservient to conditions which deprive the 63 institution   of   their   substantive   right   of   administering   such institutions.   Suffice   it   to   say   that   once   Respondent   4 Institution is held to be a minority institution entitled to the protection of Articles 26 and 30 of the Constitution of India the right   to   appoint   teachers   of   its   choice   who   satisfy   the conditions   of   eligibility   prescribed   for   such   appointments under the relevant rules is implicit in their rights to administer such institutions. Such rights cannot then be diluted by the State   or   its   functionaries   insisting   that   the   appointment should be made only with the approval of the Director or by following the mechanism generally prescribed for institutions that do not enjoy the minority status.”   In   Modern   Dental   College   and   Research   Centre   (supra),   the 31. Constitution Bench of this Court considered the provisions of Articles 19(1)(g),   19(6),   26   and   30   in   relation   to   the   right   to   freedom   of occupation of private unaided minority and non­minority educational institutions.   This Court observed that the activity of education is neither trade nor profession,   i.e. , commercialisation and profiteering cannot be permitted.  It is open to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public.  The education cannot be allowed to be a purely economic activity; it is a welfare activity aimed at achieving more   egalitarian   and   prosperous   society   to   bring   out   social transformation and upliftment of the nation. (a) This  Court further   opined  that  private  unaided  minority  and non­minority   institutions   have   a   right   to   occupation   under   Article 19(1),   the   said   right   is   not   absolute   and   subject   to   reasonable restriction in larger public interest of students community to promote merit, achieve excellence and curb malpractices by holding common 64 entrance test for admission and fee structure can undoubtedly be regulated in such institutions. (b) This Court in  Modern Dental College and Research Centre  (supra) also held that unless the admission procedure and fixation of fees are regulated and controlled at the initial stage, the evil of unfair practice of granting admission on available seats guided by the paying capacity of the candidates would be impossible to curb.  The Court also noted the   menace   of   the   fee   prevailing   in   the   various   educational professional institutions and in the context of Articles 19(1)(g), 19(6), 30,  41   and 47, and considering the Schedule VII, Entry 25  of List III and   Entry   63­66   of   List   I,   this   Court   held   that   concerning "professional   unaided   minority"   and   "non­minority   institutions", common   entrance   test   has   to   be   conducted   by   the   State   and regulation of the fee structure by it is permissible.   The Court took note   of   the   large­scale   malpractices,   exploitation   of   students, profiteering, and commercialisation and entrance examination held by various institutions failing the triple test of having fair, transparent, and   non­exploitative   process.     The   Court   held   that   reasonable restriction can be imposed to regulate admission and fee structure. The Court also observed about statutory functioning of the healthcare system in the country and the poor functioning of the MCI.  65 (c) The Court further considered the criteria of proportionality and emphasised for proper balance between the two facets viz. the rights and   limitations   imposed   upon   it   by   a   statute.   The   concept   of proportionality   is   an   appropriate   criterion. The   law   imposing restrictions will be treated as proportional if it is meant to achieve a proper purpose. If the measures taken to achieve such a goal are rationally connected to the object, such steps are necessary.   The Court considered the concept of proportionality thus: “57.  It is well settled that the right under Article 19(1)( g ) is not absolute   in   terms   but   is   subject   to   reasonable   restrictions under clause (6). Reasonableness has to be determined having regard to the nature of right alleged to be infringed, purpose of the restriction, extent of restriction and other relevant factors. In applying these factors, one cannot lose sight of the directive principles of State policy. The Court has to try to strike a just balance   between   the   fundamental   rights   and   the   larger interest of the society. The Court interferes with a statute if it clearly violates the fundamental rights. The Court proceeds on the footing that the legislature understands the needs of the people. The Constitution is primarily for the common man. Larger interest and welfare of student community to promote merit,   achieve   excellence   and   curb   malpractices,   fee   and admissions can certainly be regulated. 58.   Let us carry out this discussion in some more detail as this is the central issue raised by the appellants. Doctrine of proportionality explained and applied 59.   Undoubtedly,   the   right   to   establish   and   manage   the educational   institutions   is   a   fundamental   right   recognised under Article 19(1)( g ) of the Act. It also cannot be denied that this right is not “absolute” and is subject to limitations i.e. “reasonable restrictions” that can be imposed by law on the exercise of the rights that are conferred under clause (1) of Article 19. Those restrictions, however, have to be reasonable. Further, such restrictions should be “in the interest of general public”, which conditions are stipulated in clause (6) of Article 19, as under: “ 19. (6)  Nothing in sub­clause (g) of the said clause shall affect   the   operation   of   any   existing   law   insofar   as   it 66 imposes,   or   prevent   the   State   from   making   any   law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub­clause,   and,   in   particular,   nothing  in   the   said   sub­ clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to— ( i )   the   professional   or   technical   qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or ( ii ) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.”  Another significant feature which can be noticed from the 60. reading of the aforesaid clause is that the State is empowered to   make   any   law   relating   to   the   professional   or   technical qualifications   necessary   for   practising   any   profession   or carrying on any occupation or trade or business. Thus, while examining   as   to   whether   the   impugned   provisions   of   the statute and rules amount to reasonable restrictions and are brought out in the interest of the general public, the exercise that   is   required   to   be   undertaken   is   the   balancing   of fundamental right to carry on occupation on the one hand and the restrictions imposed on the other hand. This is what is known   as   “doctrine   of   proportionality”.   Jurisprudentially, “proportionality” can be defined as the set of rules determining the   necessary   and   sufficient   conditions   for   limitation   of   a constitutionally protected right by a law to be constitutionally permissible. According to Aharon Barak (former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Israel), there are four sub­components of proportionality   which   need   to   be   satisfied   [Aharon   Barak, Proportionality:   Constitutional   Rights   and   Their   Limitation (Cambridge   University   Press   2012)],   a   limitation   of   a constitutional right will be constitutionally permissible if: (i) it is designated for a proper purpose; (ii)   the   measures   undertaken   to   effectuate   such   a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfilment of that purpose; (iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation; and finally (iv) there needs to be a proper relation (“proportionality stricto  sensu”  or “balancing”)  between  the importance  of achieving the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing the limitation on the constitutional right. 61.   Modern   theory   of   constitutional   rights   draws   a fundamental   distinction   between   the   scope   of   the 67 constitutional rights, and the extent of its protection. Insofar as the scope of constitutional rights is concerned, it marks the outer boundaries of the said rights and defines its contents. The extent of its protection prescribes the limitations on the exercises of the rights within its scope. In that sense, it defines the justification for limitations that can be imposed on such a right. 62.   It   is   now   almost   accepted   that   there   are   no   absolute constitutional rights and all such rights are related. As per the analysis of Aharon Barak, two key elements in developing the modern   constitutional   theory   of   recognising   positive constitutional rights along with its limitations are the notions of democracy and the rule of law. Thus, the requirement of proportional   limitations   of   constitutional   rights   by   a   sub­ constitutional   law   i.e.   the   statute,   is   derived   from   an interpretation of the notion of democracy itself. Insofar as the Indian Constitution is concerned, democracy is treated as the basic feature of the Constitution and is specifically accorded a constitutional status that is recognised in the Preamble of the Constitution   itself.   It   is   also   unerringly   accepted   that   this notion   of   democracy   includes   human   rights   which   is   the cornerstone of Indian democracy. Once we accept the aforesaid theory (and there cannot be any denial thereof), as a fortiori, it has also to be accepted that democracy is based on a balance between constitutional rights and the public interests. In fact, such   a   provision   in   Article   19   itself   on   the   one   hand guarantees some certain freedoms in clause (1) of Article 19 and   at   the   same   time   empowers   the   State   to   impose reasonable restrictions on those freedoms in public interest. This notion accepts the modern constitutional theory that the constitutional rights are related. This relativity means that a constitutional licence to limit those rights is granted where such a limitation will be justified to protect public interest or the rights of others. This phenomenon—of both the right and its   limitation   in   the   Constitution—exemplifies   the   inherent tension between democracy’s two fundamental elements. On the   one   hand   is   the   right’s   element,   which   constitutes   a fundamental   component   of   substantive   democracy;   on   the other hand is the people element, limiting those very rights through   their   representatives.   These   two   constitute   a fundamental component of the notion of democracy, though this   time   in   its   formal   aspect.   How   can   this   tension   be resolved? The answer is that this tension is not resolved by eliminating the “losing” facet from the Constitution. Rather, the tension is resolved by way of a proper balancing of the competing principles.  This is one of the  expressions of the multi­faceted   nature   of   democracy.   Indeed,   the   inherent tension between democracy’s different facets is a “constructive tension”. It enables each facet to develop while harmoniously coexisting   with   the   others.   The   best   way   to   achieve   this peaceful   coexistence   is   through   balancing   between   the 68 competing   interests.   Such   balancing   enables   each   facet   to develop   alongside   the   other facets,   not  in  their place.   This tension between the two fundamental aspects—rights on the one   hand   and   its   limitation   on   the   other   hand—is   to   be resolved   by   balancing   the   two   so   that   they   harmoniously coexist with each other. This balancing is to be done keeping in mind the relative social values of each competitive aspects when considered in proper context. 63.   In this direction, the next question that arises is as to what criteria is to be adopted for a proper balance between the two facets viz. the rights and limitations imposed upon it by a statute. Here comes the concept of “ proportionality ”, which is a proper   criterion.   To   put   it   pithily,   when   a   law   limits   a constitutional right, such a limitation is constitutional if it is proportional. The law imposing restrictions will be treated as proportional if it is meant to achieve a proper purpose, and if the measures taken to achieve such a purpose are rationally connected to the purpose, and such measures are necessary. This   essence   of   doctrine   of   proportionality   is   beautifully captured by Dickson, C.J. of Canada in  R.  v.  Oakes , (1986) 1 SCR 103 (Can SC) in the following words (at p. 138): “To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified   in   a   free   and   democratic   society,   two   central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, which the measures,   responsible   for   a   limit   on   a   Charter   right   or freedom   are   designed   to   serve,   must   be   “of”   sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional protected right or freedom … Second … the party invoking Section 1 must   show   that   the   means   chosen   are   reasonable   and demonstrably   justified.   This   involves   “a   form   of proportionality   test…”   Although   the   nature   of   the proportionality   test   will   vary   depending   on   the circumstances,   in   each   case   courts   will   be   required   to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and   groups.   There   are,   in   my   view,   three   important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be … rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means … should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question … Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance”. The more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 64.  The exercise which, therefore, is to be taken is to find out as to whether the limitation of constitutional rights is for a purpose   that   is   reasonable   and   necessary   in   a   democratic 69 society   and   such   an   exercise   involves   the   weighing   up   of competitive values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality i.e. balancing of different interests.” (d)  In  Modern Dental College and Research Centre  (supra), the Court, while dealing with reasonable restriction on rights under Article 19 observed: “ 65.   We   may   unhesitatingly   remark   that   this   doctrine   of proportionality, explained hereinabove in brief, is enshrined in Article 19 itself when we read clause (1) along with clause (6) thereof. While defining as to what constitutes a reasonable restriction, this Court in a plethora of judgments has held that the   expression   “ reasonable   restriction ”   seeks   to   strike   a balance between the freedom guaranteed by any of the sub­ clauses   of   clause   (1)   of   Article   19   and   the   social   control permitted by any of the clauses (2) to (6). It is held that the expression “ reasonable ” connotes that the limitation imposed on   a   person   in   the   enjoyment   of   the   right   should   not   be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of public. Further, in order to be reasonable, the restriction must have a reasonable relation to the object which the legislation seeks to achieve, and must not go in excess of that object (see  P.P. Enterprises  v.  Union of India,  (1982) 2 SCC 33). At the same time, reasonableness of a restriction has to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of the interests of the general public and not from the point of view of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon   abstract   considerations   (see   Mohd.   Hanif   Quareshi   v. State of Bihar , AIR 1958 SC 731). In   M.R.F. Ltd.   v.   State of Kerala , (1998) 8 SCC 227, this Court held that in examining the reasonableness of a statutory provision one has to keep in mind the following factors: (1) The directive principles of State policy. (2) Restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the general public. (3)   In   order   to   judge   the   reasonableness   of   the restrictions,   no   abstract   or   general   pattern   or   a   fixed principle   can   be   laid   down   so   as   to   be   of   universal application and the same will vary from case to case as also with regard to changing conditions, values of human life, social philosophy of the Constitution, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances. (4)   A   just   balance   has   to   be   struck   between   the restrictions   imposed   and  the  social  control  envisaged  by Article 19(6). 70 (5) Prevailing social values as also social needs which are intended to be satisfied by the restrictions. (6)   There   must   be   a   direct   and   proximate   nexus   or reasonable   connection   between   the   restrictions   imposed and the object sought to be achieved. If there is a direct nexus between the restrictions, and the object of the Act, then a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the Act will naturally arise.” (e) Concerning necessity of regulatory framework, the Court opined:   “ 85.  No doubt, we have entered into an era of liberalisation of the economy, famously termed as “globalisation” as well. In such an economy, private players are undoubtedly given much more freedom in economic activities, as the recognition has drawn to the realities that the economic activities, including profession, business, occupation, etc. are not normal forte of the State and the State should have minimal role therein. It is for   this   reason,   many   sectors   which   were   hitherto   State monopolies, like telecom, power, insurance, civil aviation, etc. have now opened up for private enterprise. Even in the field of education the State/Government was playing a dominant role inasmuch as it was thought desirable that in a welfare State it is   the   fundamental   duty,   as   a   component   of   directive principles, to impart education to the masses and commoners as well as weaker sections of the society, at affordable rates. It was   almost   treated   as   solemn   duty   of   the   Government   to establish adequate number of educational institutions at all levels i.e. from primary level to higher education and in all fields including technical, scientific and professional, to cater to the varied sections of the society, particularly, when one­ third of the population of the country is poverty­stricken with large   percentage   as   illiterate.   With   liberalisation,   the Government   has   encouraged   establishments   of   privately managed institutions. It is done with the hope that the private sector   will   play   vital   role   in   the   field   of   education   with philanthropic approach/ideals in mind as this activity is not to be taken for the purpose of profiteering, but more as a societal welfare. 86.  It is, therefore, to be borne in mind that the occupation of education cannot be treated on a par with other economic activities.   In   this   field,   the   State   cannot   remain   a   mute spectator and has to necessarily step in in order to prevent exploitation,   privatisation   and   commercialisation   by   the private sector. It would be pertinent to mention that even in respect of those economic activities which are undertaken by the   private   sector   essentially   with   the   objective   of   profit­ making (and there is nothing bad about it), while throwing open such kind of business activities in the hands of private 71 sector, the State has introduced regulatory regime as well by providing regulations under the relevant statutes. 89.  With the advent of globalisation and liberalisation, though the market economy is restored, at the same time, it is also felt that market economies should not exist in pure form. Some regulation of the various industries is required rather than allowing   self­regulation   by   market   forces.   This   intervention through   regulatory   bodies,   particularly   in   pricing,   is considered necessary for the welfare of the society and the economists point out that such regulatory economy does not rob the character of a market economy which still remains a market economy. Justification for regulatory bodies even in such industries managed by private sector lies in the welfare of people.   Regulatory   measures   are   felt   necessary   to   promote basic well being for individuals in need. It is because of this reason that we find regulatory bodies in all vital industries like, insurance, electricity and power, telecommunications, etc. 90.   Thus,   it   is   felt   that   in   any   welfare   economy,   even   for private  industries,  there   is a  need  for regulatory  body  and such a regulatory framework for education sector becomes all the more necessary. It would be more so when, unlike other industries, commercialisation of education is not permitted as mandated   by   the   Constitution   of   India,   backed   by   various judgments of this Court to the effect that profiteering in the education is to be avoided.” (f)   The   Court   held   that   the   regulatory   mechanism   for   centralised examination is legal and constitutional and does not infringe on the fundamental rights of the minority or non­minority to establish and administer educational institutions.  It observed:  “57.  It is well settled that the right under Article 19(1)( g ) is not absolute   in   terms   but   is   subject   to   reasonable   restrictions under clause (6). Reasonableness has to be determined having regard to the nature of right alleged to be infringed, purpose of the restriction, extent of restriction and other relevant factors. In applying these factors, one cannot lose sight of the directive principles of State policy. The Court has to try to strike a just balance   between   the   fundamental   rights   and   the   larger interest of the society. The Court interferes with a statute if it clearly violates the fundamental rights. The Court proceeds on the footing that the legislature understands the needs of the people. The Constitution is primarily for the common man. 72 Larger interest and welfare of student community to promote merit,   achieve   excellence   and   curb   malpractices,   fee   and admissions can certainly be regulated. “  The very object of setting up institutions for the State is a 97. welfare function, for the purpose of excelling in educational standards.   On   the   other   hand,   the   primary   motivation   for private   parties   is   profit   motive   or   philanthropy.   When   the primary   motivation   for   institutions   is   profit   motive,   it   is natural that many means to achieve the same shall be adopted by the private institutions which leads to a large degree of secrecy   and   corruption.   As   such,   the   mechanism   of regulations as envisaged under the impugned laws is legal, constitutional,   fair,   transparent   and   uphold   the   primary criteria   of   merit.   The   same   does   not   infringe   on   the fundamental   rights   of   either   the   minorities   or   the   non­ minorities to establish and administer educational institutions and must as such be upheld as valid.” (g)  The Court also took note of prevailing situation of corruption in the field of education and commercialisation of education thus:   “   We   are   of   the   view   that   the   larger   public   interest 68. warrants such a measure. Having regard to the malpractices which   are   noticed   in   the   CET   conducted   by   such   private institutions   themselves,   for   which   plethora   of   material   is produced, it is, undoubtedly, in the larger interest and welfare of the student community to promote merit, add excellence and   curb   malpractices.   The   extent   of   restriction   has   to   be viewed keeping in view all these factors and, therefore, we feel that   the   impugned   provisions   which   may   amount   to “restrictions” on the right of the appellants to carry on their “occupation”, are clearly “reasonable” and satisfied the test of proportionality.” 86.  It is, therefore, to be borne in mind that the occupation of education cannot be treated on a par with other economic activities.   In   this   field,   the   State   cannot   remain   a   mute spectator and has to necessarily step in in order to prevent exploitation,   privatisation   and   commercialisation   by   the private sector. It would be pertinent to mention that even in respect of those economic activities which are undertaken by the   private   sector   essentially   with   the   objective   of   profit­ making (and there is nothing bad about it), while throwing open such kind of business activities in the hands of private sector, the State has introduced regulatory regime as well by providing regulations under the relevant statutes. 73 96.   As is evident from the facts mentioned by the State of Madhya Pradesh in its reply filed in IA No. 83 of 2015, the Association of Private Colleges has failed to hold their CETs in a fair, transparent and rational manner. The accountability and  transparency  in   State   actions   is  much  higher  than  in private   actions.   It   is   needless   to   say   that   the   incidents   of corruption in the State machinery were brought in the public eye immediately and have been addressed expeditiously. The same could never have been done in case of private actions. Even   on   a   keel   of   comparative   efficiency,   it   is   more   than evident that the State process is far more transparent and fair than one that is devised by the private colleges which have no mechanism of any checks and balances. The State agencies are   subject   to   the   Right   to   Information   Act,   audit,   State Legislature, anti­corruption agencies, Lokayukta, etc. 172.   Maintenance and improvement of public health and to provide health care and medical services is the constitutional obligation   of   the   State.   To   discharge   this   constitutional obligation, the State must have the doctors with professional excellence   and   commitment   who   are   ready   to   give   medical advice   and   services   to   the   public   at   large.   The   State   can satisfactorily discharge its constitutional obligation only when the aspiring students enter into the profession based on merit. None of these lofty ideals can be achieved without having good and committed medical professionals. 190.  For the foregoing discussion, I hold that the State has the legislative competence to enact the impugned legislation—the 2007   Act   to   hold   common   entrance   test   for   admission   to professional educational institutions and to determine the fee and   the   High   Court   has   rightly   upheld   the   validity   of   the impugned legislation. Regulations sought to be imposed by the impugned legislation on admission by common entrance test conducted   by   the   State   and   determination   of   fee   are   in compliance of the directions and observations in   T.M.A. Pai , (2002) 8 SCC 481,  Islamic Academy of Education , (2003) 6 SCC 697   and   P.A.   Inamdar ,   (2005)   6   SCC   537.   Regulations   on admission process are necessary in the larger public interest and welfare of the student community to ensure fairness and transparency   in   the   admission   and   to   promote   merit   and excellence. Regulation on fixation of fee is to protect the rights of the students in having access to higher education without being subjected to exploitation in the form of profiteering. With the   above   reasonings,   I   concur   with   the   majority   view   in upholding the validity of the impugned legislation and affirm the well­merited decision of the High Court.” 74 (h) The Court in  Modern Dental College and Research Centre  (supra) while considering the decision in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation  (supra) opined that Court did not give complete freedom to admit the students and also   as   to   fixation   of   fee.     Admission   has   to   be   based   on   merit, particularly   in   professional   educational   institutions.     This   Court observed thus: “ 34.  In the modern age, therefore, particularly after the policy of liberalisation adopted by the State, educational institutions by private bodies are allowed to be established. There is a paradigm   shift   over   from   the   era   of   complete   government control over education (like other economic and commercial activities) to a situation where private players are allowed to mushroom. But at the same time, regulatory mechanism is provided thereby ensuring that such private institutions work within such regulatory regime. When it comes to education, it is expected that unaided private institutions provide quality education and at the same time they are given “freedom in joints”   with   minimal   Government   interference,   except   what comes   under   regulatory   regime.   Though   education   is   now treated   as   an   “occupation”   and,   thus,   has   become   a fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution, at the same time shackles are put insofar as this particular occupation is concerned which is termed as “noble”. Therefore,   profiteering   and   commercialisation   are   not permitted and no capitation fee can be charged. The admission of students has to be on merit and not at the whims and fancies of the educational institutions. Merit can be tested by adopting   some   methodology   and   few   such   methods   are suggested in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation , (2002) 8 SCC 481, which includes   holding   of   CET.   It   is   to   be   ensured   that   this admission   process   meets   the   triple   test   of   transparency, fairness and non­exploitativeness. 37.   Insofar as the first part of the question is concerned, it does not pose any problem and the answer goes in favour of the appellants. We may recapitulate here that Article 26 of the Constitution gives freedom to every religious denomination or any section thereof by conferring certain rights which include right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes. Thus, insofar as religious denominations or any section thereof are concerned, they were given right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes making it a fundamental right. Likewise, Article 30 75 confers upon minorities fundamental right to establish and administer educational institutions.  Insofar as Article  26  is concerned, it comes under the caption “ Right to Freedom of Religion ”. As far as Article 30 is concerned, it is under the heading “ Cultural and Educational Rights ”. Thus, rights of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions were always recognised as fundamental rights. Further, the right of private unaided professional institutions to establish and   manage   educational   institutions   was   not   clearly recognised as a fundamental right covered under Article 19(1) ( g ) and categorically rejected by the Constitution Bench of this Court comprising of five Judges in   Unni Krishnan,   (1993) 1 SCC 645. It was held in para 198 of the judgment that: (SCC p. 752) “ 198 . [w]e are, therefore, of the opinion, adopting the line of reasoning in   State of Bombay   v.   R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala , AIR   1957   SC   699,   that   imparting   education   cannot   be treated as a trade or business. Education cannot be allowed to be converted into commerce nor can petitioners seek to obtain the said result by relying upon the wider meaning of “occupation”.”  In  Unni Krishnan case , (1993) 1 SCC 645, this Court also 38. rejected the argument that the said activity could be classified as   a   “ profession ”.   However,   the   right   of   professional institutions to establish and manage educational institutions was   finally   regarded   as   an   “ occupation ”   befitting   the recognition of this right as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)( g ) in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation,   (2002) 8 SCC 481, in the following words: (SCC p. 535, para 25) “ 25 .   The   establishment   and   running   of   an   educational institution where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or administrative staff, and an activity is carried on   that   results   in   the   imparting   of   knowledge   to   the students, must necessarily be regarded as an occupation, even if there is no element of profit generation. It is difficult to comprehend that education, per se, will not fall under any of the four expressions in Article 19(1)( g ). “Occupation” would be an activity of a person undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in life. The abovequoted observations in  Sodan Singh case , (1989) 4 SCC 155, correctly interpret the expression “occupation” in Article 19(1)( g ).” 40.  It becomes necessary to point out that while treating the managing  of educational  institution as an “ occupation ”,  the Court was categorical that this activity could not be treated as “ business ”   or   “ profession ”.   This   right   to   carry   on   the occupation that education is, the same is not put on a par with other occupations  or business  activities or  even other professions. It is a category apart which was carved out by this Court in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation , (2002) 8 SCC 481. There was a 76 specific purpose for not doing so. Education is treated as a noble “ occupation ” on “ no profit no loss ” basis. Thus, those who establish and are managing the educational institutions are not expected to indulge in profiteering or commercialising this noble activity. Keeping this objective in mind, the Court did not give complete freedom to the educational institutions in respect of right to admit the students and also with regard to fixation of fee. As far as admission of students is concerned, the Court was categorical that such admissions have to be on the   basis   of   merit   when   it   comes   to   higher   education, particularly in professional institutions.” (i) In  Modern Dental College and Research Centre  (supra), the Court considered decision in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation   (supra), and observed that Government is permitted to frame regulations for unaided private professional educational institutions, thus:   “ 42.   In   order   to   see   that   merit   is   adjudged   suitably   and appropriately, the Court candidly laid down that the procedure for admission should be so devised which satisfies the triple test of being fair, transparent and non­exploitative. The next question   was   as   to   how   the   aforesaid   objective   could   be achieved? For determining such merit, the Court showed the path   in   para   59   by   observing   that   such   merit   should   be determined   either   by   the   marks   that   students   obtained   at qualifying examination or at CET conducted by the institutions or in the case of professional colleges, by government agencies. Para 59 suggesting these modes reads as under: ( T.M.A. Pai Foundation case ,   (2002) 8 SCC 481, SCC p. 546) “ 59 .   Merit   is   usually   determined,   for   admission   to professional and higher education colleges, by either the marks   that   the   student   obtains   at   the   qualifying examination or school leaving certificate stage followed by the interview, or by a common entrance test conducted by the institution, or in the case of professional colleges, by government agencies.” This   paragraph   very   specifically   authorises   CET   to   be conducted by government agencies in the case of professional colleges. 43.  In order to ensure that the said CET is fair, transparent and merit­based,   T.M.A. Pai Foundation,   (2002) 8 SCC 481, also   permitted   the   Government   to   frame   regulations   for unaided private professional educational institutions. Paras 67 77 and   68   which   permit   framing   of   such   regulations   are reproduced below: (SCC p. 549) “ 67 . We now come to the regulations that can be framed relating to private unaided professional institutions. 68 .   It   would   be   unfair   to   apply   the   same   rules   and regulations regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional   institutions.   It   must   be   borne  in   mind  that unaided professional institutions are entitled to autonomy in their administration while, at the same time, they do not forego or discard the principle of merit. It would, therefore, be permissible for the university or the Government, at the time of granting recognition, to require a private unaided institution to provide for merit­based selection while, at the same time, giving the management sufficient discretion in admitting   students.   This   can   be   done   through   various methods. For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can be reserved for admission by the management out of those students who have passed the common entrance test held by itself or by the State/university and have applied to the college concerned for admission, while the rest of the seats may be filled up on the basis of counselling by the State agency.   This   will   incidentally   take   care   of   poorer   and backward   sections   of   the   society.   The   prescription   of percentage   for   this   purpose   has   to   be   done   by   the Government   according   to   the   local   needs   and   different percentages  can be  fixed  for  minority  unaided  and non­ minority   unaided   and   professional   colleges.   The   same principles   may   be   applied   to   other   non­professional   but unaided   educational   institutions   viz.   graduation   and postgraduation non­professional colleges or institutes.”  A plea was raised by the appellants that by exercising the 44. power to frame regulations, the State could not usurp the very function of conducting this admission test by the educational institutions. It was argued that it only meant that such a CET is to be conducted by the educational institutions themselves and   the   Government   could   only   frame   the   regulations   to regulate   such   admission   tests   to   be   conducted   by   the educational institutions and could not take away the function of holding CET. 45.   This   argument   has   to   be   rejected   in   view   of   the unambiguous   and   categorical   interpretation   given   by   the Supreme   Court   in   P.A.   Inamdar ,   (2005)   6   SCC   537,   with respect   to   certain   observations,   particularly   in   para   68   in T.M.A. Pai Foundation,   (2002) 8 SCC 481. In this behalf, we would like to recapitulate that in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation , (2002) 8 SCC 481, a Bench of eleven Judges dealt with the issues of scope of  right  to  set up educational institutions by private aided or unaided, minority or non­minority institutions and the extent of government regulation of the said right. It was 78 held that the right to establish and administer an institution included   the   right   to   admit   students   and   to   set   up   a reasonable fee structure. But the said right could be regulated to   ensure   maintenance   of   proper   academic   standards, atmosphere and infrastructure. Fixing of rigid fee structure, dictating the formation and composition of a governing body, compulsory nomination of teachers and staff for appointment or nominating students for admissions would be unacceptable restrictions.   However,   occupation   of   education   was   not business but profession involving charitable activity. The State can   forbid   charging   of   capitation   fee   and   profiteering.   The object   of   setting  up   educational   institution   is   not   to   make profit. There could, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus for development of education. For admission, merit must play an important role. The State or the University could require private unaided institution to provide for merit­based selection while giving sufficient discretion in admitting students. Certain percentage   of   seats   could   be   reserved   for   admission   by management out of students who have passed CET held by the institution or by the State/University. Interpretation of certain observations   in   para   68   of   the   judgment   in   T.M.A.   Pai Foundation , (2002) 8 SCC 481, has been a matter of debate to which we will advert to in detail hereinafter.  The matter was then considered by a larger Bench of seven 48. Judges in  P.A. Inamdar,  (2005) 6 SCC 537. It was held that the two   committees   for   monitoring   admission   procedure   and determining   fee   structure   as   per   the   judgment   in   Islamic Academy of Education , (2003) 6 SCC 697, were permissible as regulatory   measures   aimed   at   protecting   the   student community   as   a   whole   as   also   the   minority   themselves   in maintaining required standards of professional education on non­exploitative   terms.   This  did   not   violate  Article   30(1)   or Article   19(1)( g ).   It   was   observed   that:   ( P.A.   Inamdar   case , (2005) 6 SCC 537, SCC p. 607, para 145) “ 145 . …  Unless the admission procedure and fixation of fees  is regulated and controlled at the initial stage, the evil of  unfair practice of granting admission on available seats  guided by the paying capacity of the candidates would be  impossible to curb .” (emphasis supplied) On this ground, suggestion of the institutions to achieve the purpose for which committees had been set up by post­audit checks   after   the   institutions   adopted   their   own   admission procedure   and   fee   structure   was   rejected.   The   committees were, thus, allowed to continue for regulating the admissions and the fee structure until a suitable legislation or regulations were   framed   by   the   States.   It   was   left   to   the   Central Government and the State Governments to come out with a detailed   well­thought   out   legislation   setting   up   a   suitable 79 mechanism   for   regulating   admission   procedure   and   fee structure. Para 68 in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation case , (2002) 8 SCC 481, was explained by stating that observations permitting the management to reserve certain seats were meant for poorer and backward sections as per local needs. It did not mean to ignore the merit. It was also held that CET could be held, otherwise, merit becomes a casualty. There is, thus, no bar to CET being held by a State agency when the law so provides.” (j) The Court held that entrance examination is a regulatory measure and does not infringe on the rights of the institutions.  It opined:  “   Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the appellants 49. that the private medical colleges had absolute right to make admissions   or   to   fix   fee   is   not   consistent   with   the   earlier decisions of this Court. Neither merit could be compromised in admissions to professional institutions nor capitation fee could be permitted. To achieve these objects it is open to the State to introduce regulatory measures. We are unable to accept the submission that the State could intervene only after proving that   merit   was   compromised   or   capitation   fee   was   being charged. As observed in the earlier decisions of this Court, post­audit   measures   would   not   meet   the   regulatory requirements. Control was required at the initial stage itself. Therefore,   our   answer   to   the   first   question   is   that   though “occupation” is a fundamental right, which gives right to the educational institutions to admit the students and also fix the fee, at the same time, scope of such rights has been discussed and limitations imposed thereupon by the aforesaid judgments themselves explaining the nature of limitations on these rights. 55.  It would be necessary to clarify the position in respect of educational institutions run by minorities. Having regard to the pronouncement in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation , (2002) 8 SCC 481, with lucid clarifications to the said judgment given by this Court in  P.A. Inamdar , (2005) 6 SCC 537, it becomes clear that insofar as such regulatory measures are concerned, the same can   be   adopted   by   the   State   in   respect   of   minority­run institutions as well. Reliance placed by the appellants in   St. Stephen’s College  v.  University of Delhi , (1992) 1 SCC 558, may not   be   of   much   help   as   that   case   did   not   concern   with professional educational institutions. 67.   Undoubtedly,   right   to   establish   and   administer educational institutions is treated as a fundamental right as it is   termed   “ occupation ”,   which   is   one   of   the   freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)( g ). It was so recognised for the first time in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation,   (2002) 8 SCC 481. Even while   doing   so,   this   right   came   with   certain   clutches   and 80 shackles. The Court made it clear that it is a noble occupation which would not permit commercialisation or profiteering and, therefore, such educational institutions are to be run on “ no profit no loss basis ”. While explaining the scope of this right, right to admit students and right to fix fee was accepted as facets of this right, the Court again added caution thereto by mandating   that   admissions   to   the   educational   institutions imparting   higher   education,   and   in   particular   professional education, have to admit the students based on merit. For judging the merit, the Court indicated that there can be a CET. While   doing   so,   it   also   specifically   stated   that   in   case   of admission   to   professional   courses   such   a   CET   can   be conducted by the State. If such a power is exercised by the State assuming the function of CET, this was so recognised in T.M.A. Pai Foundation,  (2002) 8 SCC 481 itself, as a measure of “ reasonable restriction on the said right ”.   Islamic Academy of Education,   (2003) 6 SCC 697, further clarified the contour of such   function   of   the   State   while   interpreting   T.M.A.   Pai Foundation,  (2002) 8 SCC 481, itself wherein it was held that there can be committees constituted to supervise conducting of   such   CET.   This   process   of   interpretative   balancing   and constitutional   balancing   was   remarkably   achieved   in   P.A. Inamdar,  (2005) 6 SCC 537, by not only giving its premature to deholding ( sic   imprimatur to the holding) of CET but it went further to hold that agency conducting the CET must be the one which enjoys the utmost credibility and expertise in the matter to achieve fulfilment of twin objectives of transparency and   merit   and   for   that   purpose   it   permitted   the   State   to provide   a   procedure   of   holding   a   CET   in   the   interest   of securing   fair   and   merit­based   admissions   and   preventing maladministration.” This Court also considered the balancing of rights even if there is a violation of fundamental rights of the appellants to admit students by Central Examination Test by State.  It held as under: “   In  this sense,  when imparting  of  quality education to 92. cross­section of the society, particularly, the weaker section and   when   such   private   educational   institutions   are   to   rub shoulders with the State managed educational institution to meet   the   challenge   of   the   implementing   ambitious constitutional promises, the matter is to be examined  in a different hue. It is this spirit which we have kept in mind while balancing the right of these educational institutions given to them   under   Article   19(1)( g )   on   the   one   hand   and reasonableness of the restrictions which have been imposed by the impugned legislation. The right to admission or right to fix 81 the   fee   guaranteed   to   these   appellants   is   not   taken   away completely,  as feared.   T.M.A. Pai Foundation,   (2002)  8 SCC 481,   gives   autonomy   to   such   institutions   which   remains intact. Holding of CET under the control of the State does not impinge on this autonomy. Admission is still in the hands of these institutions. Once it is even conceded by the appellants that in admission of students “ triple test ” is to be met, the impugned legislation aims at that. After all, the sole purpose of holding CET is to adjudge merit and to ensure that admissions which are done by the educational institutions, are strictly on merit.   This   is   again   to   ensure   larger   public   interest.   It   is beyond comprehension that merely by assuming the power to hold CET, fundamental right of the appellants to admit the students is taken away. Likewise, when it comes to fixation of fee, as already dealt with in detail, the main purpose is that the State acts as a regulator and satisfies itself that the fee which is proposed by the educational institution does not have the element of profiteering and also that no capitation fee, etc. is charged. In fact, this dual function of regulatory nature is going   to   advance   the   public   interest   inasmuch   as   those students   who   are   otherwise   meritorious   but   are   not   in   a position to meet unreasonable demands of capitation fee, etc. are   not   deprived   of   getting   admissions.   The   impugned provisions, therefore, are aimed at seeking laudable objectives in larger public interest. Law is not static, it has to change with changing times and changing social/societal conditions.” (k) The Court held that MCI Act and the rules prescribed reasonable   restrictions under Article 19(6), thus: “ 53.   After referring to paras 136 and 137 in   P.A. Inamdar , (2005) 6 SCC 537, it was observed: ( Assn. of Private Dental case , 2009 SCC OnLine MP 760, SCC OnLine MP paras 34 & 37) “ 34 . It will be thus clear from paras 136 and 137 of the judgment in  P.A. Inamdar , (2005) 6 SCC 537, quoted above, that admissions to private unaided professional educational institutions can be made on the basis of merit of candidates determined   in   the   common   entrance   test   followed   by centralised counselling by the institutions imparting same or similar professional education together or by the State or by   an   agency   which   must   enjoy   utmost   credibility   and expertise and that the common entrance test followed by centralised counselling must satisfy the triple test of being fair, transparent and non­exploitative. Thus, the judgments of the Supreme Court in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation , (2002) 8 SCC   481   and   P.A.   Inamdar ,   (2005)   6   SCC   537,   permit holding   of   a   common   entrance   test   for   determination   of merit   for   admission   to   private   unaided   professional educational institutions by the State as well as any agency 82 which enjoy utmost credibility and expertise in the matter and which should ensure transparency in merit.     * 37 . Sections 3( d ), 6 and 7 of the 2007 Act by providing that the   common   entrance   test   for   determining   merit   for admissions in the private unaided professional educational institutions by a common entrance test to be conducted by the State or by an agency authorised by the State do not interfere with the autonomy of private unaided professional educational   institutions,   as   such   private   professional educational institutions are entitled to collect the fees from the students admitted to the institutions on the basis of merit, appoint their own staff (teaching and non­teaching), discipline and remove the staff, provide infrastructure and other facilities for students and do all such other things as are   necessary   to   impart   professional   education   to   the students. Sections 3( d ), 6 and 7 of the 2007 Act, therefore, do not impinge on the fundamental right to carry on the occupation of establishing and administering professional educational institutions as an occupation. The only purpose of Sections 3( d ), 6 and 7 of the 2007 Act is to ensure that students   of   excellence   are   selected   on   the   basis   of   a common entrance test conducted by the State or an agency authorised   by   the   State   and   that   students   without excellence   and   merit   do   not   make   entry   into   these professional educational institutions through malpractices and influence. As has been held both in the judgments in T.M.A. Pai Foundation,  (2002) 8 SCC 481 and  P.A. Inamdar , (2005) 6 SCC 537, the right of private unaided professional educational institutions to admit students of their choice is subject to selection of students on the basis of their merit through a transparent, fair and non­exploitative procedure. In our considered opinion therefore, Sections 3( d ), 6 and 7 of the 2007 Act do not in any way violate the fundamental right  of  citizens   guaranteed   under  Article   19(1)( g )   of  the Constitution. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the provisions of Sections 3( d ), 6 and 7 of the 2007 Act are saved by Article 15(5) of the Constitution or by the second limb of Article 19(6) of the Constitution relating to the power of the State to make a law for creation of monopoly in its favour in respect of any service.”” 32. In   Sankalp Charitable Trust   (supra), various orders passed by this Court on different dates have been reported.   This Court noted that NEET has been restored by judgment dated 11.4.2016 by which 83 the   judgment   and   order   in   Christian   Medical   College,   Vellore   and others   was   recalled.     The   respondents   were   directed   to   hold examination   for   admission   to   MBBS   and   BDS   courses   for   the academic   year   2016­17.     The   Court   passed   following   order   dated 28.4.2016:   “ 10.   In   view   of   the   submissions   made   on   behalf   of   the respondents, we record that NEET shall be held as stated by the respondents. We further clarify that notwithstanding any order passed by any court earlier with regard to not holding NEET, this order shall operate. Therefore, no further order is required to be passed at this stage. 11.   It   may   be   mentioned   here   that   some   learned   counsel representing those who are not parties to this petition have made   submissions  that  in  view   of   the   judgment   passed   in Christian Medical College, Vellore  v.  Union of India , it would not be   proper   to   hold   NEET   and   this   order   should   not   affect pending matters. 12.  We do not agree with the first submission for the reason that the said judgment has already been recalled on 11­4­2016 and   therefore,   the   Notifications   dated   21­12­2010   are   in operation as on today.” On 6.5.2016, the Court directed that no examination shall be permitted to be held for admission to MBBS or BDS studies by any private   college   or   association   or   any   private/deemed   university. Relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “   In   view   of   the   request   made   by   the   learned   Solicitor 23. General,   hearing   is   adjourned   to   9­5­2016.   However,   it   is clarified that no examination shall be permitted to be held for admission to MBBS or BDS studies by any private college or association or any private/deemed university. 24.   The   issue   with   regard   to   those   students,   who   had appeared or who are due to appear in examinations conducted 84 by the States in accordance with their State laws, shall be decided after hearing the learned Solicitor General.” On   9.5.2016,   in   the   aforesaid   matter,   the   Court   considered various   applications   filed   by   private   medical   colleges   seeking clarification of order dated 28.4.2016.  This Court directed as under: “ 29.   Medical  Council   of  India   (MCI)   and   Dental   Council   of India (DCI) issued Notifications dated 21­12­2010, amending the   existing   statutory   regulations   to   provide   for   a   single National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test (NEET) for admission to the   MBBS/BDS   course.   The   said   Notifications   were   struck down in   Christian Medical College, Vellore   v.   Union of India , (2014) 2 SCC 305. The said judgment stands recalled vide order dated 11­4­2016 in  Medical Council of India  v.  Christian Medical College, Vellore , (2016) 4 SCC 342. 32.  In a recent Constitution Bench judgment dated 2­5­2016, in   Modern Dental College & Research Centre   v.   State of M.P. , (2016) 7 SCC 353, the stand of the private medical colleges (including minorities) that conducting of entrance test by the State violated the right of autonomy of the said colleges, has been   rejected.   The   State   law   providing   for   conducting   of entrance test was upheld, rejecting the contention that the State  had no legislative  competence  on  the  subject.  At the same   time,   it   was   held   that   the   admission   involved   two aspects.   First,   the   adoption   of   setting   up   of   minimum standards of education and coordination of such standards which aspect was covered exclusively by List I Entry 66. The second aspect is with regard to implementation of the said standards which was covered by List III Entry 25. On the said aspect, the State could also legislate. The two entries overlap to some extent and to that extent List I Entry 66 prevailed over the subject covered by Entry 25.   Prima facie, we do not find any infirmity in the NEET 33. regulation on the ground that it affects the rights of the States or the private institutions. Special provisions for reservation of any category are not subject­matter of NEET nor are the rights of   minority   in   any   manner   affected   by   NEET.   NEET   only provides   for   conducting   entrance   test   for   eligibility   for admission to the MBBS/BDS course. 34.  We thus, do not find any merit in the applications seeking modification of the order dated 28­4­2016.” 85 33. In  Jainarayan Chouksey  (supra), the Court followed the decision in  Modern Dental College and Research Centre  (supra) and opined that the   said   decision   encompasses   not   only   the   State­conducted centralised   test   but   also   State­conducted   centralised   counselling. This Court issued a mandate for both the purposes, i.e., examination as well as counselling and held: “ 5.   We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   at length. We observe that mandate of our judgment was to hold centralised   entrance   test   followed   by   centralised   State counselling by the State to make it a one composite process. We, therefore, direct that admission to all medical seats shall be   conducted   by   centralised   counselling   only   by   the   State Government and none else. 6.   If   any   counselling   has   been   done   by   any   college   or university and any admission to any medical seat has been given so far, such admission shall stand cancelled forthwith and   admission   shall   be   given   only   as   per   centralised counselling done by the State Government.” 34. In   D.Y. Patil Vidyapeeth   (supra), the Court again clarified that the decision in   Modern Dental College and Research Centre   (supra) encompasses   not   only   centralised   State­conducted   test   but   also centralised State­conducted counselling. The   MCI   amended   vide   notification   dated   10.3.2017   the 35. Regulation on Graduate Medical Education, 1997 and Post Graduate Medical   Education   Regulations,   2000   providing   for   common counselling   for   admission   to   MBBS   and   post­graduate   medicine 86 courses on the basis of NEET.  The said notifications were challenged by   minority   institutions,   deemed   universities,   and   other   private institutions by filing a writ petition before this Court.  The Court vide order dated 9.5.2017 in   Dar­us­Salam Educational Trust and Ors. v. Medical Council of India and Ors.,   (Writ Petition (C) No.267 of 2017) opined that common counselling does not in any manner affect the right of minority institutions to admit students of their own minority community.  The Court held thus: “10.   Common   counselling   conducted   by   the   DGHS/State Government   will   not   in   any   manner   affect   the   rights   of minority   institutions   to   admit   students   of   their   respective minority   community.   The   minority   quota   seats,   if   any,   in institutions   run   by  minorities   will   be   filled   up   by   minority students only. Therefore, the rights of minority institutions are fully protected. Needless to say this arrangement will not apply to the States of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Jammu & Kashmir. As far as the other States are concerned, needless to say, this arrangement shall apply to all the colleges unless this Court has passed any different or separate order.” 36. In   Yatinkumar   Jasubhai   Patel   (supra),   the   Court   held   that introduction of NEET does not affect the 50% State quota seat in PG medicine course.  The Court also considered Section 10D of the Act of 1956 and regulations as amended by MCI.  It opined as under:   “ 9.4.  However, it is the case on behalf of the petitioners that in view of the introduction of the NEET Scheme and in view of Section 10­D of the MCI Act, by which admissions are to be given on the basis of merit in the NEET, such an “institutional preference” would not be permissible. It is required  to be noted that introduction of the NEET has, as such, nothing to do with any preference/institutional preference, more particularly the “institutional preference” as approved by this Court time and again. The purpose and object of the introduction of NEET was to  conduct  a  uniform  entrance  examination  for all  medical 87 educational   institutions   at   the   undergraduate   level   or postgraduate level and admissions at the undergraduate level and postgraduate level are to be given solely on the basis of the merits and/or marks obtained in the NEET examination only.   It   is   required   to   be   noted   that   earlier   the   respective universities   including   Gujarat   University   used   to   hold examination for postgraduate  admission to medical courses and   now   instead   of   such   tests   by   Gujarat University/universities concerned, merit is to be determined on   the   basis   of   the   NEET   examination   results   only   and admissions   are   required   to   be   given   on   the   basis   of   such merits  or  marks   obtained  in  NEET.  The  only  obligation  by virtue   of   introduction   of   NEET   is   that,   once   centralised admission   test   is   conducted,   the   State,   its   agencies, universities and institutions cannot hold any separate test for the purpose of admission to postgraduate and PG and diploma courses   and   such   seats   are   to   be   filled   up   by   the   State agencies, universities/institutions for preparing merit list as per the score obtained by the applicants in NEET examination and therefore by introduction of NEET, Section 10­D of the MCI Act has been amended, consequently amendment to the Post­Graduate   Education   Regulations,   2000,   admission   to postgraduate   courses   are   made   providing   for   solely   on   the basis   of   the   score   secured   by   the   candidates   seeking admission based on centralised examination i.e. NEET. 9.5.   Even   while   giving   admissions   in   the   State quota/institutional reservation quota, still the admissions are required to be given on the basis of the merits determined on the   basis   of   the   NEET   examination   results.   Under   the circumstances,  introduction of the NEET  Scheme, as  such, has   nothing   to   do   with   the   “institutional   preference”. Therefore, the change by introduction of the NEET Scheme shall   not   affect   the   institutional   preference/reservation   as approved   by   this   Court   from   time   to   time   in   a   catena   of decisions,   more   particularly   the   decisions   referred   to hereinabove.   Under   the   guise   of   introduction   of   the   NEET Scheme,   the   petitioners   cannot   be   permitted   to   re­agitate and/or   reopen   the   issue   with   respect   to   institutional preference which has been approved and settled by this Court in   a   catena   of   decisions,   more   particularly   the   decisions referred to hereinabove.” 37. The notifications, which are questioned in the matters and the amendment made to Section 10D as introduced in the Act of 1956 and regulations as amended by the MCI and similar provisions inserted in 88 the Dentists Act & Regulations, cannot be said to be taking away the rights of the unaided minority institutions or private institutions of making   admission   in   any   manner   as   it   is   permissible   to   provide regulatory   mechanism   at   the   national   level   and   the   entrance   test applies even to All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) – the most reputed Institute of India.  It is open to provide the regulatory mechanism   for   admission   for   such   courses   as   held   in   T.M.A.   Pai Foundation  (supra) the qualification and conditions of eligibility in the interest of academic standards can be provided, and there could be regulatory   measures   for   ensuring   educational   standards   and maintaining excellence in the matter of professional institution.  Thus, the decision in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation   (supra) rendered by 11­Judge Bench is juxtaposed   to the submission raised on behalf of petitioners. 38. In  P.A. Inamdar  (supra), the Court laid down the triple test of a fair, transparent and non­exploitative mechanism and if the admission procedure adopted by private institution does not satisfy all or any of the triple tests, it held that the admission procedure can be taken over by   the   State   substituting   its   process.   This   aspect   was   gauged   in Modern   Dental   College   and   Research   Centre   (supra)   in   a   broader perspective   considering   prevailing   situation   of   capitation   fee   and education becoming saleable commodity.  A decision has been taken to regulate admission in professional colleges on national basis so as 89 to wipe out the corruption and various evils from the system.  Even, the NEET has been made applicable to such premier institution like All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and so many others. The decision has been taken considering the overall national scenario, there cannot be any exemption, otherwise, there would be no end to such claims and multiple examinations.  It would not be possible to eradicate evils.  We cannot restore overall derogatory situation which prevailed   before   introduction   of   NEET.     Still,   there   are   several loopholes,   which   are   to   be   plugged   in   the   admission   procedure. Unscrupulous practices are being adopted by private colleges of not admitting students sponsored by centralised counselling committee. The minority and private institutions have to admit students based on merit in the permissible category, based on NEET as per procedure prescribed under the Act and Regulations. 39. In  Faculty Association of All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. (2013)   11   SCC   246,   concerning   issue   of Union   of   India   and   Ors.,   reservation in super­speciality, the Court opined:  “ 22.  Although the matter has been argued at some length, the main issue raised regarding reservation at the superspeciality level   has   already   been   considered   in   Indra   Sawhney   case , 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, by a nine­Judge Bench of this Court. Having regard to such decision, we are not inclined to take any view other than the view expressed by the nine­Judge Bench on the issue. Apart from the decisions rendered by this Court in    Jagadish Saran case     , (1980) 2 SCC 768 and    Pradeep Jain   case   , (1984) 3 SCC 654, the issue also fell for consideration in   Preeti   Srivastava   case,     (1999)   7   SCC   120,   which   was   also 90   decided by a Bench of five Judges. While in     Jagadish Saran   case,       (1980) 2 SCC 768 and in       Pradeep Jain case,     (1984) 3 SCC   654,   it   was   categorically   held   that   there   could   be   no compromise with merit at the superspeciality stage, the same   sentiments   were   also   expressed   in     Preeti   Srivastava   case, (1999) 7 SCC 120, as well. 23.   In   Preeti   Srivastava   case ,   (1999)   7   SCC   120,   the Constitution Bench had an occasion to consider Regulation 27 of   the   Post   Graduate   Institute   of   Medical   Education   and Research,   Chandigarh   Regulations,   1967,   whereby   20%   of seats   in   every   course   of   study   in   the   institute   was   to   be reserved  for  candidates   belonging  to  the  Scheduled   Castes, Scheduled Tribes or other categories of persons, in accordance with the general rules of the Central Government promulgated from   time   to   time.   The   Constitution   Bench   came   to   the conclusion that Regulation 27 could not have any application at the highest level of superspeciality as this would defeat the very object of imparting the best possible training to selected meritorious   candidates,   who   could   contribute   to   the advancement of knowledge in the field of medical research and its applications. Their Lordships ultimately went on to hold that   there   could   not   be   any   type   of   relaxation   at   the superspeciality level. 24.  In para 836 of the judgment in  Indra Sawhney case , 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, it was observed that   while the relevance and significance of merit at the stage of initial recruitment cannot be ignored, it cannot also be ignored that the same idea of reservation implies selection of a less meritorious person. It was also observed that at the same time such a price would have to be paid if the constitutional promise of social justice was to be redeemed. However, after making such suggestions, a note of caution was introduced in the very next paragraph in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution. A distinction was, however, made with regard to the provisions of Article 16 and it was held that Article 335 would be relevant and it would not be permissible not to prescribe any minimum standard at all. Of course, the said observation was made in the context of admission to medical colleges and reference was also made to the decision in   State of M.P.   v.   Nivedita Jain , (1981) 4 SCC 296, where admission to medical courses was regulated by an entrance test. It was held that in the matter of appointment of medical   officers,   the   Government   or   the   Public   Service Commission would not be entitled to say that there would not be   minimum   qualifying   marks   for   Scheduled Castes/Scheduled   Tribes   candidates   while   prescribing   a minimum for others. In the very next paragraph, the nine­ Judge Bench while discussing the provisions of Article 335 also observed that there were certain services and posts where either on account of the nature of duties attached to them or 91 the level in the hierarchy at which they stood, merit alone counts. In such situations, it cannot be advised to provide for reservations.   In   the   paragraph   following,   the   position   was made  even more  clear when Their  Lordships  observed that they were of the opinion that in certain services in respect of certain posts, application of rule of reservation may not be advisable in regard to various technical posts including posts in superspeciality in medicine, engineering and other scientific and technical posts.” (emphasis supplied) The Court directed the Union of India to take appropriate steps in accordance with views expressed in the case of  Dr. Preeti Srivastava and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors.  (1999) 7 SCC 120 . 40. In   Re   The   Kerala   Education   Bill   (supra) ,   it   was   opined   that minority   could   not   ask   for   aid   and   recognition   of   educational institution,  when such institutions are recognized it would be open to make   the   institution   retaining   its   character   as   effective   as   an educational institution without destroying its minority character for the purpose as enshrined in Article 30.  The institution has to be an effective vehicle of education for all concerned.  41. In   Gandhi   Faiz­e­am   College,   Shahjahanpur   (supra),   it   was opined   that   regulation   which   imposes   restrictions   is   bad;   but regulation which facilitates is good.   We find that in   Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association  (supra) it has been observed that institution has to be an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it.   There cannot be any 92 complaint   of   invasion   of   the fundamental   right to   administer   the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object. The Court observed that minorities have no right to maladminister. The notifications issued, amendment made to Section 10D of the Act of 1956 and regulations framed by MCI and similar provisions for dental courses providing for NEET cannot be said to be impinging upon the rights of the minority and the provisions of the Act and regulations framed by MCI under the Act of 1956, in DCI Act and regulations are required to be observed by each and every institution.     The   regulatory   measures   under   the   Act/   Regulations cannot be said to be averse to the interest of such institutions, and such reasonable measures   can be carved out. They do not impinge upon the rights of institutions guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 25 and 30 of the Constitution of India. 42. In   T.M.A. Pai Foundation   (supra), this Court opined that State maintained or aided educational institutions, whether established by the Government or the majority or a minority community cannot deny admission to a citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste or language.  While considering the issue    In Re The Kerala Education Bill (supra), it was observed that the right of the private training colleges to admit students of their choice was severely restricted.   It further observed that the right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to 93 prevent   the   State   from   making   any   regulation   whatsoever.     The Government cannot be prevented from framing regulations that are in the   national   interest.     This   Court   observed   that   it   is   difficult   to comprehend   that   right to   the   religious   or   linguistic   minorities   are given by the Constitution, which would enable them to establish and administer educational institutions in a manner to conflict with the other Parts of the Constitution.  There is no reason why conditions for the welfare of students and teachers should not be made, but any law or rule or regulation that would put the educational institutions run by the minorities at a disadvantage when compared to the institutions run by the others will have to be struck down.  The law of the land includes rules and regulations that must apply equally to the majority as well as minority institutions.   The minority institutions must be allowed to do what non­minority is permitted to do.   They have to comply with the conditions of recognition, which cannot be such as to whittle   down   the   right   guaranteed   under   Article   30   of   the Constitution.  43. In   Brahmo  Samaj  Education  Society   (supra),  it was  held that State could impose necessary conditions for proper maintenance of standards of education and to check maladministration.   94 44. On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that individual autonomy is the concern of any Government. There should not be interference   to   defeat   the   rights   conferred   by   the   Constitution. Reliance   has   been   placed   on   Gobind   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh (supra) in which this Court held: “ . There can be no doubt that the makers of our Constitution 20 wanted   to   ensure   conditions   favourable   to   the   pursuit   of happiness.   They   certainly   realized   as   Brandeis,   J.   said   in   his dissent   in   Olmstead   v.   United   States ,   277   US   438,   471,   the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect and that only a part of the pain, pleasure, satisfaction of life can be found in material things and therefore they must be deemed   to   have   conferred   upon   the   individual   as   against   the Government a sphere where he should be let alone. . “The liberal individualist tradition has stressed, in particular, 21 three personal ideals, to each of which corresponds a range of ‘private affairs’. The first is the ideal of personal relations; the second, the Lockean ideal of the politically free man in a minimally regulated   society;   the   third,   the   Kantian   ideal   of   the   morally autonomous man, acting on principles that he accepts as rational. [See   Benn,   “Privacy,   Freedom   and   Respect   for   Persons”   in   J. Pennock & J. Chapman. Eds., Privacy, Nomos XIII, 1, 15­16].” 23 .   Individual   autonomy,   perhaps   the   central   concern   of   any system   of   limited   Government,   is   protected   in   part   under   our Constitution   by   explicit   constitutional   guarantees.   In   the application of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has been but what may be. Time  works changes and brings  into  existence  new  conditions.  Subtler and  far  reaching means of invading privacy will make it possible to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a definition of privacy raises  serious  questions about the  propriety of judicial reliance   on  a  right   that  is  not  explicit  in  the  Constitution.  Of course,   privacy   primarily   concerns   the   individual.   It   therefore relates   to   and   overlaps   with   the   concept   of   liberty.   The   most serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of other rights and values. 24 . Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies   of   the   home,   the   family,   marriage,   motherhood, procreation   and   child   rearing.   This   catalogue   approach   to   the 95 question   is   obviously   not   as   instructive   as   it   does   not   give analytical picture of the distinctive characteristics of the right of privacy.   Perhaps,   the   only   suggestion   that   can   be   offered   as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. .   Rights   and   freedoms   of   citizens   are   set   forth   in   the 25 Constitution   in   order   to   guarantee   that   the   individual,   his personality, and those things stamped with his personality shall be free from official interference except where a reasonable basis for intrusion exists. “Liberty against Government” a phrase coined by Professor Corwin expresses this idea forcefully. In this sense, many of the fundamental rights of citizens can be described as contributing to the right to privacy. 26 . As Ely says: There is nothing to prevent one from using the word ‘privacy’ to mean   the   freedom   to   live   one’s   life   without   governmental interference. But the Court obviously does not so use the term. Nor could it, for such a right is at stake in every case. [See The Wage of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale LJ 920, 932].” The reliance has also been placed on  K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. 45. v. Union of India and Ors. , 2017 (10) SCC 1, the decision relating to privacy in which this Court held: “ 351 . The Constitution of any country reflects the aspirations and goals of the people of that country voiced through the language of the  few chosen individuals  entrusted  with  the  responsibility of framing its Constitution. Such aspirations and goals depend upon the   history   of   that   society.   History   invariably   is   a   product   of various forces emanating from religious, economic, and political 1 events .   The   degree   of   refinement   of   the   Constitution   depends upon the wisdom of the people entrusted with the responsibility of framing   the   Constitution.   The   constitution   is   not   merely   a document signed by 284 Members of the Constituent Assembly. It is a politically sacred instrument created by men and women who risked lives and sacrificed their liberties to fight alien rulers and secured freedom for our people, not only of their generation but 1 However, various forced which go into the making of history are dynamic. Those who are entrusted with the responsibility of the working of the Constitution must necessarily keep track of the dynamics of such forces. Evolution of science and growth of technology is another major factor in the modern world which is equally a factor to be kept in mind to successfully work the Constitution. 96 generations   to   follow.   The   Constitution   cannot   be   seen   as   a document written in ink to replace one legal regime by another. It is   a   testament   created   for   securing   the   goals   professed   in 2 Preamble . Part III of the Constitution is incorporated to ensure 3 the achievement of the objects contained in the Preamble . "We the 4 People"   of   this   country   are   the   intended   beneficiaries   of   the Constitution. It must be seen as a document written in the blood of innumerable martyrs of Jalianwala Bagh and the like. Man is not a creature of the State. Life and liberty are not granted by the Constitution. Constitution only stipulates the limitations on the power of the State to interfere with our life and liberty. Law is essential to enjoy the fruits of liberty; it is not the source of liberty and emphatically not the exclusive source.” 46. It was argued that certain colleges have produced doctors of renowned fame, and they are an asset for India.   There is no doubt about it that doctors of international fame have been produced by various institutions.  They are an asset not only for India but also for the entire humanity.   They are pioneers in various fields of medical science such as Oncology, Surgery, and other branches of medical science.   But, when it comes to the eradication of the malpractices that have crept into the system, we have to take into consideration larger interest of the education countrywide.   The NEET has been 2 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225. “91. … Our Preamble outlines the objectives of the whole Constitution. It expresses “what we had thought of dreamt for so long”.” (SCC p.323, para 91). 3 Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re, AIR 1958 SC 956 “5. … To implement and fortify these supreme purposes set forth in the Preamble, Part III of our Constitution has provided for us certain fundamental rights.” (AIR p. 965, para 5). 4 Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1956 SC 479 “23. After all, for whose benefit was the Constitution enacted? What was the point of making all this bother about fundamental rights? I am clear that the Constitution is not for the exclusive benefit of governments and States; it is only for lawyers and politicians and officials and those highly placed. It also exists for the common man, for the poor and the humble, for those who have businesses at stake, for the “butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker”. It lays down for this land “a rule of law” as understood in the free democracies of the world. It constitutes India into a Sovereign Republic and guarantees in every page rights and freedom to the side by side and consistent with the overriding power of the State to act for the common good of all.” (AIR p.487, para 23) [For convenience, citations have been renumbered.] 97 prescribed by the Legislature in the larger public interest that has to prevail.     We   find   the   provisions   to   be   reasonable   conditions   of recognition/ affiliation are binding for the very existence of all such institution whether they are run by majority or minority failing which they   cannot   exists   and   impart   education.     The   conditions   are reasonable   and   cannot   be   said   to   be   taking   away   any   of   the constitutional rights of minority institutions, they are reasonable, fair and   intended   to   bring   transparency   in   the   professional   education imparted by institutions.  They are applicable for all institutions alike minorities are not placed on a disadvantageous platform. 47. There is no doubt as to the concept of limited Government and least interference is welcomed, but in which field and to what extent balancing with the larger public and national interest is required. The individual autonomy, rights, and obligations are to be free from official interference except where the rational basis for intrusion exists. The Constitution   provides   a   limitation   on   the   power   of   the   State   to interfere with life, liberty, and rights, however, the concept of limited government cannot be extended to a level when it defeats the very national   interest.   The   maladies   with   which   professional   education suffers   in   this   country   are   writ   large.   The   regulatory   framework created by the MCI/ DCI is concomitant of conditions, affiliation and recognition, and providing central examination in the form of NEET 98 cannot be said to be violative of the rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30.   The   regulatory   framework   is   not   restrictive,   but   caters   to   the effective   enjoyment   of   the   rights   conferred   under   the   aforesaid provisions.     The   provisions   qualify   the   doctrine   of   proportionality considered   in   Modern   Dental   College   and   Research   Centre   (supra). What has been held therein for State level examination holds good for NEET also. 48. The   prescription   of NEET is definitely in order to improve the medical education, co­related to the improvement of public health, thus, it is a step­in furtherance of the duty of the State enshrined in the Directive Principles of the State Policy contained in Article 47 of the Constitution of India.  Similarly, Article 46 aims at promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other weaker sections.  By prescription of one equivalence examination   of   NEET,   the   interest   of   their   merit   is   also   equally protected and its aims of preventing various malpractices, which crept into system and prevent economic exploitation by selling seats with which   malady   the   professional   medical   education   system   suffered. Article 51A(j) deals with the duty to strive towards excellence in all spheres   of   individual   and   collective   activity   so   that   the   nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement.  For that purpose, recognition of merit is necessary, and one has to be 99 given a full opportunity in pursuit of his/her aim.  The prescription of NEET is to provide equal opportunity and level launching platform to an individual to perform his duty as enshrined under Article 51A(j). Thus, we find that there is no violation of the aforesaid provisions as argued   by   appellants,   rather   action   is   in   furtherance   of   the constitutional aims and directions to achieve intendment of Article 51A(j) and is in the national interest.  49. In   Secretary, Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose and Ors.,   ( 2007 )  1   SCC   386,   Court   considered   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation (supra),   and   held   that   all   laws   made   by   the   State   to regulate the administration of educational institutions and grant of aid will apply to minority educational institutions also, but dilution of right under Article 30 is not permissible.  The right under Article 30 is not above the law.  The regulations or conditions concerning the welfare of the students and teachers should be made applicable to provide a proper academic atmosphere.   50. In   P.A.   Inamdar   (supra),   the   court   opined   that   activities   of education are charitable.  The educational institutions, both of a non­ minority and minority character, can be regulated and controlled so that they do not indulge in selling seats of learning to make money. They can be allowed to generate such funds as would be reasonably required   to   run   the   institute   and   for   its   further   growth.     In   P.A. 100 Inamdar  (supra), this Court noted the difference between professional and   non­professional   educational   institutions.   It   observed   that professional educational institutions constitute a class by themselves and are distinguished from educational institutions imparting non­ professional education.  With respect to unaided minority educational institutions, Article 30 of the Constitution does not come in the way of the   State   stepping   in   for   the   purpose   of   securing   transparency and recognition of   merit   in   the   matter   of   admissions,   and   the conditions of recognition are binding on such institutions.  In   P.A. Inamdar  (supra), the Court opined that the admissions based on merit were in the national interest and strengthening the national welfare. 51. In  Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society  (supra), the Court held that   minority   institutions   have   a   right   to   admit   students   of   their choice subject to reasonable restriction for the academic qualification and the regulation, which will serve the interest of the students, can be imposed for ensuring efficiency and fairness.  Education is vital for the   nation;   it   develops   the   ethos   of   the   nation. Regulations   are necessary to see that there are no divisive or disintegrating forces in administration.     It observed that it is not reasonable to claim that minority institutions will have complete autonomy.  Some checks may be necessary and will serve the academic needs of the institution.  A correlative duty  of good administration  is  attached  to the  right  to 101 administer educational institution.  It was also opined in  Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society  (supra) in paragraph 19 quoted above that the State can prescribe regulations to ensure the excellence of the institution that does not militate against the right of the minority to administer the institutions.  Such Regulations are not restrictions on the   substance   of   the   right,   which   is   guaranteed;   they   secure   the proper   functioning   of   the   institution.     The   institution   cannot   be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence under the guise of the exclusive right of the management.  Minorities are as much part of the nation as the majority, and anything that impinges upon national interest must necessarily in its ultimate operation affect the interests of all.  52. It was further opined in  Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society (supra) in paragraph 94 quoted above that there are conditions of affiliation or recognition of an educational institution, it is implicit in the request for grant thereof that the educational institution would abide by the regulations which are made by the authority granting affiliation   or recognition.     When   Government   and   MCI/DCI   or concerned   Universities   grant   affiliation   and   recognition,   the institutions are bound by the conditions prescribed for affiliation and recognition.   It has also been observed that recognition or affiliation creates an interest in the university to ensure that the educational 102 institution is maintained for the purpose intended and any Regulation which will subserve or advance that purpose will be reasonable and no minority institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic   minority   can   claim recognition or   affiliation   without submitting to those regulations.   In view of the law laid down in  (supra), it 53. T.M.A. Pai Foundation  is   apparent   that   NEET/common   entrance   test   is   a   devise   to standardise   and   computing   equivalence   between   different   kinds   of qualifications.   It does not interfere with the rights of the unaided minority   institutions   as   it   has   been   imposed   in   national   interest considering the malpractices of granting illegal admission by virtually selling the seats in derogation to rights of meritorious students.  The charitable   activity   of   education   became   a   saleable   commodity   and prerogative of wealthy persons and poor students were forced to get education funded from Banks making it difficult for them to come out of tentacular octave of interest.  They are exploited in bud before they bloom   into   flower.     The   ill­reputation   developed   by   MCI   forced   to change its entire structure.   The national interest requires further improvement in the system to eradicate evils from the system.   The situation is still grim and require to be dealt with firm hand and steely determination.  103 54. In  Dr. Preeti Srivastava and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors.  (supra), it   was   opined   that   at   super   speciality   level   there   cannot   be   any reservation or lowering of the minimum qualifying marks. In  Modern Dental   College   and   Research   Centre   (supra),   considering   various malpractices,   it   was   observed   that   education   is   being   used   as exploitative financial device.   Education is not  a commodity  to be purchased by money power and deserving one as per merit cannot be deprived of the right to obtain it. The State cannot remain a mute spectator, and it must step in to prevent exploitation. 55. Thus, it is apparent that the provisions in question which have been incorporated in the Act relating to Medical/Dental education, the Government, MCI and DCI cannot be said to be an invasion of the fundamental   rights.     The   intendment   is   to   ensure   fairness   in   the selection, recognition of merit, and the interests of the students. In the national interest, educational institutions are basically for a charitable purpose.   By and large, at present education is devoid of its real character of charity, it has become a commodity. To weed out evils from   the   system,   which   were   eating   away   fairness   in   admission process, defeating  merit and aspiration of the  common  incumbent with no means, the State has the right to frame regulatory regime for aided/   unaided   minority/   private   institutions   as   mandated   by 104 Directives Principles, Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.  The first step has been taken to weed out the evils from the system, and it would not be in the national interest to step back considering the overall scenario.  If we revert to the old system, posterity is not going to forgive us.  Still, complaints are galore that merit is being ignored by private institutions; there is still a flood of litigation.  It seems that unfettered by a large number of regulatory measures, unscrupulous methods and malpractices are yet being adopted.  Building the nation is the  main  aspect of  education, which  could  not  be ignored  and overlooked.   They have to cater to national interest first, then their interest,   more   so,   when   such   conditions   can   be   prescribed   for recognition, particularly in the matter of professional education. 56. In  St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi  (supra), it was held that there has to be balancing of interest of rights of minorities.  It was observed that 50% of the annual admission has to be given to the members of communities other than the minority community on the basis of merit.   Regulations that serve the interest in standards of education amongst the recognised institutions could validly be made. Such   general   patterns   and   standards   are   the   need,   and   such regulation shall not have the effect of depriving the right of minorities to educate their children in their own institution. 105 57. The   learned   counsel   argued   that   it   is   open   to   some   of   the institutions to impose higher standards of merit. Firstly, conditions of affiliation are binding apart from that, we find that when it comes to national standards and the objects sought to be achieved by NEET, to conduct   individual   examinations   by   some   institutions   cannot   be permitted.  The   system  is  not   yet  out   of  clutches   of  unscrupulous devices and dubious means are adopted to defeat merit, the interest of education   would   further   suffer   and   very   purpose   of   centralised examination would be defeated. It is not possible to prescribe further examination over and above NEET that cannot be said to be workable, no exemption can be granted from NEET, considering the objective with which it has been introduced. We find that the uniform Entrance Examination cannot be said to be unreasonable regulatory framework. Considering the terms and conditions for affiliation and recognition for professional medical and such other professional courses are binding, and no relaxation can be permitted in the conditions. 58. Thus, we are of the opinion that rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of India do not come in the way of securing transparency and recognition of merits in the matter of admissions.  It is open to regulating the course of study, qualifications for ensuring educational standards.  It is open to imposing reasonable restrictions in the national and public interest. 106 The rights under Article 19(1)(g) are not absolute and are subject to reasonable restriction in the interest of the student's community to promote merit, recognition of excellence, and to curb the malpractices. Uniform   Entrance   Test   qualifies   the   test   of   proportionality   and   is reasonable.   The same is intended to check several maladies which crept into medical education, to prevent capitation fee by admitting students   which   are   lower   in   merit   and   to   prevent   exploitation, profiteering, and commercialisation of education.  The institution has to be a capable vehicle of education.   The minority institutions are equally   bound   to   comply   with   the   conditions   imposed   under   the relevant   Acts   and   Regulations   to   enjoy   affiliation   and   recognition, which apply to all institutions.  In case they have to impart education, they   are   bound   to   comply   with   the   conditions   which   are   equally applicable to all.   The regulations are necessary, and they are not divisive   or   disintegrative.     Such   regulatory   measures   enable institutions to administer them efficiently.  There is no right given to maladminister the education derogatory to the national interest.  The quality of medical education is imperative to sub­serve the national interest, and the merit cannot be compromised.  The Government has the right for providing regulatory measures that are in the national interest, more so in view of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. 107 59. The rights of the religious or linguistic minorities under Article 30 are not in conflict with other parts of the Constitution.  Balancing the   rights   is   constitutional   intendment   in   the   national   and   more enormous public interest.  Regulatory measures cannot be said to be exceeding   the concept of limited governance.  The regulatory measures in question are for the improvement of the public health and is a step, in furtherance of the directive principles enshrined in Articles 47 and 51(A)(j)   and   enable   the   individual   by   providing   full   opportunity   in pursuance   of   his   objective   to   excel   in   his   pursuit.     The   rights   to administer an institution under Article 30 of the Constitution are not above   the   law   and   other   Constitutional   provisions.     Reasonable regulatory measures can be provided without violating such rights available   under   Article   30   of   the   Constitution   to   administer   an institution.  Professional educational institutions constitute a class by themselves. Specific measures to make the administration of such institutions transparent can be imposed.  The rights available under Article 30 are not violated by provisions carved out in Section 10D of the   MCI   Act   and   the   Dentists   Act   and   Regulations   framed   by MCI/DCI.           The regulatory measures are intended for the proper functioning   of   institutions   and   to   ensure   that   the   standard   of education is maintained and does not fall low under the guise of an exclusive right of management to the extent of maladministration. The 108 regulatory measures by prescribing NEET is to bring the education within the realm of charity which character it has lost.  It intends to weed   out   evils   from   the   system   and   various   malpractices   which decayed the system.  The regulatory measures in no way interfere with the rights to administer the institution by the religious or linguistic minorities. 60. Resultantly, we hold that there is no violation of the rights of the unaided/aided minority to administer institutions under Articles 19(1) (g) and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of India by prescribing the uniform examination of NEET for admissions in the graduate and postgraduate professional courses of medical as well   as   dental   science.     The   provisions   of   the   Act   and   regulation cannot be said to be  ultra vires  or   taking away the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India under Article 30(1) read with Articles 19(1)(g), 14, 25, 26 and 29(1).   Accordingly, the transferred cases, appeal, and writ petitions are disposed of. No costs.   ................................J.  [ARUN MISHRA]  ................................J.  [VINEET SARAN]  ................................J.  [M.R. SHAH]  NEW DELHI;  APRIL 29, 2020.