Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4964 OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 5051 OF 2018)
| ESTATE OFFICER AND ANR. | .....APPELLANT(S) |
|---|---|
| VERSUS | |
| CHARANJIT KAUR | .....RESPONDENT(S) |
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4965 OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 5082 OF 2018)
A N D
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4966 OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 16740 OF 2018)
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. This order shall dispose of three appeals bearing Civil Appeal No.
4964 of 2021 - Estate Officer v. Charanjit Kaur, Civil Appeal No.
4965 of 2021 - Estate Officer v. Kamlesh and Civil Appeal No. 4966
of 2021 - Estate Officer v. D.K. Khanna raising identical questions of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2021.09.29
13:33:25 IST
Reason:
law.
2. In Civil Appeal No. 4964 of 2021, the order of the National
1
1
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dated 24.05.2017 is
the subject matter of challenge. By the aforesaid order, the NCDRC
has dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant against an
order dated 16.05.2016 passed by the State Consumer Disputes
2
Redressal Commission affirming the order of the District Consumer
3
Disputes Redressal Forum . The respondent had sought conversion
of Plot No. 4059, Sector 46 D, Chandigarh, from leasehold to
freehold site on acceptance of the requisite conversion fee. The
learned District Forum directed the appellant to convert the said
plot in question from leasehold to freehold site on acceptance of
requisite conversion fee; to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000/- as
compensation for mental agony and physical harassment; and to
pay Rs.5,000/- as costs of litigation.
3. The learned NCDRC relied upon the judgment of this Court reported
4
as Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta to hold
that the respondent would be considered to be a consumer as fee
had been charged by the appellant for conversion. The NCDRC
further held that the administrator had put a note on the file that
he would not like to take any decision till he gets clear directions
from the Central Government. It was held that the appellant had
not produced any public notification suspending all conversions of
plots from leasehold to freehold, at least on 28.03.2013 when the
1 For short the ‘NCDRC’
2 For short the ‘SCDRC’
3 For short the ‘DCDRF’
4 (1994) 1 SCC 243
2
application was received in the office of Estate Officer.
4. In Civil Appeal No. 4965 of 2021, the impugned order was passed
by NCDRC on 17.11.2017 relying upon the order passed in
Charanjit Kaur . In the said case, the respondent was allotted a
5
site under Chandigarh Milk Colony Allotment of Site Rules, 1975
on 08.08.1977 measuring 143 sq. yards on a leasehold basis for a
period of 30 years for the purposes of cowshed cum dairy. The
Chandigarh Conversion of Residential Leasehold Land Tenure into
6
Freehold Land Tenure Rules, 1996 were extended to the sites
allotted under the 1975 Rules. The lease period of 30 years was
extended by four years so that 1996 Rules could be made
applicable. The request of the respondent for conversion of
leasehold to freehold was not accepted which led to filing of a
complaint before the District Forum. The District Forum passed an
order on the same lines as in Charanjit Kaur . The NCDRC also
dismissed the revision filed by the appellant on 17.11.2017 relying
upon Charanjit Kaur .
5. In the third appeal herein i.e., Civil Appeal No. 4966 of 2021, the
order under challenge is that of the NCDRC passed on 21.03.2018
in respect of conversion of a residential site bearing no. 719,
Sector-43A, Chandigarh, from leasehold to freehold. The order in
Charanjit Kaur was followed in this matter as well.
6. Some of the statutory provisions need to be reproduced before
examining the respective contentions of the parties. Section 3 of
5 For short ‘1975 Rules’
6 For short ‘1996 Rules’
3
7
the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952
reads as:-
“ 3 . Power of Central Government in respect of transfer of
land and building in Chandigarh. – (1) [Subject to the
provisions of this section, the Central Government may] sell,
lease or otherwise transfer, whether by auction, allotment or
otherwise, any land or building belonging to the Government
in Chandigarh on such terms and conditions as it may
subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, think
fit to impose.
(2) The consideration money for any transfer under sub-
section (1) shall be paid to the [Central Government] in such
manner and in such instalments and at such rate of interest
as may be prescribed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force, until the entire consideration
money together with interest or any other amount, if any,
due to the Central Government on account of the transfer of
any site or building, or both, under sub-action (12) is paid,
such site or building, or both, as the case may be, shall
continue to belong to the Central Government.”
7. In terms of power conferred on the Central Government under
Section 3, initially Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules,
8
1960 were published on 08.03.1960. Such rules contemplated sale
of sites by auction or allotment. The Chandigarh Lease Hold of
9
Sites and Building Rules, 1973 were thereafter published on
20.08.1973 authorizing Chandigarh Administration to demise sites
and buildings at Chandigarh on lease for 99 years by allotment or
by auction. Rule 13 mandates that in addition to the premium i.e.,
price paid or promised for the transfer of a right to enjoy an
immovable property under 1973 Rules, an annual rent would be
7 For short ‘1952 Act’
8 For short ‘1960 Rules’
9 For short ‘1973 Rules’
4
payable which shall be 2½% of the premium for 33 years which
may be enhanced by the Chandigarh Administration to 3.75% for
the next 33 years and 5% of the premium for the remaining period
of lease. In terms of Rule 17, the property could be transferred on
payment of unearned increase in terms of Rule 17. The relevant
provisions of 1973 Rules read thus:
“ 3 . (1) Unless the context otherwise requires, the
words and expressions used in these rules shall have the
meaning assigned to them in the Capital of Punjab
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 and the rules made
thereunder.
(2) “Premium” means the price paid or promised
for the transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property under
these rules.
[“Prescribed mode of payment” means payment in
cash or by demand draft drawn on any Scheduled Bank
situated at Chandigarh in favour of the Estate Officer,
Chandigarh Administration or in cash upto Rs.500/- or the
amount paid in cash representing 25% of the premium at
the time of auction].
13 . Rent and consequences of non-payment- In addition
to the premium, whether in respect of site or building, the
lessee shall pay rent as under:
(i) Annual rent shall be 2-½ % of the premium for the 33
years which may be enhanced by the Chandigarh
Administration to 3-3/4% of the premium for the next 33
years and to 5% of the premium for the remaining period of
the lease.
17 . General Conditions of lease. – (1) Lease may be jointly
taken by more than one person. The liability to pay the
premium as well as the rent and any penalty imposed under
these rules shall be joint and several:
(10) The lessee will not be entitled to transfer the site or
the building without the prior permission of the Estate
Officer. Such permission shall not be given until the lessee
has paid full premium and the rent due under the lease for
the site, unless in the opinion of the Estate Officer
exceptional circumstances exist for the grant of such
permission. The lessee shall be liable to pay such transfer
charges as are notified by the Chandigarh Administration
5
from time to time.”
Provided that where the property was leased out by
allotment, or at a reserve price or at any other concessional
rate, or by hire-purchase, then transfer shall be allowed on
rd
payment of 1/3 of the unearned increase in value. The
unearned increase will be assessed by the Estate Officer by
determining the difference between the current market
value of the property and the present value of the premium
paid for the property. The current market value of the
property shall be assessed in view of the average of auction
price over the last three financial years for property of the
same category or such other evidence as the Estate Officer
deems to be appropriate. The present value of the original
premium shall be calculated by enhancing the premium by
9% per annum, compounded annually, from the date(s) of
payment. The difference between these two values shall be
the unearned increase. During assessment, notice shall be
issued to the lessee and he shall be afforded an opportunity
of being heard.”
8. The Chandigarh Administration framed 1996 Rules permitting
conversion of residential leasehold properties to freehold
properties. Some of the conditions of the said Rules are as follows:
“ 5 . Land rates will be the rates as notified by the
Chandigarh Administration from time to time.
6 . Conversion charges to be paid shall be as provided in
Annexure “A” annexed to these rules, from time to time.
8 . The conversion shall also be allowed in the cases
where the lessees/sub-lessees/allottees have parted with the
possession of the property, provided that-
(a) The application for Conversion is made by a person
holding registered and valid power of attorney and
there is also an agreement to sell from the lessee to
sub-lessee to alienate (sell/transfer) the property and
proper linkage with the original allottee/lessee is
established.
9 . In all cases of Conversion, the Conveyance-deeds shall
be got registered on payment of requisite Stamp Duty and
Registration Charges. The Consideration amount for this
purpose shall be the “Conversion Fee” and the “Surcharge”
wherever applicable. However, in cases where lease deed
6
has not been executed, the Price/Premium of the site as
reflected in the letter of allotment or last agreement for sale
or the predetermined rate as prescribed by the Competent
Authority on the date of allotment/transfer shall also be
added for the purpose of calculation of Stamp Duty.”
ANNEXURE “A”
Part – I
STATEMENT SHOWING ONE TIME CONVERSION, CHARGES/FEE FOR
VARIOUS SITES ALLOTTED BY THE ESTATE OFFICER, UNION
TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH.
| Site area in Sq.<br>Metres | Conversion<br>charges/fee to be<br>calculated as under | Formula for<br>calculating<br>charges/conversion<br>charges/fee |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Upto 50 | Nil | Nil |
The land rate has been fixed at Rs.1710/- per Square Metre
and the same shall be applicable for a period of one year
from the date as notified by the Estate Officer, Union
Territory, Chandigarh. The land rate applicable for
calculating the Conversion Charges shall be notified from
time to time by the Administrator, Union Territory,
Chandigarh.”
9. The grievance of the allottees was that conversion was allowed on
pick and choose basis rather than on the basis of either the date of
receipt of the application or the date of decision. Reference was
made to the letter dated 10.5.2013 on behalf of the Finance
Secretary to the Estate Officer. The said letter reads as: -
“To
The Estate Officer
U.T. Chandigarh
Memo No. 11/1/18-UTFI(2)-2013/3520
Dated: 10-5-2013
Subject: Re-fixation of rate for conversion of lease hold
residential sites into free hold.
Reference your memo No.7610/MA/Conversion
Policy/2013 dated 4.3.13, on the subject cited above.
7
The issue of revision of rate for conversion under the
scheme “Chandigarh Conversion of residential lease hold
land tenure into freehold land tenure, Rule 1996” is under
consideration of the Administration.
You are directed not to allow any conversion under the
said scheme till further orders.
Sd/-
Joint Secretary (Estates)
For Finance Secretary
Chandigarh Administration”
10. Mr. Ankit Goel, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the
title of leasehold property vests with the Central Government in
terms of Section 3 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The
Central Government had granted lease of residential plots for a
period of 99 years under the 1973 Rules. The conversion fee fixed
to convert leasehold property leased for 99 years to freehold
property, if allowed, would absolve the allottees from payment of
annual rent in terms of Rule 13 as well as the payment of unearned
increase in the case of transfer of leasehold rights in terms of Rule
17(10) of the 1973 Rules. Thus, an un-encumbered title would pass
on to the purchaser as against 99-year lease to an allottee under
the 1973 Rules. Therefore, the findings recorded by the NCDRC
that the respondents are consumers as charges have been paid for
conversion are not tenable for the reason that the charges
deposited were not for any services to be rendered but to grant
complete title to the allottees. Such conversion fee was in fact part
of the sale consideration to confer complete title to an allottee.
11. Still further, it was argued that the reliance on the judgment in
8
M.K. Gupta was clearly erroneous inasmuch as that was a case
wherein the allotment of flats was considered to be “service”
within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection
10
Act, 1986 . Some of the provisions from the Consumer Act as are
relevant for the decision of the present case are as under:
(c) “ complaint” means any allegation in writing made by
a complainant that-
(i) xxx xxx xxx
(iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be
hired or availed of by him suffer from deficiency
in any respect;
(d) “consumer” means any person who-
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration
which has been paid or promised or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment and includes any beneficiary of such services
other than the person who [hires or avails of] the
services for consideration paid or promised, or partly
paid and partly promised, or under any system of
deferred payment, when such services are availed of
with the approval of the first mentioned person [but
does not include a person who avails of such services
for any commercial purpose;
(g) “deficiency” means any fault, imperfection,
shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner
of performance which is required to be maintained by or
under any law for the time being in force or has been
undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a
contract or otherwise in relation to any service;
(o) “service” means service of any description which is
made available to potential users and includes, but not
limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with
banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of
electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing
construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of
news or other information, but does not include the rendering
of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal
10 For short ‘Consumer Act’
9
service;
| 14. Finding of the District Forum.—(1) If, after the<br>proceeding conducted under Section 13, the District Forum<br>is satisfei d that the goods complained against sufef r from<br>any of the defects specifei d in the complaint or that any of<br>the allegations contained in the complaint about the<br>services are proved, it shall issue an order to the opposite<br>party directing him to do one or more of the following<br>things, namely: | |
| (a) xxx xxxx | |
| (e) to remove the defects in goods or deficiencies in<br>the services in question; | |
| (f) xxx xxxx |
12. In M.K. Gupta , the question posed was as to the word “service”
extends to the deficiency in construction of a house or flat. It was
held that such construction was for the benefit of person for whom
it was to be constructed. The allottee may do so himself or hire
services of a builder or contractor. When a statutory authority
develops land or allots a site or constructs a house for the benefit
of common man, it is a statutory service. But if such service is
provided by a builder or contractor, it would be a contractual
service. The Court held as under:
“ 4. What is the meaning of the word ‘service’? Does it
extend to deficiency in the building of a house or flat? Can
a complaint be filed under the Act against the statutory
authority or a builder or contractor for any deficiency in
respect of such property. The answer to all this shall depend
on understanding of the word ‘service’. The term has
variety of meanings. It may mean any benefit or any act
resulting in promoting interest or happiness. It may be
contractual, professional, public, domestic, legal, statutory
etc. The concept of service thus is very wide. How it should
be understood and what it means depends on the context
10
| in which it has been used in an enactment. Clause (o) of the<br>defni ition section defni es it as under: | ||
|---|---|---|
| “‘service’ means ……………………..” |
6. Construction of a house or flat is for the benefit of
person for whom it is constructed. He may do it himself or
hire services of a builder or contractor. The latter being for
consideration is service as defined in the Act. Similarly
when a statutory authority develops land or allots a site or
constructs a house for the benefit of common man it is as
much service as by a builder or contractor. The one is
contractual service and other statutory service. If the
service is defective or it is not what was represented then
it would be unfair trade practice as defined in the Act. Any
defect in construction activity would be denial of comfort
and service to a consumer. When possession of property is
not delivered within stipulated period the delay so caused
is denial of service. Such disputes or claims are not in
respect of immoveable property as argued but deficiency
in rendering of service of particular standard, quality or
grade. Such deficiencies or omissions are defined in sub-
clause (ii) of clause (r) of Section 2 as unfair trade
practice. If a builder of a house uses substandard material
in construction of a building or makes false or misleading
representation about the condition of the house then it is
denial of the facility or benefit of which a consumer is
entitled to claim value under the Act. When the contractor
or builder undertakes to erect a house or flat then it is
inherent in it that he shall perform his obligation as agreed
to. A flat with a leaking roof, or cracking wall or
substandard floor is denial of service. Similarly when a
statutory authority undertakes to develop land and frame
housing scheme, it, while performing statutory duty
renders service to the society in general and individual in
particular. The entire approach of the learned counsel for
the development authority in emphasising that power
exercised under a statute could not be stretched to mean
service proceeded on misconception. It is incorrect
understanding of the statutory functions under a social
legislation. A development authority while developing the
land or framing a scheme for housing discharges statutory
duty the purpose and objective of which is service to the
citizens. As pointed out earlier the entire purpose of
11
widening the definitions is to include in it not only day to
day buying of goods by a common man but even such
activities which are otherwise not commercial but
professional or service-oriented in nature. The provisions
in the Acts, namely, Lucknow Development Act, Delhi
Development Act or Bangalore Development Act clearly
provide for preparing plan, development of land, and
framing of scheme etc. Therefore if such authority
undertakes to construct building or allot houses or building
sites to citizens of the State either as amenity or as
benefit then it amounts to rendering of service and will be
covered in the expression ‘service made available to
potential users’. A person who applies for allotment of a
building site or for a flat constructed by the development
authority or enters into an agreement with a builder or a
contractor is a potential user and nature of transaction is
covered in the expression ‘service of any description’. It
further indicates that the definition is not exhaustive. The
inclusive clause succeeded in widening its scope but not
exhausting the services which could be covered in earlier
part. So any service except when it is free of charge or
under a constraint of personal service is included in it.
Since housing activity is a service it was covered in the
clause as it stood before 1993. ”
13. The judgment in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir
11
Singh was in the context of grant of interest at the rate of 18%.
Such grant of interest was not interfered with. This Court approved
the judgment in M.K. Gupta and held as under:
“We are in full agreement with what is observed herein. Thus
the law is that the Consumer Protection Act has a wide reach
and the Commission has jurisdiction even in cases of service
rendered by statutory and public authorities. Such authorities
become liable to compensate for misfeasance in public office
i.e. an act which is oppressive or capricious or arbitrary or
negligent provided loss or injury is suffered by a citizen. The
word compensation is of a very wide connotation. It may
constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to
compensation for physical, mental or even emotional
suffering, insult or injury or loss.”
12
14. In Chandigarh Housing Board v. Avtar Singh and Ors. , the
11 (2004) 5 SCC 65
12 (2010) 10 SCC 194
12
Cooperative Housing Societies submitted an application for
allotment of plots advertised by Chandigarh Housing Board. The
Societies collected 10% of the tentative price from their members
and deposited the same in a bank specified in the scheme. If any
member was to seek refund, then 10% out of the 25% of the
earnest money was to be deducted. The dispute before the High
Court was in respect of the direction of 10% of the amount. This
Court held as under:
“ 51 . If the final order passed by the High Court is read in
conjunction with the interim order dated 11-5-1992, it
becomes clear that the Societies were to deposit the
remaining amount with interest at the rate of 18% per annum
only if they were to accept allotment of flats under the
Scheme. Although, the writ petitions were filed by the
Societies, the language of the interim order passed by the
High Court shows that the learned Judges were thinking of
imposing liability of 18% interest only on those members who
were to accept allotment of flats to be constructed by the
Societies. The members of the Societies did not get an
opportunity to accept the allotment because even after
deposit of full earnest money and 18% interest, the Board did
not allot land to the Societies on which they could construct
dwelling units/flats. The Finance Secretary misinterpreted the
orders of the High Court and issued wholly arbitrary and
unjust directive to the Board not to refund 18% interest to
the members of the Societies who had applied for refund
before allotment of land by the Board.”
15. In fact, the precise issue as to whether the auction of sites under
the 1973 Rules involves sale of goods or of rendering of service
came up for consideration in UT Chandigarh Administration
13
and Another v. Amarjeet Singh and Others . This Court
considered the judgments of this Court in M.K. Gupta and Balbir
Singh . One of the arguments raised was as under-
13 (2009) 4 SCC 660
13
“When the auction of sites (for grant of a lease for 99 years)
was in exercise of the power of the Government (the UT
Chandigarh Administration) under the provisions of the
Development Act in accordance with the Leasehold Rules, it
involves neither sale of goods nor rendering of any service.
The act of leasing plots by auction by the appellants
therefore did not result in the successful bidder becoming a
“consumer” or the appellants becoming “service providers”.
In the absence of hiring or availing of any service, the
question of deficiency in service or unfair or restrictive trade
practice with reference to a service, did not arise and the
complaint under the Act was not maintainable.”
16. In respect of the abovementioned question posed, it was held as
under:
“ 21 . With reference to a public auction of existing sites (as
contrasted from sites to be “formed”), the purchaser/lessee
is not a consumer, the owner is not a “trader” or “service
provider” and the grievance does not relate to any matter in
regard to which a complaint can be filed. Therefore, any
grievance by the purchaser/lessee will not give rise to a
complaint or consumer dispute and the fora under the Act
will not have jurisdiction to entertain or decide any
complaint by the auction-purchaser/lessee against the
owner holding the auction of sites.”
17. The second question was in respect of lack of amenities i.e., roads,
water supply lines, drainage system, rainwater drainage and
electricity etc. This Court held that since the sites were put to
public auction, therefore, no grievance regarding amenities could
be entertained as the bidder had the opportunity to verify the sites
before participating in the auction.
18. In the present case, the allotment of residential sites on lease hold
basis for 99 years is not in issue. It has not come on record as to
whether such sites were allotted in an auction or by inviting
applications. Even if the site had been allotted after inviting
14
applications, the fact remains that the respondents claim
conversion of such lease hold sites to free hold sites on payment of
the charges which are fixed by the Administration. Such conversion
was sought in view of the fact that as against the limited right in
the lease property for 99 years, the Administration has decided to
grant freehold rights on satisfaction of certain conditions
mentioned in the 1996 Rules. The fact is that the respondents had
paid the premium amount as fixed under the 1973 Rules. Now, the
claim is for purchase of remaining rights of the Central Government
to convert the site into freehold. The Central Government
continues to be owner of the land until the entire consideration
money together with interest or any other amount is paid to the
Central Government on account of transfer of any site or building
or both as provided in Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, the owner
i.e., the Central Government, cannot be said to be a trader or a
service provider. The appellant is not charging any fee for
conversion of leasehold property into freehold property except the
amount in accordance with the 1996 Rules, which is part of the sale
consideration. It is thus a case of sale of immovable property on
the terms as were fixed in the 1996 Rules. The amount so fixed
under the Rules would form part of the sale consideration and not a
fee or charge levied for providing any kind of service.
19. In terms of Section 14(1)(e) of the Consumer Act, the District
Forum can inter-alia direct removal of deficiency in the services.
The deficiency in service however does not include the transfer of
15
title in favour of the allottee who was earlier granted leasehold
rights. As noted above, appellant is not providing any services
within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Act. The
expression ‘service’ includes housing construction and not
allotment of a site or a plot.
| 20. The Consumer fora had taken into consideration a noting in the ad-<br>ministrative file of the appellant. A noting is however a part of the<br>decision-making process. Such noting does not fructify into an or-<br>der unless the same is communicated to the affected person. The<br>reference may be made to Bachhittar Singh v. State of<br>Punjab14, wherein this Court held as under:- | ||
|---|---|---|
| “9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make<br>such an order. Merely writing something on the fli e does not<br>amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of<br>the State Government two things are necessary. The order has<br>to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by<br>clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated.<br>As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of<br>the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is<br>drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be<br>regarded as bound by what was stated in the fli e. As long as<br>the matter rested with him the Revenue Minister could well<br>score out his remarks or minutes on the flie and write fresh<br>ones. | ||
| 10. The business of State is a complicated one and has<br>necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large<br>number of ofcfi ials and authorities. The Constitution, therefore,<br>requires and so did the Rules of Business framed by the<br>Rajpramukh of PEPSU provide, that the action must be taken by<br>the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh. It is<br>not till this formality is observed that the action can be<br>regarded as that of the State or here, by the Rajpramukh. We<br>may further observe that, constitutionally speaking, the<br>Minister is no more than an adviser and that the head of the |
14 AIR 1963 SC 395
16
| State, the Governor or Rajpramukh [ Till the abolition of that<br>office by the Amendment of the Constitution in 1956.], is to act<br>with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore,<br>until such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the<br>Minister or the Council of Ministers may say in regard to a<br>particular matter does not become the action of the State until<br>the advice of the Council of Ministers is accepted or deemed to<br>be accepted by the Head of the State. Indeed, it is possible that<br>after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a<br>particular stage a Minister or the Council of Ministers may<br>express quite a difef rent opinion, one which may be completely<br>opposed to the earlier opinion. Which of them can be regarded<br>as the “order” of the State Government? Therefore, to make the<br>opinion amount to a decision of the Government it must be<br>communicated to the person concerned. In this connection we<br>may quote the following from the judgment of this Court in<br>the State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [AIR (1961) SC 493,<br>512] : | ||
|---|---|---|
| “Mr Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before<br>the fni al order was passed the Council of Ministers had<br>decided to accept the respondent's representation and<br>to reinstate him, and that, according to him, the<br>respondent seeks to prove by calling the two original<br>orders. We are unable to understand this argument.<br>Even if the Council of Ministers had provisionally<br>decided to reinstate the respondent that would not<br>prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter and<br>coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a fni al<br>decision is reached by them and is communicated to<br>the Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted upon<br>by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the<br>respondent.” | ||
| Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated<br>to the person who would be afef cted by that order before the<br>State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the<br>order is communicated to the person afef cted by it, it would be<br>open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over<br>and over again and, therefore, till its communication the order<br>cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in<br>character. |
21. Therefore, the noting by itself cannot be pressed into service to
return a finding of deficiency in service. However, the fact remains
that in terms of 1996 Rules, an amount of Rs.1710/- per sq.mt. was
17
fixed as conversion charges. The land rates were to be fixed by the
Administration from time to time under Rule 5 of 1996 Rules. In
Annexure-A, the land rate for conversion was fixed at Rs.1710/- per
sq.mt. The same was to be applied for a period of one year. But as
admitted at the Bar, the rates were revised only in 2017. The
action of the appellant in rejecting the request for conversion is
thus arbitrary and discriminatory. The request could not be kept
pending when the statutory Rules were in force. The executive
authority could not by an administrative order keep the matter
pending, when there was no other reason not to accept the
conversion except impending increase in the conversion charges.
22. It is the stand of the appellant that no conversion was allowed after
a letter was issued on 10.05.2013. The Administration has
however allowed conversion of leasehold properties into freehold
even after the said letter dated 10.05.2013, as conversion of plots
bearing file No. RPL 19565 and RPL 19601, was allowed on
04.12.2013 and 11.11.2013 respectively.
23. Mr. Goel has argued that there cannot be any negative equality as
even if some sites have been converted in contravention of the
decision communicated on 10.05.2013, it would not confer any
enforceable right in favour of the allottees. Reference was made to
15
Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh . We do not find
any merit in the argument of Mr. Goel. On the date when the letter
was issued by the administration on 10.05.2013, the statutory
15 (1995) 1 SCC 745
18
1996 Rules were in force. Such Rules were kept in abeyance on the
basis of communication on behalf of the Finance Secretary to the
Estate Officer. Such communication cannot be countenanced. The
statutory rules could not be put to hold because the issue of
revision of rates of conversion was under consideration of the
Administration. Even after the said letter the rates were fixed only
in 2017. In the face of valid statutory Rules, an administrative
decision cannot be sustained.
24. Since the respondents are already in possession of the sites as
lessee on 99 years basis, it cannot be said that the appellant was
deficient in providing any service, which even if used in a liberal
sense would not include transfer of title in an immovable property.
Thus, the consumer fora under the Act would not have jurisdiction
to entertain the consumer complaints on the ground of deficiency
in service related to transfer of title of the immovable property.
25. We find that it is not a case of the deficiency in service as
contemplated by Consumer Act but definitely a case of exercise of
jurisdiction in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. In exercise
of the power conferred on this Court under Article 142, we direct
the Administration to decide the claim of conversion as on the date
when consumer complaints were filed. Such action shall be taken
within 3 months.
26. The difficulty in the Administration is that the senior officers in the
Chandigarh Administration are on deputation from the States of ei-
19
| ther Punjab or Haryana. The officers revert to their parent cadre af-<br>ter completion of deputation period of approximately three years.<br>However, the officials continue to work at the Estate Office. Though<br>the Administration has done commendable work to maintain the<br>character of Chandigarh as City Beautiful, but the Estate Office has<br>underbelly, that is, the action of the officials cannot be said to be<br>bona fdi e, as is apparent in the present case. It is a typical case of<br>‘you show me face, I will show the Rule’. On the other hand, the<br>officers are unable to take decisions which are citizen friendly. Even<br>no attempt is made to remove the bottlenecks in the working of the<br>Estate Office. | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| 27. The Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in a<br>judgment reported as Amritpal Singh v. Chandigarh<br>Administration16, has set aside the requirement of no-objection<br>certificate from the Chandigarh Administration before afef cting sale<br>of freehold properties. The Chandigarh Administration was directed<br>to re-examine Rule 17(10) of the 1973 Rules contemplating<br>unearned increase, as well the restriction to sell the properties<br>before the expiry of specific years as the root-cause of malice of<br>Power of Attorneys sales. Similar rule exists as Rule 7 of Chandi-<br>garh Estate Rules, 2007. The High Court had issued the following<br>directions: | |||
| “(i) That the requirement of ‘No Objection Certifci ate’ from<br>the Chandigarh Administration before efef cting sale of the |
| , |
|---|
16 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 9310
20
free hold properties is not supported by the Act or the Rules
framed thereunder.
(ii) The Registering Authority is duty bound to examine;
whether the Power of Attorneys are being executed for
consideration. If the Authorities are satisfied that it is for
consideration, the Power of Attorney shall not be registered
unless the proper stamp duty is affixed thereon.
(iii) If the proper stamp duty is not paid on a Power of
Attorney executed on and after 15.11.2007, the Registering
Authority shall refuse to register the document on the basis
of such attorney at any subsequent stage unless proper
stamp duty is affixed thereon in accordance with law.
(iv) The Chandigarh Administration may re-examine Rule
17(10) of the 1973 Rules contemplating unearned increase,
as well the restriction to sell the properties before the
expiry of specific years, as the root-cause of malice of
Power of Attorneys sales.
(v) The Chandigarh Administration to frame Rules to
maintain and update the property records in the manner
mutations are sanctioned in respect of non urban properties
under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 or such other
procedure, which is fair, reasonable and transparent.”
28. The Full Bench of the High Court in Dheera Singh v. U.T.
17
Chandigarh Admn. and Ors. noticed that the Executive has
failed to live-up to the expectations of the residents as instead of
approaching the concerned Ministry with a concrete proposal on
data-based information for onward consideration of the Legislature
to rejuvenate the 1952 Act and make it more vibrant and alive to
the issues in presentia or in future, it has gone for ad-hoc solutions
by taking refuge under Section 22 of the Act. The Court held as
under:
“102. Having held that, we cannot refrain from observing
that the 1952 Act may need revamping and updation to
meet the modern day challenges some of which are
incidental to the steep hike in the value of real estate and an
unprecedented pressure of population mounted on
Chandigarh. We are cognizant of the fact that the issue
17 2012 SCC Online P&H 21473
21
whether or not the 1952 Act is in need of suitable
amendments falls exclusively within the domain of law-
makers as the Courts would ordinarily expound the law and
refrain from legislating except in a case of casus omissus.
However, it cannot be overlooked that after enacting a bill
the Legislature becomes functus officio so far as that
particular Statute is concerned. The Legislature may not
have a mechanism of its own to keep track of the
deficiencies or difficulties faced by the executive who has
been assigned the duty to give effect to the enactment and
achieve the legislative object(s). It is the Executive,
therefore, who has an onerous duty to apprise, suggest and
put up before the Legislature a proposal along with facts and
figures justifying the changes that may be brought into an
enactment. Thereafter, it is the absolute and non-justiciable
prerogative of the Legislature to take a decision on such
proposal as per its wisdom.
103. The Executive has in the instant case, with reference
to the 1952 Act, failed to live-up to the expectations of the
residents as instead of approaching the Ministry concerned
with a concrete proposal on data-based information for
onward consideration of the Legislature to rejuvenate the
1952 Act and make it more vibrant and alive to the issues in
prasentia or in future, it has gone for ad hoc solutions taking
refuge under Section 22 of the Act. Strangely, the amount of
penalty or fine fixed by the Legislature in the year 1952
(Sections 8, 13 & 15) has not been got revised even after
the expiry of 60 years.
107. In the light of the interpretation given by us to some
of the provisions of the 1952 Act in paragraphs 81, 82, 84 to
87, 102, 103 & 105 of this order, we also deem it
appropriate to issue the following directions:
(iii) The Union Territory of Chandigarh through its
Administrator shall take steps as may be necessary for
updation of the 1952 Act in the light of the observations
made by us in paragraphs 102, 103 & 105 of this order
before March 31, 2013.”
29. But nothing appears to have been done either in terms of Amritpal
Singh or Dheera Singh . Dheera Singh has laid down the process
of exercising the power of resumption. However, many cases of
22
alleged misuse have been initiated but not concluded by the Estate
Office. The residents of Chandigarh are widely harassed while
seeking no-objection certificate for sale of leasehold property as
the procedure for grant of no-objection certificate and of deposit of
unearned increase is interpreted in different manners by the
different officials, which the officers of the Administration has failed
to control. Another area of concern is the unreasonable procedure
adopted by the Administration for affecting mutation after the
demise of the leaseholder or the allottee and of completing other
formalities at the offices of the appellant. The difficult and near
impossible procedure leads to arbitrary and discriminatory action
by the officials of the Estate Office. Therefore, we direct
Administration to constitute a Committee which may include a
Member of Parliament; an architect; an advocate, who is or has
represented Chandigarh Administration before the High Court; two
representatives of the Municipal Corporation being representatives
of the citizens of Chandigarh, apart from such officers which the
Administration may think fit, so as to review and streamline the
processes of sanction of mutation, grant of occupancy certificate,
no-objection certificate and other citizen-centric requirements
including calculation of unearned profit under the 1973 Rules or
under 2007 Rules.
30. In view of the above, the present appeals are disposed of with the
following directions:
23
a) The appeals are allowed and the orders passed by the DCDRF,
SCDRC and the NCDRC are set aside. The Administration shall
decide the claim of conversion of allottees as on the date when
the consumer complaints were filed. Such action shall be taken
within 3 months;
b) The Administration to give details of the notices for resumption
on account of alleged misuse which are pending consideration.
Such details to include the date of serving of notice of the
alleged misuse and the stage of proceedings pending before the
different officers of Administration. A report to be submitted by
the Administration thereafter in respect of the above directions
within 4 months for perusal and the necessary action, if so
warranted, after four months.
c) To constitute a Committee which may include inter-alia the
Member of Parliament from Chandigarh, an architect, an
advocate who is or had represented Chandigarh Administration
before the High Court, two representatives of the Municipal
Corporation and the officers of Administration.
d) Such abovementioned Committee shall submit report to the
Administrator, Chandigarh Administration preferably within
three months. We hope that the learned Administrator will take
appropriate steps to implement the suggestions made by the
Committee including forwarding of the proposed amendments in
the Statute to the Ministry of Home Affairs, if any, suggested by
the Committee.
24
31. List after 4 months for the Action Taken Report in respect of
directions (b), (c) and (d).
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
.............................................J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 7, 2021.
25