Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
S. GANAPATHY AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
AIR INDIA AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT16/06/1993
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1993 AIR 2430 1993 SCR (3)1006
1993 SCC (3) 429 JT 1993 (4) 10
1993 SCALE (3)19
ACT:
%
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Section 33(2) (b) read with Section 2(rr)-Statutory wage-
Computation of amount of one month’s wages to be paid to
discharged/dismissed workmen-Whether employer justified in
reducing the amount by statutory tax deductions-Whether
approval applications liable to be rejected on ground that
deduction of tax resulted in payment of less than one
month’s wages-Order of discharge/termination requiring
approval of competent authority-Nature and effect of order
till approval.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants, employees of the respondent Air India, who
were awarded penalties of removal or dismissal by the
respondent, as a result of the disciplinary proceedings,
were paid one month’s salary or, wages, reducing it by a sum
of Rs. 10 or 15, as deductible on account of monthly payment
of tax on employment, imposed on salary and wage earners,
under the provisions of the West Bengal State Tax on
professions,. Trades, Callings and Employments Act,1979.The
respondent-Air India sought approval of its action from the
National Industrial Tribunal, under Section 33(2) (b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, which was opposed by the appellants
on the ground that there was short payment and accordingly
it was not in terms of the mandatory provisions of Section
33(2) (b) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the objection and
rejected the approval applications.
In writ petitions preferred by the respondents, a Single
Judge of the High Court held that the Tribunal was in error
in refusing approval on the ground of short payment and
remanded the matter to the Tribunal for decision on merits’
Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the appellants- were
dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court affirming
the view of the Single Judge.
In the appeals preferred by the employees, on behalf of the
appellants it was contended that one month’s wage
statutorily required to he paid in terms
1007
of Section 33(2) (1)) was a payment which did not pay take
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the character of salary or wage as the appellants were not
salary or wage earners while getting that one month’s "-age,
and therefore, not being salary or wage earners in that
month, order (if dismissal or termination of service having
been passed against them, they were not in employment and
hence not liable to pay tax, that the very basis of tax
stood displaced and hence the deduction of tax at the
snapped source rendered the payment or deposit of one
month’s wage deficient, contravening the mandatory
provisions of Section 33(2) (b) of the Act.
It was contended on. behalf of the respondent Air India
that the statutory deduction of tax payable under the Tax
Act inhered in the payment of one month’s wage. and in any
case, the difference had been tendered before the Tribunal
for payment to the workman, on objection raised, during the
pendency of the approval proceedings.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court
HELD : 1. When an order of discharge or dismissal of a
workman is incomplete and inchoate until it,-; approval is
obtained from the Tribunal, there is no effective
termination of the relationship of the employer and the
employee. Not only in a limited way that the relationship
is snapped factually and one month’s wage is given to the
employee to soften the rigour of his factual unemployment
but the content and character of the wage would extendedly
tend to remain the same so far as subjection to statutory
tax deduction is concerned, being remuneration paid as
understood in Section 2 (rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
on the supposition that the terms of employment, expressed
or implied, were fulfilled and the same was due as wages
payable to the workman in respect of his employment,or of
work done in such employment, even though he was not put to
work.
2.1.Bare-facedly the inclusions and exclusions provided in
Section 2(rr) do not refer to tax dues. Rather the
provision is silent about statutory tax deductions. But it
goes without saving; if there is a statutory compulsion to
deduct, that compulsion would have an intrusive role to
play, getting a proper fitment, as the law may warrant its
effect, Section 33(2) (b) apart. The matter has to be
viewed in this light.
2.2.In the instant case, the appellants were salary or wage
earners, getting salaries or wages per month and from their
wages, prior to their order
1008
of removal or dismissal, tax deductions under the West
Bengal State Tax on Professions, Trades, Ceilings. and
Employments Act, 1979. were being made. It was the
employer’ liability to deduct and pay the tax on behalf if
the employee under Section 4 of the Act. Failure to comply
with the provisions of the Section exposed the respondent to
penalties and prosecution under other provisions of the Act.
3.1.The proviso to Section 33(2) (b) mandates two steps,
that unless workman is paid wages for one month and an
application as contemplated is made by the employer to the
Tribunal for approval of his action, no such workman van he
discharged or dismissed. The intention of the legislature
in providing for such a contingency was to soften. the
rigour of unemployment that will face the workman, against
whom an order of discharge or dismissal. has been passed.
3.2.By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de-facto
relationship of employer and employee is ended, but not de-
jure, for that could happen when the Tribunal accords its
approval. The employee. thus gets factually unemployed from
the date of the approval application in the sense that he is
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not called to work and is paid only a month’s wage
representing the succeeding month of his unemployment. The
relationship of employer and employee is legally not
terminated till approval of discharge or dismissal is given
by the Tribunal. And this state of affairs was required to
he ended within a period of three months; from the date of
receipt of such application in terms of sub-section (5) of
Section 33, though the lapse of such period Would not end
the proceeding and such time was extendable by the Tribunal
for reasons to be recorded in writing.
3.3.In this fluid state of affairs, the legal character of
one month’s wage would undergo a change depending (on the
result of the approval application. If the Tribunal were to
refuse the approval, the inchoate and incomplete order of
discharge or dismissal would end and the legal character of
one month’s wages would transform to be the same as In-fore,
from which statutory tax deduction could legitimately be
made by the employer. In the event of approval of the
application by the Tribunal, the legal character of one
month’s wage would, on the other hand, be a wage without
employment. In the given situation, if the Tribunal were to
refuse approval solely on the ground that statutory tax
deduction stands in its way to the grant of approval, it
could legitimately make its order conditional on making good
such payment. This is a field in which the interest of both
parties has to be kept in view,
1009
for the situation would be precarious for the employer if he
were not to deduct tax under section 4 of the Tax Act and
exposing him to the dangers of penalties and prosecution.
If approval was to be rejected on merit and otherwise to be
rejected for not making complete payment of one month wage,
it would thus be just and proper to let the. employer deduct
the statutory tax deduction from that one month wage, since
the relationship of employer and an employee has effectively
not been terminated, to meet the eventuality, lest the
approval application be dismissed on merit. On the other
hand, it would be just and proper either for the employer on
his own or on the asking of the Tribunal to let the sum
representing statutory tax deduction be deposited in the
Tribunal for payment to the workman in the event of the
approval application being allowed. If these two situations
can he saved in this manner there would, in no event, he a
dismissal of the approval application for payment of wage
subjected to statutory tax deduction.
3.4 Distinction would have to be drawn between statutory
deductions like tax deductions and other deductions which
the employer considers he can make. In either event, he
takes the risk when making a deduction. In the case of
statutory tax deductions, his justificatory burden is less,
for he has the shelter of the tax law. The case of the
other deductions would obviously be on different footing for
he may not have any thrust of law. Those may purely be
contractual. Those deductions may not be compulsive under
any law. The employer makes the deduction in such cases at
his peril.
3.5 In the instant case, there definitely arose a genuine
claim to make the tax deduction and doing so the employer
projected its case before the Tribunal in that angle. Not a
paisa otherwise was kept back. Thus, in the facts and
circumstances of the case the respondent was able to
establish that its deliberate deduction representing the tax
from one month’s wage was not to shorten the wage and cause
infraction of Section 33 (2) (b), but a compulsive’
deduction to fulfil a statutory obligation by the thrust of
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the Tax Act.
Syndicate Bank Lid. v. Rain Nath Bhat, (1967-68) (XXXII)
F.J.R. 490; Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.N. Modak,
[1963] 3 S.C.R. 411 and Bharat Electronics Ltd., Bangalore
v. Industrial Tribunal, Karnatak, Bangalore and Anr., [1990]
1 S.C.R. 971, relied on.
Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. v. S.K. Dutta, (1970) LLJ
Vol.2 p.547; Dinesh Khare v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan,
(1982) LAD I.C. 517 and Balmer- Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v.
Waman B. More, [1981] 42 F.L.R. 272, distinguished.
1010
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3134-36 of
1993.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.7.91 of the Bombay High
Court ill Appeal Nos. 1309, 1309 and 1311 of’ 1997.
M. K. Ramamurthy. Ms. Chandan Ramamurthi and M.A. Krishna
Moorthy for the Appellants.
F.S. Nariman, Arun Jaitly, Lalit Bhasin, J.K. Das, Viplay
Sharma and vineet Kumar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PUNCHHI, J. leave to appeal granted.
The question which falls for determination in these Appeals
is whether in Computing the amount of one month’s wages, to
be paid Under section 33(2) (h) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, (hereafter referred to as the ’Act’) the employer
is justified in reducing, the amount by statutory tax
deductions’?
The three appellants herein, in the period 1979-80 were in
the employment of the respondent-Air India, and stationed at
Calcutta. They individually suffered disciplinary
proceedings on the charges of some mis-conducts and ha%-in,,
been found guilty were awarded penalties of removal or
dismissal by the Air India, as, due to each. It is common
ground that the respondent-Air India, statutorily bound,
Applied to the National Industrial Tribunal. Bombay by
means of separate approval applications under section 33(2)
(b) of the Act to have its action approved. In terms of the
said provision it paid to the appellants one month’s salary
or wages reducing it by sum of Rs. 10 or 15, as deductible
on account of monthly payment of tax on employment imposed
on salary And wage earners, under the provisions of’ the
West Bengal State Tax on Professions Trades, Callings and
Employments Act, 1979 (hereafter referred to as ’the Tax
Act). The approval sought by the respondent-management was
opposed by the appellants before the Tribunal. and though
initially not part of the defence taken in the written
statement defence was later set up by them that they had not
been paid wages in terms of the mandatory provisions of
section 33(2) (b) of the Act, as there was short payment.
This put the respondent management to Alert and it laid
before the Tribunal account which, had gone on to work out
the month’s wages. It is common ground that the payment
otherwise was proper but since it was short by 10 or 15
rupees, as respectively due on account of taxable under the
Tax Act, the payment was termed as invalid.
1011
The Tribunal sustaining the objection rejected the approval
applications on that score alone and not on merits. In
separate writ petitions by the respondents, the Bombay High
Court interfered in the matter taking the view that the
Tribunal was in error in refusing-approval on the around of
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the suggested short payment and hence breach of section 33
(2) (b) of the Act. The matter could not be finalised by
the learned Single Judge and. remand to the Tribunal was
made for decision on merits. Letters Patent Appeals
preferred by the respective appellants were dismissed by a
division bench of the Bombay High Court affirming the view
of the learned Single Judge. That is why the instant
appeals.
The issue, on the face of it, is extremely narrow. But
before we get into grips with it, let us take stock of the
statutory provisions which come into action leading to the
answer. The first in priority are the two provisions of the
Act being section 2 (rr) defining ’wages’ and section 33(2)
(b) imposing the discipline, which are reproduced hereafter:
"2. IN THIS ACT, UNLESS THERE IS ANYTHING
REPUGNANT IN THE SUBJECT OR CONTEXT, -
(rr) ’wages’ means all remuneration capable of
being expressed in terms of money, which
would, if the terms of employment, expressed
or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a
workman in respect of his employment, of work
done in such employment, and includes -
(i)Such allowances including dearness
allowances as the workman is for the time
being entitled to;
(ii)the, value of any house accommodation. or
of supply of light, water, medical attendance
or other amenity or of any service or of any
concessional supply of food-rains or-other
articles,
(iii) any travelling concession;
(iv) any commission payable on the Promotion
of sales or business
or both;
but does not include-
(a) any bonus;
1012
(b) any contribution paid or payable by the
employer to any pension fund or provident fund
or for the benefit of the workman under any
law for the time being in force;
(c) "any gratuity payable on the termination
of his service"
"SECTION 33 - CONDITIONS OF SERVICE, ETC. TO
REMAIN UNC HANGED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
DURING PENDENCY OF PROCEEDINGS
(1)xxxxxxxxxxx
(2) During the pendency of any such
proceeding in respect of an industrial
dispute, the employer may, in accordance with
the standing orders applicable to a workman
concerned in such dispute or. where there are
no such standing orders, in accordance with
the terms of the contract, whether express or
implied, between him and the workman,
(a)xxxxxxxxx
(b) for any misconduct not connected with
the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise, that workman
PROVIDED that no such workman shall be
discharged or dismissed, unless he has been
paid waves for one. month and an application
has been made by the employer to the authority
before which the proceeding is pending for-
approval of the action taken by the employer."
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Bare-facedly the inclusions and exclusions provided in
section 2(rr) do not refer to tax dues. Rather the
provision is silent-about statutory tax deductions. But it
goes without saying, if there is a statutory compulsion to
deduct, that compulsion would have an intrusive role to play
getting a proper fitment, as the law may warrant its effect,
section 33 (2) (b) apart. The matter has to be viewed in
this light.
That the appellants were salary or wage earners, getting
salaries or wages per month is not in dispute. It is also
not in dispute that from their wages, prior to their order
of removal or dismissal, tax deductions under the Tax Act
were being made. There was no objection by the appellants
to such deductions at that point of time. That it was the
employers liability to deduct and pay the tax on behalf of
the. employee under section 4 of the Act is also beyond
dispute. Section 4 of the Tax
1013
Act pointedly enjoins upon the employer to deduct the tax
payable under the Act from the salary or wages payable to
any person earning a salary or wage, before such salary or
wage is paid to him and the employer has also been foisted
with the liability to pay tax on behalf of salary or wage
earner irrespective of the fact whether such deduction has
been made or not when the salary or wage was paid to such
person. In other words, the tax payable by the wage earner
is deductible from his wage irrespective of the fact whether
such deduction has been made or not, but the liability to
pay tax is on the employer. Thus it cannot be denied that
while the appellants were salary or wage earners, their
wages or salary had to suffer & deduction of payment of tax
at the hands of the respondent-employer. Failure to comply
the provisions of section 4 of the Tax Act exposed the
respondent to penalties and prosecution under other
provisions, of the Act, details of which need not be brought
herein.
It was canvassed on behalf of the appellants that one
month’s wage statutorily required to be paid in terms of
section 33(2) (b) is a payment which does not partake the
character of salary or wage as the appellants were not
salary or age earners while getting that one month’s wage
Sequelly it was canvassed that not being salary or wage
earners in that month, orders of dismissal or termination of
service having been passed against them, they were not in
employment and hence not liable to pay tax. It was asserted
that the very basis of tax stood displaced and hence the
deduction of tax at the snapped source rendered the payment
or deposit of one month’s wage deficient. contravening the
mandatory provisions of section 33(2) (b) of the Act. On
the other hand, it was contended inter alia on behalf of
the respondent that the statutory deduction of tax payable
under the Tax Act inhered in the payment of one month’s
wave, and in any case the difference had been tendered
before the Tribunal for payment to the workmen, on objection
raised. during the pendency of the approval proceedings.
These are the contours of the dispute.
The proviso to section 33(2) (b) mandates two steps, that
unless the workman is paid wages for one month and an
application as contemplated is made by the employer to the
Tribunal for approval of his action, no such workman can be
discharged or dismissed. The intention of the legislature
in providing for such a contingency is not far to seek and
as was pointed out by this Court in the case of Syndicate
Bank Limited v. Rain Nath Bhat 11 967-681 (XXXII) FJR 490 at
497 was "to soften the rigour of unemployment that will face
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the workman, against whom an order of discharge or dismissal
has been passed."
A three-judge bench decision, authored by Gajendragadkar,
C.J. of this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.N.
Modak [1963] 3 SCR 411 a page 418,
1014
had the occasion to spell out the nature of the order of
discharge or dismissal. It was ruled that-such order being
incomplete and inchoate until the approval is obtained.
could not effectively terminate the relationship of the
employer and the employee, as the question of the validity
of the order would have to be gone into, and if approval is
not accorded by the Tribunal the employer would be bound to
treat the workmen concerned as its employee and pay him all
the wages for the period even though the employer
subsequently could proceed to terminate the employee’s
services. Thus this Court’s view always has been that
relationship of employer and employee is not effectively
terminated by the passing of the order of discharge or
dismissal until approval thereto in terms of section 33(2)
(b) is accorded by tile Tribunal.
A three-judge bench of this Court in Bharat Electronic
Limited, Bangalore v. Industrial Tribunal, Karnatak,
Bangalore and another, [1990] 1 SCR 971 at pages 976-977
observed as follows
"One month’s wages as thought and provided to
be given are conceptually for the month to
follow, the month of unemployment and in the
context wages for the month following the date
of dismissal and not a repetitive wage of the
month previous to the date of dismissal. If
the converse is read in the context of the
proviso to section 32(b), it inevitably would
have to be read ,is double the wages earned in
the month previous to the date of dismissal
and that would, in our view be, reading in the
provision something which is not there, either
expressly or impliedly."
Bharat Electronics was a case in which wages had been paid
or offered to the workman in terms of section 33(2) (b).
short of the night shift allowance, and this Court took the
view that from the date of dismissal or removal (factual
though), the occasion to earn night shift allowance could
not and did not arise. In order to earn night shift
allowance the workman had to actually work in the night
shift and for the purpose had to report for duty on being
put to that shift. It was in this situation held that night
shift allowance automatically did not form part of his wage
as it was not such an allowance which flowed to him as
entitlement not restricted to his service.
In this extreme situation, the employee, in one sense, gets
unemployed as he stands deprived of work with effect from
the date of the application for approval, on which date
his discharge of dismissal is factually effective. He
stands paid his months, wage from such date and this is a
wage conceptually for the month
1015
following not double the wage for the month previous to the
date of the application. This is the dicta of Bharat
Electronics case (supra). In the other sense the order of
discharge or dismissal is incomplete and inchoate, unless
approved by the Tribunal and till approval is granted there
is no effective break of the employer’s and employee
relationship. This is the dictum of Tata Iron & Steel
Company’s case. So if these two features are grasped.
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appreciated and blended, it would lead us to the
understanding that by passing the order of discharge or
dismissal de-facto’ relationship of employer and employee is
ended, but dot de-jure, for that could happen when the
Tribunal accords its approval. The employee thus gets
factually unemployed from the date of the approval
application in the sense that he is not called to work and
is paid only a month’s wage representing the succeeding
month of his unemployment. The relationship of employer and
employee is legally not terminated till approval of
discharge or dismissal is given by the tribunal. And this
state of affairs was required to be ended within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of such application in
terms of subsection (5) of section 33, though the lapse of
such period would not and the proceeding and such time was
extendable by the Tribunal for reasons to be recorded in
writing. Now in this fluid state of affairs, the legal
character of one, month’s wage would undergo a change
depending, on the result of the approval application. If
the Tribunal were to refuse the approval, the inchoate and
incomplete order of discharge or dismissal would end and the
legal character of one month’s wales would transform to be
the same as before, from which statutory tax deduction could
legitimately be made by the employer. In the event of
approval of the application by the Tribunal, the legal
character of one month’s wage would on tile other, hand be a
wage without employment. In the given situation, if the
Tribunal were to refuse approval solely on the ground that
statutory tax deduction stands in its way to the grant of
approval, it could legitimately make its order conditional
on making food such payment. This is a field in which the
interest of- both parties has to be kept in view, for the
situation would be precarious for the employer if he were
not to deduct tax under section 4 of the Tax Act and
exposing him to the dangers, of penalties and prosecution.
If approval was to be rejected on merit and otherwise to be
rejected for not making complete payment of one month wage,
it would thus be just and proper to let the employer deduct
the statutory tax deduction from that one month wage, since
the relationship of employer and an employee has effectively
not been terminated, to meet the eventuality, lest the
approval application be dismissed on merit On the other hand
it would be just and proper either for the employer on his
own or on the asking of the Tribunal to let the sum
representing statutory tax deduction be deposited in the
Tribunal for payment to tile workman in the,event of the
approval application being allowed. If these two situations
can be saved in this manner there would, in no event be a
dismissal of the approval application for payment of wage
subjected to statutory tax deduction. Taken in this tight
one is to
1016
view the deduction and the subsequent offer of the
respondent to pay the tax deducted, and later deposited
before the Tribunal, for payment to the workman. This
payment was offered and deposited before the decision of the
approval application at a time when the relationship of
employer and employee had effectively not been terminated.
Here distinction would have to he drawn between statutory
deductions like tax deductions and other deductions which
the employer considers he can make. In either event, he
takes the risk when making a deduction. In the case of
statutory tax deductions his justificatory burden is less.
for he has the shelter of the tax law. The case of the
other deductions would obviously be on different footing for
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lie may not have any thrust of law. Those may purely be
contractual. Those deductions may not be compulsive under
any law. The employer makes the deduction in such cases at
his peril. But here, in the present situation, there
definitely arose a genuine claim to make the tax deduction
and doing so the employer projected.its case before the
tribunal in that angle. Not a paisa otherwise was kept
back. Thus in the facts and circumstances it appears to us
that the respondent was able to establish that its
deliberate deduction representing the tax from one month’s
wage was not to shorten the wage and cause infraction. of
section 33(2) (b) but a compulsive deduction to fulfill a
statutory obligation by the thrust of the Tax Act.
On this analysis and understanding the case of the Patna
High Court in Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. v. S.K.
Dutta(1990) LLJ Vol.2 page 547 where when the loan and
money-order commission was deducted from one month’s wages,
it was held to be violative of section 33(2) (b) of the Act
and the case Rajasthan High Court in Dinesh Khare v.
Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan(1982) LAB I.C. 517, decided
by S.C. Agrawal, then on that bench, and who is happily now
a member of this bench, disapproving, the deduction of
provident fund on the finding, that those did not represent
"emoluments carried by the workman concerned while on duty
within the meaning of section 2(rr) of the- Employees
Provident Fund Act. being, cases clearly distinguishable
would not further the case of the appellants. Conversely a
single bench decision of the Bombay flesh Court in Balmer
Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v. Waman B. More [1981] 42 F.L.R.
272275 would also not further the case of the respondent
because instantly no difficulty or inability to make the
necessary calculations at a particular point of time arose
which difficulty or inability get removed subsequently. The
claim to tax deduction was there to begin,with and could
subsist till the grant of the approval application and such
grant could be conditional on the payment back of the tax
deduction. All option of this method should settle the
question. We do not wish to enter upon other questions
cropping up to determine the tax liability of the employer
or the employee in that period of one month.
1017
At this juncture, it would add to our understanding if we
reproduce a passage from Bharat Electronics case supra).
It is:
"Before concluding the judgment the
observations in Syndicate Bank’s case, afore-
quoted, are again to he borne in mind. In the
facts and circumstances of this case the
management paid to the workman a sum of
Rs.607.90 as a month’s salary "to soften the
rigour of unemployment that will face the
workman". Flow could a short payment of Rs.
12 he said to have lessened the softening of
such rigour is thought stirring. Viewed in
the context, there could genuinely be a
dispute, as in the present case, as to whether
a particular sum was due as wages. It is, of
course, risky for the management to raise it
as to pay even a paise less than the month’s
wages due under section 33(2) (b), would he
fatal to its permission sought. But at the
same time it needs to be clarified that it is
for the management to establish, when
questioned, that the sum paid to the workman
under section 33(2) (b) represented full wages
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of the month following the date of discharge
or dismissal, as conceived of in the provision
and as interpreted by us in entwining the
ratios in Bennett Coleman’s case (supra) and
Dilbagh Rai Jarry’s case (supra) and adding
something ourselves thereto."
Thus on principle and percept we go on to hold that when an
order of discharge or dismissal of a workman is incomplete
and in choate until it’s approval is obtained from the
Tribunal, there is no effective termination of the
relationship of the employer and the employee. Not only in
a limited way that the relationship is snapped factually and
one month’s wage is given to the employee to soften the
rigour of his factual unemployment, but the content and
character of the wage would extendidly tend to remain the.
same so far as subjection to statutory tax deduction is
concerned, being remuneration paid as understood in section
2(rr) of the Act, on the supposition that the terms of
employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled and the
same was due as wages payable to the workman in respect of
his employment, or of work done in such employment, even
though he was not put to work.
Thus as a result, we find no cause to interfere in the
judgment and order of the High Court. Accordingly we
dismiss these appeals but leave the parties to bear their
own costs.
N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.’
1018