Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
NASIK MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HARBANSLAL LAIKWANT RAJPAL & ORS. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/12/1996
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
with
Civil Appeal No..16851..../96
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.9487/95)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment
of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated October
14, 1994, made in W.P. Nos.4023/89, Proceedings were
initiated under the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning
Act, 1966, (for short, the ’Act’), for framing a scheme and
for acquisition of the land in that behalf. The Final
Development Plan was made on November 29, 1980. Notification
under section 126(4) of the Act was published on August 6,
1987. It. was published in the local newspaper on July 18,
1987 and in the village Chavadi on September 25, 1987. It
would appear that subsequently, after Section 4(1)
notification and declaration under Section 6 of the (Land
Acquisition Act 1/1894) were published, notice was issued
under Section 9 of the said Act on September 16, 1989. Award
came to be passed on September 22, l989. The respondents
filed writ petitions on September 25, 1989. The award was
published on September 27, 1989. It would appear that the
Draft Plan was issued for reservation of certain lands for
the public purpose and no objections were filed. In the
meanwhile, by proceedings dated December 26, 1990, the same
came to be deleted by publication of the notification on
June 28, 1993 and Final Plan was published on September 30,
1993. On a representation made by the Corporation, the
Government had issued a corrigendum on August 19, 1994
restoring the status quo ante with a slight modification.
The High Court in the impugned order, while upholding the
validity of the notification under section 4(1) and
declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
held that the award was not valid in law since there was a
corrigendum issued by the Government. Consequently, the
procedure provided under the Act was to be followed by
operation of Section 37 of the Act. Thus these appeals by
special leave.
Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondents, contends that once the reservation has been
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deleted, status quo ante stands restored. As a consequence,
the entire process required under Section 28 and Section 31
read with Section 37 requires to be followed. In this case,
that was not done. The High Court was right in quashing the
award. We find no force in the contention.
It is true that if any scheme is modified and the Plan
has become final, the procedure contemplated under Sections
28 and 31 read with Section 37 of the Act is required to be
adopted. But in this case, it is seen that as per the
corrigendum what has been modified is that the entire site
is now reserved for ’informal housing’ and stable.
Originally, the entire area was reserved for stables and 100
wide road. The reservation was deleted earlier, as stated
above, and western part was included in commercial zone and
eastern part was included in the residential zone on the
plan. In view of the fact that of the final plan was
restored, though a part of it is now said to be used for
residential purpose, the question is whether the entire
process of the issuance of the notice under Section 28
involving consideration of the objections and passing of the
final plan after consideration is required to be gone
through? It is seen that by operation of Section 127 of the
Act where any land is included in any of scheme as being
reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified
therein or for the purpose of Planning Authority or
Development Authority or Appropriate Authority and the State
Government is satisfied that the same land is needed for a
public purpose different from any such public purpose or
purpose of the Planning Authority, Development Authority
Appropriate Authority, the State Government may
notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, acquire such
land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, l894.
Sub-section (3) envisages that on the land vesting in the
State Government under Section 16 or 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, as the case may be, the relevant plan
or scheme shall be deemed to be suitably varied by reason of
acquisition of the said land. Thus it could be seen that
once a notification under section 4(1) was published and
declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act came
to published, the public purpose becomes conclusive and for
any variation without substantial formalities, it is not
necessary that the entire process of re-publication of the
notification under Section 28, finding having been recorded
under both the Section 31 read with Section 37, requires to
be followed. The view of the High Court, therefore, was not
correct.
It is then contended by Mr. U.R. Lalit, that the
respondents had not been given the information of the
notification under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Therefore, the award is bad in law. We find no force in the
contention. In the absence of notice or failure to serve
notice, the award does not become invalid. Due to the fact
that immediately after the award and before the publication
of the award, the writ petition came to be filed on
September 25, 1980, we direct the appellants to make an
application within six weeks under Section 18(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act seeking reference. The land Acquisition
Officer is directed to refer the matter to the competent
civil Court for disposal within two months according to law.
The appeals are accordingly allowed but without costs.