Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10613 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.36237 of 2012)
STATE OF M.P. & ORS. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
PARVEZ KHAN …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
JUDGMENT
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment
th
and Order dated 20 March, 2012 of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No.262 of 2010.
3. The question raised for our consideration is whether the
refusal by the competent authority to give compassionate
appointment in police service on the ground of criminal
Page 1
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
antecedents of a candidate who is acquitted for want of evidence
or who is discharged from the criminal case on account of
compounding can be justified.
| serving w | ith the |
|---|
st
He died in harness on 21 June, 2005. His son, the respondent
Parvez Khan, applied for compassionate appointment. The
competent authority sent his record for police verification. It was
found that he was involved in two criminal cases. In one case,
he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 323, 324, 325,
294 and 506-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and in the other
under Sections 452, 394 and 395 of the Indian Penal Code. The
Superintendent of Police held that he was not eligible for
appointment in Government service and closed his case.
5. The respondent challenged the said order by way of Writ
JUDGMENT
Petition No.15052 of 2008 on the ground that in the first case he
st
was acquitted on 31 January, 2007 and in the second he was
discharged on account of compounding of offence.
6. Learned Single Judge did not find any merit in his
contention in the writ petition and dismissed the petition. On
appeal, the Division Bench took a different view. It was held that
the object of verification was to verify suitability of a candidate
| 2 |
|---|
Page 2
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
for employment. Since the respondent was acquitted in both the
criminal cases he could not be considered unsuitable. No
reason had been given as to why after acquittal in the criminal
| t was | considere |
|---|
Accordingly, the Division Bench directed consideration of case of
the respondent afresh in the light of observations in the order
within three months. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State has
preferred this appeal.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Learned counsel for the State submitted that since on
police verification, it was found that the respondent was involved
in criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he could not be given
appointment. Mere acquittal for want of evidence or discharge
on account of compromise could not be taken to be conclusive
JUDGMENT
for suitability of a candidate. The result of criminal proceedings
was not conclusive of suitability of a candidate for recruitment to
police service.
9. It is submitted that in a criminal case, a person cannot be
punished in absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt but the
standard of proof required for consideration of suitability or
otherwise of a candidate was not the same. Discharge on
| 3 |
|---|
Page 3
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
account of compounding of the offence by the victim depended
upon the attitude of the parties. The victim may be prepared to
settle the matter for any consideration other than innocence of
| not wash | off the |
|---|
an accused. Entering into police service required a candidate to
be of character, integrity and clean antecedents. If a person is
acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was
falsely involved and he had no criminal antecedents. All that
may be inferred is that he has not been proved to be guilty.
Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in
1
.
Commissioner of Police vs. Mehar Singh
10. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the
impugned order and submitted that some other similarly placed
candidates had been given compassionate appointment. Two
JUDGMENT
such instances have been pointed out by the respondent in the
counter affidavit. He has also submitted that the State of
th
Madhya Pradesh has issued Guidelines dated 5 June, 2003 for
character verification of candidates for recruitment to
Government service and such guidelines do no justify rejection
of candidature of the respondent. One of the instances given is
of Dilip Kumar Samadhiya son of Shri Jagdish Prasad
1
2013 (7) SCC 685
| 4 |
|---|
Page 4
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
Samadhiya against whom three criminal cases were registered
prior to the recruitment in Government service but he was
acquitted either on account of compromise or on account of
| he was | given ap |
|---|
Jitender Sharma was recruited to Police service though he was
tried for a criminal case, but acquitted on account of
compounding or on the basis of benefit of doubt. As per
th
Guidelines dated 5 June, 2003, an independent view can be
taken only where candidate has concealed the information about
pendency of trial and not where there is no such concealment,
as in the present case.
11. After due consideration, we are of the view that the
impugned order cannot be sustained. Refusal by the competent
authority to recruit the respondent on the ground of criminal
JUDGMENT
antecedents is not liable to be interfered with. The applicable
th
Guidelines dated 5 June, 2003 inter alia provide :
“On the basis of merits and demerits by the Hon’ble
Court the acquitted candidate will be eligible for the
Government Service.”
The above guidelines show that acquittal is not conclusive.
Even after acquittal, basis of order of the Court has to be gone
into by the competent authority. Even after order based on
| 5 |
|---|
Page 5
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
compromise or lack of evidence may render a candidate
ineligible. In the present case, the relevant part of the order of
the Superintendent of Police is as follows:
| taken in | regard to |
|---|
Two separate crimes had been registered against
the applicant, wherein in one case Section 394,
451, 365 of IPC are there and which come in the
category of moral turpitude. In the judgment of the
Court benefit of doubt has been given, therefore, as
per the new guidelines of 2003 issued by the
Government of Madhya Pradesh in respect of
character verification the applicant Parvez Khan
alias Sonu alias Raja has been found to be ineligible
for Government service.”
JUDGMENT
12. In Mehar Singh (supra) , the question considered by this Court
was as follows :
“18. The question before this Court is whether the
candidature of the respondents who had made a
clean breast of their involvement in a criminal case
by mentioning this fact in their
application/attestation form while applying for a
post of Constable in Delhi Police, who were
| 6 |
|---|
Page 6
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
“23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to
conclude that the Screening Committee would be
entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of
moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are
acquitted or
discharged if it feels that the acquittal or
discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable.
The Screening Committee will be within its rights to
cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the
acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct
of the prosecution case or is the result of material
witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers
of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge
whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely
to revert to similar activities in future with more
strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police
force. The Screening Committee will have to consider
the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in
the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for
worsening the law and order situation rather than
maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the
Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this
Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only
persons with impeccable character enter the police
force.
JUDGMENT
24. We find no substance in the contention that by
cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening
Committee has overreached the judgments of the
criminal court. We are aware that the question of co-
relation between a criminal case and a departmental
enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can
be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in
connection with it because the issue involved is
somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person
with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While
| 7 |
|---|
Page 7
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
| t stand on<br>a full-fled | a par wi<br>ged trial, |
|---|
25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was
considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram [2013 (1)
SCC 598]. In that case this Court was concerned with a
situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against a police officer. Criminal case was pending
against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4
of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case
because of the non-examination of key witnesses.
There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal
case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring
to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh
Panchal [1994 (1) SCC 541] where in somewhat similar
fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s action of
refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the
ground that in the criminal
case he was acquitted by
giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not
an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High
Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment
imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court
observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”,
“acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are
unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal
Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is
difficult to define what is meant by the expression
“honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that
when the accused is acquitted after full consideration
of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably
fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused,
it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably
acquitted.
JUDGMENT
| 8 |
|---|
Page 8
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
| ples will a<br>a person | pply with<br>in the po |
|---|
27. Against the above background, we shall now
examine what is the nature of acquittal of the
respondents. As per the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal,
respondent Mehar Singh and others armed with iron
chains, lathis, danda, stones, etc. stopped a bus,
rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to
take the fare from one of their associates. Those who
intervened were beaten up. They received injuries. The
miscreants broke the side windowpanes of the bus by
throwing stones. The complainant was also injured.
This incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public
order. The assault on the conductor was preplanned
and premeditated. The FIR was registered under
Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 IPC. The order dated
30-1-2009 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Khetri shows that so far as offences under
Sections 323, 341 and 427 IPC are concerned, the
accused entered into a compromise with the
complainant. Hence, the learned Magistrate acquitted
respondent Mehar Singh and others of the said
offences. The order further indicates that so far as
offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 IPC is
concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. The
learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused
of the said offence. This acquittal can never be
described as an acquittal on merits after a full-fledged
trial. Respondent Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in
JUDGMENT
| 9 |
|---|
Page 9
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
the police force by portraying this acquittal as an
honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no discussion
on merits of the case in this order. Respondent Mehar
Singh has not been exonerated after evaluation of the
evidence.
| esponden<br>against hi | t Shani K<br>m stated |
|---|
29. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushil
Kumar [1996(11) CC 605]. In that case, the
respondent therein had appeared for recruitment as a
Constable in Delhi Police Services. He was selected
provisionally, but, his selection was subject to
verification of character and antecedents by the local
police. On verification, it was found that his
antecedents were such that his appointment to the
post of Constable was not found desirable.
Accordingly, his name was rejected. He approached
the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on
the ground that since the respondent had been
discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable
under Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34
and Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of
appointment to the post under the State. This Court
disapproved of the Tribunal’s view. It was observed
that verification of the character and antecedents is
one of the important criteria to test whether the
selected candidate is suitable for the post under the
State. This Court observed that though the candidate
JUDGMENT
| 10 |
|---|
Page 10
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
| es, the sa<br>whether h | me has no<br>e should |
|---|
30. It was argued that Sushil Kumar must be
distinguished from the facts of the instant case
because the respondent therein had concealed the
fact that a criminal case was registered against him,
whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment.
It is not possible for us to accept this submission. The
aspect of concealment was not considered in Sushil
Kumar at all. This Court only concentrated on the
desirability to appoint a person, against whom a
criminal case is pending, to a disciplined force. Sushil
Kumar cannot be restricted to cases where there is
concealment of the fact by a candidate that a criminal
case was registered against him. When the point of
concealment or
otherwise and its effect was not
argued before this Court, it cannot be said that in
Sushil Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its
observations to the cases where there is concealment
of facts.
JUDGMENT
xxxxxxxxx
33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned,
his case appears to have been compromised. It was
urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a
compromise should not be treated as a
disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose
of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no
merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements
have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and
amiable atmosphere in the society by according a
quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also
to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from
the agony of pending litigation. But these
| 11 |
|---|
Page 11
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to
maintain integrity and high standard of police force,
the Screening Committee may decline to take
cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to it to be
dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted
for that.
xxxxxxxxxx
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders
the great responsibility of maintaining law and order
and public order in the society. People repose great
faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that
confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police
force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must
have impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this
category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the
criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will
have to be examined to see whether he has been
completely exonerated in the case because even a
possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a
threat to the discipline of the police force. The
Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of
taking decisions in these matters to the Screening
Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee
must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent
times, the image of the police force is tarnished.
Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward
manner by misusing power are in public domain and
are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police
force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we
would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of
a mechanism like the Screening Committee created
by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are
likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police
force. At the same time, the Screening Committee
must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed
in it and must treat all candidates with an even
hand.”
JUDGMENT
13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a
candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of
| 12 |
|---|
Page 12
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must
have impeccable character and integrity. A person having
criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is
| d, it can | not be |
|---|
completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the
credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force. No
doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the
case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by learned
counsel for the Respondent, in the present case, the
Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The
Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no
allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said
decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.
There is no material to show that the appellant was falsely
JUDGMENT
implicated. Basis of impugned judgment is acquittal for want of
evidence or discharge based on compounding.
14. The plea of parity with two other persons who were recruited
can also not help the respondent. This aspect of the matter was
also gone into by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) and it was
held :
| 13 |
|---|
Page 13
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
| ommittee.<br>ne of equa | It is well<br>lity enshr |
|---|
JUDGMENT
15. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of the
view that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified
in interfering with the order rejecting the claim of the respondent
| 14 |
|---|
Page 14
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
for recruitment to the police service by way of giving him
compassionate appointment.
| allow th | is appe |
|---|
impugned order. There will be no order as to costs.
…………………………………………J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
.…………………………………………J.
(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 1, 2014.
JUDGMENT
| 15 |
|---|
Page 15