X vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 44

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 164 OF 2026
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8173 of 2025]

X … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ANOTHER … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
R. MAHADEVAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present criminal appeal has been filed challenging the final judgment
and order dated 09.04.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
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Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 9829 of 2025,
whereby the High Court granted bail to Respondent No. 2 – accused in
connection with FIR No. 426/2024 registered with Police Station Kandhla,
District Shamli, Uttar Pradesh for offences punishable under Sections 65(1), 74,
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137(2) 352 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 5(l),
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6, 9(g) and 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 .

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For short, “POCSO Act”

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3. The case of the appellant as projected in this appeal is as follows:
3.1. Respondent No. 2 by name Arjun – accused was known to the minor
victim for about six months prior to the incident. As per the statement of the
minor victim, Respondent No. 2 repeatedly established physical relations with
her by threatening her and pointing a locally made firearm (katta) at her. It is
further stated that along with Respondent No. 2, his friends namely Goldi, Amit,
Rupak and Vedansh used to abuse and molest the minor victim and also
attempted to establish physical relations with her.
3.2. On 01.12.2024 at around 05.30 p.m., when the minor victim was walking
near her residence, the accused persons Arjun and Amit abducted her on their
motorcycle, again molested her and ultimately abandoned her at Baraut Bus
Stand, from where she contacted her uncle using a stranger’s mobile phone.
Thereafter, the minor victim narrated the entire incident including the sexual
assault committed by the accused persons over the past six months to her family
members. Immediately, the family members of the minor victim rushed to the
police station to lodge a complaint. However, the police failed to register the
FIR on 01.12.2024 and instead advised the minor victim and her family
members to compromise and settle the matter with the accused persons.
Ultimately, FIR No. 426/2024 came to be registered on 02.12.2024 under
Sections 75(2), 79 and 137(2) of the BNSS and Sections 9(g) and 10 of the
POCSO Act against five accused persons including Respondent No. 2.

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3.3. During the course of investigation, on 03.12.2024, the statements of the
minor victim and her uncle were recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS
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(corresponding to Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ). The
investigating officer obtained a certificate from Inter College, Ailum, District
Shamli, certifying the date of birth of the minor victim as 18.07.2010, which
established that she was around 14 years of age at the time of the commission of
the offence. On 05.12.2024, the statement of the minor victim was recorded
under Section 183 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 164 Cr.P.C.) before
the learned Magistrate, District Shamli, Uttar Pradesh. Thereafter, on
08.12.2024 the minor victim was medically examined and a medico-legal
examination report was obtained, which revealed the gravity of the sexual
offence committed against her.
3.4. Due to the influence exerted by the family members of the accused,
Respondent No. 2 was not arrested immediately after registration of the FIR
dated 02.12.2024 and was arrested only on 03.01.2025. Subsequently, he filed
bail application which came to be dismissed by the learned District and Sessions
Judge, Shamli on 13.02.2025.
3.5. Upon completion of investigation, the investigating officer filed
chargesheet on 19.02.2025 for offences punishable under Sections 65(1), 74,
137(2) and 352 of the BNSS and 5(l), 6, 9(g) and 10 of the POCSO Act.
Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 approached the High Court by filing Criminal

4
For short, “Cr.P.C”

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Misc. Bail Application No. 9829 of 2025. By the impugned judgment dated
09.04.2025, the High Court allowed the said application and enlarged
Respondent No. 2 on bail, subject to certain conditions. Feeling aggrieved, the
appellant has preferred the present appeal seeking cancellation of the bail
granted to Respondent No. 2.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the High
Court erred in granting bail to Respondent No. 2 without due regard to the
seriousness and gravity of the charges framed against him. It was contended that
Respondent No. 2 is accused of committing a heinous and grave offence of
repeatedly gang-raping a minor victim aged about 14 years by threatening her
with a deadly weapon (katta) and recording the acts on a mobile phone.
4.1. It was further submitted that Respondent No. 2 deliberately suppressed a
crucial and material fact before the High Court, particularly the filing of the
chargesheet prior to the consideration of the bail application. Such suppression,
it was urged, amounts to an abuse of the process of law and constitutes an
independent ground for cancellation of bail.
4.2. The learned counsel contended that the statement of the minor victim
recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS before the learned Magistrate discloses
a consistent and detailed account of repeated sexual assault, the use of a katta to
threaten the minor victim and the recording of the acts for the purpose of

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blackmail. Further, the medico-legal examination report prepared by the
E.M.O., District Women Hospital, Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh records the gravity
of offence and trauma suffered by the minor victim viz ., gang-rape, penetrative
assault, physical violence and threats thereby fully corroborating the victim’s
version.
4.3. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that although the FIR was
registered on 02.12.2024, Respondent No. 2 was arrested only on 03.01.2025
owing to his influential social status and during this intervening period, he
remained at large in the same village where the minor victim resides exposing
her to intimidation and trauma.
4.4. The learned counsel contended that the High Court failed to consider the
victim’s detailed statement under Section of the 183 BNSS, the medico-legal
evidence corroborating repeated sexual assault, the counselling reports of the
Child Welfare Committee reflecting the fear and trauma suffered by the victim
and the documentary proof of her date of birth. Instead, undue reliance was
placed on irrelevant considerations such as the alleged delay in lodging the FIR
and speculative observations regarding the victim’s age.
4.5. Further, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court
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in Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , particularly paragraph
33, which holds that bail may be cancelled even in the absence of supervening

5
(2022) 8 SCC 559

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circumstances, inter alia , where relevant material is ignored, irrelevant
considerations are taken into account, the influential position of the accused vis-
a-vis the victim is overlooked, or where the order granting bail is whimsical,
capricious, perverse or unjustified given the seriousness of the charges.
4.6. Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the grant of bail to Respondent
No. 2 is perverse, unreasonable and contrary to settled principles of law
governing bail in serious offences against minor victims and is accordingly
liable to be set aside.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the impugned
judgment granting bail to Respondent No. 2 – accused is legally unsustainable
and warrants interference by this Court.
5.1. It was submitted that FIR No. 426/2024 was registered at Police Station
Kandhla, District Shamli based on the complaint lodged by the uncle of the
minor victim. The charges framed against the accused were under Sections
65(1), 74, 137(2) and 352 of the BNSS and Sections 5(l), 6, 9(g) and 10 of the
POCSO Act alleging commission of rape and sexual assault upon a minor
victim aged about 14 years. According to the learned counsel, the allegations are
grave, specific and directly attribute culpability to the accused thereby attracting
stringent provisions of the POCSO Act.

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5.2. The learned counsel further submitted that in her statement recorded
under Section 183 of the BNSS before the learned Magistrate, the victim
categorically stated that she had known Respondent No. 2 for about six months
and he had established physical relations with her. On earlier occasions also, he
had established physical relations with her by threatening that he would make
her photographs public. She discontinued communication with Respondent No.
2 when her family members became aware of it. It was further alleged that on
the date of the incident, the accused committed rape by threatening her with a
firearm. These allegations, according to the State, disclose a clear prima facie
case of sexual assault under the POCSO Act.
5.3. The learned counsel emphasized that the victim’s date of birth was
recorded as 18.07.2010 in her educational certificate. The medical examination
also assessed her age to be approximately 16-17 years. Thus, there is no dispute
that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident i.e. 01.12.2024.
5.4. Given the statutory presumption under the POCSO Act and the
undisputed minority of the victim, the learned counsel submitted that consent, if
any, is legally irrelevant.
5.5. It was argued by the learned counsel that the trial Court rightly rejected
the bail application of Respondent No. 2 after considering the seriousness of the
allegations, the vulnerability of the victim, and the statutory mandate governing

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offences under the POCSO Act. However, the High Court failed to accord due
weight to these material factors and erroneously granted bail to Respondent
No.2.
5.6. Reliance was placed on the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v.
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Sonu Kushwaha wherein it was observed that the POCSO Act was enacted to
provide stringent punishment for offences involving child abuse and to
safeguard children from sexual exploitation and in Ramji Lal Bairwa and
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another v. State of Rajasthan and others wherein it was reiterated that
offences under the POCSO Act cannot be treated as private disputes and must
be regarded as serious offences against society at large.
6. Per contra , the learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2 – accused
submitted that this respondent is innocent and has been falsely roped into the
present case due to personal animosity and pressure exerted by the family
members of the minor victim, who disapproved of her alleged association with
the respondent. It was argued that the present case is nothing but a malicious
attempt to criminalise a consensual acquaintance and to harass an innocent
young man.
6.1. It was contended that the FIR was lodged with unexplained delay despite
the police station being situated merely half an hour away from the alleged place

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Criminal Appeal No. 1633 of 2023 dated 05.07.2023
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2024 INSC 846

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of occurrence. Importantly, the initial allegations did not refer to rape; the
accusation escalated only later allegedly after legal consultation. This delay and
escalation seriously undermine the credibility of the prosecution’s case. Further,
there are glaring inconsistencies between the FIR, the statement of the victim
under Section 180 of the BNSS and the statement under Section 183 of the
BNSS. In her statement under Section 180 of the BNSS, the minor victim
refrained from specifying any act of sexual assault or molestation by the
respondent. However, in her later statement before the Magistrate, she
acknowledged knowing the respondent for a considerable period and referred to
her family’s displeasure over her association with him. These contradictions,
according to the learned counsel, strike at the root of the prosecution’s version.
6.2. The learned counsel submitted that there is no medical corroboration of
rape. The medico-legal examination conducted on 08.12.2024 revealed no
injuries on the body of the minor victim. The absence of medical evidence
further weakens the prosecution’s case, especially given the seriousness of the
allegations.
6.3. It was further highlighted that during the investigation and medical
examination, the minor victim disclosed that she had known Respondent No. 2
for the past two years, had been in regular communication with him and had
visited cafés with him on multiple occasions. She also admitted that she stopped
communicating with Respondent No. 2 only after her family became aware of

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their association. According to the learned counsel, the victim later introduced
entirely new and inconsistent versions of alleged rape, filming of the incident
and involvement of additional persons, which render the prosecution’s case
unreliable.
6.4. The learned counsel submitted that the dispute was triggered solely after
the family of the minor victim discovered her alleged relationship with the
respondent. The FIR was lodged by the paternal uncle of the victim with mala
fide intention, without regard to the severe and irreversible impact that false
allegations of this nature could have on the respondent’s life, reputation and
future.
6.5. It was further contended that the respondent was not present at the alleged
place of occurrence on the date of the incident as he was out of the city from
28.11.2024 to 02.12.2024. The respondent’s father furnished material evidence
supporting the plea of alibi; however, the prosecution failed to properly verify or
investigate this crucial aspect.
6.6. The learned counsel also emphasized that the respondent was only 18
years and 1 month old on the date of the alleged incident, had no criminal
antecedents and had already remained in custody for a considerable period.
Given his young age and formative stage of life, any adverse order would cause
irreparable harm to his education, future prospects, and chances of reformation.

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6.7. It was submitted that Respondent No. 2 has fully cooperated with the
investigation and duly complied with all the bail conditions. Further, there is no
allegation of misuse of liberty.
6.8. The learned counsel relied on the decision in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar
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and another , wherein this Court held that interference with an order granting
bail is warranted only when the order is perverse, unreasoned, or ignores
material considerations. In the present case, the High Court passed a well-
reasoned order after independently assessing the facts and material on record.
6.9. Reference was also made to Arjun Jalba Ichke v. State of
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Maharashtra wherein bail was granted despite invocation of stringent
provisions. The respondent herein being similarly situated, the learned counsel
sought parity.
6.10. Finally, the learned counsel submitted that the object of bail is not
punitive but to secure the presence of the accused during trial. Therefore, the
impugned judgment of the High Court granting bail to Respondent No. 2 does
not warrant any interference by this Court.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for all the parties and
perused the documents placed before us.


8
(2020) 2 SCC 118
9
Criminal Appeal No. 268 of 2025 dated 17.01.2025

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8. The record reveals that the prosecution was instituted against Respondent
No. 2 – accused on the basis of a complaint lodged by the uncle of the minor
victim inter alia alleging commission of gang-rape, sexual assault and recording
of the incident on a mobile phone for the purpose of blackmail. Initially, FIR
No. 426/2024 was registered against five accused persons namely Respondent
No. 2 Arjun (A1), Amit (A2), Goldi (A3), Rupak (A4) and Vedansh (A5). After
investigation, chargesheet no. 38/2025 came to be filed on 19.02.2025 against
Respondent No. 2 (A1) under Sections 65(1), 74, 137(2) and 352 of the BNSS
and Sections 5(l), 6, 9(g) and 10 of the POCSO Act and against A2 to A4,
excluding A5 under Sections 74 and 352 of the BNSS and Sections 9(g) and 10
of the POCSO Act. The present case pertains to Respondent No.2 (A1) alone.
8.1. It further discloses that the date of birth of the victim was ascertained
from her educational records as 18.07.2010 and the medical officer assessed her
age to be between 16-17 years. Though the FIR came to be registered on
02.12.2024, Respondent No. 2 was arrested only on 03.01.2025. His bail
application was rejected by the District and Sessions Judge, Shamli upon
consideration of the victim’s statement under Section 183 of the BNSS.
However, by the impugned judgement, Respondent No. 2 came to be released
on bail. Hence, the present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant.
9. The principal plank of the submissions urged on behalf of the appellant is
that the High Court erred in granting bail to Respondent No. 2 – accused
without due consideration of the heinous nature of the acts alleged to have been

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committed against the minor victim. In support thereof, the learned counsel
invited our attention to the nature and gravity of the offence alleged against
Respondent No. 2 – accused and the maximum punishment prescribed under the
applicable provisions of law, as follows:

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9.1. Further, the learned counsel strongly relied on the statements of the minor
victim recorded before the learned Magistrate and the Medical Officer, which,
according to him, would categorically demonstrate the alleged acts of sexual
assault, physical violence and recording of the incident for the purpose of
blackmail. Therefore, it was submitted that the grant of bail to Respondent No. 2
– accused is wholly unjustified and unsustainable in law.
9.2. The learned counsel also moved an application seeking to place on record
that subsequent to being released on bail, Respondent No. 2 has been
continuously threatening and intimidating the minor victim. It was stated that
both reside in the same village and that Respondent No. 2 stalks the victim
whenever she goes to school or outside, intimidates her by glaring and showing
a katta (country-made pistol), and plays songs glorifying violence to instill fear.
Owing to such conduct, the victim has become afraid and has stopped attending
school. A complaint dated 02.09.2025 in this regard has been lodged with the
concerned police station and intimated to other authorities including the school
authorities. Therefore, the learned counsel sought cancellation of the bail

granted to Respondent No. 2.

10. Refuting the allegations levelled against Respondent No. 2, particularly in
relation to his alleged post-bail conduct, the learned counsel submitted that
Respondent No. 2 has scrupulously complied with the bail conditions imposed
by the High Court and has been fully cooperating with the proceedings.

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11. Having given our consideration to the rival submissions and the materials
placed on record, we are of the considered view that the impugned judgment
suffers from serious infirmities. The present case involves allegations of gang
rape of a minor coupled with the recording of sexual assault and threats of
circulation. The submission advanced on behalf of Respondent No. 2 regarding
a consensual relationship is wholly untenable in law, particularly where the
allegations extend beyond a single accused and involve coercion, intimidation
and multiple perpetrators. The statements of the victim recorded under Section
183 of the BNSS read with the Medico-legal examination report prima facie
establish the commission of the alleged offences.
12. It is settled law that the mere filing of a chargesheet does not, by itself,
preclude consideration of an application for bail. However, while assessing such
an application, the Court is duty-bound to have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence and the material collected during investigation. The
offences alleged in the present case are heinous and grave involving repeated
penetrative sexual assault upon a minor victim committed under armed
intimidation and accompanied by recording of the acts for the purpose of
blackmail. Such conduct has a devastating impact on the life of the victim and
shakes the collective conscience of society.
13. The High Court, while granting bail to Respondent No. 2 – accused,
failed to take into account the nature and gravity of the offences and the
statutory rigour under the provisions of the POCSO Act. The omission to notice

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that the chargesheet had already been filed, coupled with the prima facie
material emerging from the victim’s statements renders the exercise of
discretion by the High Court manifestly erroneous. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip
10
Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak and another , in the context of cancellation of bail
in a POCSO offence, this Court has reiterated that bail granted without due
consideration of material factors warrants interference. The following

paragraphs are pertinent:
“13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the
cancellation of grant of bail, cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be
present and bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner
without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it in
conducing to allow fair trial. This proposition draws support from the judgment
of this Court in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana,
(1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237], Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh
[Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 844] and
X v. State of Telangana [X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 902] .
....
16. No doubt each case would have unique facts peculiar to its own and the
same would hold key for adjudication of bail matters including cancellation
thereof. There may be circumstances where interference to or attempt to
interfere with the course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to
evade to due course of justice are abuse of concession granted to the accused in
any manner.

10
(2023) 13 SCC 549

17

….

14. Moreover, the High Court failed to apply the settled parameters governing
the grant of bail including the gravity of the offence, the vulnerability of the
victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation. Instead, reliance was placed
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on Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Manish
12
Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement . While Satender Kumar Antil laid
down general guidelines for the grant of bail, Manish Sisodia turned on the

11
(2022) 10 SCC 51
12
2024 INSC 595

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peculiar facts of prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial. In the
present case, however, Respondent No. 2 had remained in custody for only a
few months. That apart, mechanical reliance on precedent without factual
correlation is impermissible as authoritatively held by the Constitution Bench in
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Padmausundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others .

15. It is also important to point out that the victim resides in the same locality
as Respondent No. 2. The counselling report of the Child Welfare Committee
records that the victim is under fear and psychological distress. The post-release
presence of Respondent No. 2 gives rise to a real and imminent apprehension of
intimidation and further trauma to the victim. In offences involving sexual
assault against children, the likelihood of tampering with evidence or
influencing witnesses constitutes a grave and legitimate concern. The safety of
the victim and the need to preserve the purity of the trial process assume
paramount importance. In State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd.
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Yadav @ Rajballabh Yadav , this Court underscored that such factors must
weigh decisively while considering bail in serious sexual offences. The
following paragraphs are apposite:
“23. Keeping in view all the aforesaid considerations in mind, we are of the
opinion that it was not a fit case for grant of bail to the respondent at this stage
and grave error is committed by the High Court in this behalf. We would like to
reproduce following discussion from the judgment in Kanwar Singh Meena v.

13
(2002) 3 SCC 533
14
(2017) 2 SCC 178

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State of Rajasthan [Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC
180 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 614] : (SCC pp. 186 & 189, paras 10 & 18)
“10. … While cancelling bail under Section 439(2) of the Code, the
primary considerations which weigh with the court are whether the
accused is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere or attempt to
interfere with the due course of justice or evade the due course of
justice. But, that is not all. The High Court or the Sessions Court can
cancel bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from
serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the court
granting bail ignores relevant materials indicating prima facie
involvement of the accused or takes into account irrelevant material,
which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the accused,
the High Court or the Sessions Court would be justified in cancelling
the bail. Such orders are against the well-recognised principles
underlying the power to grant bail. Such orders are legally infirm and
vulnerable leading to miscarriage of justice and absence of supervening
circumstances such as the propensity of the accused to tamper with the
evidence, to flee from justice, etc. would not deter the court from
cancelling the bail. The High Court or the Sessions Court is bound to
cancel such bail orders particularly when they are passed releasing
accused involved in heinous crimes because they ultimately result in
weakening the prosecution case and have adverse impact on the
society. Needless to say that though the powers of this Court are much
wider, this Court is equally guided by the above principles in the matter
of grant or cancellation of bail.
*
18. Taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in
the interest of justice, the impugned order granting bail to the accused
deserves to be quashed and a direction needs to be given to the police
to take the accused in custody.”
24. As indicated by us in the beginning, prime consideration before us is to
protect the fair trial and ensure that justice is done. This may happen only if the
witnesses are able to depose without fear, freely and truthfully and this Court is
convinced that in the present case, that can be ensured only if the respondent is
not enlarged on bail. This importance of fair trial was emphasised in Panchanan
Mishra v. Digambar Mishra [(2005) 3 SCC 143 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 660] while
setting aside the order of the High Court granting bail in the following terms :
(SCC pp. 147-48, para 13)
“13. We have given our careful consideration to the rival submissions
made by the counsel appearing on either side. The object underlying the

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cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being
done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty by the
bail order from tampering with the evidence in the heinous crime and if
there is delay in such a case the underlying object of cancellation of
bail practically loses all its purpose and significance to the greatest
prejudice and the interest of the prosecution. It hardly requires to be
stated that once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases
where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent, the accused in
order to get away from the clutches of the same indulge in various
activities like tampering with the prosecution witnesses, threatening the
family members of the deceased victim and also create problems of law
and order situation.”

16. It is equally well settled that while bail is not to be refused mechanically,
it must not be granted on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring material
evidence. Where an order granting bail is founded on an incorrect appreciation
of facts or suffers from material omissions or where it results in miscarriage of
justice, this Court is empowered to interfere. In the present case, the grant of
bail by the High Court is vitiated by material misdirection and non-
consideration of relevant factors rendering the same manifestly perverse.
17. In such view of the matter, the impugned judgment dated 09.04.2025
passed by the High Court cannot be sustained in law and is accordingly set
aside. Consequently, the bail granted to Respondent No. 2 – accused is
cancelled. Respondent No. 2 – accused is directed to surrender before the
jurisdictional Court within a period of two weeks from today. In the event of his
failure to do so, the trial Court shall take appropriate steps in accordance with
law to secure his custody.

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18. This Court is conscious of the fact that the POCSO Act is a beneficial
legislation enacted to protect children from sexual offences and that proceedings
under the said Act warrant prompt and sensitive handling. This Court has
consistently emphasized the need for expeditious disposal of POCSO cases. At
the same time, it is equally imperative that prosecutions must be subjected to
careful judicial scrutiny so as to ensure that the process of law is not rendered
oppressive. Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to give priority to the present
case, conclude the trial and pass appropriate orders on its own merits and in
accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
19. With the aforesaid directions, this criminal appeal is allowed.
20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

.…………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]



.…………………………J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 09, 2026.