Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1114 of 2000
PETITIONER:
P.K. Arjunan
RESPONDENT:
State of Kerala
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/03/2007
BENCH:
S.B. SINHA & MARKANDEY KATJU
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. The appellant along with one T.V. Raghavan Pillai (since deceased) and
Ismail (absconding accused), were found to be in possession of 7985 litres
of spirit in 42 barrels by the Circle Inspector of Police, Hosdurg.
2. Seizure of the said excise article was made on the basis of the
information recieved by the said officer from DYSP, kanhangad to the effect
that spirit for the purpose of manufacturing arrack was stored in a house
in koolingal, without any permit. Admittedly, all the three accused were
found to be in possession of the said excise article.
3. They were prosecuted under Section 55 of the Kerala Abkari Act ("the
Act", for short) and were found guilty therefore.
4. The contention of the appellant before us was that he was an employee of
the said Ismail. The said defence has not been accepted. It appears that in
the body of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, provision of
Section 55 of the Act had not been correctly reproduced in so far as the
words "transports, transits or possesses" after the words "mport, export"
and before the words "liquor or any intoxicating drug" were missing.
Presumably. only on that premises. notice was issued and leave was granted.
5. Section 55 of the Act reads as under:
"55. For illegal import, etc.- Whoever in contravention of this Act or of
any rule or order made under this Act-
(a) imports, exports, transports, transits or possesses liquor or
any intoxicating drug; or
(b) Manufacture liquor or any intoxicating drug;
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(d) taps or causes to be tapped any toddy-producing tree, or
(e) draws or causes to be drawn toddy from any tree; or
(f) constructs or works any distillery, brewery. winery or other
manufactory in which liquor is manufacture; or
(g) uses, keeps, or has in his possession any material, still,
utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the purpose of
manufacturing liquor other than toddy or any intoxicating drug; or
(h) bottles any liquor for purposes of sale; or
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(i) sells or stores for sale liquor or any intoxicating drug;
shall be punishable.-
(1) for any offence, other than an offence falling under clause (d)
or clause (e), with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten
years and with fine which shall not be less than rupees one lakh
and
(2) for an offence falling under clause (d) or clause (e), with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both."
6. We may also notice the provisions of Section 58A of the Act which reads:
"For sale of certain preparations:- Whoever sells any preparation
which he knows or has reason to believe is intended to serve as a
substitute for alcohol or intoxicating drug shall, on conviction
before a competent court. be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to five years. or with a fine which may extend to fifty
thousand rupees, or with both.
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to the
sale of any medicinal preparation for bona fide treatment.
mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or animals."
7. Section 64 of the Act raises a presumption in regard to commission of
offence in certain cases.
8. If, therefore, a person is found to be in possession of excise articles
it is for him to adduce sufficient and cogent evidence to rebut the said
presumption.
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant before us would
raise two contentions. Firstly, it was submitted that the High Court having
found that the appellant was not the employee of the said Ismail, it was
for the prosecution to show that he was in conscious possession of the
liquor or any intoxicating liquor punishable under Section 55 (c) of the
Act. Secondly, it was contended that, in any event, it was obligatory on
the part of the prosecution to establish existence of mens rea on his part.
In support of the aforesaid contention. reliance has been placed on Inder
Sain v. State of Punjab, [1973] 2 SCC 372 and Ram Rattan v. State of
Punjab, (1979) Crl. L.J. 791.
10. The Act was enacted by the Maharaja of Cochin. After the formation of
the State of Kerala, the said Act was adopted by the State. Provisions of
the said Act having regard to the subject matter dealt w ith thereby
should, inour opinion, be read in the context of Article 47 of the
Constitution of India. Dealing in liquor is considered to be "Res Extra
Commercium". The Act prohibits dealing with the said commodity except by
way of a licence on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. Illegal
manufature possessoin, transport, export etc. have been brought within the
purview of the penal provision contained in Section 55 of the Act. Various
new provision have been introduced by way of amendment carried out in the
said Act from time to time to bring within the purview of the statute the
offences which than unknown.
11. Section 55 provides for a penal provision. The words ‘transport,
transit or possession’ have been introduced in the said section by Section
4 of Act 10 of 1955. By reason of the said amendment, the lacuna which
existed in the statute thus was sought to be remedied. Even otherwise. all
the clauses specified in Section 55 of the Act. if read in their entirety.
would give rise to a construction that the act of possession is involved in
each one of the activities mentioned in the clauses specified therein .
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12. A penal statute although is required to be construed strictly and a
potential offence would be presumed to be non-existing, the rule of
purposive construction in a case of this nature and, in particular, in the
matter of possessoin of the articles which have expressly been prohibited,
came up for consideration before this court in Indian Handicrafts Emporium
& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2003] 7 SCC 589, wherein it was
categorically held that when the statutory provisions are clear and
unambiguous, the same should be given its due effect without taking
recourse to any technical plea. The same principle was reiterated in
Balaram Kumawat v. Union of India & Ors., [2003] 7 SCC 628:
"26. The courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat
the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some
inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe. (1886) 11 AC
627). Reducing the legislature futility shall be avoided and in a case
where the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to, the
courts would accept the bolder construction forthe purpose of bringing
about an effective result. The courts, when rule of purposive construuction
is gaining momentum, should be very relucant to hold that Parliament has
achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it
seeks to achieve. [See BBC Enterprises v. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd. Ltd.
[1990] 2 All ER 118]."
13. Indisputably, where possession of a forbidden article constitutes an
offence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the ingredients therefor.
Existence of mens rea. however, would be a question which has to be
determined having regard to the provision of the statute.
14. In Inder Sain (supra). whereupo the learned counsel placed strong
reliance, the appellant therein recieved a consignment of a parcel of
apples from one Uchana Das of Solan and he never had any occassion to know
that therein some opium was kept. Existence of opium in the said parcel of
apples was established only upon chemical examination. It was in the
aforementioned premises, this Court held that as the expression "possess"
was not crystal clear in the provisions of the Opium Act, it was necessary
for the prosecution to show that the accused had the article which turned
out to be opium, stating:
"In other words, the prosecution must prove that the accused was knowingly
in control of something in circumstances which showed that he was assenting
to being in control of it."
15. What was emphasised was that sonscious possession of the accused was
necessary for the purpose of establishing the guilt.
16. The decision of this Court in Ram Rattan (supra), was to the same
effect as, in that case, the prosecution failed to establish that the
appellant was in conscious possession of the opium recovered from his
house. We do not find that, in the Opium Act. there exists any pari materia
provision like Section 64 of the Abkari Act. where the burden of proof was
upon the accused to establish the foundation of the charge. Indisputably,
thus, it was for the accused to prove the same. Section 106 of the Evidence
Act also is a clear pointer to show that whoever has any special knowledge
of fact, onus of proof in respect thereof would be on him.
17. Learned counsel would submit that the offence having been commited in
the year 1989 and the same being compoundable in nature at the relevant
point of time, leniency may be shown by this Court in the mater of quantum
of sentence. We are not inclined to do so.
18. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.