Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
2023 INSC 653
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4725 OF 2023
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.13789/2022)
GOSTHO BEHARI DAS .. APPELLANT(S)
V.
DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS. .. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave granted.
The question this Court must consider, is: –
“Whether the suspension of the Petitioner’s license to
practice medicine is alien to the nature and types of
punishment and penalties specified under the Contempt
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Indu Marwah
Date: 2023.07.28
15:45:29 IST
Reason:
of Courts Act, 1971?”
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THE FACTS
1. The present appeal stands filed against the judgement
rendered by the High Court of Calcutta, (Circuit Bench at
Jalpaiguri) in MAT No. 67 of 2022, by which it upheld
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various orders passed by learned single Judge dated 5 ,
th th th
11 , 12 and 14 July, 2022 in contempt proceedings
bearing number WPCRC9 of 2022, whereby vide the order
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dated 11 July,2022 the Petitioner/Appellant’s licence to
practice medicine, was suspended.
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2. Further with the order dated 14 July 2022, while
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extending the period of suspension till 19 August 2022, the
petitioner was asked to show cause as to why such
suspension be not affected for a period of two years.
3. A perusal of the record reveals that the Appellant had
unauthorizedly constructed a structure which was in
deviation with the plans sanctioned by the Siliguri
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Municipal Corporation. Respondent No.1(private party) filed
numerous complaints against such unauthorised
construction, but to no avail. Discontented by the non
1 Hereafter, “SMC ”
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2 3
intervention of the Commissioner of SMC , and the SMC
appellant herein filed a writ petition before the High Court.
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Vide order dated 22 December 2016 passed in W.P No.
11464 (W) of 2016, Respondent No. 3 was directed to have
the construction so made, inspected and submit a report
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before the court. On the next date of hearing, that is 19
December 2017 it was directed that the representation that
stood already filed before the Municipal Corporation dated
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2 August 2007, was to be considered and a reasoned order
was to be passed thereon.
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4. Pursuant to the above direction, an order dated 13 June
2018, directing the Respondents No. 3 to demolish the
unauthorised construction, was passed. This order however,
came to be quashed by the High Court observing the
Commissioner SMC, not to be the competent authority and
instead, only the Board of Councillors of the SMC, who
could pass orders for demolition. Subsequently, vide a fresh
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order dated 25 June 2019 the Board of Councillors of SMC
while observing the construction to be unauthorised,
ordered its demolition. In furtherance thereto, Respondent
2 Hereafter, Respondents No. 2
3 Hereafter, Respondents No. 3
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No. 2 passed an order dated 3 August 2019 directing the
demolition to be carried out.
5. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner, (Appellant herein)
filed a Writ Petition bearing No. 349/2019 before the High
Court of Calcutta (circuit bench at Jalpaiguri.) The same
was disposed of with the observation that an appeal from
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the order dated 25 June 2019, lay before the Principal
Secretary, Urban Development and Municipal Affairs,
Government of West Bengal. The said authority passed
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orders on 8 January 2020 and 28 July 2020 directing the
SMC to take necessary steps to aid the petitioner in
undertaking self demolition of the unauthorised
construction and, in the event of his failure to do so,
directed that the SMC itself undertakes such steps to do so.
6. Respondent No. 1 then filed a contempt petition in WPA No.
349 of 2019. It is hereunder that the license to practice
medicine, of the Appellant herein, was suspended.
LAW ON THE ISSUE AT HAND
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7. The grant, regulation and suspension of the licence to
practice medicine is governed by the National Medical
Commission Act, 2019. It facilitates the maintenance of a
medical register for India and enforces high ethical
standards in regards of all aspects of medical services. A
statutory body namely the National Medical Commission
looks after the abovementioned activities.
8. A perusal of the provisions of this Act as well as the now
repealed, Medical Council Act, 1956 shows that the power to
punish a registered medical practitioner for “misconduct”
rest exclusively with the body envisaged under this Act. The
Act itself provides for an exhaustive, complete mechanism to
revoke the licence of a registered practitioner for
professional misconduct. The same may be done after
holding an inquiry and complying with the principles of
audi alterum partem.
9. The instant dispute involves the question as to whether
such a punishment could be handed down under the
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Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 .
4 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Contempt Act’
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10. Contempt of Court is defined in the Act under Section 2(a) :
“2(a). “Contempt of Court” means civil contempt
or criminal contempt;”
11. Civil contempt, with which the present case concerns itself,
is defined under Section 2(b) which reads as follows:
“2(b). “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience
o any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or
other process of a court or wilful breach of an
undertaking given to a court;”
12. The punishment for contempt of Court is prescribed under
Section 12 of the Contempt Act, which reads as under:
“12. Punishment for contempt of court. (1) Save
as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in
any other law, a contempt of court may be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with
both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged or
the punishment awarded may be remitted or on
apology being made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation. An apology shall not be rejected
merely on the ground that it is qualified or
conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, no court shall
impose a sentence in excess of that specified in
subsection (1) for any contempt either in respect
of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
xx xx xx”
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13. It may be noted that right from the Privy Council onwards,
judicious and sparing use of the power of contempt has
been an accepted proposition. In Parashuram Detaram
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Shamdasani v. Emperor the Council had observed
“… this summary power of punishing for contempt
of court should be used sparingly and only in
serious cases. It is a power which a Court must of
necessity possess; its usefulness depends on the
wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised…”
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14. A Bench of seven judges in C.S. Karnan, In re , had,
referring to various decisions of other jurisdictions, observed
“ 63. The authority to punish for contempt of court
has always been exercised by the judiciary from
times immemorial [ In one of the earliest legal
pronouncements dealing with the subject, Justice
Wilmot in R. v. Almon, 1765 Wilmot's Notes 243 :
97 ER 94 explained the philosophy behind the
power to punish for contempt of court. The passage
now a classic exposition runs as follows : (ER p.
100)“… and whenever men's allegiance to the laws
is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and
most dangerous obstruction of justice, and, in my
opinion, calls out for a more rapid and immediate
redress than any other obstruction whatsoever; not
for the sake of the Judges, as private individuals,
but because they are the channels by which the
King's justice is conveyed to the people.”] . The
justification for the existence of that is not to afford
protection to individual Judges [ “14. … the law of
contempt is not made for the protection of Judges
5 1945 AC 264
6 (2017) 7 SCC 1
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who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion.
Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to
thrive in a hardy climate.” [Douglas,
J., Craig v. Harney, 1947 SCC OnLine US SC 79,
para 14 : 91 L Ed 1546 : 331 US 367 at p. 376
(1947)]] but to inspire confidence in the sanctity
and efficacy of the judiciary [ “… The object of the
discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt
of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court
or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue
interference with the administration of justice.”
[Bowen, L.J. — Helmore v. Smith (2), (1886) 35 Ch
D 449 at p. 455 (CA)]] , though they do not and
should not flow from the power to punish for
contempt. They should rest on more surer
foundations. The foundations are—the trust and
confidence of the people that the judiciary is
fearless and impartial .”
15. Krishna Iyer J. speaking for himself and Bhagwati J. in
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Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar Orissa High Court
(Constitution Bench), observed
“65. … we would like to underscore the need to
draw the lines clear enough to create confidence in
the people that this ancient and inherent power,
intended to preserve the faith of the public in
public justice, will not be so used as to provoke
public hostility as overtook the Star Chamber. A
vague and wandering jurisdiction with uncertain
frontiers, a sensitive and suspect power to punish
vested in the prosecutor, a law which makes it a
crime to publish regardless of truth and public
good and permits a process of brevi
manu conviction, may unwittingly trench upon civil
liberties and so the special jurisdiction and
jurisprudence bearing on contempt power must be
delineated with deliberation and operated with
serious circumspection by the higher judicial
7 (1974) 1 SCC 374
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echelons. So it is that as the palladium of our
freedoms, the Supreme Court and the High Courts,
must vigilantly protect free speech even against
judicial umbrage — a delicate but sacred duty
whose discharge demands tolerance and
detachment of a high order.”
16. In
W.B. Administrative Tribunal v. SK. Monobbor
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Hossain , (twoJudge Bench) has observed that the tenor of
the dicta of this Court on the topic (contempt) is crystal
clear. The Court has time and again asserted that the
contempt jurisdiction enjoyed by the Courts is only for the
purpose of upholding the majority of the judicial system
that exists. While exercising this power, the Courts must
not be hypersensitive or swung by emotions but must act
judiciously. The principle of sparing use stood reiterated in
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Prashant Bhushan, In re
On the aspect of Punishment under a specified statute
17. A Bench of seven judges in Bar Council of Maharashtra
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v. M.V Dabholkar had observed as follows, in respect of
the role of Bar Councils and the powers of disciplinary
action vested within them, as under
8 (2012) 11 SCC 761
9 (2021) 3 SCC 160
10 (1975) 2 SCC 702
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“24. The scheme and the provisions of the Act
indicate that the constitution of State Bar Councils
and Bar Council of India is for one of the principal
purposes to see that the standards of professional
conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Council
of India are observed and preserved. The Bar
Councils therefore entertain cases of misconduct
against advocates. The Bar Councils are to
safeguard the rights, privilege and interests of
advocates. The Bar Council is a body corporate. The
Disciplinary Committees are constituted by the Bar
Council. The Bar Council is not the same body as its
Disciplinary Committee. One of the principal
functions of the Bar Council in regard to standards
of professional conduct and etiquette of advocates is
to receive complaints against advocates and if the
Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate
has been guilty of professional or other misconduct
it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary
Committee. A most significant feature is that no
litigant and no member of the public can
straightaway commence disciplinary proceedings
against an advocate. It is the Bar Council of a State
which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. This Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union
of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 (fiveJudge Bench) categorically
held that –
“39. Suspending the licence to practice of any
professional like a lawyer, doctor, chartered
accountant etc. when such a professional is
found guilty of committing contempt of court, for
any specified period, is not a recognized or
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accepted punishment which a court of record
either under the common law or under the
statutory law can impose on a contemner in
addition to any of the other recognized
punishments.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. A reading of subsection (1) of Section 12 of the Act shows
that the punishment prescribed therein is simple
imprisonment, not exceeding six months or a fine not
exceeding Rs.2,000/SubSection (2) reads
“notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force” this implies that save and except
the punishment provided in subSection (1) no other
punishment can be prescribed to a person guilty of
committing contempt of Court.
20. In view of the above, this Court has no hesitation in
holding that the punishment handed down to the
contemnor is entirely foreign to the Act and, therefore,
unsustainable. The Court, in awarding such punishment
showed complete disregard for the statutory text of the
Contempt of Courts Act 1971, which is abundantly clear in
respect of the punishment that can be imposed thereunder.
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21. A medical practitioner guilty of contempt of Court may
also be so for professional misconduct but the same would
depend on the gravity/nature of the contemptuous conduct
of the person in question. They are, however, offences
separate and distinct from each other. The former is
regulated by the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 and the
latter is under the jurisdiction of the National Medical
Commission Act, 2019.
22. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment did not
consider or discuss this issue nor was any final decision
taken by the Single Judge in the subject contempt
proceedings.
23. The question raised in the instant appeal is answered in
the above terms.
24. The appellant has submitted before the High Court that
the requisite demolition has been carried out with the
exception of approximately 250 mm in the rear portion of
the concerned building as, removal of the same would have
rendered the building, legally constructed, to be unsafe. In
respect of the unauthorized construction that remains, we
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direct that an undertaking be furnished before the
concerned High Court that remedial construction to
safeguard the soundness of the existing building and the
consequent demolishing of the unauthorized construction
shall be completed within a reasonable time.
25. Consequently, the judgment of the Court’s below, i.e., the
Division Bench and the orders of the Single Judge, High
Court of Calcutta, (Circuit Bench and Jalpaiguri) in MAT
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No.67 of 2022 and orders dated 11 , 12 and 14 of July
2022 are set aside. The licence of the appellant, to practice
medicine is revived.
26. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of. No costs.
………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
Date : 28 July, 2023;
Place : New Delhi.