Full Judgment Text
2024 INSC 513
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2230 OF 2012
CENTRAL INFORMATION
COMMISSION …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
D.D.A. & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. The autonomy and independence of
administrative bodies are fundamental to their
ability to perform their designated functions
effectively. These institutions are established to
carry out specialized tasks that require a level of
impartiality and expertise, which can only be
achieved if they are free from undue interference.
Ensuring their independence is essential for
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Neetu Khajuria
Date: 2024.07.12
17:31:40 IST
Reason:
maintaining the integrity and efficacy of the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 1 of 36
administrative system. Interfering in the
functioning of these bodies can be detrimental,
as it undermines their ability to operate
efficiently and impartially. Such interference
can stem from restrictive interpretations of their
powers or direct interventions that impede their
operational autonomy. Administrative bodies
must have the freedom to establish and
implement internal procedures and regulations
that best suit their unique mandates and
operational needs. The principle of non-
interference is not merely an administrative
convenience but a cornerstone for upholding the
rule of law and ensuring that these bodies can
serve the public interest effectively. When these
institutions are allowed to function without
external pressures, they can make decisions
based on expertise and objective criteria, which
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 2 of 36
enhances their credibility and public trust.
2. The present appeal challenges the judgment
and order dated 21.05.2010, passed by the High
Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No. 12714 of
2009. The High Court, by the impugned order,
quashed the Central Information Commission
1
(Management) Regulations, 2007 framed by
2
the Chief Information Commissioner and held
that the CIC has no power to constitute Benches
of the Commission. This appeal is confined to
the issue of the validity of the Regulations and
the powers of the CIC under Section 12(4) of the
3
Right to Information Act, 2005 .
3. The matter originates from an application filed
by one Mr. Sarbjeet Roy, proforma Respondent
No.2, under Section 18 read with Section 19 of
1
In short, “the Regulations”
2
In short, “CIC”
3
In short, “the RTI Act”
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 3 of 36
the RTI Act, seeking information concerning the
ongoing modification of the Master Plan of Delhi
4
for the year 2021 . The applicant also sought
5
directions to the Delhi Development Authority
to fulfil its obligations under Section 4 of the RTI
Act, which mandates proactive disclosure of
information by public authorities.
4. On 22.09.2009, the CIC issued an order
directing the constitution of a Committee to
inquire into the matter of compliance with
Section 4 of the RTI Act by the DDA and to
submit a report to the Commission. The
Committee comprised Ms. Sujata Chaturvedi,
Director, Ministry of Urban Development; Shri
Dunu Roy, Hazards Centre, Delhi; and Shri
Pankaj KP Shreyaskar, Joint Registrar, CIC.
4
In short, “MPD 2021”
5
In short, “DDA”
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 4 of 36
5. Aggrieved by this order, the Contesting
Respondent authority-DDA filed a Writ Petition
(C) No. 12714/2009 before the Delhi High Court.
During the proceedings before the Delhi High
Court, the DDA specifically challenged the
summoning of its Vice-Chairman by the CIC,
arguing that such authority is vested solely with
the High Court. The DDA underscored those
certain powers, such as summoning high-
ranking officials and conducting detailed
inquiries, were traditionally within the domain
of Supreme Court and High Court having
plenary powers. They argued that the CIC, as an
administrative body, should not exercise such
powers as it would blur the lines between
administrative and judicial functions. However,
the High Court expanded its examination
beyond this specific challenge. It delved into the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 5 of 36
broader issue of the CIC's authority under
Section 12(4) of the RTI Act, ultimately
questioning and declaring the Regulations
framed by the CIC as ultra vires .
6. The High Court framed the following questions
to determine the issues at hand:
“I. Whether the Central Information
Commission has the authority, under the
RTI Act and the Rules made thereunder, to
appoint a committee comprising individuals
other than the Commission's members to
investigate the implementation of
obligations imposed on a public authority,
such as the DDA, by Section 4 of the RTI
Act?
II. Whether the Chief Information
Commissioner possessed the power to enact
the Central Information Commission
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 6 of 36
(Management) Regulations, 2007 under
Section 12(4) of the RTI Act, particularly
concerning the provisions in Chapter IV,
which address 'registration, abatement, or
return of appeals'?”
III. Whether the Central Information
Commission had the authority to mandate
the appearance of the Vice-Chairman, DDA,
in its proceedings?”
7. The High Court, after examining the matter at
length, came to the following conclusions on the
aforementioned three questions:
a) Regarding the first question, the High Court
concluded that the CIC does not have such
power. The Court held that the CIC's
authority is confined to the provisions
explicitly stated in the RTI Act, which do not
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 7 of 36
include the power to delegate its inquiry
responsibilities to a committee.
b) On the second question, the High Court
found that the CIC exceeded its jurisdiction.
The Court determined that Section 12(4) of
the RTI Act does not confer legislative power
on the CIC to frame such Regulations,
especially those that go beyond procedural
management and touch upon substantive
matters.
c) As for the third question, the High Court
concluded that such powers are reserved for
a judicial authority, specifically the
Supreme Court or the High Court. The
Court held that the CIC does not possess
the jurisdiction to summon high-ranking
officials such as the Vice-Chairman of the
DDA, thereby overstepping its statutory
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 8 of 36
limits.
8. We have heard Learned Attorney General of
India, Mr. R Venkataramani, appearing for the
appellant, Mr. Nitin Mishra, learned counsel for
DDA which is the Respondent No. 1 and have
perused the submissions of Mr. Sarbajit Roy,
Respondent No. 2.
9. The arguments of the Attorney General on
behalf of the appellant are briefly summarized
hereunder:
I. The Central Information Commission (CIC),
under the authority granted by Section 12(4)
of the RTI Act, framed the Central
Information Commission (Management)
Regulations, 2007, to manage the affairs of
the CIC effectively. Section 12(4) of the RTI
Act confers upon the CIC the power of
‘general superintendence, direction, and
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 9 of 36
management of the affairs of the CIC’. This
broad authority allows the CIC to take
necessary actions for the efficient
functioning of the Commission, including
the formation of benches for the allocation
of work among Information Commissioners.
II. The absence of an explicit provision for the
formation of benches in the RTI Act does not
negate the CIC's authority to do so. The
power to form benches is inherently
included within the CIC's general
superintendence and management
responsibilities. The broad language of
Section 12(4) of the RTI Act indicates that
the CIC has comprehensive authority to
organize the internal functioning of the
Commission, which necessarily includes
the ability to form benches for the efficient
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 10 of 36
handling of cases.
III. The ability to form benches is essential for
the efficient disposal of the large volume of
cases handled by the CIC. The Commission
registers nearly 20,000 cases annually and
deals with approximately 1,500 cases
monthly. Hearing cases collectively by all
the Information Commissioners and the
CIC together would be cumbersome and
would adversely affect the expeditious and
effective disposal of cases. The formation of
benches allows for the efficient allocation of
work and ensures the timely handling of
cases, which is crucial for upholding the
right to information.
IV. The distinction between rule-making power
conferred upon the Central Government
and regulation-making power conferred on
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 11 of 36
statutory bodies like the CIC supports the
Commission’s authority to frame
Regulations for internal management and
functional allocation. The regulation-
making power deals with matters of internal
management, functional allocation, and
measures in aid of discharge of functions.
This distinction validates the CIC’s
approach and underscores its authority to
manage its affairs autonomously without
impinging on the rule-making powers of the
Central Government.
V. The principle of non-interference is crucial
for maintaining the integrity and efficacy of
the CIC. Any undue interference in its
administrative functions, such as the power
to constitute benches, would significantly
impede its ability to handle the large volume
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 12 of 36
of cases efficiently and expeditiously.
Allowing the Commission to function
independently and exercise its powers of
superintendence, direction, and
management without external constraints
is essential for fulfilling its role in promoting
transparency and accountability.
VI. The practical necessity of forming benches
is further underscored by the large volume
of cases the CIC handles. The Commission
deals with a substantial number of cases
each month, and having all Information
Commissioners and the CIC hear cases
collectively would be impractical and
counterproductive. The formation of
benches allows for better case management,
timely disposal, and effective
implementation of the RTI Act's objectives,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 13 of 36
ensuring that the right to information is
upheld in both letter and spirit.
10. On behalf of the respondent no.1-DDA, learned
counsel stated that he has no instructions to
address on the issue of Regulations being
declared as ultra vires. However, respondent
no.2 although was not present at the time of
hearing, he has filed written submissions which
are summarised hereunder:
I. The respondents underscored that certain
powers, such as summoning high-ranking
officials and conducting detailed inquiries,
were traditionally within the domain of
judicial authorities. They argued that the
CIC, as an administrative body, should not
exercise such powers as it would blur the
lines between administrative and judicial
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 14 of 36
functions. The respondent contended that
the High Court was correct in quashing the
CIC’s order and Regulations to maintain the
distinction between administrative and
judicial roles.
II. The respondent highlighted a contradiction
between the appellant's assurances and the
Central Government's official stance. They
noted that the Department of Personnel and
Training (DoPT) had consistently stated that
orders passed by single benches of the CIC
were void due to the lack of provisions in the
RTI Act authorizing the CIC to constitute
separate benches. This position had been
conveyed to the CIC and was published on
the DoPT website. The respondent
referenced the DoPT's correspondence and
legal opinions obtained from the Ministry of
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 15 of 36
Law and Justice. These opinions confirmed
that the RTI Act did not empower the CIC to
constitute benches. They cited specific
letters and internal notes from the DoPT,
which reinforced the view that the CIC
should function as a full commission rather
than through benches.
III. The respondents maintained that neither
the RTI Act nor the rules made thereunder
provided for the formation of benches by the
CIC. They emphasized that the absence of
explicit provisions for benches indicated
that the legislature did not intend to grant
such powers to the CIC. As such, the CIC’s
action in constituting benches exceeded the
scope of its statutory authority.
IV. The respondents contended that the CIC
had overstepped its jurisdiction by
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 16 of 36
delegating its inquiry powers to a committee
comprising non-members. They argued that
only the CIC itself or its members had the
statutory authority to conduct inquiries
under the RTI Act. The formation of such a
committee, according to the respondent,
violated the provisions of the RTI Act and
undermined the statutory framework.
V. The respondents supported the High
Court’s reasoning that the CIC’s
Regulations exceeded the powers conferred
by the RTI Act. They endorsed the High
Court’s interpretation that the broad
powers of superintendence, direction, and
management did not encompass the
authority to frame Regulations for
constituting benches or forming committees
of non-members. The respondents agreed
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 17 of 36
with the High Court’s view that Regulation
22 was ultra vires the RTI Act and the rules
made thereunder.
VI. The respondents highlighted the potential
negative impact of the CIC’s actions on the
functioning of public authorities. They
argued that summoning high-ranking
officials, such as the Vice-Chairman of the
DDA, and constituting committees of non-
members could create an undue burden on
public authorities and disrupt their
functioning. The respondents maintained
that such actions were not envisaged by the
RTI Act and should be curtailed to ensure
the smooth operation of public authorities.
VII. The respondents described the CIC's
current system as dysfunctional,
highlighting issues like the establishment of
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 18 of 36
multiple registries, arbitrary procedures,
and a significant backlog of cases. They
argued that the CIC's actions under the
guise of autonomy had led to inefficiencies
and delays, undermining the RTI Act's
objectives.
11. The CIC has approached this Court by way of
the present appeal against the High Court's
judgment. The appellant, while not challenging
the quashing of the order dated 22.9.2009,
seeks to challenge the High Court's judgment
regarding the Regulations and the scope of the
powers vested in the CIC under Section 12(4) of
the RTI Act. The CIC maintains that the
Regulations were framed within the scope of its
statutory authority to ensure effective
management and functioning of the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 19 of 36
Commission and that the ability to constitute
Committees is an integral part of this mandate.
12. Having considered the respective submissions,
the primary issue to be considered is whether
the CIC, under the provisions of Section 12(4) of
the RTI Act, has the authority to constitute
benches of the CIC and frame Regulations for
the effective management and allocation of work
within the Commission, including the issuance
of orders and the formation of committees.
13. At the outset, it is pertinent to elaborate on the
relevant provisions of the RTI Act apropos the
present issue. Section 12 of the RTI Act outlines
the constitution and powers of the CIC. The
Central Government is mandated to establish
the CIC, which consists of the CIC and a
specified number of Information Commissioners,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 20 of 36
not exceeding ten, as deemed necessary.
Crucially, Section 12(4) of the RTI Act grants
CIC the general superintendence, direction, and
management of the Commission's affairs. This
provision implies that the CIC has
comprehensive authority to oversee and direct
the functioning This broad section allows the
CIC to implement measures that ensure smooth
and efficient functioning of the Commission,
including the formation of benches of the
Commission, including making decisions
necessary for its effective operation.
14. Section 15 of the RTI Act mirrors the provisions
of Section 12 but applies to the State
Information Commissions. It similarly
establishes the State Information Commissions
and outlines the powers and responsibilities of
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 21 of 36
the State Chief Information Commissioner and
State Information Commissioners. Both
Sections 12 and 15 of the RTI Act use similar
language, emphasizing the wide-ranging powers
of the CIC and the State Chief Information
Commissioners to manage their respective
commissions' affairs autonomously and without
external interference. This language clearly
suggests that the legislative intent was to
provide these officials with broad authority to
ensure their commissions function effectively.
15. The High Court of Delhi, in its impugned
judgment dated 21.05.2010, quashed the
Regulations framed by the CIC. The Court
specifically took issue with Regulation 22,
which dealt with the constitution of Benches
within the Commission. The High Court held
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 22 of 36
that the RTI Act did not explicitly provide for the
formation of benches by the CIC. According to
the Court, the statutory framework and rules
made under the RTI Act did not contain any
provision allowing for Single or Division
Benches of Information Commissioners.
16. In our opinion, the High Court's interpretation
was based on a restrictive reading of the RTI Act,
focusing on the absence of explicit provisions for
benches within the RTI Act. The High Court
noted that Regulation 22 exceeded the limits of
the powers prescribed under the RTI Act and
rules. It emphasized that the RTI Act required
orders to be pronounced in open proceedings,
while Regulation 22 permitted orders to be
placed on the website or communicated to
parties, deviating from the statutory
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 23 of 36
requirement. This Court believes that a broader
interpretation of the RTI Act is warranted. The
general superintendence, direction, and
management powers vested in the CIC imply a
wide- ranging authority to organize the internal
functioning of the Commission, including the
ability to constitute benches. This interpretation
aligns with the purpose and objective of the RTI
Act, which aims to facilitate the efficient
disposal of cases and the effective
implementation of the right to information.
17. The absence of an explicit provision for Benches
does not negate the CIC's authority to constitute
them, as such powers are implicitly included
within the scope of the CIC's general
superintendence and management
responsibilities. The broad language of the RTI
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 24 of 36
Act indicates an intention to grant the CIC
comprehensive authority to ensure the effective
and efficient functioning of the Commission.
The Delhi High Court's narrow reading of the
provisions overlooked the inherent powers of the
CIC to manage the affairs of the Commission.
The RTI Act's broad language suggests that the
legislative intent was to provide the CIC with the
necessary authority to implement measures
that ensure the Commission's effective
operation.
18. In the present case, the RTI Act should be
interpreted purposively, taking into account the
broader objectives of the legislation. The
purpose of the RTI Act is to promote
transparency and accountability in the
functioning of public authorities, ensuring
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 25 of 36
citizens' right to information. To achieve these
objectives effectively, it is essential that the
Central Information Commission operates
efficiently and without undue procedural
constraints. The principle of purposive
interpretation supports the view that the CIC's
powers under Section 12(4) of the RTI Act
include all necessary measures to manage and
direct the Commission's affairs effectively. This
includes the ability to form benches to handle
the increasing volume of cases. The formation of
Benches allows for the efficient allocation of
work and ensures the timely disposal of cases,
which is crucial for upholding the right to
information.
19. Furthermore, the High Court's reliance on the
absence of explicit provisions for Benches
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 26 of 36
overlooks the broad language of Sections 12(4)
and 15(4) of the RTI Act, which grants the CIC
and State Chief Information Commissioners
wide-ranging powers to manage their respective
Commissions' affairs. The legislative intent, as
reflected by the broad language of these
provisions, was to provide these officials with
the necessary authority to ensure that their
Commissions function effectively and efficiently.
These provisions explicitly use the words
“superintendence, direction and management”
of the affairs of the Commission. There have
been various landmark judgements of this
Court which have interpreted the words
"superintendence, direction, and control"
occurring in Article 324 (1) of the Constitution
in respect of the Election Commission.
20. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Election
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 27 of 36
6
Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar , has
recognized the wide ambit of the powers given to
the Election Commission for the
superintendence, direction, and control of the
Election process.
“…13. Article 324 of the Constitution
contemplates constitution of the Election
Commission in which shall vest the
superintendence, direction and control of
the preparation of the electoral rolls for,
and the conduct of, all elections to
Parliament and to the legislature of every
State and of elections to the offices of
President and Vice-President held under
the Constitution. The words
“superintendence, direction and control”
have a wide connotation so as to include
therein such powers which though not
specifically provided but are necessary to
be exercised for effectively accomplishing
the task of holding the elections to their
completion…”
21. Similarly, in Union of India Vs. Association for
6
(2000) 8 SCC 216
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 28 of 36
7
Democratic Reforms , this Court has held that
Article 324 allows the Election Commission to
operate in areas of laws which are not explicitly
mentioned in the legislation.
*
“ 26. The aforesaid decision of the
Constitution Bench unreservedly lays
down that in democracy the little man —
voter — has overwhelming importance on
the point and the little-large Indian (voter)
should not be hijacked from the course of
free and fair elections by subtle perversion
of discretion of casting votes. In a
continual participative operation of
periodical election, the voter does a social
audit of his candidate and for such audit
he must be well informed about the past of
his candidate. Further, Article 324
operates in areas left unoccupied by
legislation and the words
“superintendence, direction and control”
as well as “conduct of all elections” are the
broadest terms. The silence of statute has
no exclusionary effect except where it flows
from necessary implication. Therefore, in
our view, it would be difficult to accept the
7
(2002) 5 SCC 294
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 29 of 36
contention raised by Mr Salve, learned
Solicitor-General and Mr Ashwani Kumar,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the intervenor that if there is no
provision in the Act or the Rules, the High
Court ought not to have issued such
directions to the Election Commission. It
is settled that the power of the
Commission is plenary in character in
exercise thereof. In statutory provisions or
rules, it is known that every contingency
could not be foreseen or anticipated with
precision, therefore, the Commission can
cope with a situation where the field is
unoccupied by issuing necessary orders.”
22. Therefore, the use of the words
“superintendence, direction and management”
in Sections 12(4) and 15(4) of the RTI Act clearly
provides the CIC an ambit of power wide enough
to frame its own Regulations and to delegate its
power to a committee formed by it. The Central
Information Commission, utilizing these broad
powers, has enacted 'The Central Information
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 30 of 36
Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007.'
While the RTI Act does not explicitly grant CIC
the authority to frame Regulations, the
overarching powers granted under Section 12(4)
of the RTI Act inherently include the ability to
manage the Commission’s affairs effectively.
These Regulations are essential tools for
ensuring the efficient administration and
operation of the Commission, addressing
various procedural and managerial aspects
necessary for fulfilling its mandate. Focusing
narrowly on the nomenclature and the absence
of an explicit provision for Regulation-making
within the RTI Act would undermine the broader
purpose and intent of the same. The
nomenclature used to describe these
Regulations should not detract from their
necessity and their role in facilitating the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 31 of 36
Commission’s functioning. A purposive
interpretation of Section 12(4) of the RTI Act
reveals that the powers of "superintendence,
direction and management" are intended to be
comprehensive, enabling the CIC to adopt
measures, including the framing of Regulations,
that ensure transparency, accountability, and
efficient handling of its responsibilities. Thus,
the creation of these Regulations is not only
justified but crucial for the CIC to manage its
workload and operational demands effectively,
thereby serving the core objectives of the RTI Act.
23. At this juncture, it is necessary to elucidate that
under Section 12(4) of the RTI Act, the CIC has
the authority to issue various forms of
administrative guidelines, directives and
instructions essential for the effective
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 32 of 36
management of its affairs. The 'Central
Information Commission (Management)
Regulations, 2007,' framed by the CIC, could
have been pronounced as 'Circulars,' 'By-laws,'
or any other similar administrative orders. The
primary objections have been raised due to the
word "Regulations," which respondents argue,
confers the gravity of a separate legislation.
However, this interpretation misses the
substantive purpose behind these measures.
The use of the term "Regulations" should not
detract from their function, which is akin to any
other administrative orders or circulars that an
authority like the CIC might promulgate to
ensure the smooth operation of its duties. The
essence of these regulations lies in their role in
facilitating the internal management and
procedural operations of the Commission, a
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 33 of 36
necessity clearly envisioned by the broad
powers of superintendence, direction, and
management granted under Section 12(4) of the
RTI Act. By focusing on the terminology, the
objections fail to appreciate the functional
equivalence of these regulations to other forms
of administrative guidance. The regulations
were crafted to address the practical needs of
the Commission, providing structure and clarity
to its operations, in any administrative context.
Therefore, raising objections based solely on the
label "Regulations" is an exercise in semantics
rather than a substantive argument.
24. We believe that the autonomy of the Central
Information Commission is of paramount
importance to its effective functioning. Any
undue interference in its administrative
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 34 of 36
functions, such as the power to constitute
benches, would significantly impede its ability
to handle the large volume of cases efficiently
and expeditiously. The CIC must be allowed to
operate independently and exercise its powers
of superintendence, direction, and management
without external constraints. The principle of
non-interference is crucial for maintaining the
integrity and efficacy of the CIC. Allowing the
Commission to function autonomously ensures
that it can fulfil its role in promoting
transparency and accountability, which are the
cornerstones of the RTI Act. The ability to form
benches and allocate work among Information
Commissioners is essential for the CIC to
manage its workload effectively and uphold the
citizens' right to information.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 35 of 36
25. The appeal is accordingly allowed, and the
judgment of the Delhi High Court, is set aside.
The Chief Information Commissioner’s powers
to frame Regulations pertaining to constitution
of Benches of the Commission are upheld as
such powers are within the ambit of Section
12(4) of the RTI Act.
26. There shall be no order as to costs.
……………………………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
……………………………………J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
NEW DELHI
JULY 10, 2024
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2230 OF 2012 Page 36 of 36