Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BHAGWANT KISHORE JOSHI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
17/04/1963
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION:
1964 AIR 221 1964 SCR (3) 71
CITATOR INFO :
R 1968 SC1292 (5,7)
E&R 1970 SC1396 (6,7)
R 1984 SC 718 (21)
RF 1991 SC1260 (54)
AFR 1992 SC 604 (81)
ACT:
Criminal Trial--Investigation by Police Officer below the
rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police--Previous permission
of Magistrate not obtained--If proper investigation--Such
omission if vitiated the trial--Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947 (2of 1947), s. 5A--Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 4 (1), 154, 157.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent was a booking clerk. He committed
criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 49/1/0. On the
receipt of the above mentioned information
Superintendent of Police directed M, a Sub-Inspector of
Police, to make an enquiry. Thereafter M verified the
allegations contained in the information and examined the
relevant railway records. On
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the basis of the information collected, he submitted a
report. M made the first stage of investigation without
obtaining the order of the Magistrate, 1st Class.1
Subsequently, M obtained permission of a Magistrate, 1st
Class, to investigate into the case as required by s. 5A of
the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thereafter. he made
further investigation and submitted a charge sheet. The
respondent was tried and convicted by the Special Judge
under s. 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. On appeal
the High Court set aside the conviction mainly on the ground
that the first stage of the investigation was contrary to s.
5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the accused must
be held to have been seriously prejudiced by the said
contravention of the Act.
Held (per Subba Rao and Dayal, JJ.), that the first
stage of investigation made by M, before obtaining the
requisite permission. of the Magistrate, 1st Class, under
s. 5A of the Act, was an "investigation" within the meaning
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of s. 4 (1) of the code of Criminal Procedure. M received
through the report a detailed information of the offence
alleged to have been committed by the accused with necessary
particulars; he proceeded to the spot of the offence,
ascertained the relevant facts by going through the railway
records, and submitted a report. These acts constituted
an investigation within the meaning of the definition of
"investigation" under s. 4 (1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and as such there was a contravention of s. 5A of
the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Subsequently M rectified the earlier defect by
obtaining the permission of the Magistrate, 1st Class, to
investigate into the offence alleged to have been committed
by the accused and in effect there was practically de novo
investigation in strict compliance with the provision of
Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact, the accused has not
been prejudiced by the illegality committed by the Police in
the first stage of investigation. The conviction of an
accused cannot be set aside on the ground of some
irregularity or illegality in the matter of investigation.
there must be sufficient nexus either established or
probabilized, between the conviction and the irregularity in
the investigation.
H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State at Delhi, [1955]
1 S.C.R. 1150, relied on.
In re Nanumuri Anandayya, A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 312, In re
Rangarajulu, A.I.R. 1958 Mad, 368 and The State Kerala
v.M. ,1. Samuel I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 783, referred to.
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Mudholkar J.--In fact there was no defect. or
irregularity in conducting the first stage of investigation.
Investigation, in substance, means collection of evidence
relating to the commission of offence for establishing, the
accusation against the offender. It is open to a Police
Officer to hold preliminary enquiry for ascertaining the
correctness of the information. Such preliminary enquiry
does not amount to collection of evidence and so cannot be
regarded as investigation.
H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi [1955] 1
S.C.R. 1150, relied on.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
171 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order
dated January 30, 1960, of the Allahabad High Court
(Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 643 of
1960.
R.L. Mehta, G.C. Mathur and C.P. Lal, for the appellant.
T.R. Bhasin, for the respondent.
1963. April 17. The Judgment of Subba Rao and Dayal
JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao J. Mudholkar J., delivered a
separate Judgment.
SUBBA RAO J.--This appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, Lucknow, Bench Lucknow setting aside that of
the Special Judge (West), Lucknow, who convicted the
accused-respondent and sentenced him to one year’s
rigorous imprisonment Under s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act (No. II of 1947), hereinafter called the Act.
The case of the prosecution may be briefly stated: The
respondent was a booking clerk at Saharanpur in the year
1955-56. Between October 22, 1955, and May 26, 1956, he
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committed criminal
74.
breach of trust in respect of Rs. 49/1/0. On the said
allegations the accused was sent up for trial before the
Special Judge for offences under s. 5 (1) (c), read with s.
5 (2), of the Act. Before the Special Judge the
prosecution filed a number of documents numbering up to 124
and examined 20 witnesses. The accused admitted before
him that he had realized the amounts as alleged by the
prosecution, but pleaded that he had no dishonest intention,
and that the deficit found was due to inadvertance and
oversight. The Special Judge considered the entire evidence
and found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution
established that the accused misappropriated the amounts
received by him as a public servant. It was contended before
him that the investigation of the case has been made by
SubInspector Mathur, who under the law was not entitled
to investigate the case, as he was below the rank of Deputy
Superintendent and hence the trial was vitiated. The
learned Special Judge held that the said Sub-Inspector did
not conduct any investigation before he obtained the
requisite permission from the appropriate authority and that
even if he did it had not been established that the accused
was prejudiced by such an enquiry. In the result he
convicted the accused and sentenced him as aforesaid. On
appeal by the accused, the High Court set aside the
conviction mainly on the ground that the SubInspector Mathur
made "Investigation" before he obtained the permission of
the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Lucknow, to
investigate the case and as the said investigation was in
violation of the provisions of the Act, the accused must be
held to have been seriously prejudiced by the said
contravention of the Act. The High Court also casually
observed that it was inclined to take the view that the
prosecution had not eliminated the reasonable possibility
of the defence of the accused being correct. For the said
reasons the High Court set aside the conviction of the
accused and acquitted
75
him. The State has preferred the present appeal against the
said judgment of the High Court.
The only question that was argued before us is whether
the High Court was right in acquitting the accused on the
ground that the investigation made by Sub-Inspector Mathur
before he obtained ’the permission of the Magistrate
vitiated the entire trial.
Learned counsel for the State contended that the said
Sub-Inspector only made a preliminary enquiry to ascertain
the truth of the information received by him and,
thereafter, after obtaining the requisite permission of the
Magistrate he made an investigation of the offence and,
therefore, there was neither illegality nor irregularity in
the matter of investigation. In any view, the argument
proceeded, the High Court went wrong in setting aside the
conviction based on evidence without considering and coming
to a conclusion whether the said irregularity, if any, had
prejudiced the accused.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused-
respondent, pressed on us to hold that the investigation was
made in consistent disregard of the safeguards provided by
the Legislature in such a case and therefore the Court.
should, without any further proof, presume prejudice to the
accused.
Before we consider the merits of the rival contentions
it would be necessary to notice briefly the alleged
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irregularity-committed by the prosecution in the matter of
investigation.
On April 26, 1956, A.N. Khanna, the Railway Sectional
Officer, Special Police Establishment, Lucknow, sent report
to the Superintendent of Police, Special Police
Establishment, stating that he had received information
through a source that
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the accused was in the habit of misappropriating Government
money, giving 7 instances of the acts of misappropriations
committed by him and informing him that if a proper
investigation was made many more cases of misappropriation
would come to light. Mathur, the Sub-Inspector of Police,
Special Police Establishment, as P.W. 15 says that on the
receipt of the said report, the said Superintendent
of .Police directed him to make an enquiry; and he further
says that on the basis of the information he checked the
railway records, found that the information was correct and
submitted a report accordingly. After he submitted the
report, on October 8, 1956, the said Sub-Inspector applied
to the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Lucknow,
for permission to investigate the case. On October 19,
1956, the said Magistrate permitted him to investigate.
Thereafter, he made further investigation, seized
documents, took statements from witnesses and finally
submitted a charge-sheet against the accused.
The first question is whether the enquiry made by him
before he obtained the permission of the Magistrate was
"investigation" within the meaning of the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 of the Code
prescribes the mode of recording the information received
orally or in writing by an officer incharge of a police
station in respect of the commission of a cognizable
offence. Section 156 thereof authorizes such an officer to
investigate any cognizable offence prescribed therein.
Though ordinarily investigation is undertaken on information
received by a police officer, the receipt of information is
not a condition precedent for investigation. Section 157
which prescribes the procedure in the matter of such an
investigation can be initiated either on information or
otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions that an
officer incharge of a police station can start
investigation either on information or otherwise. Under s.
4 (1) of the Code of Criminal
77
Procedure, "Investigation" includes all the proceedings
under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by
a police-officer Or by any person (other than a Magistrate)
who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf." This
Court in H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi
(1), described the procedure prescribed for investigation
under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus:
"Thus, under the Code investigation consists
generally of the following steps: (1)
Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances of the case, (3)
Discovery and arrest of the suspected
offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating
to the commission of the offence which may
consist of (a) examination of various persons
(including the accused) and the reduction of
their statements into writing, if the officer
thinks fit, (b) the search of places of
seizure of things considered necessary for
the investigation and to be produced at the
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trial, and (5) Formation of the opinion as to
whether on the material collected there is a
case to place the accused before a M
agistrate
for trial and if so taking the necessary steps
for the same by filing of a charge-sheet under
section 173."
Did Mathur, the Sub-Inspector, make such an investigation
before he obtained the permission of the Magistrate under s.
5A of the Act ? Ex. P-113 shows that Khanna, the Railway
Sectional Officer, received through a source information
that the accused was in the habit of misappropriating
Government money by not accounting for the saleproceeds of
blank paper and other tickets; it also indicates that the
information received by the said officer was not vague, but
contained precise particulars of the acts of
misappropriation committed by
78
the accused. On April 26, 1956 he sent a report of the
information received to the Superintendent of Police,
Special Police Establishment, Lucknow, indicating to him
that if a proper investigation was made many more cases of
misappropriation would come to light. On the receipt of the
said report, the matter was entrusted to the said Mathur, a
SubInspector of Police of the Special Police Establishment,
Lucknow. As P.W. 20 he describes the steps he had taken
pursuant to the information given in the said report. He
verified the allegations contained in the information given
by Khanna, saw the relevant railway records after taking the
permission of the Station Master and found the information
given to be correct.. On the basis of the information
collected, he submitted a report. But the full details of
the enquiry were not mentioned therein. He also did not
prepare any case diary in respect of the said enquiry. The
said report is not in the record. We may assume that the
Sub-Inspector did nothing more than what he states he did in
his evidence. Even so t e said police officer received a
detailed information of the offence alleged to have been
committed by the accused with necessary particulars,
proceeded to the spot of the offence, ascertained the
relevant facts by going through the railway records and
submitted a report of the said acts. The said acts
constituted an investigation within the meaning of the
definition of "investigation" under s. 4 (1)of the Code of
Criminal Procedure as explained by this Court. The
decisions cited by the learned counsel for the State in
support of his contention that there was no investigation in
the present case are rather wide off the mark. In In re
Nanumuri Anandayya a division Bench of the Madras High Court
held that an informal enquiry on the. basis of a vague
telegram was not an investigation within the meaning of s.
157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In In re Rangarajulu
(2), Ramaswami J., of the Madras
(1) A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 312. (2) A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 368, 371-372.
79
High Court described the following three ’stages a policeman
has to pass in a conspiracy case:
"......hears something of interest affecting
the public security and which puts him on the
alert; makes discreet enquiries, takes
soundings and sets up informants and is in the
second stage of qui vive or lookout; and’
finally gathers sufficient information
enabling him to bite upon something definite
and that is the stage when first information
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is recorded and when investigation starts."
This graphic description of she stages is only a restatement
of the principle that a, vague information or an
irresponsible rumour would not in itself constitute
information within the meaning of s. 154 of the Code or the
basis for an investigation under s. 157 thereof. In The
State of Kerala v. M.J. Samuel (1), a full Bench of the
Kerala High Court ruled that,"it can be stated as a general
principle that it is not every piece of information however
vague, indefinite and unauthenticated it may be that should
be recorded as the First Information for the sole reason
that such information was the first, in point of time, to be
received by the police regarding the commission of an
offence." The full Bench also took care to make it clear
that whether or not a statement would constitute the First
Information Report in a case is a question of faCt and would
depend upon the circumstances of that case. These and such
other decisions were given in the context of the question
whether an information given was the First Information
within the meaning of s. 154 of the Code: they are not of
much relevance in considering the question whether in a
particular case a police officer has made an investigation
of a cognizable offence within the meaning of s. 157 of the
Code; that would depend upon the nature of the information
received by the police officer, and the steps taken by him
for
(1) I. L. R, 1960 Kerala 783.
80
ascertaining the ’truth of the information and for detecting
the crime.
In this case, the information received was clear and
precise and the Sub-Inspector, on the basis of the said
information, went to the spot to investigate into the truth
of the allegations and indeed took some of the crucial steps
to detect the crime. We, therefore, hold that the Sub-
Inspector of the Police made investigation of the offence
before obtaining the requisite permission of the Magistrate.
Section 5A of the Act reads:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no police
officer below the rank--
X X X X X
(c) elsewhere, of a deputy superintendent of
police,
shall investigate any offence punishable under
section 161, section 165, or section 165A of
the Indian Penal Code or Under sub-section (2)
of section 5 of this Act, without the order of
a presidency magistrate or a magistrate of the
first class, as the case may be, or make any
arrest therefore without a warrant ;"
It is manifest from the section that an officer below the
rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot investigate
an offence punishable under the provisions of the Act
without the order of a Magistrate, First Class. The scope
of the said section and the reason underlying the said
provision and others were considered by this Court in The
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali (1). It was stated
therein that s. 5A was inserted in the Act by Act 59 of 1952
to protect
(1) [1959] supp. 2 S. C. R. 201.
81
public servants against harassment and victimization. This
Court further observed therein that the said statutory
safeguards must be strictly complied with, for they were
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conceived in public interest and were provided as a
guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecution. The
reason for the rule was given thus, at p. 208:
"While in the case of an officer of assured
status and rank, the legislature was prepared
to believe him implicitly, it prescribed an
additional guarantee in the case of police
officers below that rank, namely, the previous
order of a presidency magistrate or a
magistrate of the first class., as the case
may be..The magistrate’s status gives
assurance to the bona fide of the
investigation ."
Notwithstanding the clear and express provisions of the
statute, in the present case the Sub-Inspector made the
investigation of the.offence alleged to have been committed
by a public servant without obtaining the order of a
Magistrate, First Class.. We hope and trust that
investigations under the Act will be conducted in strict
compliance with the provisions of the Act.
But in this case the police officer realised his duty
after he made some investigation of the offence and hastened
to rectify the defect. After he verified the railway
records in the light of the information received by him, he
registered the case. Thereafter on October 8, 1956. he
applied to the Additional District Magistrate (.Judicial),
Lucknow, for permission to investigate the offence. Therein
he stated that no Deputy Superintendent of Police was posted
for the Lucknow branch of the Special Police J
establishment. The Superintendent of Police in Eorwarding
that application endorsed that statement nd further pointed
out that he was busy with the
82
supervision of other important cases and administrative
duties. The Magistrate on October 19, 1956, on the basis of
the said facts gave the necessary permission to the Sub-
Inspector to investigate the offence. The Sub-Inspector
thereafter made a detailed investigation, took statements,
of witnesses, seized the relevant papers, got an
investigation ,made, when necessary through other branches
of the Special Police Establishment, and thereafter
submitted the charge-sheet. In short, after taking the
permission of the Magistrate, he started practically a fresh
investigation in strict compliance with the provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, no attempt has been
made to point out any defect or contravention of the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the matter
of investigation after the granting of the said permission.
After the investigation, the accused was tried by the
Special Judge. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses and
filed 124 exhibits. The defence examined 3 witnesses. The
learned Special Judge, on a careful consideration of the
entire evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution
had brought home the guilt of the accused.
In these circumstances the question is whether the High
Court was justified in setting aside the conviction on the
ground that the first stage of the investigation was
contrary to the provisions of the Act.
The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent may
be elaborated thus:Whenever there is a consistent disregard
of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the
matter of investigation it must be held almost in all cases
that it’ has prejudiced the accused in the matter of trial,
for otherwise it would enable a police officer below the
rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police to make an
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investigation free from the statutory safeguards
83
designed to prevent the abuse of police powers, to secure
the necessary information and thereafter to take the
requisite permission of the Magistrate and then to shape his
investigation to achieve the desired result or to implement
his scheme. No doubt this practice, if it exists, must be
condemned; but the question is, does the infringement of the
salutary provisions of the Act in the matter of
investigation, without more, invalidate the trial ? If we
accept the broad proposition advanced by the learned
counsel, we would be disregarding the provisions of s. 537
of the Code of Criminal Procedure; we would be ignoring an
honest body of compelling evidence on the basis of the
dereliction of duty by the police. The question is not
whether in investigating an offence the police have
disregarded the provisions of the Act, but whether the
accused has been prejudiced by such disregard in the matter
of his defence at the trial. It is, therefore, necessary
for the accused to throw a reasonable doubt that the
prosecution evidence is such that it must have been
manipulated or shaped by reason of the irregularity in the
matter of investigation, or that he was prevented by reason
of such irregularity from putting forward his defence or
adducing evidence in support thereof. But where the
prosecution evidence has been held to be true and where the
accused had full say in the matter, the conviction cannot
obviously be set aside on the ground of some irregularity or
illegality in the matter of investigation: there must be a
sufficient nexus, either established or probabilized,
between the conviction and the irregularity in the
investigation.’ In this case, as we have earlier pointed
out, not only the trial was fair and the evidence
convincing, but even the earlier defect was rectified by
having practically a de novo investigation in strict
compliance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. We cannot, therefore, hold that the accused has
been prejudiced by the illegality
84
committed by the police in the first stage of ’the
investigation,
The High Court st:t: aside the conviction on the ground
that there was a breach of the mandatory safe guards of the
Act in that the first stage of the investigation was
contrary to the provisions of the Act. But it did not
consider the other question whether the said breach caused
prejudice to the accused in the matter of’ his trial. In
doing so, the High Court ignored the provisions of s. 537 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Having carefully gone
through the record, for the reasons aforesaid, we are
satisfied that no such prejudice has been caused to the
accused. He had a fair trial and had his full say. We,
therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and convict
the respondent under s. 5 (2) of the Act and sentence him to
one year’s rigorous imprisonment.
MUDHOLKAR J.--I have perused the .judgment prepared by
Subba Rao, 3., and I agree with him that the appeal should
be allowed and the respondent who was a booking clerk at
Saharanpur at the relevant time should be convicted and
sentenced as proposed by him. I also agree that a mere
irregularity in investigation would not be a ground for
setting aside the conviction of an accused person unless the
court is satisfied that the accused has been prejudiced by
it. I, however, find it difficult to agree with his
conclusion that there was in fact a defect or irregularity
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in the investigation in this case.
For the purpose of dealing with this point it is not
necessary to set out all the facts ,which fully appear in
the judgment of my learned brother. I will, therefore, set
out only those facts which have a bearing upon this point.
85
Upon receiving a report from the Railway Sectional
Officer, Special Police Establishment, Lucknow, stating
that he had received information through an undisclosed
source that the respondent is in the habit of
misappropriating Government money, the Superintendent of
police, Special Police Establishment directed Sub-
Inspector Mathur to verify the truth of the allegations
made against the respondent. Mathur thereupon went to the
Saharanpur railway station and with the permission of the
appropriate authority went through certain railway records
and submitted a report to his superior to the effect that
the allegations made against the respondent appeared to be
correct. It was thereafter that he obtained the
permission of the Additional District Magistrate
(judicial), Lucknow, to investigate into the case as
required by s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and
then proceeded to investigate the ease. The High Court held
that what SubInspector Mathur did before obtaining the
permission to investigate was nothing but investigation and
that he had done something which is prohibited by s. 5A of
the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, according to
the High Court the entire investigation was vitiated and
consequently the respondent’s conviction and sentence could
not be sustained.
What is investigation is not defined in the Code of
Criminal Procedure; but in H.N. Rishbud and lnder Singh v.
The State q/Delhi (1), Ibis Court has described the
procedure for investigation as follows:
"Thus, under the Code investigation consists
generally of the following steps’:(1)
Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances of the case, (3)
Discovery and arrest of the suspected
offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating
to the commission of the offence which may
consists of (a) the examination of various
persons (including the
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1150.
86
accused) and the reduction of the their
statements into writing, if the officer thinks
fit, (b) the search of places of seizure of
things considered necessary for the
investigation and to be produced at the trial,
and (5) formation of the opinion as to whether
on the material collected there is a case to
place the accused before a Magistrate for
trial and if so taking the necessary steps for
the same by the filling of a charge-sheet
under section 173."
This Court, however, has not said that if a police officer
takes merely one or two of the steps indicated by it, what
he has done must necessarily be regarded as investigation.
Investigation, in substance, means collection of evidence
relating to the commission of the offence ? The
Investigating Officer is, for this purpose, entitled to
question persons who, in his opinion, are able to throw
light on the offence which has been committed and is
likewise entitled to question the suspect and is entitled to
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reduce the statements of persons questioned by him to
writing. He is also entitled, to search the place of the
offence and to search other places with the object of
seizing articles connected with the offence. No doubt. for
this purpose he has to proceed to the spot where the offence
was committed and to. various other things. But the main
object of investigation being to bring home the offence to
the offender the essential part of the duties of an
Investigating Officer in this connection is, apart from
arresting the offender, to collect all material necessary
for establishing the accusation against the.. offender.
Merely. making some preliminary enquiries upon receipt of
information from an anonymous source or a source of doubtful
reliability for checking up the correctness of the
information does not amount to collection of evidence
and so cannot be regarded as investigation. In the absence
of any prohibition m the Code, express or implied, I am of
opinion that it is open
87
to a Police Officer to make preliminary enquiries before
registering an offence and making a full scale investigation
into it. No doubt, s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption
Act was enacted for preventing harassment to a Government
servant and with this object in view investigation, except
with the previous permission of a Magistrate, is not
permitted to be made by an officer below the rank of a
Deputy Superintendent of Police. Where however, a Police
Officer makes some preliminary enquiries, does not arrest or
even question an accused or question any witnesses but
merely makes a few discreet enquiries or looks at some
documents without making any notes, it is difficult to
visualise how any possible harassment or even embarrassment
would result therefrom to the suspect or the accused
person. If no harassment to the accused results from the
action of a Police Officer how can it be said to defeat the
purpose underlying s. 5A ? Looking at the matter this way,
I hold that what Mathur did was something very much short of
investigation and, therefore, the provisions of s. 5A were
not violated. Since no irregularity was committed by him
there is no occasion to invoke the aid of the curative
provisions of the Code.
Appeal allowed.
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