Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SMT. KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, AURANGABAD AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/02/1984
BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
VARADARAJAN, A. (J)
CITATION:
1984 AIR 892 1984 SCR (2) 900
1984 SCC (2) 324 1984 SCALE (1)304
CITATOR INFO :
R 1988 SC 943 (6)
R 1992 SC 666 (4)
RF 1992 SC2298 (8)
ACT:
Constitution of India 1950, Article 141.
Supreme Court in appeal setting aside judgment of High
Court-High Court directed to dispose of case afresh-High
Court whether entitled to resurrect the earlier Judgment.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 23-Large tract of
land acquired valuation of such land-Transactions in respect
of small properties do not offer proper guide-lines.
HEADNOTE:
A large tract of land located with in the Municipal
Limits was notified for acquisition under s.3 (1) of the
Land Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of Hyderabad,
corresponding to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
for a public purpose. Appeals were filed by two groups of
people whose lands were acquired under a common
notification, and they were disposed of by the High Court by
applying a common basis.
Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded, the first
group of claimants and the State preferred appeals. A
Division Bench of the High Court after dividing the land
into zones for the purpose of fixation of compensation
determined the compensation. Being dissatisfied with the
results, the claimants preferred appeals to this Court.
In the appeals, it was urged on behalf of the claimants
that the decision of the Civil Judge in the second groups
had not become final and that an enhanced compensation was
granted by the Civil Judge in that matter, and sought to
introduce additional evidence. This Court set aside the
judgments of the High Court, sent the cases back to the High
Court and directed the High Court to dispose them.
In the connected appeal (second group), the claimant
being dissatisfied with the compensation awarded both by the
Land Acquisition Collector and
901
the Civil Judge preferred an appeal to the High Court, and a
Division Bench which reassessed the evidence, held that as
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no acceptable material was on record to justify any
enhancement of compensation, that award of the Land
Acquisition Officer should be sustained, The appellant
challenged this order of the High Court, in his appeal to
this Court.
When the appeals after remand (first group) came before
the same Division Bench, the High Court finding that no
further evidence was forthcoming either on behalf of the
appellants or the State, held that the earlier Judgment of
the High Court should be treated as the substantive judgment
declared it to be placed on the record as the judgment of
the High Court after remand by the Supreme Court, and
thereby confirmed the valuation and compensation awarded by
the earlier Division Bench.
Allowing the appeals by both the groups to this Court;
^
HELD : 1 (i) The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction
in dealing with the first appeals. This Court in exercise of
its appellate powers vested in it under Article 136 of the
Constitution had set aside the Bench decision of the High
Court delivered in 1971 and that judgment for all intents
and purposes had become non-existent. The present Division
Bench of the High Court was not entitled, by any process
known to law, to resurrect that judgment into life. [909B-C]
(ii) The direction of the appellate court is binding on
all courts subordinate thereto. The provisions of Article
141 of the Constitution, require all Courts in India to be
bound to follow the decisions of this Court. Judicial
discipline requires and decorum known to law warrants that
appellate directions should be taken as binding and
followed. [909D-E]
Broom v. Cassell & Co., [1972] 1 All. E.R 801 ;
referred to.
In the instant case, a judgment which has already been
set aside has been brought on record and has been described
as the judgment in the first appeals. That judgment is a
nullity. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed itself
to be swayed away and landed up in a situation which was
wholly unwarranted. Some of its observations were uncalled
for and greater restraint was expected. It was open to the
High Court to require the parties to move this Court for
modification of the direction. If necessary, a reference
could have been made to the Registry of this Court, so that
this Court could have even taken suo motu action. If
additional evidence was not forth coming, the Division Bench
could have applied its mind afresh to the materials already
on record, and the appeals should have been disposed of by
an independent judgment and not by restoring to life a
judgment which had, in exercise of appellate powers of this
Court, been rendered lifeless. [910G-H; D-F]
2. When large tracts of land are acquired, the
transaction in respect of small properties do not offer a
proper guideline. Therefore, the valuation in transactions
in regard to smaller property is not taken as a real basis
for determining the compensation for larger tracts of
property. For determining the market value of a large
property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller
property a deduction should be given. A reduction of 25% was
indicated in one case
902
while certain other cases indicated that the reduction
should be to the extent of 1/3. [912F-H; 913A]
Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others, [1972] 2 S.C.R 633; Padma Uppal Etc. v. State of
Punjab and Others, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 329; Special Land
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Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty,
[1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 404; referred to.
In the instant case, the lands have been acquired in a
town, which was in a developed part of the State, and was a
constituted municipality. Not far away from it are places of
tourist importance. A fort and a place of historical
importance are in the vicinity of the town. There is
evidence that the lands acquired are located close to these
spots, and that these areas were developed and semi-
developed portion of the town. The town had become the
regional head-quarters of a Zone of the State and had been
industrially developing. The lands in question had potential
value which had to be kept in view in the matter of fixing
the compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. Taking an
overall picture of the matter, compensation is fixed at the
rate of Rs. 1.50 per square yard or Rs. 7260/- per acre for
all the lands acquired by the notification in question. Over
and above this amount, the appellants shall be entitled to
statutory solatium of 15% as also interest at the rate of 6%
per annum on additional compensation from the date of
dispossession till payment thereof. The Collector to work
out the compensation within two months. If the amount of
compensation determined is not paid within three months
thereafter interest at 12% per annum on the additional
compensation shall be payable till payment is made. [912C-D;
913D-E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2458-
2461 of 1981.
Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 16th October, 1979 of the Bombay High Courts in
Ist. Appeal Nos. 773/67, and 537/68, F.A. No. 774/67 and
Cross Appeal No. 702/68.
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 2462 of 1981.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 15th October, 1979 of the Bombay High Court in
Civil Appeal No. 628 of 1972.
Shanti Bhushan, C.S. Vaidyanath, P. Chowdhary, M.
Mudgal,
903
Ms. Gurdip Kaur and Prasant Bhushan for the Appellants.
O.P. Rana and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J. All these appeals are by special
leave and seek to challenge two separate judgments of the
Bombay High Court. A large tract of land located within the
municipal limits of Aurangabad within the State of
Maharashtra was notified for acquisition under section 3 (1)
of the Land Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of
Hyderabad (corresponding to s. 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, Act I of 1894), by notification dated November 28,
1957, for the purpose of locating a Medical College and an
attached hospital. These lands can be conveniently referred
to as Navkhanda and Ahmadibag properties. Four of these
appeals are by one group being Kausalya Devi Bogra and
others and the other is by Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin.
Since their lands were acquired under a common notification
and as would be indicated later, the appeals were disposed
of by the High Court by applying a common basis and these
appeals at the request of the counsel have been heard
together, they are being disposed of by a common judgment.
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The total acquisition was of about 150 acres of land. Out of
it, the first group owned about 74 acres while the claim of
Yusufuddin related to about 15 acres of land.
In so far as the lands of Kausalya Devi’s group are
concerned, the Land Acquisition Officer determined
compensation at 4 paise per square yard for the Navkhanda
land in the two blocks besides statutory solatium of 15%. At
the instance of the claimants reference was made to the
Civil Judge who raised the compensation to 15 paise per
square yard as against the claim laid at the rate of Rs.
2.50 per square yard. So far as Ahmadibag lands are
concerned, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation
at the rate of 3 paise per square yard and on a reference to
the Court, the learned Civil Judge raised the compensation
to 12 paise per square yard besides the statutory solatium
of 15% while the claimants had asked for compensation at the
rate of Rs. 1.50 per square yard. In both the cases the
claimants as also the State preferred appeals-the State
challenging the enhancement and the claimants asking for
more. A Division
904
Bench of the Bombay High Court by judgment dated April 27,
1971, divided the Ahmadibag lands into three zones for the
purpose of fixation of compensation; the first portion was
on the east, the portion which abutted the road near the
main gate up to an indicated depth was treated as the second
block and the patch of land which was to the north of the
second portion was treated as the third block. The High
Court fixed compensation at 12 paise per square yard for the
middle portion and at 9 paise per square yard for the rest
of the land. So far as Navkhanda lands were concerned, the
same was also divided into three zones and depending upon
the location of these three blocks, compensation was fixed
at 16 paise per square yard of the land in the zone abutting
the road; 10 paise per square yard for the second zone and
at 8 paise per square yard for the remaining lands forming
the third zone. Being dissatisfied with the results obtained
in the first appeals before the High Court, the claimants
came before this Court by certificate under Article 133 of
the Constitution on the basis of valuation involved. Attempt
was made to introduce additional evidence which mainly
consisted of material to show that higher compensation had
been given for similarly situated properties. By Judgment
dated March 23, 1979, in Civil Appeal Nos. 1035 & 1038 of
1972, this Court directed :
"We, therefore, allow the appeals, set aside the
judgment of the High Court and send the cases back to
the High Court to be restored and direct the High Court
to take the appeals on its file and dispose them of
according to law in the light of the directions given
above."
One of the consideration for remand was reference to
two judgments of the Civil Judge where, in respect of lands
covered by the same Notification, compensation had been
worked out at Rs. 4.50 per square yard. One of these
judgments was the case of Yusufuddin. As the judgment of
this Court would show, it had been represented by the
claimants before this Court that the decision of the Civil
Judge in Yusufuddin’s case had not been challenged in appeal
and had become final. That was, however, not a fact and
First Appeal No. 628/72 had been taken to the High Court by
the State.
In Yusufuddin’s case, as already indicated, the
property acquired was around 15 acres. These lands were
covered by two sector; 10 acres and 16 gunthas appertained
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to Sej Nos. 3, 4 and
905
5 while 5 acres 32 gunthas related to Saj No. 167, and all
these lands were situated close to the road leading from
Aurangabad City to Panchakki. The Land Acquisition Officer
had given an award of Rs. 5454.71 inclusive of solatium of
15% for the first sector and a sum of Rs. 4614.11 inclusive
of the solatium in respect of 5 acres 32 gunthas in Sej 167.
The appellant was aggrieved by the Award and laid claim of
Rs. 40,360 in respect of first block and Rs. 2,26,512 in
respect of the other. On the basis of the evidence placed on
record, the learned Civil Judge came to hold that market
value of the property on the date of the preliminary
notification was Rs. 4.50 per square yard but as the
claimants had claimed a lesser amount, he confined the
compensation to the amount claimed and fixed the
compensation accordingly. The decision of the Civil Judge
was challenged in appeal as already indicated. The High
Court re-assessed the evidence and came to hold that no
acceptable material was on record to justify any enhancement
of compensation and the Award of the Land Acquisition
Officer should be sustained. Accordingly, the decision of
the Civil Judge was vacated and if out of the enhanced
compensation any amount had been paid, refund thereof was
directed.
This first appeal of the State against Yusufuddin was
disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J.
and Deshpande, J. on October 15, 1979. Before the same
Division Bench the other batch of first appeals remanded
pursuant to the direction of this Court came up for hearing
on the next day, viz., October 16, 1976. The High Court
referred to these first appeals as once upon disposed of by
a Division Bench of the Court and stated :
"Being dissatisfied with this common judgment
disposing of the four appeals, the claimants carried
the matter to the Supreme Court on leave from this
Court. According to the provisions of the law then
existing, the leave granted was as a matter of course
as the claim involved in each of the appeals was much
more than Rs. 20,000 at all stages of the litigation.
After obtaining a certificate of fitness for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court on 17th December 1971 from
this Court, the petition of appeal was filed in the
Supreme Court on 15th February 1972. Certain statements
were made in this petition of appeal with an allegation
that steps were being taken to produce additional
906
evidence by a separate application as per rules.
Accordingly, a separate application for production of
additional evidence was made on 27th February 1972.
Presumably a copy of the appeal memo, as also a copy of
this application was served upon the State Government
of Maharashtra, who were the respondents, and we
further presume that those copies were made available
to the learned counsel who were engaged by the State to
defend the said appeals. We are told that before the
matter comes up for hearing, there is an intervening
stage when a statement of case is required to be filed
before the final hearing. The learned counsel is not
aware whether in these appeals any such statement of
case was filed by the parties. After a lapse of about
seven years these appeals were called out for hearing
before the Supreme Court on 23rd March, 1979. By a
speaking order, the Supreme Court set aside the
Judgment of this Court and remanded the original four
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appeals for being further heard and disposed of on
merits. It is only in this manner that we are hearing
today the said four appeals over again.
For reasons which we will detail hereafter, we
have not heard the parties on merits at all. It is true
that the Supreme Court has set aside the judgment of
this Court and remanded the appeals for further hearing
and disposal according to law. That is what precisely
we are doing but for reasons which we will record
hereunder why we have not heard the parties on merits.
On considering in detail the long and able
judgment delivered by the two judges of this Court and
after reading the Supreme Court order and noting the
factual position, there is not much force in hearing
the appeal afresh and further there is no necessity for
the application of mind by another two judges of this
Court to the same evidence which is on record. The
factual position that has come to our notice reveals a
state of affairs which cannot be described as very
commendable so far as the handling of the Government
litigation is concerned......... What surprises us is
that when copies of original appeal, petition as well
as civil application for additional evidence are served
upon the Government no attempt is made to file a reply
that these judgments need not be admitted as additional
evidence as the High Court is
907
already seized of the judgments in appeals which are
admitted and they have not become final as alleged by
the appellants in their memo of appeal to the Supreme
Court. Even after seven years when the matter was
called out for final hearing before the Supreme Court,
we are surprised to find from the Supreme Court’s order
that the Government representative before the Supreme
Court was on the defensive all the while and merely
wanted to state that he should be heard further in the
matter of additional evidence. We do not know whether
any attempt was made to seek instructions from the
State Government or in spite of query being made the
information was wanting from this end. Whatever the
reason may be for the Government’s failure to provide
instructions to the counsel appearing for the State in
the Supreme Court or whatever may be the reason for the
failure of the Government counsel in Delhi to seek
information either of them is not a very commendable
state of affairs. The Supreme Court should have been
told at once that those judgments were subjected to
appeals and the appeals are pending and almost ready
for hearing. We are sure the Supreme Court would have
adjourned the hearing until the decision by the High
Court in First Appeal Nos. 628 of 1972 and 179 and 180
of 1972. That undoubtedly would have been the proper
course for the Government to adopt and we have no doubt
that the Supreme Court would have valued that
suggestion."
Then followed a long paragraph censuring the conduct of
counsel for the claimants which closed with the following
observation:
"The Supreme Court took cognizance of all this and
thinking that Court cannot go into such questions in
detail as it may involve taking of evidence, the
Supreme Court passed the order and that is how this
group of appeals has come back to us for further
hearing."
A set of first appeals one of which related to
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Yusufuddin’s matter being of the year 1972 first came up for
hearing before the High Court. In course of hearing thereof,
when the judgment of the Division Bench of 1971 in the case
of Kausalya Devi’s group was produced, it was pointed out
that this Court had already vacated the judgment of the
Division Bench and the matter had
908
been remanded. The Division Bench hearing the appeals after
remand, therefore, directed as stated in its order:
"We, therefore, said that the office may find out
as to which are the group of appeals which were
remanded and issue notice fixing 8th October, 1979 as
the date of hearing along with those group of appeals.
That is how they came to be shown on our Board from
that day onwards continuously until they reached the
final hearing.
However, the very next day after 18th September
1979, Mr. Savant came to tell us that he would not be
in a position to apply for additional evidence, as the
very judgments of the Civil Judge in respect of which
certain representations were made before the Supreme
Court are those which are the subject-matters of First
Appeals Nos. 179 and 180 of 1972 as also first appeal
no. 628 of 1972. Since we had already adjourned the
matter, we decided to hear these appeals first and take
up these remanded appeals."
The Division Bench continued to State:
"The first factual position which we note here is
that neither the appellant has pressed for additional
evidence nor the State could lend additional evidence,
though the wording of the Supreme Court order says that
both the parties will be at liberty to apply for
additional evidence. None of the parties has any
additional evidence to offer. In fact, in our humble
view, remand seems to be a direct result of a rash
statement, not being denied even at final hearing
stage. If this is the position in so far as the appeal
in the matter was concerned where two other judges of
this Court who were seized of the matter had given full
hearing to the parties at an earlier stage we told Mr.
Andhyarujina, Advocate, that there was no necessity for
any further hearing in the matter and that we are not
inclined to do so. Since there is no change in the
record and no additional evidence is offered and the
High Court judgment was pronounced on the evidence
already recorded, we see no reason to differ in any way
with the well considered earlier judgment of this
Court. We, therefore, declare that a copy of that
judgment, which will be our substantive judgment, be
placed
909
on record as the judgment of this Court after remand by
the Supreme Court. We thus not only confirm the
valuation and compensation awarded by the earlier Bench
of this Court but also confirm their order as to
costs."
Having read the judgment of the High Court and
considering the manner in which the first appeals have been
disposed of, we have no doubts in our mind that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in dealing with the first
appeals. This Court in exercise of appellate powers vested
it under Article 136 of the Constitution had set aside the
Bench decision of the High Court delivered in 1971 and that
judgment for all intents and purposes had become non-
existent. The present Division Bench of the High Court was
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not entitled, by any process known to law, to resurrect that
judgment into life.
The direction of the appellate court is certainly
binding on the courts subordinate thereto. That apart, in
view of the provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution,
all courts in India are bound to follow the decisions of
this Court. Judicial discipline requires and decorum known
to law warrants that appellate directions should be taken as
binding and followed. It is appropriate to usefully recall
certain observations of the House of Lords in Broom v.
Cassell & Co.(1) Therein Lord Hailsham, L. C. observed:
"The fact is, and I hope it will never be
necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical
system of courts which exist in this country, it is
necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of
Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher
tier."
Lord Reid added:
"It seems to me obvious that the Court of Appeal
failed to understand Lord Delvin’s speech but whether
they did or not, I would have accepted them to know
that they had no power to give any such direction and
to realise the impossible position in which they were
seeking to put those judges in advising or directing
them to disregard a decision of this House."
910
Lord Diplock observed at p. 874 of the Reports:
"It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of
courts that there are decisions of the Supreme
appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous
approval of all members of the judiciary. When I sat in
the Court of Appeal, I sometimes thought the House of
Lords was wrong in over ruling me. Even since that time
there have been occasions, of which the instant appeal
is one, when alone or in company. I have dissented from
a decision of the majority of this House. But the
judicial system only works if someone is allowed to
have the last word and if that last word, once spoken,
is loyally accepted."
We refuse to accept the submission of Mr. Shanti
Bhushan for the appellants that the High Court intended to
disobey the direction given in the appellate order of
remand. Nevertheless, the Division Bench of the High Court
allowed itself to be swayed away and landed up in a
situation which was wholly unwarranted. Some of the
observations which we have extracted were uncalled for and
greater restraint was expected. It was open to the High
Court to require the parties to move this Court for
modification of the direction. If necessary, a reference
could have been made to the Registry of this Court so that
this Court could have even taken suo motu action. Finally,
if additional evidence was not forth coming, the Division
Bench could have applied its mind afresh to the materials
already on record and the appeals should have been disposed
of by an independent judgment and not by restoring to life
judgment which had, in exercise of appellate powers of this
Court, been rendered lifeless. We hope and believe that such
an unfortunate situation will never recur and, therefore, we
propose to say no more on this aspect of the matter.
As already indicated, the order of remand has not been
operative on account of the High not giving effect to it. On
the other hand, a judgment which already been set aside has
been brought on record and has been described as the
judgment in the first appeals. In our opinion, that judgment
is a nullity. The two options available before the Court,
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therefore, are, a further remand to the High Court asking
for a fresh disposal of the appeals or to dispose of the
appeals in exercise of appellate powers by recording
findings. Acquisition in this case is of the year 1957.
Twenty-seven
911
years have already passed. A remand at this stage would
indeed be not in the interest of the parties nor in public
interest. We have, therefore, decided to look into the
materials ourselves and dispose of these appeals finally.
Aurangabad was in a developed part of the Nizam’s State
of Hyderabad and was a constituted municipality. Hyderabad
had become a part of India by 1948. By the State Re-
organisation Act of 1956, Aurangabad and certain other
tracts of Hyderabad became parts of the then State of
Bombay. Aurangabad was of historical importance. Not far
away from it are the famous caves of Ajanta and Ellora.
Aurangabad, therefore, had been of tourist importance from
before. A fort and a palace of historical importance are in
the vicinity of this town. There is evidence that the lands
acquired in the instant appeals are located close to these
spots. There is also evidence that these areas were
developed and semi-developed portions of the town.
The learned Civil Judge did take into account certain
documents for fixing up the valuation of the property on the
date of the notification. In Yusufuddin’s case a sale deed
of October 18, 1957, was relied upon where the valuation was
about Rs. 4.50 per square yard. This sale deed was of the
year of the notification though the transaction happened to
be a few months after the date. The learned Civil Judge had
found that the property was located not away from the
acquired land. Exhibit 36 was also the certified copy of a
sale deed of 1957 but since it had a construction on the
property and the separate valuation thereof could not be
known in the absence of any substantive, no reliance had
actually been placed on this transaction. Exhibit 37 was a
transaction of 1953 and the rate adopted there was about Rs.
5 per square yard. A party to the transaction was examined
as a witness. As noticed by the learned Civil Judge, the
property was located at a distance of about there furlongs
from the acquired land. The learned Civil Judge stationed at
Aurangabad was certainly in a better position to take
judicial notice of the location of important landmarks
within Aurangabad than the learned Judges of the Bombay High
Court or even the Judges of this Court sitting at a long
distance from the place where the lands are situated.
Exhibit 42 is a saledeed of 1960 and keeping in view the
extent of lands sold and the consideration per square yard,
the rate worked out at Rs. 2.25. The purchaser had been
examined as a witness and the land has been found to be
about
912
half a furlong away from the acquired land. The learned
Civil Judge also relied upon a letter of the Collector of
Aurangabad addressed to the Deputy Director of Excise
Department wherein it was indicated that the price of land
in the area was about Rs. 5 per square yard and that was
stated with reference to some land near the Railway Station.
The acquired land is admittedly not far away from the
Railway Station.
The learned Civil Judge did in fact state in his order
that the lands of Yusufuddin were situated by the side of
the road leading from Panchakki to Bhadkal gate. The
historical monument of Panchakki has been stated to be
located by the side of the acquired land. A State Hotel has
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come up not far away from the land. The Court took judicial
notice of the fact that Aurangabad city had developed
rapidly following police action which brought about
accession of the Nizam’s State to India. Aurangabad had
become the regional headquarters of a zone of the State. The
city had been industrially developing. Therefore, the lands
in question had potential value which had to be kept in view
in the matter of fixing the compensation under the Land
Acquisition Act.
Admittedly, the lands of Yusufuddin and the lands
belonging to Kausalya Devi group are in one adjacent tract.
Therefore, it would not be improper to assume, particularly
in the absence of any contrary evidence from the side of the
State that there was no great disparity in the quality of
lands and that all these lands were substantially of similar
type.
Two principles relating to the matter of fixation of
compensation relevant for the present purpose may be kept in
view. When large tracts are acquired, the transaction in
respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline.
Therefore, the valuation in transactions in regard to
smaller property is not taken as a real basis for
determining the compensation for larger tracts of property
(see Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh and
Ors(1).; Padma Uppal etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors(2). In
certain other cases this Court indicated that for
determining the market value of a large property on the
basis of a sale transaction for smaller property a deduction
should be given. In Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty, (3) a reduction of 25%
913
was indicated while there are certain other cases where the
view is that the reduction should be to the extent of 1/3.
Again, in the very scheme for fixation of compensation
provided by the Land Acquisition Act there is bound to be
some amount of arbitrariness. The acquisition is deemed to
be a statutory purchase and on the basis of evidence the law
requires an assumed consideration to be determined. Keeping
in view the fact that acquisition is of compulsory nature, a
solatium of 15% on the valuation is provided. Bearing these
considerations in view and taking into account the fact that
the lands in question were located in a developed part of
Aurangabad and had considerable potential value, we proceed
to fix the market value of the property. One acre of land is
equal to 4840 square yards. The learned Civil Judge had
maintained a distinction between the two classes of lands.
We take note of that fact also in the matter of determining
the compensation. We, however, do not propose to indicate
separate valuations for the two classes of lands. Taking an
overall picture of the matter, we direct compensation to be
fixed at the rate of Rs. 1.50 per square yard or Rs. 7260
per acre for all the lands of the present appellants
acquired by the notification in question. Over and above
this amount, the appellants shall be entitled to statutory
solatium of 15% as also interest at the rate of 6% per annum
on the additional compensation from the date of
dispossession till payment thereof. We direct the Collector
to work out the compensation on the basis indicated above
within two months from today. If the amount so determined is
not paid within three months thereafter, the interest on the
additional compensation shall be at the rate of 12% per
annum till payment is made.
Ordinarily, the appellants should have been entitled to
costs. Keeping in view the history of the litigation and
manner in which the Kausalya Devi group of appellants had
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conducted themselves on the earlier occasion before this
Court, we do not award costs to them. In Civil Appeal No.
2462/81 appellant Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin will be
entitled to his costs in this Court and hearing fee of Rs.
1,000.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
914