Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 867 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Mahadeo Bajirao Patil
RESPONDENT:
State of Maharashtra and others
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2005
BENCH:
B.P. SINGH & S.B. SINHA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
B.P. SINGH, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment
and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated
October 30, 2001 in First Appeal No. 981 of 1996. By the
aforesaid judgment the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by
the State of Maharashtra/respondent No.1 herein and held that the
application filed by respondent No.1 under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act for making a reference was barred by limitation.
The sole question which, therefore, arises for consideration in the
instant appeal is whether the said application filed by the appellant
herein under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was barred by
time.
The facts of the case in so far as they are relevant for the
disposal of this appeal are as follows:-
One Kulkarni held a lease executed on December 3, 1979
for a period of 20 years in respect of an area of 142 Hectares 78
Ares from the State of Maharashtra for mining Silica sand. The
aforesaid lessee applied to the State of Maharashtra on May 3,
1991 for transfer of the mining lease in favour of the appellant
herein. In the mean time, on October 8, 1991 a proposal was
submitted to the Collector of Sindhudurg by Respondent No.136,
namely, M/s. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. for acquisition of
land for the purpose of the said Corporation situated in village
Achirne. Pursuant thereto land measuring 13 Hectare 9 Ares were
notified for acquisition by Notification issued under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act on February 13, 1992. Subsequent
thereto the Government by its Order dated February 20, 1992
allowed the application for transfer of mining lease in favour of the
appellant herein. This included the lands notified for acquisition of
village Achirne. The agreement was thereafter executed by and
between the aforesaid Kulkarni and the appellant on May 15, 1992
and the lease-hold rights were transferred in favour of the
appellant.
On July 25, 1992 a declaration under Section 6 of the Act
was issued in respect of the lands earlier notified on February 13,
1992.
Sometime in May 1994, the appellant filed a writ petition
before the High Court of Bombay being Writ Petition No. 1238 of
1994 for quashing the acquisition proceeding as also the inquiry
conducted under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act. It was also prayed
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that respondent No.136 M/s. Konkan Railway Corporation. Ltd. be
restrained from taking any further action in the matter. This writ
petition was disposed of by order of June 7, 1994 which directed
the State of Maharashtra to comply with the requirements of
Section 17(3)(a) of the Act within eight weeks and declare the
award within eight weeks thereafter. The award ultimately came
to be declared on August 29, 1994 which awarded compensation
only to the land owners/ respondents 2 to 135 and not to the
appellant who was a mere lessee and found not entitled to grant of
compensation. It is also not disputed that on September 18, 1994 a
telegram was sent to the appellant herein by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer informing him of the declaration of the award
which translated into English reads as follows:-
"This Office No. LQN/Konkan Railway
Project/Sank-3-Achirne 463/91 dated 31-8-94 be
perused Mouje Achirne Taluka Vaibhavwadi
Award No.463/91 has been declared on 29-8-94".
"As per the discussion in this Award first
demand is rejected".
On receiving the telegram on September 20, 1994 the
appellant immediately applied to the Collector for providing him a
copy of the award filed in his office. Thereafter, on December 9,
1994, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.447 of 1995 before the
Bombay High Court. In the Writ Petition, he admitted the fact that
although an award had been declared by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer it had not been officially served upon him.
The appellant annexed to this writ petition as Ex. B an ordinary
copy of the award and challenged the validity of the award in as
much as the appellant had not been awarded any compensation.
This writ petition was disposed of by the High Court by its
judgment and order of January 30, 1995 directing the appellant to
seek remedy under Section 18 of the Act with liberty to make an
appropriate application for condonation of delay. On February 20,
1995 an application under Section 18 of the Act was filed. The
Joint Civil Judge who heard the aforesaid Land Reference No.69
of 1995 allowed the reference application and awarded
compensation of Rs.4 crores to the appellant with interest @ 10%
per annum from November 1, 1996 onwards. We may only notice
that in the aforesaid writ petition the land owners/ respondents 2 to
135 were added as party respondents while respondent No.136
intervened in the writ petition making a grievance that in the land
reference case no order should have been passed in the absence of
respondent 136 i.e. M/s Konkan Railway Corporation. Ltd. since
the acquisition was made at the instance of the aforesaid
Corporation.
The State of Maharashtra challenged the judgment and order
of the Joint Civil Judge in First Appeal No.981 of 1996 before the
Bombay High Court. It was contended, inter alia, that the
application for reference made under Section 18 was barred by
limitation and there was no power in the Court or the Land
Acquisition Officer to condone the delay in filing an application
under Section 18 of the Act. The High Court by its impugned
judgment and order has upheld the contention of the State of
Maharashtra.
From the facts noticed above it cannot be disputed that an
award had been declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer
on August 29, 1994. Intimation about the declaration of the award
was sent to the appellant by telegram dated September 18, 1994
which was admittedly received by the appellant on September 20,
1994. In the writ petition filed on December 9, 1994 the appellant
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admitted knowledge of the fact that an award has been declared but
asserted that a copy of the award had not been officially served
upon the appellant. However, an ordinary copy of the award was
annexed to the writ petition as Ext-B. The application under
Section 18 of the Act was made by the appellant on February 20,
1995. Section 18 of the Act reads as follows :-
"18.Reference to Court \026 (1) Any person interested
who has not accepted the award may, by written
application to the Collector, require that the matter
be referred by the Collector for the determination
of the Court, whether his objection be to the
measurement of the land, the amount of the
compensation, the persons to whom it is payable,
or the apportionment of the compensation among
the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds
on which objection to the award is taken :
Provided that every such application shall be
made \026
(a) if the person making it was present or
represented before the Collector at the time
when he made his award, within six weeks
from the date of the Collector’s award.
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the
receipt of the notice from the Collector
under section 12, sub-section (2); or within
six months from the date of the Collector’s
award, whichever period shall first expire".
A mere perusal of section 18 discloses that there are three
situations for which period of limitation has been provided for
making an application for reference. Firstly, if the person making
the application was present or represented before the Collector at
the time when he made his award, the application must be filed
within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the appellant was
not present when the award was made and, therefore, Section
18(2)(a) is not applicable to the facts of this case.
Second and third situations are envisaged by Section 18 (2)
(b). The second situation envisaged is where a notice is received
by the applicant under Section 12 sub-section (2) of the Act. In
such a case, the period of limitation prescribed is six weeks from
the date of the receipt of the notice or within six months from the
date of the Collector’s award whichever period shall first expire.
In the instant case, the High Court has held the application to be
barred by limitation, firstly, on the ground that the telegram sent to
the appellant on September 18, 1994 amounted to a notice under
sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act, and secondly, on the
ground that in any event as on December 9, 1994 the applicant had
not only knowledge of the fact that an award had been declared but
had also a copy of the award which he annexed with writ petition
as Ext.B. If the date of knowledge is taken to be December 8,
1994, even then the application under Section 18 was barred by
limitation. The correctness of these findings has been assailed
before us.
It is by now well settled that notice under Section 12(2) of
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the Act is a clear intimation of making of the award requiring the
owner or person interested to receive the compensation awarded
under Section 11 of the Act. It is not necessary that the notice
should contain all the details of the award including the
consideration by the Land Acquisition Collector and its manner of
determination of the compensation. No particular form is
prescribed by the Act or the Rules.
In State of Punjab and another vs. Satinder Bir Singh :
(1995) 3 SCC 330 this Court held :-
"The question then is whether the notice under
Section 12(2) is a valid notice. From a conjoint
reading of Sections 11 and 12, it is clear that notice
is only an intimation of making of the award
requiring the owner or person interested to receive
compensation awarded under Section 11. On
receipt of the notice, if the person interested
receives compensation without protest, obviously
no reference need be made. The determination of
compensation becomes final and binds the parties.
When he receives the compensation under protest
as contemplated under Section 31 of the Act, the
need to make the application for reference under
Section 18(1) would arise. At that juncture it will
be open to the person interested either to make an
inspection of the award which was conclusive
between him and the Collector by operation of
sub-section (1) of Section 12, or seek a certified
copy of the award from the Collector and the
contents. Thereon he could make necessary
objection for the determination inter alia, of
compensation for the land. It is not necessary that
the notice should contain all the details of the
award including his consideration and its manner
of determination of the compensation as opined by
the learned Judge of the High Court. It is not
incumbent that the person interested should
immediately make the reference application on his
receiving compensation under Section 31. In other
words receipt of the amount and making the
reference application are not simultaneous. The
statutory operation of limitation mentioned by
Section 18(2) does not depend on the ministerial
act of communication of notice in any particular
form when the Act or Rules has not prescribed any
form. The limitation begins to operate from the
moment the notice under Section 12(2) is received
or as envisaged by Section 18(2)".
It is not disputed that a telegram was sent to the appellant by
the Special Land Acquisition Officer informing the appellant that
the award had been declared on August 29, 1994 and further
stating that the first demand as discussed in the award was rejected.
The counsel for the appellant sought to contend before us that
though this telegram intimated the factum of declaration of the
award necessary particulars were not disclosed therein. On the
other hand, counsel for respondent No.1 and 136 contended that
the telegram clearly mentions the fact that the demand of the
appellant had been rejected. The appellant sought to contend that
the reference to "first demand" in the telegram is to the request of
the appellant made on September 15, 1993 to change the alignment
of the railway track so that the mining area of which the appellant
was the lessee, was not disturbed. It was this demand that had
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been rejected. Such a plea does not appear to have been raised
before the High Court. The appellant has not placed before us a
copy of the award declared by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer. The representation made by him on September 15, 1993 to
the Collector, Sindhudurg, of which copy had no doubt been
endorsed to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, did not relate to
any claim of compensation payable in respect of the lands to be
acquired. It was only a representation confined to the request
made by the appellant to change the railway alignment so that the
mining area was not disturbed. He submitted that the appellant
later claimed compensation amounting to Rs.29 crores by a
demand made on May 26, 1994. We are not persuaded to accept
this contention. The Special Land Acquisition Officer while
making an award was certainly not concerned with the alteration of
railway track alignment. He was only concerned with the grant of
compensation in accordance with law relating to the lands forming
subject matter of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The
submission urged on behalf of the appellant before the High Court
that since no amount had been awarded to the appellant, the award
declared on August 29, 1994 was not an award under Section 11 of
the Land Acquisition Act, must also be rejected. It is not disputed
before us and also noticed by the High Court, that the Land
Acquisition Officer held that the appellant being a lessee was not
entitled to any compensation and compensation was payable only
to the land owners, namely, respondents 2 to 135.
We are here not concerned with the correctness of the
decision, but the fact remains that having considered the claim of
the appellant for compensation, the Special Land Acquisition
Officer rejected the claim. This does amount to the making of an
award, commonly described as "nil award". If the appellant was
aggrieved by such an award, it was open to him to seek reference
under Section 18 of the Act which the appellant actually did. We,
therefore, cannot hold that no award as envisaged by Section 11 of
the Act was declared on August 29, 1994, since the claim of the
appellant was considered and was totally rejected. There was,
therefore, no question of giving any calculation of the manner in
which the compensation was computed. Since, the application
under Section 18 was not filed within six weeks of the receipt of
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, the High Court did not
commit any error in holding that the application was barred by
limitation. It was not disputed before us that the Land Acquisition
Officer making a reference, or the Court considering a reference
under Section 18 of the Act has no power of condonation of delay
in making an application under the aforesaid Section.
The next ground on which the High Court held the
application to be barred by limitation is that in any event the
appellant had knowledge of the award being made on December 8,
1994, since he filed a copy of the award as annexure to the writ
petition filed on December 9, 1994 and, therefore, should have
filed the application under Section 18 of the Act within six weeks.
The submission urged on behalf of the appellant relying upon the
decision of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The
Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1500 that
in the instant case even if it is assumed that the appellant had
knowledge of the award at least on December 8, 1994, he could
make an application within six months from the date of such
knowledge, would have deserved serious consideration, but for the
finding recorded by us earlier that the appellant had notice under
Section 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, period of limitation for
filing the application under Section 18 was six weeks from the date
of receipt of the notice and not six months from the date of
knowledge of the award.
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In the view that we have taken, we find no merit in this
appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.