UMMER vs THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER

Court
Kerala High Court

​CNR : KLHC010143842025​
​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025​ ​1​ ​2026:KER:85738​
​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM​
​PRESENT​
​THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V​
​&​
​THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR​
​TH​
​THURSDAY, THE 5​ ​DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026 / 14TH KARTHIKA, 1948​
​ICR (CRL.MC) NO. 9 OF 2025​
​ARISING FROM THE ORDER DATED 27.09.2026 IN CRL.MC NO.630​
​OF 2020 OF THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA​
​PETITIONER/ACCUSED:​
​UMMER​
​AGED 49 YEARS​
​S/O ABOOBACKER, ASARITHODI, THEENDAPPARA,​
​CHAKKAPARAMBIL, OMANNUR P.O., CHEEKKODE,​
​MALAPPURAM - 673 645​
​BY ADVS.​
​SRI.CIBI THOMAS​
​SMT.SWARNA THOMAS​
​SMT.ANUSREE K.​
​RESPONDENTS/STATE AND COMPLAINANT:​
​1​ ​THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER​
​PANOOR POLICE STATION,​

​CNR : KLHC010143842025​
​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025​ ​2​ ​2026:KER:85738​
​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​KANNUR DISTRICT - 670 692​
​2​ ​THE STATE OF KERALA​
​REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,​
​HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM - 682 031​
​3​ ​MUSTHAFA T.K.​
​S/O MOHAMOOD, AGED 57 YEARS, ROSHI MAHAL,​
​PANOOR P.O., THALASSERY, KANNUR DISTRICT 670 692​
​BY ADV​
​SMT. AMBIKA DEVI, SPL PP​
​SRI.K.PRAVEEN KUMAR​
​SMT. RAJI P. MATHEWS, SR.PP​
​THIS​ ​INTRA​ ​COURT​ ​REFERENCE​ ​(CRIMINAL​ ​MISC.​ ​CASE)​ ​HAVING​
​COME​ ​UP​ ​FOR​ ​FINAL​ ​HEARING​ ​ON​ ​05.11.2026,​ ​THE​​COURT​​ON​​THE​
​SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:​

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​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025​ ​3​ ​2026:KER:85738​
​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V.,​
​&​
​K.V. JAYAKUMAR, JJ.​
​- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -​
​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025 in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
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​th​
​Dated this the 05​ ​day of November, 2026​
​O R D E R​
​"CR"​
​Raja Vijayaraghavan, J.​
​This​​matter​​is​​placed​​before​​us​​on​​a​​reference​​made​​by​​the​​learned​​Single​
​Judge,​ ​seeking​ ​an​ ​authoritative​ ​pronouncement​ ​on​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​and​ ​extent​ ​of​ ​the​
​inherent​​powers​​of​​this​​Court​​to​​quash​​criminal​​proceedings​​involving​​offences​​under​
​the​​Protection​​of​​Children​​from​​Sexual​​Offences​​Act,​​2012​​(hereinafter​​referred​​to​​as​
​the​​'POCSO​​Act'),​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​a​​settlement​​arrived​​at​​between​​the​​accused​​and​
​the victim or the victim's family.​
​2.​ ​The​ ​learned​ ​Single​ ​Judge​ ​took​ ​note​​of​​the​​fact​​that​​divergent​​views​
​had​​been​​expressed​​by​​learned​​Single​​Judges​​of​​this​​Court​​on​​the​​question​​whether​
​proceedings​​involving​​offences​​under​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​could​​be​​quashed​​on​​the​​basis​
​of​​a​​settlement​​between​​the​​parties.​​In​​particular,​​it​​was​​noticed​​that​​the​​view​​taken​

​CNR : KLHC010143842025​
​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025​ ​4​ ​2026:KER:85738​
​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​1​
​in​ ​Abdul​​Salam​​v.​​State​​of​​Kerala​​and​​Others​ ​was​​in​​direct​​conflict​​with​​the​
​view​ ​expressed​ ​by​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Vishnu​ ​and​ ​Others​ ​vs.​ ​State​ ​of​ ​Kerala​ ​and​
​2​ ​3​
​Others​ ​, as well as in​ ​XXXX v. State of Kerala​ ​.​
​3.​ ​Taking​​note​​of​​the​​conflicting​​views,​​the​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​was​​of​
​the​​opinion​​that​​the​​question​​whether​​offences​​of​​comparatively​​lesser​​gravity​​under​
​the​ ​POCSO​ ​Act​​could​​be​​quashed​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​a​​settlement,​​in​​exercise​​of​​the​
​inherent​ ​jurisdiction​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Court,​ ​required​ ​an​ ​authoritative​ ​pronouncement​ ​by​ ​a​
​Division​​Bench.​​The​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​was​​concerned​​with​​the​​extent​​to​​which​
​the​​inherent​​powers​​of​​this​​Court​​could​​be​​exercised​​in​​such​​cases,​​having​​regard​​to​
​the​​object​​and​​purpose​​of​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​and​​the​​nature​​of​​the​​offences​​dealt​​with​
​therein. It was in the above circumstances that the matter has been referred to us.​
​4.​ ​We​ ​have​ ​heard​ ​the​ ​submissions​ ​advanced​ ​by​ ​Smt.​​Swarna​​Thomas,​
​the​ ​learned​ ​counsel​ ​appearing​ ​for​ ​the​ ​petitioner/accused,​ ​and​ ​the​​learned​​Senior​
​Public Prosecutor.​
​5.​ ​Though​​the​​reference​​raises​​a​​question​​of​​law,​​it​​would​​be​​appropriate​
​to​ ​briefly​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​factual​ ​background​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​appreciate​ ​the​ ​contentions​
​1​
​[2024 KLT OnLine 2322]​
​2​
​[(2023) 3 KLT 754]​
​3​
​[2024 KLT OnLine 2075]​

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​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025​ ​5​ ​2026:KER:85738​
​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​advanced before us.​
​6.​ ​The​ ​petitioner​ ​is​ ​an​​Ustad​​of​​Hibamul​​Islam​​Madrassa​​at​​Cheruvoth.​
​The​​victim​​in​​the​​present​​case​​was​​a​​child​​aged​​17​​years​​at​​the​​time​​of​​the​​alleged​
​incident,​ ​which​ ​occurred​ ​on​ ​01.07.2018.​ ​The​ ​allegation​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​
​petitioner/accused,​ ​being​ ​a​ ​staff​ ​of​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​institution​ ​imparting​ ​education,​
​sexually​ ​assaulted​ ​the​ ​child​ ​by​ ​touching​ ​her​ ​breast​ ​on​ ​01.07.2018​ ​and​ ​on​
​subsequent days and thereby committed repeated sexual assault.​
​7.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​a​ ​complaint​ ​lodged​ ​by​ ​the​ ​father​ ​of​ ​the​ ​victim​ ​on​
​24.04.2019,​​Crime​​No.​​357​​of​​2019​​was​​registered​​at​​Panoor​​Police​​Station​​for​​the​
​offences​​punishable​​under​​Section​​354A(1)(i)​​of​​the​​Indian​​Penal​​Code​​and​​Sections​
​7, 8, 9(l), 9(f) and 10 of the POCSO Act.​
​8.​ ​It​ ​appears​ ​that​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​had​ ​initially​ ​approached​ ​this​ ​Court​
​seeking​​to​​quash​​the​​criminal​​proceedings.​​An​​affidavit​​sworn​​to​​by​​the​​victim​​was​
​produced​​in​​support​​of​​the​​said​​petition.​​However,​​this​​Court​​declined​​to​​accept​​the​
​affidavit​​as​​a​​ground​​for​​terminating​​the​​proceedings.​​Subsequently,​​after​​attaining​
​majority,​ ​the​ ​victim​ ​herself​​filed​​an​​affidavit​​stating​​that​​the​​police​​had​​registered​
​the​ ​crime​ ​and​ ​completed​ ​the​ ​investigation​ ​in​ ​a​ ​routine​ ​manner​ ​without​ ​properly​

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​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025​ ​6​ ​2026:KER:85738​
​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​ascertaining​​the​​entire​​facts​​and​​circumstances​​of​​the​​case.​​She​​further​​stated​​that​
​the​​complaint​​had​​been​​lodged​​on​​account​​of​​a​​mistaken​​impression​​and​​that​​she​
​had​​been​​ill-advised​​by​​certain​​persons​​who​​were​​inimical​​towards​​the​​accused.​​She​
​asserted​ ​that​ ​she​ ​had​ ​no​ ​grievance​ ​against​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​and​ ​that​ ​the​ ​continued​
​pendency​​of​​the​​criminal​​proceedings​​was​​adversely​​affecting​​her​​future​​prospects.​
​On​ ​these​ ​grounds,​ ​she​ ​expressed​ ​that​ ​she​ ​had​ ​no​ ​serious​ ​objection​ ​to​ ​the​
​proceedings being quashed.​
​9.​ ​The​ ​learned​ ​Single​ ​Judge,​ ​while​​considering​​the​​matter,​​noticed​​that​
​learned​​Single​​Judges​​of​​this​​Court​​had​​expressed​​divergent​​views​​in​​similar​​cases.​
​It​​was​​observed​​that​​the​​view​​taken​​in​ ​Abdul​​Salam​ ​(supra)​​was​​inconsistent​​with​
​the​ ​approach​ ​adopted​ ​in​ ​Vishnu​ ​and​ ​Others​ ​(supra)​ ​and​ ​XXXX​ ​v.​ ​State​ ​of​
​Kerala​ ​(supra).​ ​It​ ​was​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​resolve​ ​the​ ​said​ ​conflict​ ​and​ ​lay​ ​down​ ​the​
​applicable legal principles that the present reference came to be made.​
​10.​ ​The​​learned​​counsel​​appearing​​for​​the​​petitioner​​invited​​our​​attention​
​to​​the​​judgment​​of​​the​​Hon'ble​​Supreme​​Court​​in​ ​Ayyub​​Malik​​and​​Ors.​​vs.​​State​
​4​
​of​ ​Uttarakhand​ ​and​ ​Ors.​ ​,​ ​and​ ​contended​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court​ ​had​ ​quashed​
​criminal​ ​proceedings​ ​involving​ ​offences​ ​under​ ​the​ ​POCSO​​Act​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​the​
​4​
​[2026 INSC 331]​

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​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​subsequent​​developments​​in​​the​​relationship​​between​​the​​accused​​and​​the​​victim.​
​Reliance​ ​was​ ​also​ ​placed​ ​on​ ​the​ ​judgment​ ​rendered​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Delhi​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​on​
​5​
​16.04.2026​​in​ ​Harmeet​​Singh​​vs.​​State​​of​​GNCT​​Delhi​​and​​Anr​ ​,​​wherein​​the​
​proceedings​​were​​quashed​​in​​the​​peculiar​​circumstances​​arising​​from​​the​​settlement​
​between​ ​the​ ​parties.​ ​According​ ​to​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​counsel,​ ​the​ ​said​ ​decisions​
​demonstrate​ ​that​ ​the​ ​mere​ ​fact​​that​​an​​offence​​falls​​under​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​would​
​not,​​by​​itself,​​place​​an​​absolute​​restriction​​on​​the​​exercise​​of​​the​​inherent​​powers​​of​
​this​​Court.​​It​​was​​therefore​​contended​​that,​​particularly​​in​​cases​​involving​​offences​
​of​ ​comparatively​ ​lesser​ ​gravity,​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​ought​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​
​quashing the proceedings on the basis of a genuine and voluntary settlement.​
​11.​ ​The​ ​learned​ ​Public​ ​Prosecutor,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​submitted​ ​that,​
​though​ ​the​ ​inherent​ ​jurisdiction​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​under​ ​Section​ ​482​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Code​ ​of​
​Criminal​​Procedure,​​1973,​​and​​the​​corresponding​​provision​​under​​Section​​528​​of​​the​
​Bharatiya​​Nagarik​​Suraksha​​Sanhita,​​2023,​​is​​of​​wide​​amplitude,​​the​​exercise​​of​​such​
​jurisdiction​ ​is​ ​governed​ ​by​ ​well-recognised​ ​legal​ ​principles.​ ​The​ ​power​ ​can​ ​be​
​exercised​​only​​to​​secure​​the​​ends​​of​​justice​​or​​to​​prevent​​the​​abuse​​of​​the​​process​
​of​ ​any​ ​Court.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​contended​ ​that​ ​the​ ​power​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​invoked​ ​to​​defeat​​the​
​object​ ​of​​a​​special​​enactment​​intended​​to​​protect​​children​​from​​sexual​​abuse​​and​
​5​
​2026: DHC: 3142​

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​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​exploitation.​
​12.​ ​The​​learned​​Public​​Prosecutor,​​by​​placing​​reliance​​on​​the​​judgments​​of​
​6​
​the​​Apex​​Court​​in​ ​Gian​​Singh​​v.​​State​​of​​Punjab​ ​and​ ​Narinder​​Singh​​v.​​State​
​7​
​of​​Punjab​ ​,​​submitted​​that​​heinous​​and​​serious​​offences​​involving​​mental​​depravity,​
​including​ ​murder,​ ​rape​ ​and​ ​dacoity,​ ​cannot​ ​ordinarily​​be​​quashed​​merely​​because​
​the​​victim​​or​​the​​victim's​​family​​has​​entered​​into​​a​​settlement​​with​​the​​accused.​​It​
​was​ ​further​ ​submitted​ ​that​ ​such​ ​offences​ ​are​ ​not​ ​essentially​ ​private​ ​disputes​
​between​ ​individuals,​ ​but​ ​offences​ ​which​ ​have​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​bearing​ ​on​ ​society​ ​at​
​large.​
​13.​ ​Reliance​​was​​also​​placed​​on​​the​​judgment​​of​​the​​Apex​​Court​​in​ ​Gopal​
​8​
​Lodhi​ ​v.​ ​State​ ​of​ ​M.P.​ ​&​ ​Anr.​ ​,​ ​wherein​ ​the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​reiterated​ ​the​
​limitations​​governing​​the​​exercise​​of​​inherent​​jurisdiction​​in​​cases​​involving​​serious​
​offences.​ ​The​ ​learned​ ​Public​ ​Prosecutor​​also​​referred​​to​​the​​decisions​​in​ ​Jagdish​
​9​
​Chanana​ ​&​ ​Ors.​ ​vs.​​State​​of​​Haryana​​and​​Anr.​ ​,​ ​Madan​​Mohan​​Abbot​​vs.​
​10​ ​11​
​State​​of​​Punjab​ ​,​ ​Shiji​​vs.​​Radhika​​and​​Anr.​ ​,​ ​Narinder​​Singh​​and​​Ors.​​vs.​
​6​
​[(2012) 10 SCC 303]​
​7​
​[(2014) 6 SCC 466]​
​8​
​[2026 INSC 1164]​
​9​
​[(2008) 15 SCC 704]​
​10​
​[(2008) 4 SCC 582]​
​11​
​[(2011) 10 SCC 705]​

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​ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025​ ​9​ ​2026:KER:85738​
​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​12​
​State​​of​​Punjab​ ​,​ ​Anita​​Maria​​Dias​​and​​Anr.​​vs.​​State​​of​​Maharashtra​​and​
​13​
​Anr.​ ​and​ ​Gian​ ​Singh​ ​(supra),​ ​and​ ​highlighted​ ​the​ ​distinction​ ​between​ ​private​
​disputes​​capable​​of​​settlement​​and​​serious​​criminal​​offences​​having​​a​​wider​​societal​
​impact.​
​14.​ ​We have considered the rival submissions advanced before us.​
​15.​ ​The​​question​​that​​arises​​for​​consideration​​is​​whether​​the​​inherent​​powers​
​of​​this​​Court​​can​​be​​exercised​​to​​terminate​​proceedings​​involving​​offences​​under​​the​
​POCSO​ ​Act​ ​solely​ ​on​ ​the​ ​ground​ ​that​ ​the​ ​victim,​ ​upon​ ​attaining​ ​majority,​ ​has​
​entered​ ​into​ ​a​ ​settlement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​or​ ​has​ ​expressed​ ​her​ ​willingness​ ​to​
​withdraw from the prosecution.​
​16.​ ​At​ ​the​ ​outset,​ ​it​​is​​necessary​​to​​bear​​in​​mind​​that​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​is​​a​
​special​​legislation​​enacted​​with​​the​​specific​​object​​of​​protecting​​children​​from​​sexual​
​assault,​ ​sexual​ ​harassment​ ​and​ ​exploitation.​ ​The​ ​enactment​ ​recognises​ ​the​
​vulnerability​ ​of​ ​children​ ​and​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​them​​with​​effective​​legal​​protection​
​against​ ​sexual​ ​offences.​ ​The​ ​statutory​ ​framework​ ​is​ ​founded​ ​on​ ​the​ ​legislative​
​recognition​​that​​a​​child​​may​​not​​possess​​the​​maturity,​​understanding​​or​​capacity​​to​
​12​
​[(2014) 6 SCC 466]​
​13​
​[​ (2018) 3 SCC 290]​

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​comprehend​​the​​consequences​​of​​sexual​​conduct​​and​​that​​the​​law​​must​​intervene​​to​
​protect the child from exploitation.​
​17.​ ​The​​offences​​under​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​are,​​therefore,​​not​​merely​​offences​
​against​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​victim​ ​in​ ​the​ ​conventional​ ​sense.​ ​They​ ​implicate​ ​the​ ​larger​
​public​​interest​​in​​protecting​​children​​and​​ensuring​​that​​they​​are​​able​​to​​grow​​in​​an​
​environment​ ​free​ ​from​ ​sexual​ ​abuse​ ​and​ ​exploitation.​ ​The​ ​prosecution​ ​of​ ​such​
​offences​​cannot​​be​​treated​​as​​a​​matter​​which​​the​​victim​​or​​her​​family​​is​​at​​liberty​​to​
​terminate at will by entering into a private arrangement with the accused.​
​18.​ ​It​​is​​in​​this​​context​​that​​the​​distinction​​between​​compounding​​an​​offence​
​and​​quashing​​criminal​​proceedings​​in​​exercise​​of​​the​​inherent​​powers​​of​​this​​Court​
​assumes​ ​significance.​ ​The​ ​inherent​ ​jurisdiction​ ​under​ ​Section​ ​482​ ​of​ ​the​ ​CrPC​ ​is​
​distinct​ ​from​​the​​power​​of​​compounding​​under​​Section​​320​​of​​the​​Code.​​The​​fact​
​that​ ​an​ ​offence​ ​is​​non-compoundable​​does​​not,​​by​​itself,​​preclude​​the​​High​​Court​
​from​ ​exercising​ ​its​ ​inherent​ ​jurisdiction​ ​in​ ​an​ ​appropriate​ ​case.​ ​However,​ ​the​
​existence​​of​​such​​jurisdiction​​does​​not​​mean​​that​​every​​non-compoundable​​offence​
​can be quashed merely because the parties have arrived at a settlement.​
​19.​ ​In​ ​Gian​ ​Singh​ ​(supra),​ ​a​ ​three-judge​ ​Bench​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court​

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​considered​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​the​ ​inherent​​powers​​of​​the​​High​​Court​​to​​quash​​criminal​
​proceedings​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​a​​settlement.​​The​​Apex​​Court​​held​​that​​the​​power​​under​
​Section​​482​​of​​the​​CrPC​​is​​distinct​​from​​the​​power​​of​​compounding​​under​​Section​
​320.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​observed​ ​that​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​may,​ ​in​ ​appropriate​ ​cases,​ ​quash​
​proceedings​ ​involving​ ​non-compoundable​ ​offences​ ​where​ ​the​ ​dispute​ ​is​
​predominantly​​private​​in​​nature​​and​​where​​such​​an​​exercise​​would​​secure​​the​​ends​
​of​​justice.​​However,​​the​​Apex​​Court​​made​​it​​clear​​that​​offences​​which​​are​​heinous​
​and​​serious​​in​​nature,​​involving​​mental​​depravity,​​or​​offences​​such​​as​​murder,​​rape​
​and​ ​dacoity,​ ​cannot​ ​ordinarily​ ​be​ ​quashed​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​a​ ​settlement,​ ​as​ ​such​
​offences​ ​have​ ​a​ ​serious​ ​impact​ ​on​ ​society​ ​and​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​regarded​ ​as​ ​disputes​
​having an essentially private character.​
​20.​ ​The​ ​principles​ ​laid​ ​down​ ​in​ ​Gian​ ​Singh​ ​(supra)​ ​were​ ​subsequently​
​elaborated​ ​in​ ​Narinder​ ​Singh​ ​(supra).​ ​The​ ​Apex​ ​Court​ ​laid​ ​down​ ​the​ ​broad​
​parameters​ ​to​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​by​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Courts​ ​while​ ​exercising​ ​their​ ​inherent​
​jurisdiction​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​a​​settlement.​​It​​was​​specifically​​observed​​that​​offences​
​involving​​serious​​crimes​​and​​those​​having​​a​​substantial​​impact​​on​​society​​should​​not​
​be​ ​quashed​ ​merely​ ​because​​the​​parties​​have​​settled​​their​​differences.​​The​​nature​
​and​ ​gravity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offence,​ ​the​ ​circumstances​​in​​which​​it​​was​​committed​​and​​the​

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​impact of the crime on society are relevant considerations.​
​21.​ ​The​​principles​​laid​​down​​in​​the​​above​​decisions​​were​​reiterated​​by​​the​
​14​
​Apex​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Parbatbhai​​Aahir​​v.​​State​​of​​Gujarat​ ​,​​and​ ​State​​of​​Madhya​
​15​
​Pradesh​ ​v.​​Laxmi​​Narayan​ ​.​​The​​latter​​decision,​​in​​particular,​​emphasises​​that​
​the​ ​nature​​and​​gravity​​of​​the​​offence,​​the​​impact​​on​​society​​and​​the​​likelihood​​of​
​conviction​​are​​relevant​​considerations​​and​​that​​serious​​offences​​cannot​​be​​treated​​as​
​private disputes merely because the parties have arrived at a compromise.​
​22.​ ​The​​position​​becomes​​even​​more​​significant​​when​​the​​offences​​alleged​
​are​ ​under​ ​the​ ​POCSO​ ​Act.​ ​The​​statutory​​protection​​afforded​​to​​a​​child​​cannot​​be​
​diluted​​by​​treating​​the​​subsequent​​willingness​​of​​the​​victim​​or​​the​​victim’s​​family​​to​
​settle​​the​​matter​​as​​sufficient​​justification​​for​​terminating​​the​​prosecution.​​The​​fact​
​that​​the​​victim​​has​​attained​​majority​​during​​the​​pendency​​of​​the​​proceedings​​does​
​not​ ​retrospectively​ ​alter​ ​the​ ​legal​ ​character​ ​of​ ​the​ ​alleged​ ​act​ ​or​ ​extinguish​ ​the​
​offence,​ ​if​ ​the​ ​ingredients​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offence​ ​were​ ​made​ ​out​ ​when​ ​the​ ​victim​​was​​a​
​child.​
​16​
​23.​ ​In​ ​State​ ​of​ ​Madhya​ ​Pradesh​ ​v.​ ​Madanlal​ ​,​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court​
​14​
​[(2017) 9 SCC 641]​
​15​
​[(2019) 5 SCC 688]​
​16​
​[​ (2015) 7 SCC 681]​

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​emphatically​​held​​that​​an​​offence​​of​​rape​​cannot​​be​​treated​​as​​a​​matter​​capable​​of​
​settlement​ ​between​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​and​ ​the​ ​victim.​ ​The​ ​Court​ ​cautioned​ ​against​
​adopting​​a​​liberal​​approach​​on​​the​​ground​​that​​the​​victim​​or​​her​​family​​had​​agreed​
​to​ ​a​ ​compromise​ ​or​ ​that​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​was​ ​willing​ ​to​ ​marry​ ​the​ ​victim.​ ​The​ ​Apex​
​Court​​observed​​that​​the​​dignity​​and​​bodily​​integrity​​of​​the​​victim​​cannot​​be​​made​
​the​​subject​​matter​​of​​a​​negotiated​​settlement.​​The​​same​​principle​​was​​reiterated​​in​
​17​
​Shimbhu​​and​​Another​​v.​​State​​of​​Haryana​ ​,​​wherein​​the​​Apex​​Court​​held​​that​
​a​​compromise​​or​​an​​offer​​of​​marriage​​cannot​​constitute​​a​​mitigating​​circumstance​​to​
​dilute the gravity of an offence of rape.​
​18​
​24.​ ​In​ ​Ramji​​Lal​​Bairwa​​V.​​The​​State​​of​​Rajasthan​ ​,​​the​​facts​​were​
​that​​the​​father​​of​​a​​16-year-old​​Class​​XI​​student​​got​​an​​FIR​​registered​​alleging​​that​
​the​​accused,​​who​​was​​none​​other​​than​​a​​teacher,​​molested​​the​​girl​​by​​touching​​her​
​cheeks,​​inserting​​his​​hand​​into​​her​​bodice​​and​​rubbing​​her​​breast,​​and​​then​​hurled​
​caste-based​​abuses.​​Offences​​were​​invoked​​under​​Sections​​354A,​​342,​​509​​and​​504​
​IPC,​ ​Sections​ ​7​ ​&​​8​​of​​the​​Protection​​of​​Children​​from​​Sexual​​Offences​​Act,​​2012​
​(POCSO),​​and​​Sections​​3(1)(r),​​3(1)(s),​​3(1)(b)​​&​​3(2)(vii)​​of​​the​​SC/ST​​(Prevention​
​of​​Atrocities)​​Act,​​1989.​​Relying​​on​​a​​compromise​​entered​​into​​between​​the​​parties,​
​17​
​[​ (2014) 13 SCC 318]​
​18​
​2024 SCC ONLINE SC 3193​

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​in Crl.MC No. 630 of 2020​
​a​ ​learned​ ​Single​ ​Judge​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rajasthan​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​quashed​ ​the​ ​FIR​ ​and​ ​all​
​consequential​​proceedings,​​relying​​on​​the​​principles​​of​​law​​laid​​down​​in​ ​Gian​​Singh​
​(supra).​ ​The​ ​matter​ ​was​ ​taken​ ​up​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Hon'ble​ ​Supreme​ ​Court,​ ​which​
​converted​ ​the​ ​matter​ ​into​ ​a​ ​Special​ ​Leave​ ​Petition​ ​(Criminal​ ​Appeal​ ​No.​ ​3403​ ​of​
​2023)​​under​​Article​​136,​​appointed​​an​​amicus​​curiae,​​and​​heard​​all​​parties,​​including​
​the​​Delhi​​Commission​​for​​Protection​​of​​Child​​Rights.​​The​​Hon'ble​​Court,​​while​​setting​
​aside the order quashing the proceedings, observed as under:​
​45.​ ​In​​the​​decision​​relied​​on​​by​​the​​High​​Court​​to​​quash​​the​
​proceedings​ ​viz.​ ​Gian​ ​Singh​ ​case​ ​[Gian​ ​Singh​ ​v.​ ​State​ ​of​ ​Punjab,​
​(2012)​​10​​SCC​​303​​:​​(2012)​​4​​SCC​​(Civ)​​1188​​:​​(2013)​​1​​SCC​​(Cri)​
​160​​:​​(2012)​​2​​SCC​​(L&S)​​988]​​and​​the​​decision​​in​​Laxmi​​Narayan​
​case​​[State​​of​​M.P.​​v.​​Laxmi​​Narayan,​​(2019)​​5​​SCC​​688​​:​​(2019)​​2​
​SCC​​(Cri)​​706]​​in​​unambiguous​​terms​​this​​Court​​held​​that​​the​​power​
​under​ ​Section​ ​482​ ​CrPC​ ​could​ ​not​ ​be​ ​used​ ​to​​quash​​proceedings​
​based​​on​​compromise​​if​​it​​is​​in​​respect​​of​​heinous​​offence​​which​​are​
​not​​private​​in​​nature​​and​​have​​a​​serious​​impact​​on​​the​​society.​​When​
​an​​incident​​of​​the​​aforesaid​​nature​​and​​gravity​​allegedly​​occurred​​in​
​a​ ​higher​ ​secondary​ ​school,​ ​that​ ​too​ ​from​ ​a​ ​teacher,​ ​it​ ​cannot​​be​
​simply​​described​​as​​an​​offence​​which​​is​​purely​​private​​in​​nature​​and​
​has no serious impact on the society.​
​46.​​In​​view​​of​​the​​reasons​​as​​aforesaid​​and​​in​​the​​light​​of​​the​
​decisions​​referred​​supra,​​the​​impugned​​order​​dated​​4-2-2022​​of​​the​
​High​​Court​​in​​Vimal​​Kumar​​Gupta​​v.​​State​​of​​Rajasthan​​[Vimal​​Kumar​
​Gupta​​v.​​State​​of​​Rajasthan,​​2022​​SCC​​OnLine​​Raj​​3564]​​,​​quashing​

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​FIR​​No.​​6/2022​​dated​​8-1-2022​​and​​all​​further​​proceedings​​pursuant​
​thereto​​solely​​on​​the​​ground​​that​​the​​accused​​and​​the​​complainant​
​had​​settled​​the​​matter,​​invites​​interference.​​We​​have​​no​​hesitation​​to​
​hold​​that​​in​​cases​​of​​this​​nature,​​the​​fact​​that​​in​​view​​of​​compromise​
​entered​ ​into​ ​between​ ​the​ ​parties,​ ​the​ ​chance​ ​of​ ​a​ ​conviction​ ​is​
​remote​​and​​bleak​​also​​cannot​​be​​a​​ground​​to​​abruptly​​terminate​​the​
​investigation,​​by​​quashing​​FIR​​and​​all​​further​​proceedings​​pursuant​
​thereto,​​by​​invoking​​the​​power​​under​​Section​​482CrPC.​​(​​emphasis​
​supplied )​
​25.​ ​In​ ​Madanlal​ ​(supra),​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court,​ ​while​ ​considering​ ​the​ ​question​
​whether​ ​a​ ​compromise​ ​entered​ ​into​​between​​the​​parties​​could​​be​​construed​​as​​a​
​factor​ ​based​ ​on​ ​which​ ​lesser​ ​punishment​ ​can​ ​be​ ​awarded,​ ​relied​ ​on​​the​​law​​laid​
​down in​ ​Shimbhu​ ​(supra) and observed as under:​
​17.​ ​In​​this​​context,​​it​​is​​profitable​​to​​reproduce​​a​​passage​
​from​​Shimbhu​​v.​​State​​of​​Haryana​​[(2014)​​13​​SCC​​318​​:​​(2014)​​5​
​SCC​​(Cri)​​651]​​wherein,​​a​​three-Judge​​Bench​​has​​ruled​​thus​​:​​(SCC​
​pp. 328-29, para 20)​
​“20.​​Further,​​a​​compromise​​entered​​into​​between​
​the​​parties​​cannot​​be​​construed​​as​​a​​leading​​factor​​based​
​on​​which​​lesser​​punishment​​can​​be​​awarded.​​Rape​​is​​a​
​non-compoundable​ ​offence​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​​an​​offence​​against​
​the​​society​​and​​is​​not​​a​​matter​​to​​be​​left​​for​​the​​parties​​to​
​compromise​​and​​settle.​​Since​​the​​court​​cannot​​always​​be​
​assured​ ​that​ ​the​ ​consent​ ​given​ ​by​ ​the​ ​victim​ ​in​

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​compromising​ ​the​ ​case​ ​is​ ​a​ ​genuine​ ​consent,​ ​there​ ​is​
​every​ ​chance​ ​that​ ​she​ ​might​​have​​been​​pressurised​​by​
​the​​convicts​​or​​the​​trauma​​undergone​​by​​her​​all​​the​​years​
​might​ ​have​ ​compelled​ ​her​ ​to​​opt​​for​​a​​compromise.​​In​
​fact,​ ​accepting​ ​this​ ​proposition​ ​will​ ​put​ ​an​ ​additional​
​burden​ ​on​ ​the​ ​victim.​ ​The​ ​accused​ ​may​ ​use​ ​all​ ​his​
​influence​​to​​pressurise​​her​​for​​a​​compromise.​​So,​​in​​the​
​interest​ ​of​ ​justice​ ​and​ ​to​ ​avoid​ ​unnecessary​
​pressure/harassment​​to​​the​​victim,​​it​​would​​not​​be​​safe​​in​
​considering​ ​the​ ​compromise​ ​arrived​ ​at​ ​between​ ​the​
​parties​ ​in​ ​rape​ ​cases​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​ground​ ​for​ ​the​ ​court​ ​to​
​exercise​ ​the​ ​discretionary​ ​power​ ​under​ ​the​ ​proviso​ ​of​
​Section 376(2) IPC.”​
​18.​​The​​aforesaid​​view​​was​​expressed​​while​​dealing​​with​​the​
​imposition​​of​​sentence.​​We​​would​​like​​to​​clearly​​state​​that​​in​​a​​case​
​of​​rape​​or​​attempt​​to​​rape,​​the​​conception​​of​​compromise​​under​​no​
​circumstances​​can​​really​​be​​thought​​of.​​These​​are​​crimes​​against​​the​
​body​​of​​a​​woman​​which​​is​​her​​own​​temple.​​These​​are​​the​​offences​
​which​ ​suffocate​ ​the​ ​breath​ ​of​ ​life​ ​and​ ​sully​ ​the​ ​reputation.​ ​And​
​reputation,​ ​needless​ ​to​ ​emphasise,​ ​is​ ​the​ ​richest​ ​jewel​ ​one​ ​can​
​conceive​​of​​in​​life.​​No​​one​​would​​allow​​it​​to​​be​​extinguished.​​When​​a​
​human​ ​frame​ ​is​​defiled,​​the​​“purest​​treasure”,​​is​​lost.​​Dignity​​of​​a​
​woman​​is​​a​​part​​of​​her​​non-perishable​​and​​immortal​​self​​and​​no​​one​
​should​ ​ever​ ​think​ ​of​ ​painting​ ​it​ ​in​ ​clay.​ ​There​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​a​
​compromise​​or​​settlement​​as​​it​​would​​be​​against​​her​​honour​​which​
​matters​​the​​most.​​It​​is​​sacrosanct.​​Sometimes​​solace​​is​​given​​that​
​the​​perpetrator​​of​​the​​crime​​has​​acceded​​to​​enter​​into​​wedlock​​with​
​her​​which​​is​​nothing​​but​​putting​​pressure​​in​​an​​adroit​​manner;​​and​
​we​​say​​with​​emphasis​​that​​the​​courts​​are​​to​​remain​​absolutely​​away​

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​from​​this​​subterfuge​​to​​adopt​​a​​soft​​approach​​to​​the​​case,​​for​​any​
​kind​ ​of​ ​liberal​ ​approach​ ​has​ ​to​ ​be​ ​put​ ​in​ ​the​ ​compartment​ ​of​
​spectacular​​error.​​Or​​to​​put​​it​​differently,​​it​​would​​be​​in​​the​​realm​​of​
​a sanctuary of error.​
​26.​ ​The​​ratio​​emerging​​from​​these​​decisions​​is​​that​​the​​criminality​​of​​an​​act​
​cannot​ ​be​ ​extinguished​ ​merely​ ​by​ ​a​ ​subsequent​ ​arrangement​ ​or​ ​a​ ​compromise​
​between​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​and​ ​the​ ​victim,​ ​especially​​in​​sexual​​assault​​cases​​and​​rape.​
​The​​victim's​​willingness​​to​​forgive​​the​​accused,​​or​​the​​desire​​of​​the​​family​​to​​put​​an​
​end​​to​​the​​proceedings,​​cannot​​by​​itself​​determine​​whether​​a​​prosecution​​involving​
​a​​serious​​sexual​​offence​​should​​be​​permitted​​to​​continue.​​The​​Court​​is​​required​​to​
​examine​​the​​nature​​of​​the​​offence,​​the​​legislative​​policy​​underlying​​the​​enactment​
​and the larger public interest involved.​
​27.​ ​We​​also​​find​​it​​necessary​​to​​refer​​to​​the​​judgment​​of​​the​​Apex​​Court​​in​
​19​
​Just​​Rights​​for​​Children​​Alliance​​and​​Another​​v.​​S.​​Harish​​and​​Others​ ​.​​In​
​the​​said​​case,​​the​​Supreme​​Court​​considered​​the​​scope​​and​​object​​of​​the​​POCSO​​Act​
​while​​examining​​the​​legality​​of​​an​​order​​passed​​by​​the​​Madras​​High​​Court​​quashing​
​proceedings​​involving​​offences​​under​​Section​​15(1)​​of​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​and​​Section​
​67B​​of​​the​​Information​​Technology​​Act,​​2000.​​The​​Apex​​Court​​set​​aside​​the​​order​​of​
​19​
​[​ 2024 INSC 716]​

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​the​​High​​Court​​and​​restored​​the​​criminal​​proceedings.​​The​​judgment​​emphasises​​the​
​need​ ​to​ ​interpret​ ​and​ ​enforce​ ​the​ ​POCSO​ ​Act​ ​in​ ​a​ ​manner​ ​that​ ​advances​ ​its​
​protective​ ​object​ ​and​ ​recognises​ ​the​ ​serious​ ​and​ ​lasting​ ​consequences​ ​of​ ​sexual​
​exploitation​ ​of​ ​children.​ ​Though​ ​the​ ​said​ ​decision​ ​did​ ​not​ ​directly​ ​concern​ ​a​
​settlement​ ​between​ ​the​ ​victim​ ​and​ ​the​ ​accused,​ ​the​ ​principles​ ​laid​ ​down​ ​therein​
​reinforce​ ​the​ ​need​ ​for​ ​considerable​ ​judicial​ ​circumspection​ ​before​ ​terminating​ ​a​
​prosecution involving offences against children.​
​28.​ ​The​​learned​​counsel​​appearing​​for​​the​​petitioner​​has​​placed​​considerable​
​reliance​ ​on​ ​Ayyub​ ​Malik​ ​(supra).​ ​In​ ​the​ ​said​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court​ ​quashed​
​proceedings​​involving​​offences​​under​​Sections​​5(8)​​and​​6​​of​​the​​POCSO​​Act,​​along​
​with​​offences​​under​​the​​Indian​​Penal​​Code.​​It​​is​​necessary,​​however,​​to​​examine​​the​
​peculiar​​factual​​circumstances​​in​​which​​the​​Apex​​Court​​exercised​​its​​jurisdiction.​​In​
​that​ ​case,​​the​​accused​​and​​the​​victim​​had​​entered​​into​​a​​matrimonial​​relationship​
​and​​had​​been​​living​​together​​as​​husband​​and​​wife​​for​​several​​years.​​The​​victim​​had​
​herself​ ​approached​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​along​ ​with​ ​the​ ​accused,​ ​supporting​ ​the​​request​​for​
​quashing​ ​the​ ​proceedings.​ ​A​ ​child​ ​had​ ​also​ ​been​ ​born​ ​in​ ​the​​wedlock.​​The​​Apex​
​Court​ ​took​ ​note​ ​of​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​the​ ​parties​ ​had​ ​voluntarily​ ​entered​ ​into​ ​the​
​matrimonial​ ​relationship,​ ​were​ ​residing​ ​together​ ​peacefully​ ​and​ ​were​ ​desirous​ ​of​

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​continuing​​their​​married​​life.​​The​​Court,​​in​​the​​peculiar​​circumstances​​of​​that​​case,​
​held​​that​​the​​continuation​​of​​the​​criminal​​proceedings​​would​​amount​​to​​an​​abuse​​of​
​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​law​ ​and​ ​quashed​ ​the​ ​same​ ​in​​the​​interests​​of​​rendering​​complete​
​justice.​
​29.​ ​It​​is​​significant​​to​​note​​that​​the​​decision​​in​ ​Ayyub​​Malik​ ​(supra)​​was​
​rendered​​in​​the​​context​​of​​an​​established​​matrimonial​​relationship,​​the​​subsequent​
​birth​ ​of​ ​a​ ​child​ ​and​ ​the​ ​parties'​ ​continued​ ​cohabitation​ ​over​ ​several​ ​years.​ ​The​
​judgment​​cannot​​be​​understood​​as​​laying​​down​​a​​general​​proposition​​that​​offences​
​under​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​can​​be​​quashed​​whenever​​the​​victim​​or​​her​​family​​expresses​​a​
​willingness​ ​to​ ​settle​ ​the​ ​matter.​ ​Nor​ ​can​ ​it​ ​be​ ​construed​ ​as​ ​recognising​ ​an​
​unrestricted​​right​​in​​the​​accused​​to​​seek​​termination​​of​​proceedings​​on​​the​​basis​​of​
​a subsequent settlement.​
​30.​ ​In​ ​Harmeet​​Singh​ ​(supra),​​relied​​upon​​by​​the​​learned​​counsel,​​the​
​petitioner​​had​​approached​​the​​High​​Court​​by​​filing​​a​​petition​​under​​Article​​226​​of​​the​
​Constitution​ ​of​ ​India​ ​read​ ​with​ ​Section​ ​528​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Bharatiya​ ​Nagarik​ ​Suraksha​
​Sanhita,​​2023,​​seeking​​to​​quash​​an​​FIR​​registered​​for​​the​​offences​​punishable​​under​
​Section​ ​64(1)​ ​of​ ​the​​Bharatiya​​Nyaya​​Sanhita,​​2023,​​and​​Section​​6​​of​​the​​POCSO​
​Act.​​At​​the​​time​​of​​the​​alleged​​incident,​​the​​prosecutrix​​was​​approximately​​17​​years​

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​of​ ​age.​ ​The​ ​parties​ ​contended​ ​that​ ​they​ ​had​ ​solemnised​ ​their​ ​marriage​ ​on​
​04.09.2024​ ​and​ ​that​ ​a​ ​child​ ​was​ ​born​ ​to​ ​them​ ​on​ ​12.06.2025.​ ​A​ ​copy​ ​of​ ​the​
​Marriage​ ​Certificate​ ​was​ ​also​ ​produced​ ​before​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Single​​Judge.​​The​​FIR​
​had​​been​​registered​​pursuant​​to​​information​​furnished​​by​​the​​doctors​​at​​Safdarjung​
​Hospital,​ ​who,​ ​upon​ ​examination,​ ​had​ ​noticed​ ​that​ ​the​ ​mother​ ​was​​a​​minor.​​The​
​victim​ ​thereafter​ ​filed​ ​an​ ​affidavit​ ​stating​ ​that​ ​she​ ​had​ ​no​ ​grievance​ ​against​ ​the​
​petitioner,​​that​​she​​had​​married​​him​​voluntarily​​and​​that​​she​​was​​residing​​with​​him​
​along​ ​with​ ​their​ ​child.​ ​The​ ​State​ ​also​ ​submitted​ ​that​ ​it​ ​had​ ​no​ ​objection​ ​to​ ​the​
​quashing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​proceedings.​​The​​learned​​Single​​Judge,​​after​​examining​​the​​facts​
​and​​circumstances​​of​​the​​case,​​observed​​that,​​if​​the​​accused​​were​​to​​be​​imprisoned,​
​the​​victim​​and​​the​​child​​would​​be​​left​​without​​any​​means​​of​​support​​or​​sustenance.​
​Taking​ ​note​ ​of​ ​the​ ​peculiar​ ​circumstances,​ ​particularly​ ​the​ ​subsisting​ ​matrimonial​
​relationship,​​the​​birth​​of​​the​​child​​and​​the​​welfare​​of​​the​​victim​​and​​the​​child,​​the​
​learned Single Judge allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings.​
​31.​ ​The​​facts​​of​​the​​present​​case​​stand​​on​​an​​entirely​​different​​footing.​
​The​​allegation​​is​​that​​the​​accused,​​who​​was​​an​​Ustad​​of​​the​​Madrassa​​where​​the​
​child​ ​was​​studying,​​had​​committed​​repeated​​sexual​​assault​​of​​a​​17-year-old​​child.​
​There​​is​​no​​subsequent​​matrimonial​​relationship​​or​​other​​comparable​​circumstance​

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​which​ ​could​ ​bring​ ​the​ ​present​ ​case​ ​within​ ​the​ ​exceptional​ ​factual​ ​situation​
​considered​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Ayyub​ ​Malik​ ​(supra)​ ​or​ ​in​ ​Harmeet​ ​Singh​
​(supra).​​The​​subsequent​​affidavit​​filed​​by​​the​​victim,​​after​​attaining​​majority,​​cannot​
​by​ ​itself​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​as​ ​sufficient​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​the​ ​case​ ​within​ ​the​ ​ratio​ ​of​ ​the​ ​said​
​decision.​
​32.​ ​We​​also​​find​​it​​appropriate​​to​​refer​​to​​the​​recent​​decision​​of​​the​​Apex​
​Court​​in​ ​Gopal​​Lodhi​ ​(supra).​​Though​​the​​said​​case​​did​​not​​arise​​under​​the​​POCSO​
​Act,​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court​ ​had​ ​occasion​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​the​ ​propriety​ ​of​ ​quashing​ ​serious​
​criminal​​proceedings,​​including​​allegations​​of​​rape,​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​a​​settlement.​​The​
​Apex​​Court​​expressed​​serious​​concern​​regarding​​the​​practice​​of​​terminating​​criminal​
​proceedings​ ​involving​ ​grave​ ​offences​ ​merely​ ​because​​the​​parties​​had​​arrived​​at​​a​
​compromise.​​The​​Court​​specifically​​noticed​​the​​possibility​​of​​victims​​being​​subjected​
​to​​pressure,​​coercion​​or​​inducement​​to​​enter​​into​​settlements.​​It​​was​​observed​​as​
​under:​
​10……….However,​ ​quashing​ ​of​ ​a​ ​case​ ​under​ ​Section​ ​482​
​relying​ ​solely​ ​on​ ​a​ ​compromise,​ ​especially​ ​when​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​
​non-compoundable​ ​offence,​ ​would​ ​be​ ​stepping​ ​outside​ ​the​
​jurisdiction​ ​under​ ​Section​ ​482​ ​that​ ​too​ ​in​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​power​
​conferred​ ​under​​Section​​320.​​We​​are​​not​​only​​concerned​​with​​the​
​settlements​ ​which​ ​could​​be​​arrived​​at​​on​​coercion​​by​​the​​accused​

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​but​ ​also​ ​apprehensive​ ​of​ ​the​ ​multiplicity​ ​of​ ​such​ ​false​ ​complaints​
​being made, with the lure of a future settlement being arrived it.​
​11.​​We​​are​​not​​prima​​facie​​satisfied​​that​​the​​cases​​referred​
​to​ ​by​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Single​ ​Judge​ ​of​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​would​ ​enable​
​invocation​​of​​the​​power​​under​​Section​​528​​to​​quash​​the​​complaint,​
​on​ ​a​ ​compromise​​where​​a​​heinous​​offence​​of​​rape​​is​​alleged;​​the​
​powers​​of​​Section​​482​​still​​being​​distinct,​​but​​such​​examination​​of​
​the case having not been done.​
​33.​ ​The​ ​observations​ ​made​ ​in​ ​Gopal​ ​Lodhi​ ​(supra)​ ​assume​
​considerable​​significance​​in​​cases​​involving​​offences​​against​​children.​​A​​settlement​
​or​ ​affidavit​ ​furnished​ ​by​ ​the​ ​victim​ ​cannot​ ​invariably​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​as​ ​a​ ​free​ ​and​
​voluntary​ ​expression​ ​of​ ​her​ ​wishes,​ ​particularly​ ​when​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​may​ ​have​
​exercised​​influence​​or​​authority​​over​​the​​victim​​or​​when​​the​​victim​​is​​dependent​​on​
​the​​accused​​or​​the​​accused's​​family.​​The​​Court​​must​​remain​​alive​​to​​the​​possibility​
​that​ ​a​ ​settlement​ ​may​ ​be​ ​the​ ​result​ ​of​ ​pressure,​ ​social​ ​circumstances,​ ​economic​
​dependence or other forms of inducement.​
​34.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​precisely​ ​for​ ​this​ ​reason​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​cannot​ ​abdicate​ ​its​
​responsibility​​by​​accepting​​a​​settlement​​at​​face​​value.​​The​​inherent​​powers​​of​​this​
​Court​​are​​required​​to​​be​​exercised​​independently,​​having​​regard​​to​​the​​nature​​of​​the​

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​allegations,​ ​the​ ​materials​ ​collected​​during​​investigation​​and​​the​​larger​​interests​​of​
​justice.​
​35.​ ​Having​​regard​​to​​the​​above​​principles,​​we​​are​​of​​the​​view​​that​​the​
​question​​whether​​a​​particular​​offence​​under​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​is​​of​​lesser​​or​​greater​
​gravity​ ​cannot,​ ​by​ ​itself,​ ​furnish​ ​a​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​terminating​ ​the​ ​prosecution​ ​on​ ​the​
​ground​​of​​settlement.​​The​​fact​​that​​an​​offence​​may​​fall​​under​​Sections​​7​​and​​8,​​as​
​distinguished​​from​​more​​aggravated​​forms​​of​​sexual​​assault,​​does​​not​​automatically​
​render​​the​​dispute​​a​​private​​one​​capable​​of​​being​​settled​​between​​the​​parties.​​The​
​statutory​ ​scheme​ ​of​ ​the​ ​POCSO​ ​Act​ ​does​ ​not​ ​recognise​ ​any​ ​distinction​ ​whereby​
​offences​​of​​comparatively​​lesser​​gravity​​can​​be​​compounded​​or​​brought​​to​​an​​end​
​merely at the instance of the victim.​
​36.​ ​The​ ​expression​ ​'lesser​ ​gravity',​ ​as​ ​expressed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Single​
​Judge,​​cannot​​be​​employed​​to​​dilute​​the​​legislative​​intent​​underlying​​the​​enactment.​
​Even​ ​an​ ​act​ ​of​ ​sexual​ ​assault​ ​involving​ ​physical​ ​contact​ ​of​ ​a​ ​child,​ ​though​ ​not​
​accompanied​ ​by​ ​the​​more​​aggravated​​forms​​of​​sexual​​violence,​​may​​have​​serious​
​consequences​ ​for​ ​the​ ​child's​ ​dignity,​ ​bodily​ ​integrity​​and​​psychological​​well-being.​
​The​​nature​​of​​the​​act,​​the​​age​​of​​the​​child,​​the​​relationship​​between​​the​​accused​
​and​​the​​victim,​​the​​circumstances​​in​​which​​the​​alleged​​offence​​was​​committed,​​and​

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​the​ ​position​ ​of​ ​trust​ ​or​ ​authority​ ​occupied​ ​by​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​are​ ​all​ ​relevant​
​considerations.​
​37.​ ​In​​the​​present​​case,​​we​​are​​not​​called​​upon​​to​​consider​​the​​contentions​
​advanced by the petitioner on its merits.​
​38.​ ​We​​are,​​therefore,​​of​​the​​considered​​view​​that​​a​​prosecution​​involving​
​offences​​under​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​cannot​​be​​quashed​​merely​​on​​the​​ground​​that​​the​
​victim,​​after​​attaining​​majority,​​has​​filed​​an​​affidavit​​expressing​​no​​objection​​to​​the​
​termination​ ​of​ ​the​ ​proceedings,​ ​or​ ​that​ ​the​ ​victim's​ ​family​ ​has​ ​entered​ ​into​ ​a​
​settlement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​accused.​ ​Such​ ​an​ ​approach​ ​would​ ​not​ ​only​ ​undermine​ ​the​
​protective​ ​object​ ​of​ ​the​ ​POCSO​ ​Act​ ​but​ ​could​ ​also​ ​expose​ ​vulnerable​ ​victims​ ​to​
​pressure​ ​and​ ​inducement​ ​to​ ​withdraw​ ​from​ ​the​ ​prosecution.​ ​The​ ​criminal​ ​justice​
​system​​cannot​​permit​​offences​​against​​children​​to​​be​​converted​​into​​private​​disputes​
​capable of being resolved through a negotiated settlement.​
​39.​ ​However,​​it​​is​​equally​​important​​to​​clarify​​that​​the​​above​​principle​​does​
​not​ ​take​ ​away​ ​the​ ​inherent​ ​jurisdiction​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​to​ ​quash​ ​proceedings​ ​in​ ​an​
​appropriate​​case.​​The​​power​​under​​Section​​482​​of​​the​​CrPC​​or​​Section​​528​​of​​the​
​BNSS,​​as​​applicable,​​is​​intended​​to​​secure​​the​​ends​​of​​justice​​and​​prevent​​the​​abuse​

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​of​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​law.​ ​There​ ​may​ ​be​ ​cases​ ​where,​ ​upon​ ​an​ ​examination​ ​of​ ​the​
​allegations​ ​in​ ​the​ ​First​ ​Information​ ​Report,​ ​the​ ​final​ ​report​ ​and​ ​the​ ​materials​
​collected​ ​during​​investigation,​​the​​Court​​finds​​that​​the​​essential​​ingredients​​of​​the​
​alleged​​offence​​are​​not​​made​​out,​​that​​the​​allegations​​are​​inherently​​improbable,​​or​
​that​ ​the​ ​proceedings​​are​​manifestly​​frivolous​​or​​vexatious.​​In​​such​​circumstances,​
​this​ ​Court​ ​would​ ​certainly​ ​be​ ​justified​ ​in​ ​exercising​ ​its​ ​inherent​ ​jurisdiction​ ​in​
​20​
​accordance​ ​with​ ​the​ ​principles​ ​laid​ ​down​​in​ ​State​​of​​Haryana​​v.​​Bhajan​​Lal​ ​.​
​The​​distinction​​is​​that​​the​​power​​must​​be​​exercised​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​the​​merits​​of​​the​
​case​​and​​the​​recognised​​parameters​​governing​​the​​exercise​​of​​inherent​​jurisdiction,​
​and​ ​not​ ​merely​ ​because​ ​the​ ​victim​ ​or​ ​her​ ​family​ ​has​ ​agreed​ ​to​ ​a​ ​settlement.​ ​A​
​settlement​ ​may​ ​form​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​factual​ ​background,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​cannot,​ ​by​ ​itself,​
​constitute​​the​​legal​​foundation​​for​​quashing​​a​​prosecution​​involving​​offences​​under​
​the POCSO Act.​
​40.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​light​ ​of​ ​the​ ​above​ ​discussion,​ ​we​ ​answer​ ​the​ ​reference​ ​by​
​holding​ ​that​ ​criminal​ ​proceedings​ ​involving​ ​offences​​under​​the​​POCSO​​Act​​cannot​
​ordinarily​​be​​quashed​​in​​exercise​​of​​the​​inherent​​powers​​of​​this​​Court​​solely​​on​​the​
​basis​ ​of​ ​a​ ​settlement​ ​or​ ​compromise​ ​between​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​and​​the​​victim​​or​​the​
​victim's​ ​family,​ ​even​ ​where​ ​the​ ​offence​ ​is​ ​alleged​ ​to​ ​be​ ​of​ ​comparatively​ ​lesser​
​20​
​[​ 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]​

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​gravity.​ ​The​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offence​ ​and​ ​the​ ​protective​ ​object​ ​of​ ​the​ ​POCSO​ ​Act​
​preclude​ ​the​ ​treatment​ ​of​ ​such​ ​proceedings​​as​​purely​​private​​disputes​​capable​​of​
​being​​terminated​​by​​agreement​​between​​the​​parties.​​However,​​nothing​​stated​​above​
​shall​​preclude​​the​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​from​​exercising​​the​​inherent​​jurisdiction​​of​
​this​​Court​​in​​an​​appropriate​​case​​where,​​upon​​an​​independent​​examination​​of​​the​
​allegations​ ​and​ ​the​ ​materials​ ​on​ ​record,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​found​ ​that​ ​the​ ​proceedings​ ​are​
​frivolous,​​vexatious,​​inherently​​improbable​​or​​otherwise​​amount​​to​​an​​abuse​​of​​the​
​process​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Court.​ ​Such​ ​power​ ​shall,​ ​however,​ ​be​ ​exercised​ ​strictly​​within​​the​
​parameters​ ​laid​ ​down​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Apex​ ​Court​ ​and​ ​not​ ​merely​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​a​
​settlement.​
​41.​ ​The reference is answered accordingly.​
​The​​matter​​shall​​be​​placed​​before​​the​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​for​​consideration​
​of the petition on its merits in the light of the principles laid down herein.​
​Sd/-​
​RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V,​
​JUDGE​
​Sd/-​
​K.V. JAYAKUMAR,​
​JUDGE​
​APM/​
​PS​