PARVINDER SINGH vs ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORATE
- Court
- Uttarakhand High Court
Reserved on: 30.10.2026
Delivered on: 17.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Misc. Application No. 1400 of 2026
Banmeet Singh
--Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement
--Respondent
Presence:-
Mr. Aditya Singh, Advocate with Mr. Tushar Chauhan and Mr. Mahendra Singh
Rawat, Advocates for the applicant.
Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Senior Advocate (through video conferencing) assisted by
Ms. Monika Pant and Mr. Atul Bahuguna, Advocates for the respondent.
Criminal Misc. Application No. 1355 of 2026
Parvinder Singh
--Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement
--Respondent
Presence:-
Mr. Arvind Vashistha, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ayush Kaushik, Advocate
for the applicant.
Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Senior Advocate (through video conferencing) assisted by
Ms. Monika Pant and Mr. Atul Bahuguna, Advocates for the respondent.
Third Bail Application No. 30 of 2026
Banmeet Singh
--Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement
--Respondent
Presence:-
Mr. Aditya Singh, Advocate with Mr. Tushar Chauhan and Mr. Mahendra Singh
Rawat, Advocates for the applicant.
Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Senior Advocate (through video conferencing) assisted by
Ms. Monika Pant and Mr. Atul Bahuguna, Advocates for the respondent.
2
First Bail Application No. 1825 of 2025
Parvinder Singh
--Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement
--Respondent
Presence:-
Mr. Arvind Vashistha, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ayush Kaushik, Advocate
for the applicant.
Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Senior Advocate (through video conferencing) assisted by
Ms. Monika Pant and Mr. Atul Bahuguna, Advocates for the respondent.
JUDGMENT
Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J.
In these petitions under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“the BNSS”) and bail
applications, common questions of law and facts are involved.
Hence, they are heard together and being decided by this common
judgment.
2. The challenge in C-528 No. 1400 of 2026 is made to
the order dated 12.06.2026 passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 29
of 2024, Directorate of Enforcement v. Banmeet Singh, by the
st
court of Special Judge, PMLA/1 Additional Sessions Judge,
Dehradun, by which an application for non-extension of remand of
the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh was rejected and the
petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh was remanded to judicial
custody.
3. In BA 3 No. 30 of 2026, the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh seeks bail. This is his third bail application. His
first and second bail applications have already been rejected by
this Court vide orders dated 07.01.2025 and 04.12.2025,
respectively.
3
4. In C-528 No. 1355 of 2026, the petitioner/applicant
Parvinder Singh has also challenged the order dated 12.06.2026
passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 28 of 2024, Directorate of
st
Enforcement v. Parvinder Singh, by the court of 1 Additional
Sessions Judge/Special Judge, PMLA, Dehradun, by which an
application for non-extension of remand filed by the
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh was rejected and the
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh was remanded to judicial
custody.
5. In BA 1 No. 1825 of 2025, the petitioner/applicant
Parvinder Singh seeks bail.
FACTS
In Re : Banmeet Singh
(i) The petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh is in
judicial custody in ECIR No. ECIR/DNSZ0/4/2003, Special
Sessions Trial No. 29 of 2024, Directorate of Enforcement v.
Banmeet Singh (“Banmeet’s case”), under Sections 3 and 4 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“the PMLA,
st
2002”), pending before the 1 Additional Sessions
Judge/Special Judge, PMLA, Dehradun. The facts relating to
the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh have been set out in
paras 2, 3 & 4 of the order dated 07.01.2025 passed in First
Bail Application No. 1760 of 2024 of the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh. They are as follows:-
“2. The background of the case is as follows: The applicant was
investigated with regard to the offences of drug trafficking and
money laundering in the United States of America. He was
arrested in the month of April, 2019, in the United Kingdom on
extradition request of the US authorities on drug trafficking and
money laundering charges. The applicant entered into a plea
agreement with the US authorities on 05.01.2024. He was
4
convicted, but his sentence was reduced to 60 months. On
19.04.2024, the applicant was released. On his arrival in India,
he was interrogated and finally arrested. It has been the case of
the Enforcement Directorate (“ED”) that as per the information
received from the US authorities, the applicant along with his
brother Parvinder Singh was operating an international drug
trafficking group named as the Singh DTO (Drug Trafficking
Organization). That used vendor marketing sites on the dark web,
numerous free advertisements on clear websites, and a network of
narcotic and controlled-substance distributors and distribution
cells to sell drugs. In exchange, the Singh Organization received
drug trafficking proceeds in the form of crypto currency and
laundered these proceeds through crypto currency wallets. The
Singh Organization received the drug trafficking proceeds through
the sales on dark web markets, then laundered those proceeds
through crypto currency transactions. Both brothers, i.e. the
applicant and Parvinder Singh, used the monikers “Liston” and
“Listonishere” on a variety of dark web markets. After his arrest in
India, the statement of applicant was recorded under Section 50
of the Act. The statement of Parvinder Singh was also recorded
under Section 50 of the Act.
3. It is the case of the ED that in US court, the applicant was
prosecuted and convicted with regard to some Bitcoins (“BTC”),
which he had earned through his drug trafficking business.
Before the US authorities, the applicant, as per the ED, has given
a statement that he had split the business with his brother
Parvinder Singh and 4250 BTC were transferred to Parvinder
Singh. According to the ED, Parvinder Singh had denied
acquisition of 4250 BTC. He had though revealed possession of
some BTC, which have been taken into custody by the ED.
4. Complaint has already been filed by the ED in the matter.
In Para 10.2.21, 10.2.22 and 10.2.23, the averments that have
been made in the complaint are as follows:-
“10.2.21 That Banmeet Singh did not have
any legitimate source of income in India as well as
in United Kingdom during the period 2012 to 2017,
and he stayed mostly at the United Kingdom during
the said period along with his wife Amarpreet Kaur
Chawla. On being asked, both Banmeet Singh and
Amarpreet Kaur Chawla could not produce any
proof for their legitimate source of income during
the said period. Thus the foreign inward
remittances received in their accounts are nothing
but a part of proceeds of crime. Thus the proceeds
of crime in the instant case have been mixed with
legitimate source (in case of Surjeet Singh) in order
to disguise the tainted money i.e. proceeds of crime
project it as untained.
10.2.22 That the foreign inward remittances
5
received in the bank accounts of Banmeet Singh,
Amarpreet Kaur Chawla and Surjeet Singh were
further rotated to various other accounts belonging
to them so as to disguise the origin of funds and
project those as untainted money. The rotation of
funds through various accounts to make them
appear as untainted money is a classic example of
Money Laundering. This clearly proves the malafide
intention of Banmeet Singh and Amarpreet Kaur
Chawla of projecting the illegally earned money
through sale of illegal drugs as untainted and
utilizing the same for their personal use.
10.2.23 Further, the remaining PoC in the
instant case i.e. 4250 Bitcoins is still untraceable
and is suspected to be in possession of the
Banmeet Singh or Parvinder Singh, investigation in
respect of the same is undergoing. ”
(ii) The petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh was
arrested on 29.05.2024. The complaint was filed on
26.07.2024. Cognizance was taken on 27.07.2024.
Meanwhile, the petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh
had assailed his cognizance order in SLP (Cri.) No.
12055 of 2025, Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of
Enforcement, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court (“the
SLP”). Vide order dated 19.05.2026, passed in the SLP,
the cognizance order qua the petitioner/applicant
Parvinder Singh was set aside and the Special Court
was directed to proceed afresh from the stage of
cognizance after affording an opportunity of hearing to
the petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh.
(iii) The petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh also
challenged the cognizance order in WPCRL No. 567 of
2024, Banmeet Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement,
which was allowed on 30.05.2026 and the order taking
cognizance was set aside and the Special Court was
directed to proceed afresh from the stage of cognizance
6
after affording opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh.
(iv) In Banmeet’s case, on 23.05.2026, the
petitioner/applicant Banmeet was remanded to
judicial custody, which was to expire on 06.06.2026.
(v) 06.06.2026 was declared holiday and
07.06.2026 was Sunday.
(vi) On 08.06.2026, the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh moved an application opposing further
remand. This application was heard and by the
impugned order dated 12.06.2026, the application filed
by the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh was
rejected and the custody remand extended.
(vii) It has been the case of the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh that the cognizance order had already
been set aside; complaint having been filed; there is no
provision available to the court concerned to remand
the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh to custody. As
stated, this order dated 12.06.2026 is impugned in C-
528 No. 1400 of 2026.
(viii) The petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh has also
sought bail. This is his third bail application. In
addition to the grounds that have been raised by the
petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh in his application
dated 08.06.2026 in Banmeet’s case, it has further
been the ground to challenge the custody that from
06.06.2026 to 08.06.2026, there was no remand order
in respect of the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh
and from 08.06.2026 to 12.06.2026, there was
production warrant but no remand order, and even the
7
petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh was not present
before the court on 08.06.2026. This will be discussed
in a short while from now.
In Re : Parvinder Singh
(i) The petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh is in
judicial custody in ECIR No.
ECIR/DNSZ0/04/2023, Special Sessions Trial
No. 28 of 2024, Directorate of Enforcement v.
st
Parvinder Singh, pending in the court of 1
Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, PMLA,
Dehradun (“Parvinder’s case”), under Sections 3
& 4 of the PMLA, 2002.
(ii) The Parvinder’s case is based on a complaint
filed against the petitioner/applicant Parvinder
Singh under Section 3 & 4 of the PMLA , 2002.
During proceedings against the
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh, the
statement of the petitioner/applicant Parvinder
Singh was recorded, which is quoted in para
10.1.1 of the complaint as follows:-
“ 10.1.1 Brief of statements dated 27.04.2024,
28.04.2024, 29.04.2024, 30.04.2024, 01.05.2024,
03.05.2024, 05.05.2024, 06.05.2024of Parvinder
Singh has been recorded under section 50 during
PMLA investigation, and 07.05.2024 and Statement
dated 27.04.2024 recorded under (RUD No.-12)
a) On being asked, Parvinder Singh stated that he
is a resident of 5/473, Guru Teq Bahadur Road,
Tikonia, Haldwani. That, he along with his
brother Banmeet Singh started a business in
the name of Narula Medicals for
pharmaceuticals trading in the year 2002. This
business ran till 2005. Thereafter, he and his
8
brother Banmeet Singh started building a
pharmaceuticals manufacturing unit as a
partnership firm in the name of Denver
Healthcare. The production of Pharmaceuticals
started in the year 2008, with general tablet
and liquid manufacturing plant. The production
of the same stopped in 2012-13.
b) That in the year 2011 his brother Banmeet
Singh came up with the idea of selling illegal
drugs abroad. Accordingly, they came into
illegal drug business of selling drugs abroad
(mainly Europe) online. Initially it was through
online forums and encrypted emails however
later on they started selling through Darkweb.
That, they started selling Diazepam Tablets,
Xanax Tablets, Tramadol Tablets etc. mostly in
European Countries. That he used to
communicate with the buyers and suppliers
through online forums, encrypted email and
websites on dark web. That they used to take
payments in the form of cryptocurrency
(Bitcoin). That in the year 2012 he and his
brother Banmeet Singh started working
independently, however as he could not find a
supplier by himself, therefore he asked
Banmeet Singh to become his Counts supplier.
That he used to find buyers online on forums,
emails and darkweb and then used to ask
Banmeet Singh to supply the drugs to a
address provided by the buyers. Banmeet Singh
used to deliver the illegal drugs to the
designated buyers and for that Parvinder Singh
used to pay Banmeet Singh. Parvinder Singh
used to receive his payments from buyers in
form of Bitcoins and over the period of time
numbers of bitcoins were accumulated by him.
He also stated that he never maintained any
records so he doesn't have the idea about how
much he has earned by selling illegal drugs.
When specifically asked about where the
bitcoins are kept, he stated that the said
bitcoins are kept in the cold wallet and seed
phrase for accessing the same is hidden at a
secret place at his home and that only he can
access the said seed phrase. Further, he stated
that he has done sale of illegal drugs majorly in
European region(90%-95%) and has sold drugs
in very less quantity in USA(5%-10%). That he
has not received any cryptocurrency from
9
Banmeet Singh. Further, he stated that he was
left with around 250 bitcoins and that he
wished to surrender the same. Further, he
asked the officials of Enforcement Directorate to
provide one Crypto Hardware wallet of Ledger
Company and apart from that he asked the
officials to arrange for one laptop with internet
connection. Thereafter, the officials of the
Enforcement Directorate provided the same to
him. That he used the Ledger Nano S Plus
device and by connecting it with the laptop
(provided by Enforcement Directorate) and
feeding in it the seed code which he had hidden
at his home. he gained access to his Bitcoin
wallet on Electrum.org. That, he was having
268.22632428 earned through sale of illegal
drugs in that wallet and on directions of the
officials surrendered the same by transferring
them to the wallet address provided by officers
of Enforcement Directorate on 02.05.2024. He
has stated that he had stopped this business of
selling illegal drugs in the year 2017. He further
stated that he is not having any amount of
bitcoins left with him. That his brother
Banmeet Singh is making false statements
regarding transfer of 4250 Bitcoins just to
mislead the investigation.
c) He further stated that used to do property
dealing, Labor contracts and poultry and meat
business and all these works generated funds
in cash, therefore he used to earn majorly in
cash and the same was deposited in his bank
accounts from time to time. Further, he has
declared the same in his ITRs.”
(iii) After investigation, the conclusion has been
recorded in para 12 of the complaint qua the
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh, which
reads as follows:-
“12. CONCLUSION OF INVESTIGATION UNDER
PMLA, 2002
12.1. During the investigation conducted by this
directorate, it has been established that Parvinder
Singh has indulged in sale of illegal drugs in foreign
countries using Dark Web from 2011 to 2017 and
was taking the payments in the form of
cryptocurrency i.e. Bitcoins and was in possession
10
of 268.22632428 Bitcoins worth Rs. 130.48 Crores
(approx. as on 02.05.2024) earned through sale of
illegal drugs online. Apart from this Parminder
Singh has received foreign currency amounting to
Rs. 1,24,90,166.58/ in his bank accounts
maintained with Kotak Mahindra Bank, Haldwani
and Rs. 11,26,259/ in his Bank Account
maintained with ICICI Bank, Haldwani and the
same was utilised by him after making cash
withdrawals. On being asked about the source of
the said foreign remittance received by him,
Parvinder Singh has said that the said foreign
remittance was sent by Banmeet Singh. Further, as
per the supplementary MLA Request dated
01.02.2024 (RUD No. 3), Banmeet Singh during the
said period in which he had transferred the said
foreign remittance in Parvinder Singh's bank
account used to earn money through sale of illegal
drugs in USA and other countries and he used to
receive the proceeds in form of Bitcoins. Banmeet
Singh was not having any other source of income
apart from this. From the above it is clear that
Parvinder Singh in connivance with Banmeet Singh
has received tainted money in form of Bitcoins as
well as in his Indian Bank accounts in form of
Indian Currency which was nothing but proceeds
earned through sale of illegal drugs using dark web
in European Countries and USA.”
(iv) The role of Parvinder Singh is stated in para 14
of the complaint, which reads as under:-
“ In mid 2012 Parvinder Singh, in
connivance with Banmeet Singh utilizing the dark
web started selling illegal drugs online and started
taking payments in form of Cryptocurrency i.e.
Bitcoins. On being asked he could not prove any
legitimate source of his income and justify the
foreign inward remittances made in his bank
account. Upon his arrest he surrendered
268.22632428 Bitcoins worth Rs. 130.48 Crores
(approx. as on 02.05.2024) as on date of seizure
which were earned by him through sale of illegal
drugs online. Hence it is evident that Parvinder
Singh is actually involved in generation of Proceed
of Crime by way of illegal sale of drugs and its
acquisition, possession, use and concealment in
the form of cryptocurrency hence being involved in
11
the offence of money laundering as defined u/s 3 of
PMLA, 2002 and punishable u/s 4 of PMLA, 2002.”
(v) The Parvinder’s case was listed for hearing on
06.06.2026, but that day was declared holiday
and 07.06.2026 was Sunday. Therefore, the
matter was taken up on 08.06.2026.
(vi) On 08.06.2026, like the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh, the petitioner/applicant
Parvinder Singh also moved an application in
Parvinder’s case objecting for extension of
remand. This application was heard on
08.06.2026 and dismissed vide order dated
12.06.2026, and the petitioner/applicant
Parvinder Singh was remanded to custody.
(vii) This order dated 12.06.2026 is impugned in C-
528 No. 1355 of 2026.
(viii) The petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh also
seeks bail.
(ix) In the application that was filed by the
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh, on
08.06.2026, the main ground was that the
cognizance order had already been set aside by
the higher court; complaint having been filed,
there was no provision of law, which could
empower the court to remand the
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh to custody.
(x) In the bail application, in addition, it is also the
ground that from 06.06.2026 to 08.06.2026, the
12
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh was not
remanded to any judicial custody. There was no
remand order or production warrant and from
08.06.2026 to 12.06.2026, there was a
production warrant, but no remand order, and
even the petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh
was never produced before the court on
08.06.2026.
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner/applicant Banmeet
Singh submits that the case against the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh is a complaint case, therefore, the provision of
complaint case will apply in the matter. He submits that in the
complaint case of cognizable offence, a person cannot be taken into
custody. He has also raised the following points in his
submission:-
(i) There is no inherent power of remand.
(ii) The court cannot remand a person into
custody after investigation is complete, but
cognizance is not taken; there is no such
power under statute.
(iii) The provision of remand and investigation
as contained under Section 190 of BNSS
will not apply in complaint cases.
8. It is argued that in both the cases, the complaints had
already been filed against the petitioners/applicants Banmeet
Singh and Parvinder Singh, but cognizance order had already been
13
quashed; therefore, there cannot be any remand.
9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh also adopts these arguments
on this aspect. According to him, once the investigation is complete
and there is no cognizance order, there cannot be any remand.
Hence, extension of remand by the designated court on 12.06.2026
is bad in the eyes of law.
10. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the
petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh has relied on the principle of
law as laid down in the cases of Yash Tuteja and another v. Union
1
of India and others , Natabar Parida Bisnu Charan Parida
2
Batakrushna Parida Babaji Parida v. State of Orissa , Mithabhai
3
Pashabhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and Union of India
4
v. Thamisharasi and others .
11. In the case of Yash Tuteja ( supra ), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, inter alia, held in para 6 that once a complaint is
filed under the provisions of the PMLA, 2002, the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) shall apply to the
proceedings before the special court. It was further held that once
a complaint is filed before the Special Court, the provisions of
Sections 200 to 204 of the Code will apply.
12. In the case of Natabar Parida ( supra ), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, inter alia, held that
“ It may be emphasised here
that the Court will have no inherent power of remand of an
1
(2024) 8 SCC 465
2
(1975) 2 SCC 220
3
(2009) 6 SCC 332
4
(1995) 4 SCC 190
14
accused to any custody unless the power is conferred by law. ”
13. In the case of Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel ( supra ) also,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “
The pre-cognizance
jurisdiction to remand vested in the subordinate courts,
therefore, must be exercised within the four corners of the
Code. ”
14. In the case of Thamisharasi ( supra ), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that “ It is settled that “the court will
have no power of remand of an accused to any custody unless
.
the power is conferred by law”. ”
15. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the
Directorate of Enforcement submits that the provisions of the Code
in the matter of remand are applicable in the cases under the
PMLA, 2002. He would refer to the principles of law as laid down in
the case of V. Senthil Balaji v. State represented by Deputy
5
Director and others .
16. In the case of V. Senthil Balaji ( supra ), it was argued
that in the cases under the PMLA, 2002, the provision of remand
under Section 167(2) of the Code may not be applicable. In para
21, this argument is noted as follows:-
“ 21. There is no power vested under the PMLA, 2002 to
seek custody in favour of an authorised officer. Such an
authorised officer is not a police officer and therefore,
Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as “CrPC, 1973”), with particular
reference to a remand in his favour, is not available.
Custody under Section 167(2)CrPC, 1973 can only be in
favour of a police officer and not any other agency. There is
no investigation under the PMLA, 2002 since it is to be
5
2023 SCC OnLine SC 934
15
taken as synonymous with inquiry. After the completion of
24 hours from the arrest, there cannot be further custody
in favour of an officer. Being a beneficial legislation, non-
compliance of Section 41-ACrPC, 1973 would vitiate the
orders of remand. The learned Principal Sessions Judge
passed a cryptic order ignoring the clear non-compliance
of Section 19 of the PMLA, 2002.”
17. After discussion on all the relevant aspects of the
matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paras 90 and 91 of the
judgment in the case of V. Senthil Balaji ( supra ), observed as
follows:-
“ 90. The arguments of the learned Senior Advocates on
the interpretation of Section 167(2)CrPC, 1973 cannot be
accepted as the law has been quite settled by this Court in
Deepak Mahajan [Enforcement Directorate v. Deepak
Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 785] . One
cannot say that while all other safeguards as extended
under Section 167(2)CrPC, 1973 would be available to a
person accused but nonetheless, the provision regarding
remand cannot be applied. Section 167(2)CrPC, 1973
merely complements and supplements Section 19 of the
PMLA, 2002. We do not find any inherent contradiction
between these two statutes. Obviously, an arrest under
Section 19 of the PMLA, 2002 can only be made after the
compliance of much more stringent conditions than the
one available under Section 41CrPC, 1973.
91. The interplay between an investigation and inquiry
conferring the same meaning is only for the usage of
common materials arising therefrom. Such materials are
to be utilised for both the purposes. This is the basis upon
which they are read together, giving the same meaning at a
particular stage. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 :
2022 SCC OnLine SC 929] it was in the context of a
challenge to the enactment, particularly in the light of
Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872.”
16
18. Finally, the law has been summed up by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in the case of V. Senthil Balaji ( supra ), in para 95,
which reads as under:-
“ 95.Summation of law
i. When an arrestee is forwarded to the jurisdictional
Magistrate under Section 19(3) of the PMLA, 2002
no writ of habeas corpus would lie. Any plea of
illegal arrest is to be made before such Magistrate
since custody becomes judicial.
ii. Any non-compliance of the mandate of Section 19
of the PMLA, 2002 would enure to the benefit of the
person arrested. For such non-compliance, the
competent court shall have the power to initiate
action under Section 62 of the PMLA, 2002.
iii. An order of remand has to be challenged only
before a higher forum as provided under CrPC,
1973 when it depicts a due application of mind
both on merit and compliance of Section
167(2)CrPC, 1973 read with Section 19 of the
PMLA, 2002.
iv. Section 41-ACrPC, 1973 has got no application to
an arrest made under the PMLA 2002.
v. The maximum period of 15 days of police custody is
meant to be applied to the entire period of
investigation — 60 or 90 days, as a whole.
vi. The words “such custody” occurring in Section
167(2)CrPC, 1973 would include not only a police
custody but also that of other investigating
agencies.
vii. The word “custody” under Section 167(2)CrPC,
1973 shall mean actual custody.
viii. Curtailment of 15 days of police custody by any
extraneous circumstances, act of God, an order of
Court not being the handy work of investigating
agency, would not act as a restriction.
ix. Section 167CrPC, 1973 is a bridge between liberty
and investigation, performing a fine balancing act.
x. The decision of this Court in Anupam J. Kulkarni
17
[CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 554] , as followed subsequently
requires reconsideration by a reference to a larger
Bench.”
19. In view of the principles of law as laid down in the case
of V. Senthil Balaji ( supra ), there is no doubt now that the
provisions relating to remand as available under Section 190 of the
BNSS shall also be applicable in the instant case.
20. Learned Senior Counsel for the Directorate of
Enforcement, submits that the provision of Section 190 of the
BNSS applies to the cases under the PMLA, 2002. He would
submit that even if the complaint is filed and the cognizance is not
taken, the accused has to be in the custody of the court. He
submits that the issue has already been settled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v.
6
State of Maharashtra .
21. Replying to it, learned counsel for the
petitioners/applicants submit that the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand
Jain ( supra ) relates to the police report and does not relate to the
complaint cases. It is argued on behalf of the Directorate of
Enforcement that this principle has been followed in the complaint
case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Serious Fraud
7
Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi .
22. Learned Senior Counsel for the Directorate of
Enforcement submits that the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain
6
(2013) 3 SCC 77
7
(2023) 15 SCC 311
18
( supra) and Rahul Modi ( supra ) applies to the instant case, and
even if cognizance is not taken, the accused has to be remanded to
the custody. He has also relied on the principle of law as laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Surender Kumar
8
Bansal v. Directorate of Enforcement and another and Thokchom
9
Gyaneshor v. Directorate of Enforcement .
23. In the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain
( supra ), the charge sheet had already been filed, but cognizance
had not been taken on the basis thereof. However, the Magistrate
continued to pass remand orders without apparently having
proceeded to the stage contemplated under Section 309 of the
Code. It was argued in that case that since cognizance has not
been taken for want of sanction, the petitioner in that case was
entitled to be released on bail forthwith, since the order of remand
passed by the Magistrate after a period of ninety days was without
jurisdiction. Reference in that case was made to the principle of
law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Natabar Parida ( supra ). But, this contention was not accepted by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
that “ The scheme of CrPC is such that once the investigation
stage is completed, the court proceeds to the next stage,
which is the taking of cognizance and trial. An accused has to
remain in custody of some court............. In such a situation,
the accused continues to remain in the custody of the
Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by the court
trying the offence, when the said court assumes custody of the
accused for purposes of remand during the trial in terms of
Section 309 CrPC. ” In para 18 of the judgment, the Hon’ble
8
2023 SCC OnLine Del 1259
9
2026:DHC:9590-DB, [W.P. (CRL) 3157/2026, CRL.M.A. 31406/2026].
19
Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“18. None of the said cases detract from the
position that once a charge-sheet is filed within the
stipulated time, the question of grant of default bail or
statutory bail does not arise. As indicated hereinabove, in
our view, the filing of charge-sheet is sufficient compliance
with the provisions of Section 167(2)( a )( ii ) in this case.
Whether cognizance is taken or not is not material as far
as Section 167 CrPC is concerned. The right which may
have accrued to the petitioner, had charge-sheet not been
filed, is not attracted to the facts of this case. Merely
because sanction had not been obtained to prosecute the
accused and to proceed to the stage of Section 309 CrPC,
it cannot be said that the accused is entitled to grant of
statutory bail, as envisaged in Section 167 CrPC. The
scheme of CrPC is such that once the investigation stage is
completed, the court proceeds to the next stage, which is
the taking of cognizance and trial. An accused has to
remain in custody of some court. During the period of
investigation, the accused is under the custody of the
Magistrate before whom he or she is first produced. During
that stage, under Section 167(2) CrPC, the Magistrate is
vested with authority to remand the accused to custody,
both police custody and/or judicial custody, for 15 days at
a time, up to a maximum period of 60 days in cases of
offences punishable for less than 10 years and 90 days
where the offences are punishable for over 10 years or
even death sentence. In the event, an investigating
authority fails to file the charge-sheet within the stipulated
period, the accused is entitled to be released on statutory
bail. In such a situation, the accused continues to remain
in the custody of the Magistrate till such time as
cognizance is taken by the court trying the offence, when
the said court assumes custody of the accused for
purposes of remand during the trial in terms of Section
309 CrPC. The two stages are different, but one follows the
other so as to maintain a continuity of the custody of the
accused with a court.”
24. Undoubtedly, the judgment in the case of Suresh
Kumar Bhikamchand Jain ( supra ) was on police report. But,
merely because these principles were laid down on the police
report, it cannot be said that these principles cannot be made
applicable in a complaint case. Even, this has been upheld by the
20
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahul Modi ( supra ).
25. In the case of Rahul Modi ( supra ), a criminal complaint
was filed under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.
Cognizance was not taken before the expiry of sixty days period
and solely on this basis, the High Court had granted bail. But, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in that complaint case in the matter of
Rahul Modi ( supra ) referred and followed the principle of law as
laid down in the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain ( supra ).
In paras 18 and 19 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as follows:-
18. The scheme of CrPC is such that once the
investigation stage is completed, the court proceeds to the next
stage, which is the taking of cognizance and trial. During the
period of investigation, the accused is under the custody of the
Magistrate before whom he or she is first produced, with such
Magistrate being vested with power to remand the accused to
police custody and/or judicial custody, up to a maximum period
as prescribed under Section 167(2). Acknowledging the fact that
an accused has to remain in custody of some court, this Court in
Bhikamchand Jain [ Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of
Maharashtra , (2013) 3 SCC 77 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 229 : (2013) 1
SCC (L&S) 480] concluded that on filing of the charge-sheet
within the stipulated period, the accused continues to remain in
the custody of the Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken
by the court trying the offence, when the said court assumes
custody of the accused for purposes of remand during the trial in
terms of Section 309CrPC. This Court clarified that the two stages
are different, with one following the other so as to maintain
continuity of the custody of the accused with a court.
19. It is clear from the judgment of this Court in
Bhikamchand Jain [ Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of
Maharashtra , (2013) 3 SCC 77 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 229 : (2013) 1
SCC (L&S) 480] that filing of a charge-sheet is sufficient
compliance with the provisions of Section 167CrPC and that an
accused cannot demand release on default bail under Section
167(2) on the ground that cognizance has not been taken before
the expiry of 60 days. The accused continues to be in the custody
of the Magistrate till such time cognizance is taken by the court
trying the offence, which assumes custody of the accused for the
purpose of remand after cognizance is taken. The conclusion of
the High Court that the accused cannot be remanded beyond the
21
period of 60 days under Section 167 and that further remand
could only be at the post-cognizance stage, is not correct in view
of the judgment of this Court in Bhikamchand Jain [ Suresh Kumar
Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra , (2013) 3 SCC 77 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 229 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 480] .
26. Finally, in para 27 of the judgment in the case of
Rahul Modi ( supra ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that
“
The conundrum relating to the custody of the accused after
the expiry of 60 days has also been dealt with by this Court in
Bhikamchand Jain [Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State
of Maharashtra, (2013) 3 SCC 77 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 229 :
(2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 480] . It was made clear that the accused
remains in custody of the Magistrate till cognizance is taken
by the relevant court. As the issue that arises for
consideration in this case is squarely covered by the judgment
in Bhikamchand Jain [Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v.
State of Maharashtra, (2013) 3 SCC 77 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 229
: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 480] , the order passed by the High Court
on 31-5-2019 [Mukesh Modi v. SFIO, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H
”
6252] is hereby set aside.
27. In the case of Surender Kumar Bansal ( supra ) also, the
principles of law as laid down in the cases of Suresh Kumar
Bhikamchand Jain ( supra ) and Rahul Modi ( supra ) were followed
and the Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that “ It was thus
categorically held that in case, on the filing of the charge
sheet, cognizance is not taken, the Magistrate may postpone
the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, for
reasons to be recorded and may by a warrant, remand the
accused if in custody for a period of 15 days at a time. Thus,
in cases, where though charge sheet is filed, however, sanction
22
is not received, the accused will have no right to bail,
however, his remand under Section 167 CrPC will be required
”
to be continued if necessary.
supra
28. In the case of Thokchom Gyaneshor ( ), the facts
were identical. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court relied on the principle
of law as laid down in the case of Judgebir Singh alias Jasbir
Singh Samra alias Jasbir and others v. National Investigation
10
Agency , in which case, in fact, the principle of law as laid down
in the cases of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain ( supra ), Rahul
Modi ( supra ) and other judgments were followed. Thereafter, the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court, in para 20 of the judgment, observed as
follows:-
“20. In the present case, the complaint was filed by the
respondent within the period as prescribed under Section
187 of the BNSS. Though, the order dated 18.12.2024,
taking cognizance thereon, has been set aside by the
learned Single Judge of this Court for want of compliance
with section 223 of the BNSS, that is, grant of prior
hearing to the accused before taking cognizance on such
complaint, in our view, the above judgment in Judgebir
Singh ( supra ) would squarely apply to the facts of the
present case and therefore, the order of further remand
cannot be said to be illegal. The remedy of the petitioner
was to apply for bail on merits.”
29. In view of the law laid down in the case of Suresh
Kumar Bhikamchand Jain ( supra ), Rahul Modi ( supra ), Surender
Kumar Bansal ( supra ) and Thokchom Gyaneshor ( supra ), it is
settled that even when on a complaint under the PMLA, 2002
cognizance is not taken, a remand order can be passed. Therefore,
the arguments made on behalf of the petitioners/applicants that
after setting aside of the cognizance order, the designated court
could not have remanded the petitioners/applicants to the custody
10
(2023) 17 SCC 48
23
has less merit for acceptance and their applications filed in
Banmeet’s case and Parvinder’s case on 08.06.2026 have rightly
been rejected by the designated court on 12.06.2026. Those orders
do not warrant any interference.
30. In the instant matters, extensive arguments have been
made on cognizance as to when cognizance is taken in a complaint
case. Discussion on this aspect may only remain academic now
because this Court has already held that after filing of the
complaint under the PMLA, 2002, even if cognizance is not taken,
a designated court may remand the accused to custody. Therefore,
the Court refrains to make any discussion on the aspect as to
when cognizance is said to be taken in a complaint case.
31. On bail, multiple other grounds have been raised on
behalf of the petitioners/applicants.
32. Learned counsel for the petitioner/applicant Banmeet
Singh submits that a person cannot be remanded to custody
without physical presence. He would submit that from 06.06.2026
to 08.06.2026, there had been no remand order. On 08.06.2026,
the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh was not produced before
the court. On that date, no remand order was passed, only
production order was passed, which is bad in the eyes of law. In
support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on
the principle of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of
11
Gujarat .
33. In the case of Jigar ( supra ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
11
(2023) 6 SCC 484
24
observed that at the time of extension of judicial custody remand,
the presence of accused is necessary because the accused has a
right to oppose for extension of remand. In para 41, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“41. Clause ( b ) of sub-section (2) of Section 167CrPC lays
down that no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the
accused in the custody of the police unless the accused is
produced before him in person. It also provides that judicial
custody can be extended on the production of the accused either
in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage.
Thus, the requirement of the law is that while extending the
remand to judicial custody, the presence of the accused has to be
procured either physically or virtually. This is the mandatory
requirement of law. This requirement is sine qua non for the
exercise of the power to extend the judicial custody remand. The
reason is that the accused has a right to oppose the prayer for the
extension of the remand.”
34. In fact, in the case of Jigar ( supra ), it was observed
that non-production of the accused had taken away his
indefeasible right to apply for default bail. In paras 45 and 46, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“45. The logical and legal consequence of the grant of
extension of time is the deprivation of the indefeasible right
available to the accused to claim a default bail. If we accept the
argument that the failure of the prosecution to produce the
accused before the Court and to inform him that the application
of extension is being considered by the Court is a mere procedural
irregularity, it will negate the proviso added by sub-section (2) of
Section 20 of the 2015 Act and that may amount to violation of
rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The reason is
the grant of the extension of time takes away the right of the
accused to get default bail which is intrinsically connected with
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the
Constitution which is required to be followed before the liberty of
a person is taken away has to be a fair and reasonable procedure.
In fact, procedural safeguards play an important role in protecting
the liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The failure to procure the
presence of the accused either physically or virtually before the
Court and the failure to inform him that the application made by
the Public Prosecutor for the extension of time is being
considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity. It is gross
25
illegality that violates the rights of the accused under Article 21.
46. An attempt was made to argue that the failure to
produce the accused will not cause any prejudice to him. As noted
earlier, the grant of extension of time to complete the investigation
takes away the indefeasible right of the accused to apply for
default bail. It takes away the right of the accused to raise a
limited objection to the prayer for the extension. The failure to
produce the accused before the Court at the time of consideration
of the application for extension of time will amount to a violation
of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus,
prejudice is inherent and need not be established by the
accused.”
35. Learned Senior Counsel for the Directorate of
Enforcement submits that the principle of law as laid down in the
case of Jigar ( supra ) may not help the petitioners/applicants. He
would submit that those principles were applicable in the case of
default bail because had the accused in that case been produced
at the time of extension of remand, he would have exercised his
right to default bail, which he could not.
36. In para 41 of its judgment, last line, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Jigar ( supra ) noted that the reason
for production of the accused at the time of extension of remand is
that the accused has a right to oppose for the prayer for remand.
In the instant matter, on 06.06.2026, till which date the
petitioners/applicants were remanded to judicial custody, was
declared a holiday and 07.06.2026 was Sunday. On 08.06.2026,
on behalf of both the petitioners/applicants, remand was opposed.
Therefore, it cannot be said that non-production of the
petitioners/applicants on 08.06.2026 had taken away any of their
indefeasible rights on 08.06.2026.
37. Learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants also
argued that on 08.06.2026 no remand order was passed in respect
26
of both the petitioners/applicants and in absence of the remand
order, the custody is illegal; it cannot be cured by subsequent
remand order. In support of their contention, reliance has been
placed on the principles of law as laid down in the cases of Yogesh
12
Mittal v. Enforcement Directorate , Yogesh Mittal v. Enforcement
13 14
Directorate , Subhash Baburao v. State of MP , Charan H.V. v.
15 16
State of Karnataka , Manohari v. State of Rajasthan , Directorate
17
of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma , Vihaan Kumar v. State of
18 19
Haryana , In the matter of Madhu Limaye and others , and Arun
20
Pati Tripathi v. Directorate of Enforcement .
38. In the case of Yogesh Mittal ( supra ), an accused was
remanded for judicial custody for more than fifteen days in one go,
but the High Court recorded that for the fault of the court, the
prosecution cannot be made to suffer. But, this order of the High
Court was set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 11.12.2017
in Criminal Appeal No. 2012 of 2017, Yogesh Mittal v. Enforcement
Directorate, and the matter was remanded for hearing afresh by
the High Court. Upon remand, the matter was heard by the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in BA No. 1165 of 2017, Yogesh Mittal v.
Enforcement Directorate. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court while
noting the dates of remand held that on the date of application, the
date of return and the date of hearing, the custody of the petitioner
was illegal, hence he was entitled to bail. In para 19.6 of the
judgment in the case of Yogesh Mittal ( supra ), the Hon’ble Delhi
High Court observed as under:-
12
(M.A. No. 1487 of 2017, in Criminal Appeal No. 2012 of 2017)
13
2018:DHC:397 (Bail Appln. 1165/2017)
14
1988 SCC OnLine MP 56
15
(Criminal Appeal No. 2056 of 2025)
16
1983 Cri LJ 1231
17
2025 SCC OnLine SC 240
18
(2025) 5 SCC 799
19
(1969) 1 SCC 292
20
2025 SCC OnLine SC 3122
27
“19.6 In the present case, the petitioner filed the
present bail application and it came up before this Court
th
on 15 June, 2017. During the pendency of the said bail
application when according to the petitioner no cognizance
was taken by the learned Special Court on the
supplementary complaint, the petitioner filed an
application before this Court being Crl.M.A. 12920/2017
seeking permission to file additional ground for bail inter
alia that no cognizance having been taken his custody was
th
illegal which application was allowed on 11 August, 2017
in the presence of the counsel for the respondent followed
by further application being Crl. M.A. No. 13800/2017
th
which came up before this Court on 25 August, 2017
inter alia urging that no order of remand in the eyes of law
th
was passed on 11 August, 2017, the remand if any was
beyond 15 days hence the custody of the petitioner was
illegal which additional grounds were also followed vide
th
order dated 25 August, 2017. Even the bail application in
th
the present case was heard on 29 August, 2017, that is,
the date before the custody of the petitioner became legal,
hence the date of application, the date of return and the
date of hearing were all at the time when the custody of
the petitioner was illegal, hence the petitioner is entitled to
be released on bail on this count itself.”
39. In the case of Subhash Baburao ( supra ), the Hon’ble
High Court of Madhya Pradesh relied upon the principles of law as
21
laid down in the case of Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi and
held that “ Once an order of remand expires and a fresh order of
remand is not passed, merely noting the next date of
production on the jail warrant without there being anything in
the order-sheet, committing or further continuing such
custody, the detention becomes illegal which cannot be cured
by a subsequent order of remand for subsequent period”.
40. This has been disputed by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Directorate of Enforcement. He would submit
that, in fact, in the case of Ram Narayan Singh ( supra ), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court did not hold that the detention without valid order
21
AIR 1953 SC 277
28
of remand is illegal. It is argued that in the case of Ram Narayan
Singh ( supra ), the issue was Habeas Corpus Petition, and the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in the Habeas Corpus
proceedings, the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise
of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to
the institution of the proceedings. In fact, it has been held so by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Singh
( supra ).
41. On behalf of the petitioners/applicants also, reliance
has been placed on the principles of law as laid down in the case of
Ram Narayan Singh ( supra ). It was not a case of curing of defects.
42. Relying on the judgment in the case of Subhash
Baburao ( supra ), in the case of Charan H.V. ( supra ), bail was
granted.
43. In the case of Subhash Sharma ( supra ), the issue was
different. There, the accused was not presented before the
Magistrate within twenty-four hours. In that context, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that “ Once a Court, while dealing with a
bail application, finds that the fundamental rights of the
accused under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India
have been violated while arresting the accused or after
arresting him, it is the duty of the Court dealing with the bail
”. Present is not such a
application to release the accused on bail
case.
44. In the case of Manohari ( supra ), the Hon’ble Rajasthan
High Court, following the principles of law laid down earlier, held
that once an order of remand expires and a fresh order of remand
29
is not passed then the detention becomes illegal. It was further
held that by a subsequent order of remand for a subsequent
period, the previous order of detention which was patently illegal
cannot be cured.
45. In the case of Madhu Limaye ( supra ), the issue was
with regard to non-communication of ground of arrest, which was
in violation of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. This was held
to be a ground for bail. In para 12 of the judgment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“12. Once it is shown that the arrests made by the
police officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to
establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate
directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind
to all relevant matters. This the State has failed to do. The
remand orders are patently routine and appear to have
been made mechanically. All that Mr Chagla has said is
that if the arrested persons wanted to challenge their
legality the High Court should have been moved under
appropriate provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
But it must be remembered that Madhu Limaye and
others have, by moving this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution, complained of detention or confinement in
jail without compliance with the constitutional and legal
provisions. If their detention in custody could not continue
after their arrest because of the violation of Article 22(1) of
the Constitution they were entitled to be released
forthwith. The orders of remand are not such as would
cure the constitutional infirmities. This disposes of the
third contention of Madhu Limaye.”
46. In the case of Vihaan Kumar ( supra ) also, similar issue
came up for discussion before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein
in para 26.6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “
When a
violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the
court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will
be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the
grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the
30
power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles
”
21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.
47. In the case of Arun Pati Tripathi ( supra ), cognizance
was taken, which had already been set aside by the High Court.
Under those peculiar facts, bail was granted in that case. But, in
the case of Arun Pati Tripathi ( supra ), as such law has not been
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. If cognizance is not
taken and the chargesheet is filed, can the accused be remanded,
this has already been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
cases of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain ( supra ), Rahul Modi
( supra ), Surender Kumar Bansal ( supra ) and Thokchom Gyaneshor
( supra ).
48. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the
Directorate of Enforcement submits that the legality is to be
considered on the date of return, when the prosecution is given
time to reply. He would submit that there is no quarrel on the
principles of law that if grounds of arrest are not communicated,
an accused is entitled to bail in view of the law laid down in the
cases of Madhu Limaye ( supra ) and Vihaan Kumar ( supra ). He
would argue that if in a Habeas Corpus petition, the validity of
custody is examined on the date of return, which means the
previous illegality is not seen, why should in the bail matters, such
illegality should be considered, which is not violative of Articles 21
and 22 of the Constitution of India?
49. As referred to, learned Senior Counsel for the
Directorate of Enforcement has argued that the principle of law as
laid down in the case of Subhash Baburao ( supra ) by the Hon’ble
31
High Court of Madhya Pradesh is not a good law, because it is so
laid down by misreading the principle of law as laid down in the
case of Ram Narayan Singh ( supra ). Similarly, it is argued that the
principle of law as laid down in the case of Manohari ( supra ) is not
a good law in view of the principle of law as laid down in the case
of Ram Narayan Singh ( supra ). It is argued that even if there is any
illegality in the remand order, the subsequent remand order cures
it. The word “custody” includes illegal custody, which may be
extended by a valid order.
50. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel
for the Directorate of Enforcement has placed reliance on the
principles of law as laid down in the cases of Naranjan Singh
22
Nathawan v. State of Punjab , Pranab Chatterjee v. State of
23
Bihar and Kripanand Pandey v. Varishtha Adheekshak Kendriya
24
Karagar .
51. In the case of Naranjan Singh Nathawan ( supra ), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as followed:-
“ 9. It is contended by the Advocate General of the Punjab
that the decision in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. Emperor
[ Basanta Chandra Ghose v. Emperor , AIR 1945 FC 18 :
(1945) 7 FCR 81 : 1945 SCC OnLine FC 3] is a clear
authority in support of the validity of the aforesaid order.
On essentially similar facts the Court laid down two
propositions both of which have application here : ( 1 )
where an earlier order of detention is defective merely on
formal grounds, there is nothing to preclude a proper
order of detention being based on the pre-existing grounds
themselves, especially in cases in which the sufficiency of
the grounds is not examinable by the courts, and ( 2 ) if at
any time before the court directs the release of the detenu,
a valid order directing his detention is produced, the court
cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at
22
(1952) 1 SCC 118
23
(1970) 3 SCC 926
24
2011 SCC OnLine All 1486
32
some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention.
The question is not whether the later order validates the
earlier detention but whether in the face of the later valid
order the court can direct the release of the petitioner. The
learned Judges point out that the analogy of civil
proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily
to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the
proceedings has no application to proceedings in the
nature of habeas corpus where the Court is concerned
solely with the question whether the applicant is being
lawfully detained or not.
52. Further, in the case of Naranjan Singh Nathawan
( supra ), in para 10, bottom lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that “
Once it is conceded that in habeas corpus
proceedings the court is to have regard to the legality or
otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not
with reference to the date of the institution of the proceeding,
it is difficult to hold, in the absence of proof of bad faith, that
the detaining authority cannot supersede an earlier order of
detention challenged as illegal and make a fresh order
wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies
with the requirements of the law in that behalf. ”
53. In the case of Pranab Chatterjee ( supra ), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court followed the principles of law as laid down in the
case of Ram Narayan Singh ( supra ).
54. In the case of Kripanand Pandey ( supra ), the release of
the petitioner in that case was sought on the ground that his
custody was illegal, as he was not produced within twenty-four
hours before the Magistrate; he was not informed regarding
reasons and grounds of arrest, etc. Dealing with the remand
orders, in the case of Kripanand Pandey ( supra ), the Hon’ble
Allahabad High Court held that no order of remand of the accused
33
is necessary to be passed by the court on the order-sheet of the
file. It was further held that the court can rectify the mistake and if
the subsequent order is passed regarding custody, then the
detention would not be illegal. The court can rectify its mistake
and transform illegal imprisonment into legal imprisonment. In
paras 18 to 23, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court observed as
under:-
“18. In case of Urooj Abbas , 1973 Crl. L. J. 1458, full
Bench of our High Court held that “no specific order for
remand of the accused is necessary to be passed by the Court
on the order-sheet or the court file.”
19. According to full Bench if the Magistrate signs the
warrant of custody then the same is sufficient compliance of
Section 309 Cr.P.C. The aforesaid view was affirmed by the
larger Bench consisting of 5 Hon'ble Judges of our High Court
in Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 236 of 1992, Deepak Som
v. Superintendent, District Jail, Lucknow , connected with other
habeas corpus writ petitions decided on 7.9.2000.
20. In case of Surjeet Singh v. State of U.P. 1984 ALL. L.J.
375 full Bench of our High Court held that custody includes
illegal custody. The Court is competent to remand the accused
to custody under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C., even if he was in
illegal imprisonment. Subsequently, the court can rectify the
mistake and if the subsequent order is passed regarding
custody then the detention would not be illegal. The Court can
rectify its mistake and transform his illegal imprisonment into
legal imprisonment.
In case of Bal Mukund Jaiswal v. Superintendent,
21.
District Jail, Varanasi ACC 1998 (36) Page 542 it was held : -
“Where an accused person is under judicial custody on the
basis of a valid remand order passed under Sections 209 or
309 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate or by any other competent court
then such accused person can not be set at liberty by issuing
a writ of Habeas Corpus solely on the ground that his initial
detention was violative of Constitutional guarantee enshrined
in Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.”
22. In the aforesaid full Bench case, the earlier
judgements of the Apex Court including the case of Madhu
Limaye were considered.
In view of the fact of this case and considering the
23.
facts and circumstances in case of Madhu Limaye , the
judgment of the Apex Court in that case is not applicable in
the present case. When Madhu Limaye was arrested there was
34
no FIR in existence, he was not wanted in any cognizable and
non bailable offence. There was no warrant of arrest. He was a
Member of Parliament. Proceeding was initiated under Section
107 Cr.P.C. under that section the Magistrate can require a
person to show cause why he should not be ordered to
execute a bond for a period not exceeding one year for keeping
peace. Under Section 117 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate can make an
enquiry regarding the correctness of an information. In the
present case, petitioner was named in the FIR, raid was
conducted for his arrest and subsequently, he was arrested.
There was information to the petitioner and after his arrest his
son was also informed. Apart from that custody warrant was
issued and signed by the C.J.M. and subsequent date for
appearance was mentioned. It may be advisable and
appropriate to pass remand order on order sheet, for record,
but since there is valid custody warrant hence custody is
legal.”
55. In the instant case, the petitioners/applicants were
remanded to custody till 06.06.2026. That day was declared a
holiday. 07.06.2026 was Sunday. On 08.06.2026, the custody
warrants were signed, but there was no remand order as such.
But, thereafter, on 12.06.2026, valid remand order was passed.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the custody is illegal. In view of
the law as laid down in the cases of Naranjan Singh Nathawan
( supra ), Pranab Chatterjee ( supra ) and Kripanand Pandey ( supra ),
if there had been any irregularity in the previous remand order,
that is curable, which has been done in this case. Therefore, on
this ground also, the petitioners/applicants are not entitled to bail.
56. Learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants submit
that the petitioners/applicants are in custody for long. On behalf of
the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh, it is argued that he has
already undergone custody in United States’ court for 60 months
and the instant case is a continuation of the United States’ case
and in the present case also, the petitioner/applicant Banmeet
Singh is in custody for more than two years five months now; there
are more than 60 witnesses; the case is yet at the stage of
35
cognizance and the custody may not be penal. Learned counsel
submits that the petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh has not been
supplied with the documents; on mere suspicion, he is in jail;
hence, he is entitled to bail. It is also argued that it is merely
suspicion of the Directorate of Enforcement that the
petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh is in possession of Bitcoins
and he can transfer them. It is argued that for transferring of
Bitcoins, physical presence is not required. The Bitcoins, which
are allegedly in the control of the petitioner/applicant Banmeet
Singh have not been moved since 2017, therefore, there is no risk
of tampering with the evidence; hence, the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh is entitled to bail on the ground of delay and
otherwise also.
57. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/applicant
Parvinder Singh submits that unlike the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh, the petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh is not
convicted in any offence; he is in custody for a long now; there is
no case against him for the offences under the Narcotics Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, hence, he is entitled to
bail.
58. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the
Directorate of Enforcement submits that in order to grant bail, the
conditions given under the PMLA, 2002 under Section 45 of the
Act need to be complied with. He also submits that despite the
provisional attachment order, the actual possession and control of
the attached Bitcoins are yet to be secured; 4250 Bitcoins forming
part of the proceeds of crime are yet in the hands of the
petitioners/applicants. He would submit that delay cannot be
36
applied mechanically for grant of bail.
59. Except statutory provisions, there is no rule that after
which time, a trial may be considered as a delayed trial, which may
entitle an accused to bail. Instant case is related to trafficking and
laundering of proceeds of crime, which has transnational
ramifications. As per the Directorate of Enforcement, the
petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh has transferred 4250 Bitcoins
to the petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh, in India. The
Directorate of Enforcement records that huge foreign currency was
remitted in the account of the petitioner/applicant Parvinder
Singh. Admittedly both the petitioners/applicants have
surrendered Bitcoins. The petitioner/applicant Banmeet Singh had
surrendered in the USA and stated that 4250 Bitcoins have been
given to the petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh. The
petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh has also surrendered certain
Bitcoins to the Directorate of Enforcement. Considering all these
aspects, this Court is of the view that the period of custody, which
the petitioners/applicants have undergone in the instant case,
respectively, may not entitle them to bail.
60. Having considered the entirety of facts, this Court is of
the view that there are no grounds to make any interference with
the order dated 12.06.2026 passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 28
of 2024, Directorate of Enforcement v. Parvinder Singh, as well as
the order dated 12.06.2026 passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 29
of 2024, Directorate of Enforcement v. Banmeet Singh, by the
st
court of 1 Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, PMLA,
Dehradun. Accordingly, the C-528 Nos. 1355 of 2026 and C-528
No. 1400 of 2026 deserve to be dismissed.
37
61. Further, in view of the discussion made above, this
Court is also of the view that there are no grounds to release the
petitioners/applicants on bail. Consequently, Third Bail
Application No. 30 of 2026 filed by the petitioner/applicant
Banmeet Singh and First Bail Application No. 1825 of 2025 filed by
the petitioner/applicant Parvinder Singh deserve to be rejected.
62. The C-528 No. 1355 of 2026 and C-528 No. 1400 of
2026 are dismissed.
63. The Third Bail Application No. 30 of 2026 and the First
Bail Application No. 1825 of 2025 are rejected.
(Ravindra Maithani, J.)
17.11.2026
Avneet/