Rani Gupta vs Surinder Kumar & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~16
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 05.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010347402025
+ RC.REV. 175/2025
RANI GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Avinash Kr. Lakhanpal,
Mr. Piyush Lakhanpal, Mr.
Dhiraj Kumar and Ms. Vanshita
Lakhanpal, Advocates
versus
SURINDER KUMAR & ORS. .....Respondents
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
CM APPL. 51792/2026 (Delay of 173 days in filing the written
submissions)
1. The present Application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963, seeks condonation of delay of 173 days in filing the written
submissions by the Petitioner.
2. For the sufficient reasons stated in the Application, the delay is
condoned.
3. The written submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant/
Petitioner are taken on record.
4. The Application stands disposed of.
RC.REV. 175/2025
5. The present Revision Petition has been instituted under the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“ DRC
Act ”], assailing the Judgment/Order dated 01.04.2025 [“ Impugned
Order ”] passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller-01, Central
District, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi [“ learned ARC ”], in ARC No.
221/2024 .
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner would
submit that the learned ARC has gravely erred in granting leave to
defend on the premise that triable issues arose with respect to the
availability of alternate suitable accommodation and the bona fide
requirement of the Petitioner. It is contended that a bare perusal of the
averments made in the Eviction Petition, read in conjunction with the
Reply filed to the Application seeking leave to defend, would
demonstrate that no triable issue warranting a full-fledged trial had
arisen and that the learned ARC was, therefore, unjustified in
permitting the matter to proceed to trial.
7. No other grounds have been urged by the learned counsel for
the Petitioner.
ANALYSIS:
8. This Court has heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Petitioner at length, and, with his able assistance, perused the
relevant documents as well as the Impugned Order.
9. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
10. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
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BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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1
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
2 3
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
11. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
4
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
5
Grover .
12. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
1
(1998) 8 SCC 119
2
(2014) 9 SCC 78
3
(2022) 6 SCC 30
4
2024:DHC:9322
5
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
13. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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jurisdiction may be warranted.
15. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined. In
this backdrop, it would be apposite for this Court to extract the
relevant portion of the Impugned Order, which reads as under:
“ BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND NON AVAILABILITY
OF ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION
10. As far as the bonafide requirement and non availability of
accommodation is concerned, the said issues being inter connected
are taken up together. It is pertinent to note here the judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, Civil
Appeal No. 9444 of 2016 where it was stated by the Hon'ble court
that requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is
no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there
has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement
being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably
suitable residential accommodation. Further, such reasonableness
along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the
landlord and not the tenant.
12. Next, it is contended that alternative accommodation is
available in (1) property bearing no. 2207, Kinari Bazar, Chandni
Chowk, Delhi-06: (ii) property bearing no. 2195-1/2 and 2196,
Kinari Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-06; (iii) property bearing no.
1653, Kinari Bazar, Chandni Chowk. Delhi-06; (iv) property
bearing no. G-81 & 82, V3S Mall, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi and (v) G-
36, V3S Mall, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi. In MM Quasim vs/ Manohar
Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court has that the landlord
does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely
showing that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his
possession may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim if
the vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he
required the premises.
13. As far as shop bearing no. G-36, V3S Mall is concerned, it is
admitted position that the said shop is under the occupation of a
tenant and therefore, it cannot be stated to be vacant and available
to the petitioner for the bonafide need. Further, with respect to
property bearing no. 2195-1/2 and 2196, Kinari Bazar, Chandni
Chowk, Delhi-06, it is pleaded by the respondents itself that the
husband of the petitioner and her two sons are running business of
M/s Fancy Lace Collection from the said premises. Therefore the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
15:58:17
said property also cannot be held to be suitable alternative and
available to the petitioner. With respect to property bearing no.
2207, Kinari Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-06 and 1653, Kinari
Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-06, It is not in dispute that the said
properties are not on the ground floor. It is pertinerit to note that
the tenanted premises are on ground floor. Hon'ble Apex Court in
Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC
503, where it was held that it is not for the Courts to say that the
landlord should shift to the first floor or any higher floor as it is
well known that shops and businesses are usually conducted on the
ground floor, because the customers can reach there easily. Thus,
the Court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use
for his business and that is for the landlord himself to decide. Even
otherwise, it is a well known fact that a ground floor premises is
more suitable for commercial purpose than the first floor premises
as it has more footfall of the customers. Further, it has been held by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahabhar Productions
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera Kumar Tandon 72 (1998) DLT 629 that the
landlord is not disentitled from seeking recovery of the possession
of a ground floor merely on the plea that he is also in possession of
first floor and second floor so long as the court is satisfied with
respect to the bonafide requirement of the landlord for the tenanted
premises. 14. With respect to property bearing no. G-81 & 82, V3S
Mall, Lomi Nagar, Delhi, it is admitted by the respondents that the
said property, though, owned by the petitioner and her daughter-in-
law but they are not the sole owners. As per the sale deed filed by
the respondents themselves, the property is jointly owned by many
persons and therefore cannot be compared with the tenanted
portion of which the petitioner is the absolute owner. Further, the
said shops are not vacant and under the occupation of tenant
Arvind Lifestyle Brands and the Deed of Confirmation of the
landlord-tenant relationship in this regard has been filed by the
petitioner with the reply. Therefore, the said property also cannot
be said to be vacant and available to the petitioner for the projected
bonafide need.
15. Next, it is contended that the petitioner has alternative
accommodation available in the subject premises itself on the
ground floor in the form of shop no. 2201. It is stated that the said
shop is vacant and lying closed and the respondents have also filed
photographs in this regard with leave to defend application. Per
Contra, It is contended by the petitioner that the business of firm
Mis Fancy Lace Collection ie. partnership firm of the petitioner
and her sons is being carried out from the said shop. Additionally,
it is argued that the shop cannot be kept open all the time and the
respondents have deliberately taken the photograph of the said
shop when the petitioner or her family members were on lunch or
not available due to some other ground. Further, copy of the GST
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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certificate of the said firm has also been filed to show that the said
shop is already occupied and business is being run from the said
shop. In rebuttal of the said contention, the respondents have filed
electricity bills of the said shop from April 2023 till 27.09.2024
and additional photographs to contend that the said shop is lying
vacant.
16. Perusal of record shows that as per the electricity bills, which
are not disputed, during the time period of roughly 18 months, the
electricity consumption was only of 11 units. Thus, less than one
electricity unit per month was being consumed during the said
period. The said fact prima facie shows that the shop is not being
used and is lying vacant. Furthermore, the respondents have also
filed photographs to show that even when the shop is open, prima
facie no business thereof is carried out. Moreover, perusal of
record shows that as per the case of petitioner, the firm M's Fancy
Lace Collection is also carrying out business from property bearing
no. 2195-1/2 and 2196, Kinari Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-06.
Perusal of the GST certificate shows that the address of shop no.
2201 is only mentioned as additional address whereas the principal
place of business is mentioned as 2195-1/2 and 2196, Kinari Bazar,
Chandni Chowk, Delhi-06. Here it is pertinent to note that in
Rampar v. Ganga Devi RC (Rev.) No.271/14, it was held by the
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that where a tenant has pleaded that a
shop is lying vacant, a triable issue of alternative suitable
accommodation is made out
17. Further, it is also pertinent to that it is not in dispute that the
husband of the daughter-in-law for whose projected bonafide need,
the present petition has been filed is earning and not financially
dependent upon the petitioner. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer
to the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in RC Revision no.
154/15, Babu Lal ve Mukesh Kumar, 2015 SCC Online Del 12348
whereby it has been observed that questions relating to the
financial dependency of daughter-in-law cannot be decided in a
summary manner, especially when prima facle the
respondents/tenant has been able to raise triable issue. Therefore,
as triable issue qua availability of alternative accommodation has
already been made out, therefore, it is essential that the petitioner
establishes genuine bonafide need and not a mere design or desire
to evict the respondents on the basis of purported requirement of
daughter-in-law when her husband is earning and also having
properties in his name. It is trite to state that while deciding an
application for leave to defend, the court is required to only see if
the facts alleged in the tenant's affidavit are such that, if proved at
the trial if leave is granted, the landlord would be disentitled to
relief claimed, then the Controller must grant leave and proceed to
hold a regular trial. Thus, the test is that if the defence raises triable
issues, leave should be granted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
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BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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"Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh" (2001) 1 SCC 706" held that
"As is evident from Section 25 B (4) & (5) of the Act,
burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the
affidavit filed by him discloses such facts would disentitle
the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of
the possession of the premises on the ground specified in
clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act, with
which we are concerned in this case, are good enough to
grant leave to defend. 18. In this regard, it is also pertinent
to refer to the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of "Precision & Engineering Works Vs. Prema
Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal", (1982) 3 SCC 270, whereby
it is held that the controller is not to record a finding on
disputed questions of facts on the basis of his preference
for one set of affidavit against other set of affidavits Thus,
in the present case, it is only deemed appropriate that
petitioner's projected need be tested at the touch-stone of
evidence/cross-examination
19. In the present case, thus, there is a triable issue with respect to
availability of alternative accommodation and also qua the
bonafide of the petitioner. It is also pertinent to note that the
petitioner/landlord had not disclosed the ownership of other
properties in the same area. Though it is contended that the said
properties were not suitable and/or not available but it is also
undisputed that eviction order cannot be passed straightaway when
details of all the properties in the same is not made by the landlord
Reliance in this regard is placed upon Giri Raj va Sheela Devi,
2014 SCC Online, Del 856. A proceeding under Section 14(1)(e)
read with Section 250 DRCA, being summary in nature, it is
imperative that ample caution is exercised before a tenant is
evicted from the premises. The legislation is enacted for the benefit
of those class of landlords who genuinely require the premises for
their needs and do not have any other accommodation. The
requirement must be sincere and honest and not a pretense to evict
the tenant.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the
Petitioner and examined the reasoning adopted by the learned ARC in
the Impugned Order, this Court finds that the challenge sought to be
raised is essentially directed against the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC that the defences raised by the Respondents warrant a
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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full-fledged trial. The Petitioner, in substance, seeks to persuade this
Court to undertake a fresh examination of the respective pleadings and
the material placed on record, and thereafter arrive at a conclusion
different from the one reached by the learned ARC. Such an exercise,
however, would travel beyond the permissible contours of the
revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act.
17. It is pertinent to note that the learned ARC has not granted leave
to defend in a mechanical or perfunctory manner. On the contrary, a
perusal of the Impugned Order would demonstrate that the learned
ARC has undertaken a detailed examination of the rival contentions
advanced by the parties in respect of the availability of alternative
suitable accommodation as well as the bona fide requirement
projected by the Petitioner. The learned ARC has considered each of
the properties specifically referred to by the Respondents in their
application seeking leave to defend and has recorded reasons as to
why the suitability, availability and nature of occupation of the said
properties require examination. The learned ARC has also considered
the rival stands concerning shop bearing No. 2201, including the
electricity consumption reflected in the bills, the photographs placed
on record, the GST registration certificate and the respective
assertions regarding the nature and extent of business being carried
out from the said premises. Further, the issue concerning the financial
dependency of the daughter-in-law, for whose projected requirement
the eviction petition has been instituted, has also been considered in
the context of the material and judicial precedents relied upon by the
parties.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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18. Thus, the Impugned Order reflects that the learned ARC has
duly applied its mind to the principal defences raised by the
Respondents and has examined whether the same disclose triable
issues which would require adjudication through evidence. The fact
that the learned ARC has ultimately found the said defences to be
deserving of consideration at trial cannot, by itself, furnish a ground
for interference in revisional jurisdiction. It is well settled that, at the
stage of considering an application seeking leave to defend, the Rent
Controller is not required to conclusively determine disputed
questions of fact or undertake a final adjudication of the rival claims
on the basis of competing affidavits and documents. The inquiry at
that stage is confined to examining whether the defence disclosed by
the tenant raises such issues which, if established, may disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. Once the learned ARC,
upon consideration of the material placed before it, has found that
such issues arise, the appropriate course is to permit the parties to lead
evidence and have their respective claims adjudicated in accordance
with law.
19. This Court is, therefore, unable to accept the endeavour of the
Petitioner to re-agitate, in the present proceedings, the very
contentions which have already been noticed, considered and dealt
with by the learned ARC in the Impugned Order. The Petitioner
cannot seek to short-circuit the adjudicatory process by inviting this
Court to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material and substitute
its own assessment for that of the learned ARC, merely with a view to
obviate the necessity of a trial. The grant of leave to defend
necessarily entails that the parties would have to establish their
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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respective assertions through evidence, and the mere fact that the
Petitioner considers the material already available on record to be
sufficient for an order of eviction cannot be a basis to deny the
Respondents an opportunity to substantiate the defences which have
been found to raise triable issues. In other words, the revisional
jurisdiction cannot be employed as a means of preventing the matter
from proceeding to trial, particularly when the learned ARC has
recorded cogent reasons for permitting such adjudication.
20. It is equally significant that the Petitioner has not been able to
demonstrate that the learned ARC has ignored any material
consideration, proceeded on an erroneous proposition of law, or
returned findings which are perverse or manifestly unreasonable. No
specific infirmity in the decision-making process has been pointed out
which would warrant the exercise of the limited supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court. The submissions advanced on behalf of the
Petitioner, at their highest, seek a reconsideration of the merits of the
rival claims and an alternative appreciation of the material already
considered by the learned ARC. Such an exercise is impermissible in
proceedings under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
21. This Court is conscious of the fact that the proceedings
contemplated under Section 25B of the DRC Act are intended to
provide an expeditious remedy to landlords seeking eviction on the
ground of bona fide requirement. However, the summary nature of the
procedure cannot be construed to mean that a tenant must be denied
leave to defend even where the affidavit discloses bona fide and
substantial triable issues. The legislative scheme contemplates a
balance between the expeditious adjudication of eviction proceedings
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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and the necessity of permitting a defence where the statutory threshold
for grant of leave stands satisfied. Therefore, once the learned ARC,
upon examining the pleadings and material placed before it, has found
that the issues concerning alternative accommodation and bona fide
requirement require adjudication through evidence, this Court would
not be justified in interfering with such determination merely because
another view may also be possible.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity in the Impugned
Order warranting interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
The learned ARC has considered the rival contentions in detail and
has furnished adequate reasons for concluding that the Respondents
have raised triable issues requiring adjudication.
23. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the present Petition
and is not inclined to interfere with the Impugned Order.
24. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforementioned terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 5, 2026/rk/va
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:07.11.2026
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