M/S Naman Enterprise vs The State Of Assam And Anr
- Court
- Gauhati High Court
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GAHC010184012026
2026:GAU-AS:16554
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.Pet./1219/2026
M/S NAMAN ENTERPRISE
A PROPRIETORSHIP FIRM HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT WARD NO.
4 KARIM CHOWK, MANGALDAI
R/O BARUA PARA, P.S.AND P.O. MANGALDAI, DISTRICT DARRANG,
ASSAM, PIN-784125. REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR SRI
DHRUBAJYOTEE KASHYAP AGED 49 YEAR) R/O BARUA PARA, P.S. AND
P.O. MANGALDAI, DIST. DARRANG, ASSAM, PIN-784125
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
REPRESENTED BY THE LEARNED PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, ASSAM.
2:M/S GOPI MOHAN DRUG DISTRIBUTOR
A PROPRIETORSHIP FIRM HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT S.C.
GOSWAMI ROAD
PANBAZAR
P.S. AND P.O. PANBAZAR
DISTRICT KAMRUP M
ASSAM
PIN-781001
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR SRI RAJESH KUMAR SIVASARIA
BEFORE
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SHAMIMA JAHAN
Advocate for the petitioner(s) : Mr. W. Raja
Advocate for the respondent(s): Mr. M P Goswami, APP Assam
Mr. M Agarwalla, R-2
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Date on which judgment was reserved : NA
Date of pronouncement of judgment : 11.11.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the : NA
operative part of the judgment?
Whether the full judgment has been : Yes
pronounced?
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. W Raja, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M P
Goswami, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Assam. Also
heard Mr. M Agarwalla, learned counsel representing the respondent No. 2.
2. By this application filed under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, the
petitioner has prayed for setting aside of the complaint case being NI Case No.
412 of 2025 as well as the Order dated 16.10.2025, passed by the Judicial
Magistrate First Class-2, Kamrup (Metro) in the said NI Case, by which
cognizance of the offence was taken under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881 (here-in-after referred to as “the Act”) against the
petitioner along with the order dated 24.07.2026, by which bailable warrant of
arrest was issued against the petitioner.
3. The case of the petitioner is that a complaint was filed by the respondent
No. 2, wherein it was stated, inter alia, that the complainant firm carries on the
wholesale business of sales, distribution of medicines and surgical items and
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that that the petitioner is a proprietorship concern, which also carries on the
business of sales and distribution of medicines and surgical items. It is further
stated that the complainant had a business relationship with the petitioner and
had been supplying products to the petitioner since long back on credit basis, as
per the orders placed by the petitioner on different dates and that the petitioner
had been making payment for all the goods, that the complainant provides to
them. It is the further case of the petitioner that during the said transaction, an
amount of Rs. 75,650/- remained unpaid and that the petitioner had assured
the complainant that he will make the payment. The complainant further stated
that in discharge of such a lawful dues, the petitioner had issued one cheque
bearing Cheque No. 623718 on 04.12.2024, for Rs. 75,650/- drawn on the
Allahabad Bank, Mangaldoi Branch. The complainant thereafter stated that he
deposited the said cheque in the bank account maintained by the complainant
in the HDFC Bank and the same was dishonoured and was returned by the Bank
showing the reason as “ Bank merged” and the fact of dishonour of the said
cheque was communicated to the complainant by the Bank. Subsequent
thereto, the complainant stated that he served a legal notice on 26.12.2024,
intimating the petitioner about the dishonour of the cheque and demanded
payment within a period of 15 days. However, the complainant stated that
neither acknowledgement card nor unserved notice was received back, but he
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stated that the notice was received by the petitioner on 30.12.2024, as it
appeared from the track consignment report. The complainant thereafter, stated
that since the petitioner failed to make the payment within a period of 15 days,
the case under the Act, was filed before the Court of learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kamrup (Metro) which was registered as NI Case No. 412 of 2025. It
is further stated that the learned Court had taken cognizance of offence vide
order dated 16.10.2025, and by order dated 24.07.2026, bailable warrant of
arrest has been issued against the petitioner.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the cheque that is
alleged to have been issued by the petitioner towards discharge of his legally
enforceable debt, is not for the same and that the said cheque was issued by
the petitioner many years before the alleged transaction. He submits that the
said cheque was issued as a security cheque during the business transaction
between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2. He further submits that he
has no legally enforceable debt towards the respondent as he had made all the
payments, required to be made to the respondent No. 2, in due time with
regard to the transactions. He further submitted that the cheque which has
been returned by the Bank on the ground of merger of bank, cannot be
considered as a valid cheque, and the same will also not entail prosecution
under Section 138 of the Act. To substantiate his argument, he placed a
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judgment of the Allahabad High Court passed in Smti. Archana Singh
Gautam vs. State of U.P , delivered on 05.06.2024, in application u/s 482 No.
9536 of 2024, by which the Allahabad High Court had categorically stated that
after the merger of the Allahabad Bank into the Indian Bank on 01.04.2020, any
cheque of Allahabad Bank is to be considered as invalid. It is also held that
presentation of such a cheque, which is not valid before the Indian Bank, after
the merger, will not attract liability under Section 138 of the Act, as per the
proviso (a) of
Section 138 of the said Act. He further submits that admittedly there was an
th
amalgamation of Allahabad Bank into Indian Bank, on 4 of March, 2020,
issued by the Government of India, and it was further provided that all branches
st
of Allahabad Bank will function as branches of Indian Bank from 1 of April,
2020. He, as such submits that the cheque purportedly shown to have been
issued in the year 2024, is an invalid cheque and the same will not entail any
proceedings under the Act.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.
2 submits that the petitioner had issued the cheque in discharge of his legally
enforceable debt, towards the respondent No. 2, on 04.12.2024, for an amount
of Rs. 75,650/-. He further submits that the issue of merger of Bank has been
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considered by a number of High Courts of the country and there are divergent
view with regard to the same. He, however, submits that the petitioner has an
enforceable debt towards respondent No. 2, which he is legally bound to meet.
6. I have heard the learned counsels and I have carefully gone through the
records.
7. It is a well-settled proposition that High Court, while exercising power
under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1972, which is now Section 528
of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), is empowered to quash the
criminal proceedings or complaint, in cases where it is satisfied that no prima
facie offence is made out. It is also in cases where the High Court arrives at a
conclusion that proceedings sought to be quashed, if permitted to sustain would
amount to sheer abuse of the process of law and it is likely to fail in all
probabilities, it can exercise power under Section 528 of BNSS, and quash the
FIR, criminal proceedings as well as complaint. In the judgment passed by the
three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka, vs. L.
Muniswamy and others , reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 , it was held that
High Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC, is entitled to quash
the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
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justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
8. Further in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others ,
reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, while
elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash
criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC, laid down certain principles
governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. The observations
are as follows: -
8.1. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised:
(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused;
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(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code;
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and
the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence
but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
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where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge.
9. By keeping the aforesaid guidelines into account, this Court will now
examine as to whether the present case can be quashed vis-a vis the factual
matrix of the same.
10. In the instant case, the complainant had stated in clear terms that during
the business transaction carried on between the petitioner and the respondent
No. 2, the petitioner did not pay an amount of Rs. 75,650/- to the complainant
and it is also seen that the cheque was issued on 04.12.2024 by the petitioner
for the said amount. However, the authenticity of the said cheque was disputed
by the petitioner on the ground that one cheque was issued to Respondent No.
2 as a security cheque many years before, which according to the petitioner has
been used by the complainant for ulterior motive.
11. The main argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
under proviso to Section 138 of the Act, the conditions are enumerated therein,
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under which a case will lie under the said Section. To ascertain the correctness
of the aforesaid plea, this Court would like to take note of Section 138 of the
Act, which reads as under:-
“ 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.--
Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him
with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt
or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the
amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid
from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person
shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without
prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with
fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a)the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six
months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
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(b)the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may
be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by
giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days
of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of
the cheque as unpaid; and
(c)the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said
amount . of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in
due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said
notice.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability"
means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.]”
12. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision of law reveals that where any
cheque drawn by a person, on an account maintained by him for payment to
another person, towards discharge of his lawful liability, is returned by the Bank
unpaid because of insufficiency of funds or it exceeds the amount agreed to be
paid from that account, by an agreement, it shall be deemed that the person
drawing the cheque has committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act.
13. The question which needs to be determined in the present case is whether
reasons, other than the reasons, detailed under Section 138 of the Act, assigned
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by the Bank, while returning the cheque can be a ground for filing complaint
under Section 138 of the Act. This question has been aptly answered by the
Apex Court in Laxmi Dyechem vs. State of Gujarat ; reported in (2012) 13
SCC 375. It has been held that the expression “insufficiency of fund” or “the
amount in excess” has been described as the genus and dishonour of the
cheque for reasons such as account closed, payment stopped, signature did not
match etc. are only species of that genus. The Apex Court had observed in the
following terms:-
15. The above line of decisions leaves no room for holding that the two
contingencies envisaged under Section 138 of the Act must be interpreted strictly or
literally. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the decision in NEPC Micon
Ltd. (supra) that the expression "amount of money is insufficient" appearing in Section
138 of the Act is a genus and dishonour for reasons such "as account closed",
"payment stopped", "referred to the drawer" are only species of that genus. Just as
dishonour of a cheque on the ground that the account has been closed is a dishonour
falling in the first contingency referred to in Section 138, so also dishonour on the
ground that the "signatures do not match" or that the "image is not found", which too
implies that the specimen signatures do not match the signatures on the cheque
would constitute a dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 of the Act. This Court
has in the decisions referred to above taken note of situations and contingencies
arising out of deliberate acts of omission or commission on the part of the drawers of
the cheques which would inevitably result in the dishonour of the cheque issued by
them. For instance this Court has held that if after issue of the cheque the drawer
closes the account it must be presumed that the amount in the account was nil hence
insufficient to meet the demand of the cheque. A similar result can be brought about
by the drawer changing his specimen signature given to the bank or in the case of a
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company by the company changing the mandate of those authorised to sign the
cheques on its behalf. Such changes or alteration in the mandate may be dishonest or
fraudulent and that would inevitably result in dishonour of all cheques signed by the
previously authorised signatories. There is in our view no qualitative difference
between a situation where the dishonour takes place on account of the substitution by
a new set of authorised signatories resulting in the dishonour of the cheques already
issued and another situation in which the of drawer of the cheque changes his own
signatures or closes the account or issues instructions to the bank not to make the
payment. So long as the change is brought about with a view to preventing the
cheque being honoured, the dishonour would become an offence under Section 138
subject to other conditions prescribed being satisfied. There may indeed be situations
where a mismatch between the signatories on the cheque drawn by the drawer and
the specimen available with the bank may result in dishonour of the cheque even
when the drawer never intended to invite such a dishonour. We are also conscious of
the fact that an authorised signatory may in the ordinary course of business be
replaced by a new signatory ending the earlier mandate to the bank. Dishonour on
account of such changes that may occur in the course of ordinary business of a
company, partnership or an individual may not constitute an offence by itself because
such a dishonour in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 shall have to be
preceded by a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon and has the
opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque. It is only
when the drawer despite receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make
the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount
that the dishonour would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence
punishable. Even in such cases, the question whether or not there was a lawfully
recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued would be a
matter that the trial Court will examine having regard to the evidence adduced before
it and keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration.”
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14.
The Bombay High Court in its decision in the case of Chetan Sunderji
Bhanushali and Others vs. Hema Ramesh Chheda ; reported in
MANU/MH/1187/2026, had held that no straitjacket formula can be applied
to conclude that an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, is not made out
solely because the cheque appeared to have been presented after the original
drawee bank ceased to exist and it is also held that proceeding under Section
138 of the NI Act cannot be quashed merely because, a cheque was presented
after structural changes, such as, merger or acquisition of the drawee bank. The
observations made by the Bombay High Court are as follows:-
40. The conspectus of aforesaid consideration is that, though the expression 'within
“
the period of its validity' used in the later part of the clause (a) of the proviso to
Section 138 of the N. I. Act, 1881, is elastic enough to cover in its fold a case where
the validity of the cheque, is affected by the factors like acquisition by or merger with
another bank, despite the validity period specifically mentioned on the cheque not
having come to an end, yet, the attendant circumstances bear upon the question
whether the cheque has been presented within its validity period. In cases where
despite the original drawee bank having ceased to be 'the bank' within the meaning of
clause (a) of the said proviso the cheque is returned un-encashed with the remarks
"insufficiency of funds" and the like, the investigation into facts becomes necessary,
and the question whether the drawee bank could have honoured the cheque as it was
rendered invalid, would warrant adjudication at the trial. Whereas, in cases where the
cheque has been returned with the remarks, 'invalid' or 'presented on the successor
bank after the period of the validity of the cheque' and the like, compliance of clause
(a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the N. I. Act, 1881, in the matter of presentation
of the cheque within the validity period, could be examined by the Court, in the light
of the attendant facts and circumstances of the case. No straight- jacket formula that,
since the cheque appeared to have been presented after expiry of the period of
validity of the cheque drawn on the erstwhile drawee bank, no offence punishable
under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, is made out, can be adopted.”
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15. In similar facts and circumstances, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
th
in Surjit Kumar vs. Sunil Kumar Dalmia, delivered on 9 of October, 2023
in CRM-M No. 51125 of 2023, had held that once it is not in dispute that cheque
was issued towards discharge of lawful liability, mere fact that cheque was
returned unpaid on account of the fact that erstwhile State Bank of Patiala
merged with State Bank of India, cannot be deduced that case will not lie under
Section 138 of the Act and further as to whether the cheque has been issued by
the accused person is proper or not, is a question of trial, which has to be
adjudicated by the trial Court.
16. In yet another decision decided by Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Balkour Singh vs State of Punjab and Others, delivered on 05.12.2023 in
CRM-M No. 36565 of 2019, similar facts and circumstances were placed and the
relevant observations are quoted hereinbelow:-
“ 11. Another argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner that
the return memo dated 18.12.2018 with remarks 'account closed' was
obtained by the respondent No.2 in an illegal and unjust manner, as the
cheque issued was of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, which bank
was merged with State Bank of India and on such merger, the cheques
issued by the erstwhile State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur were declared
invalid by the Reserve Bank of of India w.e.f. 30.06.2018. The dishonour
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of cheque with remarks 'account closed' would certainly be an offence
under Section 138 of the NI Act as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd., (1999) 4 SCC 253.
Further, invalidation of the cheque on account of merger with another
bank would be a disputed question of fact and would be a probable
defence that the petitioner is free to take before the trial Court. This Court
cannot negate the complainant's case without allowing the complainant to
lead evidence while exercising its discretionary power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. Furthermore, it is also a disputed question of fact whether the
respondent No.3 kept the cheque of the petitioner with him or the
petitioner himself gave the alleged invalid cheque, which was dishonoured
on presentation by respondent No.2. Therefore, at this nascent/pre-trial
stage, this Court cannot delve upon the disputed question of fact under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., without giving an opportunity to the respondent No.2-
complainant to lead evidence in rebuttal.”
17. In the present case, since the cheque allegedly issued by the petitioner towards
discharge of lawful liability as stated by the complainant was returned unpaid by the
Indian Bank on the ground of merger, it cannot be presumed that the complainant was
aware of the legal or contractual consequences flowing from the merger of Allahabad
Bank with the Indian Bank. The complainant could not be reasonably expected to know
that cheques issued by Account holders of the erstwhile Allahabad Bank, had become
invalid after the merger and that the Indian Bank was under no obligation to honour such
cheques. These are matters lying within the exclusive knowledge of the concerned
banking institutions and cannot, by themselves, be a ground for a bar to a suit under
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Section 138 of the Act.
18. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner had shown the ledger
account of the petitioner, by which he endeavored to show that he had no
legally enforceable debt against the respondent No. 2, but the same is disputed
by the respondent No. 2 and when there are disputed facts, this Court normally
cannot go into the same, as the same has been a settled position of law.
Further, the question as to whether there was a lawfully recoverable debt from
the petitioner or as to whether the cheque was issued by the petitioner in
discharge of his liability towards the complainant or as to whether the said
cheque was issued as a security cheque wayback to the complainant are
matters that the Trial Court will examine, by taking into account, the evidence
adduced before it and also by keeping in view the statutory presumption that
the cheque will be considered to have been given for valid consideration unless
rebutted by the petitioner.
19. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, this Court, as such, is not inclined
to interfere with the complaint case, being NI Case No. 412 of 2025, filed by the
respondent No. 2 as well as the order dated 16.10.2025, by which cognizance of
offence was taken by the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamrup (M)
under Section 138 of the Act against the petitioner.
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20. As such, the criminal petition is dismissed and disposed of.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant