Dayanand Pal vs Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Bhati & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 30.09.2026
Date of Decision: 29.10.2026
Date of Uploading: 29.10.2026
+ CM(M) 474/2025 & CM APPL. 69889/2025
DAYANAND PAL .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Siddhartha Yadav,
Ms. Ishita Yadav and
Mr. Deepak Kumar Mishra,
Advs.
versus
MR. DHARMENDRA KUMAR BHATI & ORS.
....Respondents
Through: Ms. Nandni Sahni, Adv. for
R-1&2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
J U D G M E N T
%
1. Through the present petition, the petitioner is assailing the order
dated 28.10.2024 passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial
1
Court-02), Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in OMP (COMM.) No.
18/2024 titled as ‘Dharmendra Kumar Bhati & Anr. v. Dayanand Pal
& Anr.’ , whereby respondents no. 1 & 2’s appeal, filed under Section
2
37(2)(b) of the Indian Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 ,
challenging the order dated 06.09.2022, passed by the learned Sole
Arbitrator in Arbitration Reference No. DIAC/2653/12-19 titled
‘Dayanand Pal v. Dharmender Kumar Bhati & Ors.’ , came to be
1
hereinafter “the learned Appellate Court”
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 1 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
partly allowed.
2. The relevant facts which led to filing of the present petition are
that respondents no. 1 & 2’s appeal arose from a partnership dispute
concerning M/s Alwin DMD Pharmaceuticals. The petitioner, and
respondents no. 1 & 2 entered into a partnership agreement dated
05.04.2013 for manufacturing, and trading of human/animal health-
related goods. Soon thereafter, respondent no. 3 entered into a
partnership agreement with the aforesaid parties through a
supplementary partnership deed dated 11.07.2017.
3. It is the case of the respondents that during the course of
business, the petitioner purportedly, inter alia , misappropriated Rs.
38,00,000/- from the firm for personal gain, and committed breach of
the terms of the partnership deed dated 05.04.2013, by starting a
competing proprietorship, namely M/s Jai Maa Pharma on 23.08.2016.
It is also stated that vide notice dated 21.12.2017, the petitioner sought
to retire from the partnership in view of the differences that had arisen
with the respondents.
4. The petitioner, however, contested the aforesaid position taken
by the respondents, and stated that the respondents through a forged
and fabricated letter dated 09.02.2018, illegally expelled the petitioner
from the partnership firm. It is the stand of the petitioner neither did
the petitioner resign from the partnership firm, nor was he expelled by
the respondents vide letter dated 09.02.2018, or any other date
thereafter.
5. As the aforesaid disputes arose between the parties, the
petitioner invoked the arbitration clauses i.e., Clause 19 of the
2
hereinafter “ the Arbitration Act”
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 2 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
partnership deed dated 05.04.2013, and Clauses 17 and 22 of the
supplementary partnership deed dated 11.07.2017 vide notice dated
05.04.2019, which was replied to by the respondents no. 1 & 2 on
24.04.2019.
6. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court for appointment
of arbitrator by way of filing an application under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration Act, bearing A.R.B.P No. 632/2019 titled as ‘Dayanand
Pal v. Dharmender Kumar Bhat & Ors.’ , which came to be allowed
vide order dated 29.11.2019.
7. Subsequently, the petitioner filed the statement of claim dated
28.01.2020, seeking, inter alia , permanent injunction to restrain
respondents no. 1 and 2 from manufacturing or producing any
products in the name of the partnership firm, declaration that the
alleged expulsion of the petitioner from the partnership firm by the
respondents was illegal and that the petitioner continues to be partner
in the firm, dissolution of the partnership firm, and payment of his due
share on settlement of accounts, along with 18 % interest per annum ,
against the respondents no. 1 & 2, who subsequently addressed their
rival contentions by filing the written statement dated 22.02.2020.
8. In the interregnum , the petitioner preferred an application under
Section 17 of the Arbitration Act read with Rule 15(1) of the DIAC
(Arbitration Proceeding Rules), 2018 before the learned Sole
Arbitrator, seeking ad-interim ex-parte injunction to restrain
respondents no. 1 & 2 from manufacturing or selling any products in
the name of Alwin DMD Pharmaceuticals, and using or exploiting the
goodwill of the said firm, till the final disposal of the arbitration
proceedings.
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 3 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
9. The learned Sole Arbitrator vide order dated 06.09.2022,
disposed of petitioner’s aforesaid application, and held that the interim
reliefs sought by the petitioner can only be adjudicated at the
appropriate stage after appreciating the evidence led by the parties.
However, in order to protect the interest of the petitioner in the
partnership business, and in the event the reliefs claimed by the
petitioner in his statement of claim dated 28.01.2020 are subsequently
granted after adjudication on the merits of the case, the learned Sole
Arbitrator issued the following direction to respondents no. 1 & 2:
“In the circumstances and in order to secure the partnership interest
of the Claimant, it is hereby directed that the Respondents No. 1&2
shall file on record by way of affidavits, the business transactions
carried out by them along with document in support of the same,
for alleged continuous use of name of the firm, new firm or
proprietorship concern using the firm name as Alwin DMD
Pharmaceuticals and profits earned therefrom with effect from
14.11.17 till the date of this decision by 10.10.22 and continue to
file the record of the said transactions on 10th day of every
subsequent month, tiil the disposal of these arbitration proceedings
and if the 10th day happens to be a holiday or leave then on the
following day. It is clarified 'Business transactions' regarding
which affidavits are to be filed, include transactions in the bank
accounts in the name of the said firm and also the profit and loss
account of the firm submitted with the Tax Authorities.
If the Respondent No. 1 & 2 fail to file the said affidavits as
directed above, they may be restrained from using the said firm
name in any manner whatsoever and in any capacity such as
continuing firm, new firm or proprietorship concern, by an
appropriate order to be passed in this regard.”
10. Aggrieved by the order dated 06.09.2022, respondents no. 1 & 2
preferred the underlying appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the
Arbitration Act before the learned Appellate Court.
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 4 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
11. The learned Appellate Court, vide the impugned order dated
28.10.2024, recorded the submissions made on behalf of the parties
and partially allowed the aforesaid appeal. It upheld the findings of the
learned Sole Arbitrator insofar as it required respondents no. 1 & 2 to
disclose, by way of an affidavit, business transactions and relevant
records up to 05.04.2019 i.e., the period preceding the petitioner’s
invocation of the arbitration clauses vide notice dated 05.04.2019.
However, the learned Appellate Court set aside the direction requiring
respondents no. 1 & 2 to file affidavits for the period from 06.04.2019
onwards, on the ground that a direction to disclose documents for the
period during the subsistence of the arbitral proceedings exceeded the
scope of relief sought by the petitioner, who had not himself sought
rendition of accounts till the final disposal of the arbitral proceedings,
and was accordingly, beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Sole
Arbitrator.
12. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 28.10.2024, the
petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court by
filing the present petition under Article 277 of the Constitution of
India.
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits
that the learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the direction
requiring disclosure of business transactions from 06.04.2019 onwards
was passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator in excess of its jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate
that the petitioner had categorically sought rendition of accounts and
production of the partnership firm’s account books, among other
reliefs, by way of the prayers (f) and (g) of his statement of claims
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 5 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
dated 28.01.2020. The aforesaid prayers are produced herein below:
“(f) pass an award in favour of the claimant and against the
respondent nos. 1 & 2 thereby directing them to render accounts
and produce all accounts books, Order, vouchers, export
documents and all other ddcuments of the Partnership Firm namely
'Alwin DMD Pharmaceuticals';
(g) pass an award in favour of the claimant and against the
respondent nos. 1 & 2 thereby directing them to render accounts
and produce all accounts books, Order, vouchers, export
documents of the firm( s) created by them later on pursuant to
14/11/2017 by executing partnership deeds dated 24/01/2018,
23/04/2018 and/or other deeds bearing identical name i.e. 'Alwin
DMD Pharmaceuticals';”
14. It is further submitted that the learned Appellate Court, although
itself observed that the learned Sole Arbitrator is vested with ample
power under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act to pass interim
directions, nonetheless interfered with a well-reasoned interim
measure granted by the learned Sole Arbitrator vide order dated
06.09.2022. It is argued that such intervention is contrary to the settled
position of law, as laid down by the judgment of this Court in
3
‘Dinesh Gupta and Ors. v. Anand Gupta and Ors.’ , wherein it was
held that the appellate court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37
of the Arbitration Act, does not ordinarily disturb the interim
measures granted by the Arbitral Tribunal in exercise of its own
discretionary powers. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads
thus:
“ 84. Having said that, it is indisputable that the exercise of
jurisdiction, by the arbitrator, under Section 17, is fundamentally
discretionary in nature-as contrasted with Section 16(2) and (3).
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 6 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
Judicial interference, with the exercise of discretionary power, is,
classically, limited, and is even more circumscribed, where the
authority exercising discretion is itself a judicial authority-as
opposed to a purely administrative or executive functionary. (One
uses the expression "judicial authority", here, to denote the nature
rather than the status of the jurisdiction exercised by the Arbitrator,
it having been settled, by the Supreme Court, in M.D., Army
Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd.
MANU/SC/0797/2003 : (2004) 9 SCC 619, that an arbitrator is not
a "Court", and does not exercise judicial functions.) Discretionary
orders passed by arbitral tribunals have, therefore, to be handled
with kid gloves, and protected from injury by any over-zealous
administration, by the court, of the law as it perceives it to be. If
anything, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court, under Section
37(2)(b), is even more limited than the jurisdiction that it exercises
under Section 37(2)(a) or, for that matter, under Section 34. The
discretionary jurisdiction, as exercised by the arbitrator, merits
interference, under Section 37(2)(b), therefore, only where such
exercise is palpably arbitrary or unconscionable.”
15. Similarly, petitioner places reliance on the ratios of the
judgments pronounced in Bluefire Infotax Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. &
4
Ors. vs. ANS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. , Databit Technologies Pvt. Ltd. &
5
Ors. vs. Red Fort Capital Finance Company Pvt. Ltd. , and AMR-
6
BBB Consortium vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. , to reiterate that the
power of the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act
is a discretionary one, exercised to balance the equities between the
parties, and that an appellate court is not expected to substitute its own
discretion for that of the arbitrator. It is contended that judicial
interference with such an order is permissible only where the order is
completely perverse, and the perversity is apparent on the face of the
3
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2099
4
2025:DHC:1571
5
2026 SCC OnLine Del 284
6
2024:DHC:8538
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 7 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
order.
16. It is therefore submitted that interference of this Court is
warranted in the present case to set aside the impugned order dated
28.10.2024. Reliance is placed on ‘ Deep Industries Ltd. v. Oil and
7
Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. and another’ , wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court while dealing with the question relating to High
Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India when it comes to matters that are decided under Arbitration Act,
observed as follows:
“ 16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause contained in
Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration
Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided
in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal
against certain judgments and orders and no others. Further, the
statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the cherry, and
interdicts a second appeal being filed [see Section 37(2) of the
Act].
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if
petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the
entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to
fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that
Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched
by the non obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these
circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions
can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or
dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High
Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the
same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us
hereinabove so that interference is restricted to orders that are
passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.”
7
(2020) 15 SCC 706
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 8 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
17. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents
no. 1 & 2, contends that the present petition ought to be dismissed on
the ground of maintainability alone. It is submitted that the Arbitration
Act is a self-contained code under which the Section 5 and Section
37(3) bar the right of second appeal. It is therefore contended that the
present petition is not maintainable to question the impugned order
dated 28.10.2024 of the learned Appellate Court, passed under Section
37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act.
18. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgments of the
8
Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. ,
‘Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar
9
Narmada Nigam Ltd. , and ‘Lalit Kumar v. Sanghavi v. Dharamdas
10
v. Sanghavi and Others’ , wherein it was held that the supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution should
not be invoked as a matter of course where the aggrieved party has an
effective alternate remedy, and interference beyond the provisions of
the Arbitration Act ought to be exercised only where the impugned
order is demonstrably perverse, patently without jurisdiction, or
offends the basic structure of the Constitution. It is submitted that the
petitioner has failed to discharge this burden since no grounds have
been pleaded to even demonstrate that the learned Appellate Court
exceeded its jurisdiction, or committed an error, so apparent on the
face of the record, while passing the impugned order dated
28.10.2024.
19. The learned counsel brought the notice of this Court towards the
8
(2005) 8 SCC 618
9
2022) 1 SCC 75
(
10
(2014) 7 SCC 255
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 9 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
following observations made in Bhaven Construction (supra) in
paragraphs 18, 20 and 22:
" 18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework, mandates
that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a constitutional right. In
Nivedita Sharma v. COAI, this Court referred to several judgments
and held: "11. We have considered the respective
arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the
power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari,
mandamus, quo warrant and prohibition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be
curtailed by parliamentary legislation - L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India. However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of
the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed
by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or
any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial
body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that
each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course
ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective
alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory
forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition
should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation."
It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to
allow judicial interference beyond the procedure established under
the enactment. This power needs to be exercised in exceptional
rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under the statute or a
clear "bad faith" shown by one of the parties. This high standard
set by this Court is in terms of the legislative intention to make the
arbitration fair and efficient.
20. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to show
exceptional circumstance or "bad faith" on the part of the appellant,
to invoke the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution. No
doubt the ambit of Article 227 is broad and pervasive, however, the
High Court should not have used its inherent power to interject the
arbitral process at this stage. It is brought to our notice that
subsequent to the impugned order of the sole arbitrator, a final
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 10 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
award was rendered by him on merits, which is challenged by
Respondent 1 in a separate Section 34 application, which is
pending.
22. The High Court did not appreciate the limitations under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and reasoned that the
appellant had undertaken to appoint an arbitrator unilaterally,
thereby rendering Respondent 1 remediless. However, a plain
reading of the arbitration agreement points to the fact that the
appellant herein had actually acted in accordance with the
procedure laid down without any mala fides."
20. Heard. Perused the record.
21. At the outset, this Court is inclined to take up the objection
regarding maintainability raised by the respondents no. 1 & 2 qua
effect of the restriction imposed by Section 37(3) of the Arbitration
Act upon the present petition, filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution.
22. Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act provides that no second
appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act, but nothing in the said provision shall affect or take
away the right to appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of a
Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. The
restriction is thus directed against a second appeal. The question
which arises for consideration is whether a petition under Article 227
of the Constitution, directed against an order passed in appeal under
Section 37, partakes the character of such a second appeal.
23. In the considered view of this Court, the answer to the aforesaid
question must be in the negative. The supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 is a constitutional power which is distinct in its nature and
scope from an appellate remedy. A court exercising the said
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 11 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
jurisdiction does not reappreciate the material on record, nor does it
substitute its own view for that of the Court below. Its enquiry is
confined to whether the court below has acted within the bounds of its
authority, as prescribed under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act.
24. The aforesaid position is no longer res integra , in Deep
Industries (Supra) , a Special Leave Petition was preferred before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the maintainability of a petition
filed under Article 227. The Article 227 writ was preferred against an
order passed in appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, which
in turn arose from an order of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17.
The procedural posture of that case is thus identical to the present one.
In paragraphs no. 16 and 17, extracted hereinabove, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court acknowledged the legislative intent behind the non-
obstante clause in Section 5 as well as the bar on a second appeal
under Section 37. It nonetheless held that the supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by courts under Article 227 remains unaffected by Section
5, and that petitions filed under Article 227 against any judgment
allowing or dismissing a first appeal under Section 37, cannot be
dismissed on the ground of maintainability alone. The concern raised
therein was with regard to the extent of interference, and not with
regard to the maintainability of the petition.
25. It follows that the objection, as framed by respondents no. 1 &
2, conflates the maintainability of the present petition with its
entertainability. The former concerns the existence of jurisdiction,
while the latter deals with the circumstances in which said jurisdiction
ought to be exercised. The submissions advanced on behalf of
respondents no. 1 & 2 are, in substance, addressed to the latter aspect.
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 12 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
The same shall be considered at the appropriate stage of examining
whether the petitioner has made out a case for interference on merits.
26. The judgments relied upon by the respondents no. 1 & 2 do not
advance their case any further on the question of maintainability. In
Patel Engineering (Supra) , the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court were directed against the practice of orders passed by the
Arbitral Tribunal, during the course of arbitral proceedings, being
directly challenged before the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of
the Constitution. In Bhaven Construction (Supra) , the order of the
learned Sole Arbitrator rejecting an application under Section 16 of
the Arbitration Act was assailed directly before the High Court under
Article 226 and 227. It was in this context that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that the High Court ought not to have interjected in the
subsisting arbitral proceedings.
27. Similarly, in Lalit Kumar (Supra) , the order of the Arbitral
Tribunal terminating the arbitral proceedings was challenged directly
by way of a writ petition, notwithstanding the remedies available
under the Arbitration Act.
28. In the aforesaid cases, the orders of the Arbitral Tribunal were
itself the subject of challenge before the High Court, and the statutory
remedy had not been availed. That is not the case in the present
petition. The order of the learned Sole Arbitrator dated 06.09.2022
was appealed under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act by
respondents no. 1 & 2 themselves. It is the order of the learned
Appellate Court that is under challenge before this Court. The matter
at hand is thus governed by the ratio laid down in Deep Industries
(Supra) . In view of the foregoing, the objection to maintainability, as
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 13 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
raised by respondents no. 1 & 2, cannot be sustained, and is
accordingly rejected.
29. However, it is evident that the Section 5 of the Arbitration Act,
read with the principles enunciated in the abovementioned judgments,
indicates that the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court in matters
arising under Part I of the Arbitration Act is to be exercised with
considerable circumspection. Interference is warranted only where the
order under challenge suffers from a patent lack of inherent
jurisdiction, or where the court below has exceeded the jurisdiction
vested in it, or where an error is apparent on the face of the record.
The present petition is required to be tested on the said parameters.
30. In the present case, the main contention of the petitioner is that
the learned Appellate Court interfered excessively and unnecessarily
with a discretionary interim measure during the pendency of the
arbitral proceedings. This Court is unable to accept the said
contention. The application preferred by the petitioner under Section
17 of the Arbitration Act sought to restrain respondents no. 1 & 2
from manufacturing or selling products in the name of Alwin DMD
Pharmaceuticals, and from using or exploiting the goodwill of the said
firm, till the disposal of the arbitral proceedings. The said application
did not contain any prayer for rendition of accounts, or for disclosure
of business transactions, during the pendency of the arbitral
proceedings.
31. The learned Appellate Court sustained the direction of the
learned Sole Arbitrator insofar as it related to the period up to
05.04.2019. However, it set aside the direction to the extent it operated
for the period from 06.04.2019 onwards, on the reasoning that such a
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 14 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
direction travelled beyond the relief sought by the petitioner.
Additionally, the learned Appellate Court reasoned that the
petitioner’s status as a partner in the firm remained disputed inter se .
Since this issue had been kept open for adjudication by the learned
Sole Arbitrator as a triable issue, it was held that the period for which
accounts could be renditioned ought not to have extended beyond the
disputed dates qua the petitioner’s purported expulsion or retirement
from the firm, or the date on which the petitioner sent the notice dated
05.04.2019 invoking arbitration.
32. It is not disputed that the legal proposition, as laid down in
Dinesh Gupta (Supra) , and other judgments relied upon by the
petitioner, dictates that the discretion exercised by an Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 17 is ordinarily not to be interfered with in
appeal. The learned Appellate Court, however, has not substituted its
own discretion in place of the learned Sole Arbitrator. It merely
examined whether the direction was traceable to the relief sought by
the petitioner, an enquiry which falls well within the bounds of the
court exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37. The view so
taken is a plausible one. Even if another view were possible, that by
itself would not furnish a ground for interference by this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Deep Industries (Supra) .
33. The impugned order dated 28.10.2024 is a reasoned order,
passed after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner as well as respondents no. 1 & 2. The petitioner has not
been able to demonstrate that the learned Appellate Court lacked
jurisdiction, or that the impugned order suffers from any error
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 15 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59
apparent on the face of the record. In view of the aforesaid, no
perversity is made out in the order dated 28.10.2024 passed in OMP
(COMM.) No. 18/2024, appeal preferred by respondents no. 1 and 2
under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. This Court therefore
finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order in the exercise of
its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, having regard to the principles laid down in Deep Industries
( Supra ) , and the judicial intent underlying Section 37(3) of the
Arbitration Act.
34. It is clarified that the affirmation of the impugned order dated
28.10.2024, passed by the learned Appellate Court in OMP (COMM.)
No. 18/2024 under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, shall not
be construed as curtailing the substantive rights of any aggrieved party
to avail the appropriate appellate remedies available under the
Arbitration Act, in the manner prescribed therein. It is further clarified
that the observations made hereinabove are confined to the
controversy raised in the present petition. The same shall not be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the claims
pending adjudication before the learned Sole Arbitrator or any other
appropriate forum. All rights and contentions of the parties in that
regard are left open.
35. The present petition is, accordingly, dismissed in the aforesaid
terms. The pending application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
36. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
AJAY DIGPAUL, J.
OCTOBER 29, 2026/gs/os
Signature Not Verified
CM(M) 474/2025 Page 16 of 16
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:19:59